Politics of forgetting: New Zealand-Greek wartime relationship by Brown, Martyn
  
 
 
Politics of Forgetting: New Zealand-Greek Wartime Relationship 
Martyn Brown 
Bachelor of Arts 
Graduate Diploma Library Science 
Graduate Diploma Information Technology 
Post-Graduate Diploma Business Research 
Master of Arts (Research) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at 
The University of Queensland in 2014 
School of History Philosophy Religion and Classics 
 i 
 
Abstract 
In extant New Zealand literature and national public commemoration, the New Zealand experience 
of wartime Greece largely focuses on the Battle of Crete in May 1941 and, to a lesser extent, on the 
failed earlier mainland campaign. At a politico-military level, the ill-fated Greek venture and the 
loss of Crete hold centre stage in the discourse. In terms of commemoration, the Battle of Crete 
dominates as an iconic episode in the national history of New Zealand. As far as the Greeks are 
concerned, New Zealand elevates and embraces Greek civilians to the point where they overshadow 
the Greek military. 
 
The New Zealand drive to place the Battle of Crete as supporting its national self-imagining has 
been achieved, but what has been forgotten in the process? The wartime connection between the 
Pacific nation and Greece lasted for the remainder of the international conflict and was highly 
complex and sometimes violent. In occupied Greece and Crete, as well as in the Middle East, North 
Africa and Italy, New Zealand forces had to interact with a divided Greek nation that had been 
experiencing ongoing political turmoil and intermittent civil conflict. Individual New Zealanders 
found themselves acting as liaison officers with competing partisan groups. Greek military units 
with a history of mutiny and political intrigue were affiliated with the main New Zealand fighting 
force, the Second New Zealand Division. This complex relationship was compounded by a 
controversial British foreign policy towards Greece as well as by the emergence of the United 
Nations Organisation. There are a few published traces of these episodes and almost nothing 
recorded in commemoration endeavours about this wider experience. What options and constraints 
faced the New Zealand national leadership (military and civil) at the time? How did they navigate 
through such a complex relationship? What did they publicly promote, distort, conceal or secretly 
sacrifice during the events themselves, and what was altered in establishing an official memory? 
This thesis is therefore a study in the making of an official, “usable” memory that ensures a 
sanitised version of a publicly acknowledged “special relationship” between the Pacific and 
Mediterranean nations. And the axiom that the State conceals only that which is damaging to it is 
not the case regarding New Zealand's constructed war memory of its involvement in Greek matters.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
SITUATING THE THESIS 
This thesis examines the construction and use of an official memory of an often publicly expressed 
and celebrated “special relationship” between two nations, New Zealand and Greece. Its genesis is 
expressed as the battles on the Greek mainland and Island of Crete during early 1941.  
 
While two countries are involved, this study is predominantly mono-directional rather than 
comparative and is focussed on the Pacific nation. This focus is due to limits of making a 
manageable examination as well as to the interest in assessing the impact of a conscious drive by 
New Zealand's leaders to use the memory of the war to generate a positive national imagining.1 
These endeavours would naturally include Greece. But in addition to Greece being a type of 
“other”, it was also a fragmented entity both during the war and for the remainder of the 1940s (that 
is, the core period this thesis in concerned with). Greece underwent major civil upheaval during the 
world war and afterwards, and its history is extremely complex. All this was exacerbated by foreign 
interventions and the predilections of major powers – the Axis and its ally, Britain.  
 
However, the complexity of the Greek situation again leads to the emphasis that this study is, again, 
focussed on New Zealand i.e. there is no exhaustive research and analysis into the intra-Greek 
dynamics in the relationship.  
 
New Zealand had also been involved in Greek politics. Individuals and groups of New Zealanders, 
by their imposed situation and/ or own choice, decided which factions to support as various groups 
vied to shape post-war Greece. New Zealand’s nation-state leadership had done the same. During 
the events themselves, the degree of public awareness of these differing views and their specific 
contexts varied. Implicit neutrality was the stance the government wanted to present, but the reality 
was hardly the case. This political dimension of the relationship was within the context of the horror 
of war and the atrocities and the deprivations it brings.  
  
Hence, this project looks at the New Zealand-Greek relationship in a way that interweaves this 
darker and contentious involvement with a New Zealand national imagining, promoted by the State, 
that incorporated relations with Greece as well as projecting its stature in a way that would be 
                                               
1 This view follows the theoretical tradition of Benedict R Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006). 
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lauded by its own citizens. Empirical data reveals a wartime relationship that is much more 
extensive and complicated than that commemorated or “remembered”. Ostensibly, elite members 
and bureaucracies in the Dominion’s military and State machinery undertook genuine efforts to 
ensure an ongoing association with Greece during the Second World War and its immediate 
aftermath. The nation-state repeatedly welcomed a recalcitrant Greek military to join its own forces. 
New Zealand’s leaders were aware that their soldiers fought alongside Greek partisans in the 
occupied areas. The suffering of Greek civilians invoked Dominion material aid during the 
Occupation and afterwards. This was accompanied by relief volunteers, who travelled halfway 
around the world to help with rehabilitation. The Dominion also helped with the pursuit of Axis war 
criminals who had committed atrocities against Greek civilians. When it came to the internal 
political profile of liberated Greece, Wellington advocated the return of parliamentary democracy to 
the country following nearly 10 years of pre-war military dictatorship and totalitarian occupation.   
 
Having said all this, members of the New Zealand leadership were often uncoordinated and 
contradictory in their actions.  The national elite lagged behind its own citizens and former soldiers 
when it came to some of their Greek initiatives, or else simply refused requests for more special 
treatment for the Greeks. In one extreme incident, it deceived its own people over its humanitarian 
commitment. The fate of New Zealand soldiers enduring the violence of Greek factionalism did not 
bring any interest from the New Zealand leadership, even though, in some cases, they had placed 
their soldiers in jeopardy.  Throughout all of this, there were constraints and complications imposed 
by war itself, Britain, the United Nations Organisation (U.N.O.) and the Dominion itself.  
 
Silence, concealment and skewing of the realities of the relationship were the tools used by the 
national elite to navigate a way through the Greek-related turmoil and to create a seamless official 
memory. Application of certain memories was also used reflexively by key Dominion leaders 
during the events of the war and immediately afterward to deflect any notion that they were taking 
sides in Greek politics.  These tactics were a precursor to a more permanent official projection. 
Hence, memory became a tactical tool with certain audiences (Greek, New Zealand, British, public, 
semi-public and closed) in particularly sensitive situations.  
 
Championing the relationship during the events themselves did not necessarily flow into the same 
commitment during subsequent major memory construction.  And it does not hold that the New 
Zealand government would only hide the ugly aspects of its actions from its own population. 
Omitted was some long-standing behaviour that would have readily strengthened the government's 
projection of a national leadership genuinely committed to a special place for Greece in the national 
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psyche. Conversely, there were aspects (such as clandestine work) of the wartime involvement that 
were bluntly ignored by the New Zealand leadership but were embraced in subsequent State 
memory making. Ironically, it is the state, rather than non-state publications, that has largely 
provided glimpses of the complex multi-threaded dynamics. So pervasive was State involvement 
that there is relatively little new material from non-State publications. That this extreme limitation 
on information occurs in a liberal democracy, rather than in a totalitarian regime, for example, is 
something for sociologists or social-anthropologists to investigate further.  It appears to be an 
exception to the memory studies of other nations involved in the war, in which one can at least see 
changes in memory and history during subsequent decades.  
 
The following sections expand on the introduction and provide the methodology and justification 
for the study. 
 
Research Question 
The writer's initial observations led to the following research question - 
To what extent does the official memory created by the New Zealand national elite fully reflect or 
exclude the complex, often contentious and sometimes violent, interaction between the New 
Zealand and Greece during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath?  
At this point, it needs to be stressed that the thesis is only concerned with official memory outputs 
generated by the national elite. The extent to which it pervades other memory types (for example, 
“public” or “collective”), a much argued about area in itself, 2 is not included in the scope. A 
subsequent section on the characteristics of the “special relationship” shows commonalities across 
the State and the wider community, with little deviation, that suggest, as some academics have 
argued, that the influence of the New Zealand Nation State is indeed, widespread.
3
  
 
Definitions 
The following definitions are used. 
Official Memory. This is the official record generated by the national elite. Examples include the 
official war history project, commemorative efforts (such as certificates of appreciation to Greeks, 
monuments, and utilitarian commemoration through aid) and public statements. Preliminary 
                                               
2 For example, an article in a recent issue of the journal Memory Studies described the area of memory studies thus: an ‘incoherent 
and dispersed field, characterized by a host of different terminologies rather than a common, generally-agreed upon conceptual 
foundation’. P. Vermuelen et al., “Dispersal and redemption: future dynamics of memory studies - a roundtable,” Memory Studies, 5, 
2 (2012): 224. 
3
 This is in contrast to the range and changing “vectors” of memory identified by studies of other nations, such as Henry Rousso, 
Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944 ( Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), Ch. 6. 
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research suggested that taking a more granular level of analysis, such as examination of text books 
and curricula, financial grants to documentary makers or displays at museums, was not feasible.  
The later methodology section provides a wider theoretical underpinning (especially “history” 
versus “memory”) for the above question and definitions. It also differentiates between official 
memory and other related types of memory.  
 
National Elite- Elites may be analysed using a variety of theoretical frames (such as simple 
typologies) across the spectrum of society.
4
 In their examination of official commemoration, Winter 
and Sivan (1999) recognise this as well as multi-tier elites within structures, but conclude with the 
overall comment that “the State remains relevant both as the carrier of the brunt of warfare[…] and 
as a major producer and choreographer of commemoration.”5 While this comment adds weight to 
the use of a national elite construct, the complexity of multiple elites is not as applicable in the case 
of New Zealand. It was a smaller organism dominated by several personalities, in particular, Labour 
Prime Minister Peter Fraser and Lieutenant-General General Bernard Freyberg. Hence their frequent 
mention in this thesis is symptomatic of their dominance during the war. However, there are also 
government bureaucratic bodies that had a major influence on the information received by the 
domestic Dominion population during the conflict. They did not necessarily come under the direct 
control of these two personalities. The New Zealand national elite therefore comprises political, 
military and government decision makers (individuals such as the Prime Minister, and bureaucracies 
such as the National Patriotic Fund, Official War History Project of the Internal Affairs Department 
and other succeeding Ministerial bodies).  
 
Use of War and the New Zealand National Imagining  
War and nation building has its own discourse in academic literature.
6
 The related idea of a general 
history based upon the New Zealand Nation State has been recently challenged.
7
 In this thesis, it is 
accepted that war is used to promote the idea of the entity called the “nation” inasmuch as the 
national elite thought it so.  Hence, an internal government memorandum from the early 1950’s 
reads:  “New Zealanders today are still inclined to be parochial” and stated that building of 
                                               
4 “Elites,” in SAGE Publications, Inc.,  International Encyclopedia of Political Science, ed. B. Badie, D Berg-Schlosser, & L 
Morlino (Thousand Oaks, CA:SAGE Publications, 2011), 760-5. 
5 J. Winter and E. Sivan, “Setting the Framework” in War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, ed. Jay Winter and 
Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 38. 
6 J. Hutchinson, “Warfare and the Sacralisation of Nations: The Meanings, Rituals and Politics of National Remembrance,” 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 38,2 (2009): 401-417; Henry Reynolds, “Are nations really made in war?” in What’s 
Wrong with ANZAC?, ed. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds (Sydney: University of NSW, 2010), Ch. 1. 
7The dialogue is evident in these publications- New Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Giselle Byrnes (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Jock Philips, “Review of the New Oxford History of New Zealand,” Journal of New Zealand Studies, 9 
(2010): 157-162; The whole issue of  New Zealand’s major academic history journal was dedicated to the discussion. See New 
Zealand Journal of History, 45, 1 (2011). 
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unknown warrior tombs in the Wellington war memorial “will do more than anything else to weld 
our people into a nation.”8  The embarkation of the State’s major presence in war history began with 
the Second World War History Project. The previous world conflict of 1914-1918 had not attracted 
the same attention.
9
 One of the co-authors of the quoted memorandum above, General Howard 
Kippenberger, was placed at the head of the Project. He had also served as a senior officer 
throughout the war in the Mediterranean. The gestation of relevant State war histories is a key 
element in this thesis project. As the following shows, the fifty volume-plus corpus and associated 
activities are major components in the State’s strategy to ensure a positive national imagining. 
 
Figure 1.1: Howard Kippenberger. Head of the New Zealand Official War History Project Source: Dictionary of New 
Zealand Biography. Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 30-Oct-20URL: 
http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/5k11/kippenberger-howard-karl. Accessed February 27, 2014. 
 
Impact of the War History Project 
The project was considered until recently as “the largest publishing effort in New Zealand's 
history”10, with more than 100 staff in early 1946. 11  The extensive output has been successfully 
migrated to the World Wide Web environment12 and is made available by Victoria University of 
Wellington. Positive representation of New Zealanders was the norm. As a member of the official 
                                               
8 Memorandum to W.A. Bodkin Minister or Internal Affairs from H.K. Kippenberger, Will Appleton and Ernest E. Muir vertical 
subject files. New Zealand Defence Force Library (NZDFL) 
9 Great History War [Videorecording] (Sydney: ABC, 2008) http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/special_eds/20081110/war/ Accessed  
December 10, 2013. Professor Geoffrey Sheffield believes New Zealand did not have an equivalent to the influential Australian war 
historian Charles Bean and that they were "One of the losers in the battle for history". 
10 Ian McGibbon, ‘‘Something of Them is Here Recorded’: Official History in New Zealand,” in Last Word: Essays on Official 
History in the United States and British Commonwealth, ed. Jeffrey Grey (Westport, CT: Praeger, c2003), 53. A recent Ph. D thesis 
argues the output of the Waitangi Tribunal has now surpassed the project.  Rachael Bell, “Memory History Nation War: Official 
Histories of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-1945” (Ph. D thesis, Massey University, 2012), 1. 
11 Ronald Walker, “New Zealand Second World War History Project,” Military Affairs, 32, 4 (1969): 175. 
12 They can be found at the New Zealand Electronic Text Collection is operated by Victoria University of Wellington 
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/subject-000004.html Accessed June 3 2014. 
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war history project later wrote, the subjects of the official histories were “fellow countrymen of a 
small and intimate country, and no one wished them to be criticised, even indirectly.”13 
 
The official histories are considered a major influence in New Zealand war history by both their 
critics and their supporters. The former
14
 see them as having major elements of sanitisation and 
mythology and retardation of further historical analysis. The latter argue that they are “a solid 
foundation.”15  Radio talks, public requests for information from veterans and distribution of 
thousands of copies of the various volumes into the small island dominion and concentrated 
population ensured a major impact at the time of its writing.16  A biographer of Kippenberger has 
stated, “The War Histories project was undoubtedly exceptional and extraordinary. It was a 
statement of claim by a small country about its role in the world, its contribution to the Allied cause 
in the defeat of a monstrous tyranny. As such, it fitted into, and grew out of, the many efforts of the 
First Labour Government to assert a national perspective and pride in country.”17  The frequent 
face-to-face meetings between Prime Minister Fraser and Kippenberger, which bypassed Fraser’s 
own Minister of Internal Affairs,
18
 indicate the solid endorsement and heavy influence of the former 
general – he “was given an important part in a continuing political effort.”19 That he was the 
President of the New Zealand Returned Services Association (R.S.A.) for 7 years from 1948 adds to 
the weight of his authority. Kippenberger publicly sought data from the returned soldiers in way that 
harnessed them, now as citizens, to a nation-building effort.
20
    
 
Having said the above, there needs to be some qualification. Such a pointedly nationalistic effort 
was not entirely shared by the incoming National Party government in 1949. Although they did not 
shut the project down, they reduced support. 
21
 As a result, Kippenberger threatened to resign.
22
 The 
reduced support influences assessments of publications with a scope that was drastically reduced. 
                                               
13  Ronald Walker, “New Zealand Second World War History Project,” 177. 
14 John Mcleod, Myth and Reality (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986), 14.; James Belich, Paradise Reforged (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2001), 270; Deborah Montgomerie, “Reconnaissance: Twentieth-Century New Zealand War History at Century's 
Turn,”New Zealand Journal of History 37,1, (2003): 66. 
15 Ian McGibbon, ‘‘Something of Them is Here Recorded’, 53. 
16 This is far more pervasive activity than other official history production as illustrated by, for example, Andrew Green, Writing the 
Great War: Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915-1948 (London, Portland Oregon: F. Cass, c 2003); Jeffrey Grey ed., 
Last Word?  
17 Denis Maclean, Howard Kippenberger: Dauntless Spirit. (Auckland: Random House, 2008), 296. Reviewing the book, Australian 
military historian Jeffrey Grey believed the same. He added a comparative rejoinder : “New Zealand’s official history was an 
extraordinary and enormous undertaking, both by comparison with what had been done after 1919 and in terms of other, comparable 
efforts within the Commonwealth.” Jeffrey Grey, “Review of Denis McLean’s Dauntless Spirit” New Zealand International Review, 
XXIV, 5, Sept/Oct (2009): 29. Kippenberger was paid the same salary and allowance as a High Court Judge and had a contract 
organized directly by the Prime Minister, Peter Fraser. Denis Maclean, Howard Kippenberger, 296. 
18 Michael Bassett, Mother of All Departments (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1997), 133. 
19 Maclean, Howard Kippenberger, 297. 
20 Ibid., 300. For example, headlines like “Your turn now Veterans of Minqar Qaim Action” RSA Review, July 1, (1948). 
21 The new government’s cabinet “kept him at a polite distance”, Michael Bassett, Mother of all Departments, 135. 
22 Glyn Harper, Kippenberger: an Inspired Commander (Auckland: Harper Collins, 1997), 273. 
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This factor is of particular importance when discussing one particular volume relevant to this study: 
the one dealing with New Zealanders operating in secret organisations in occupied Greece and 
Crete (Chapter 4). 
 
The practicalities of the war history enterprise involved an enormous amount of research. It started 
during the war itself through archival efforts.
23
 The actual writing was very much project-based:  a 
staff member wrote the narrative, which went through revisions driven by the General Editor, 
Kippenberger, who also had a major influence with the “historian” who worked on the published 
version. This influence becomes most evident when analysing the discussions and decisions made 
during the project. 
 
Long-term State Influence on War Historiography 
Beyond the Official War History project, it should be emphasised that the New Zealand nation state 
has a continuing and influential role in what we can call “war history” as well as, unsurprisingly, 
official memory. This may be part of the extensive historical role of the State in the country’s 
development, as outlined by Bassett24. In any event, an understanding of the long-established state 
presence in war historiography assists an understanding of the State’s influence. One of the most 
prolific New Zealand war historians today is Ian McGibbon, until recently General Editor of War 
History with the Ministry of Culture and Heritage. The major study of New Zealand war 
monuments by Maclean, Philips and Willis also came out of the State (the Department of Internal 
Affairs).
25
  
 
While the study by Maclean et. al. refers to the present, revisionist academic historian James Belich 
claims that the decades-earlier official history series of 48 volumes and 24 booklets dominate the 
country’s war history.26 The co-editor of the Journal of New Zealand History, Deborah 
Montgomerie, asserts that its adherents project a sense of completeness that denies a place for other 
forms of history ( in her case, the social type).
27
 In contrast, McGibbon’s defence of the official 
story is such that, in 2003, he would maintain, as against quoted primary material from other 
historians
28
 and biographers
29, that there may have been some “self censorship” even though the 
                                               
23 Michael Bassett, Mother of All Departments, 128-135. 
24 Michael Bassett, State in New Zealand 1840-1984: Socialism without Doctrines (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1998). 
25 Chris Maclean, Jock Philips and Debbie Willis, Sorrow and the Pride: New Zealand War Memorials (Wellington: Historical 
Branch GP Books, 1990). 
26 Belich, Paradise Reforged, Ch. 9.  
27 Deborah Montgomerie, “Reconnaissance: Twentieth Century New Zealand War History at Century Turn”: 66. 
28 Glyn Harper, “From Darkness to Light: Kippenberger and a Tale of Two Battles,” in Kia Kaha : New Zealand in the Second World 
War, ed. John Crawford (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2000), 131. 
29 Keith Ovenden, Fighting Withdrawal: Life of Dan Davin, Writer, Soldier, Publisher (Oxford: Oxford Uni Press, 1996), 241. 
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head of the project had insisted there would be “no censorship”.30 He accepts as historical truth 
what was stated in the press by the head of the war history project himself.
31
 
 
What does this past and present major State presence mean for the place of Greece in the vision that 
New Zealand intended to build and maintain? What did the New Zealand Nation State decide that it 
wanted to remember about the multidimensional dimension of its wartime interaction with Greece? 
The following theoretical framework will be applied to assist an examination. 
 
SCOPE 
As discussed earlier, this is a focused mono-directional study where one national elite (that is, that 
of New Zealand) fashions its national imagining through “official memory” using its relationship 
with another nation (Greece). It excludes the war-influenced Maori – Pakeha (i.e. Anglo settlers) 
relationship and the specificity of the Maori-Greek/Cretan discussions
32
. Those are discourses 
warranting their own projects with distinct dynamics, actors and events more specific to it.   
Period under Examination 
The timespan involved begins with 1941 and ends in 2012. While this study covers decades, its 
diagrammatic profile, so as to speak, is like a wave with an abrupt crest and a long slimming tail to 
2012. The majority of the analysis and discussion in this thesis is concerned with the war years, the 
remainder of that decade, and the researching and publication of the relevant New Zealand official 
war histories.  
 
The closure date is 2012, because two major related 70
th
 commemorations took place during that 
and the previous year.  One is the commemoration of the Battle for Crete in 2011. In New Zealand, 
it generated, amongst other things, much heated public indignation against the State, 
33
 specifically, 
anger over a lack of funding for living veterans to attend what will probably be their last “round” of 
ceremonies on the island.
34
  The second commemoration also involved remembrance of New 
Zealanders. It was based on the Greek mainland at Gorgopotamos viaduct, several hours by car 
north of Athens. This was the Greek National Day of Resistance. In contrast to the Crete event in 
                                               
30 McGibbon, “Something of them is Here Recorded”. 
31 Ibid, the article appeared in the Evening Post, April 4, 1957. 
32 Monty Soutar, Nga Tamatoa:Pprice of Citizenship C Company 28 Maori Battalion 1939-1945 (Auckland: David Bateman, 2008); 
Manos Nathan, prominent New Zealand ceramics artist and also a child from a Cretan mother and Maori father. He developed a form 
of art blending ancient Cretan/Greek culture and Maori. Nathan discusses his work during an extended interview. “Arts on 
Sunday:Ceramicist - Manos Nathan”, sound interview. (Wellington: Radio National) May 17, 2009), 
http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/artsonsunday/audio/1948528/ceramicist Accessed July 21 2011; Also see Dale 
Husband, ”Kiwis in Athens,” Mana 60,4 (2004);Patricia Grace, Ned and Katina: a True Love Story (North Shore: Penguin, 2009). 
33 Tim Donoghue, “Veterans Seek to Join Crete Celebrations,” Dominion Post, April 12, 2011; Kasia Jillings, “Crete Veteran 
Welcomes Funding,” Waikato Independent, July 22, 2011. 
34 The backlash generated a change in policy and a public apology 14.7.11 - Question 12: Hon Rick Barker to the Minister of 
Defence.[video]. http://inthehouse.co.nz/node/9787, Accessed March 10, 2011. 
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the previous year, the 70
th
 commemoration on the mainland in 2012 passed seemingly unnoticed in 
New Zealand. This was despite several New Zealanders having their names read out in this annual 
ceremony that included volleys of army rifle salutes, a band, television cameras and a crowd of 
hundreds.  It is an indication of differing paths of official memory and the predilections of differing 
states to satisfy their own needs. This difference is discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP” 
Over 60 years after the end of the Second World War, public expressions of a relationship or 
“special relationship” emanating from shared experience and sacrifice in war between New Zealand 
and Greece range across a number of places. These include country profiles published on respective 
government foreign ministry websites
35
 and official commemorations.
36
  The bond has also been 
mentioned in trade discussions,
37
 twinning of cities
38
 and whaling ecological policy.
39,
 It has 
generated funding support for school curriculum materials. 
40
  It is physically represented in the 
Greek-New Zealand memorial in Wellington, which is largely configured around the war efforts.
41
  
When a Greek Prime Minister dies, the war connection is included in condolences from 
Wellington.
42
 The events of early 1941 pervade the expressions. One campaign is more 
remembered than any other. 
 
Crete above Mainland Greece 
It is the Battle for Crete in May 1941 rather than the earlier campaign on the mainland that is 
celebrated. Defeat in these days even overshadows the only shared New Zealand-Greek victory of 
the entire war (Chapter 4). Remembrance of the Battle of Crete recently rated an official Cabinet-
                                               
35
 New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. “Country Guide – Greece,” 
http://mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Europe/Greece.php; Accessed July 6, 2014; Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs; “Bilateral 
Relations – New Zealand,” http://www.mfa.gr/en/blog/greece-bilateral-relations/new-zealand/, Accessed July 6, 2014. 
36
 “Clark: Luncheon for the PM of the Republic- Address at State Luncheon for Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic,” May 21 
2007, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0705/S00560.htm, Accessed July 1 2014 ;Unbroken Bonds a Pilgrimage to Crete 2006 
[Dunedin, N.Z.] Wild Sweet Productions, (2008), DVD. At a local level and outside of official commemoration anniversaries see 
“Greek Village seek Kiwi soldiers,” RSA Review December (1992), 21; Finally, a South Island archives  states “warm and close 
links”  in the article “Kiwis among the Olympians,” Hocken Bulletin 47 July (2004). 
37 Greg Ansley, “Blood Ties with Greece Foundation for Market Expansion”, New Zealand Herald, May 21, 2001.  An earlier 
example is from an official trade visit to Athens “Ties between Greece and New Zealand remain close, says International Trade 
Minister Lockwood Smith. Speaking at the end of an official visit to Athens from May 28-29, Dr Smith said: "I was impressed by the 
warmth of the Greek people towards New Zealanders. They have clearly never forgotten the contribution of Kiwi soldiers in Greece 
and Crete during World War Two.” Smith Reinforces NZ/Greek Ties,” http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/smith-reinforces-
nzgreek-ties, Accessed June 30, 2014. 
38“Sister Cities,” http://www.sistercities.org.nz/Editable/sister-cities/nzsistercities.shtml, Accessed June 15, 2014. 
39 “Greece backs NZ on Whaling,” http://tvnz.co.nz/content/1133807/425825.xhtml , Accessed June 15, 2014. 
40 Marina Bennett, Shelter from the Storm: Cretan Stories War in Crete, 1941-1945 (Nelson: Nelson Provincial Museum, 2010). 
41 See “Greek-New Zealand Memorial in Wellington,” New Zealand History Online.http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/photo/greek-
new-zealand-memorial-wellington, Accessed June 21, 2014. 
42 When commenting on the death of his Greek counterpart in Andreas Papandreou in 1996, New Zealand Prime Minister Jim Bolger 
stated “Our friendship with Greece is a longstanding one, stemming from the shared experiences in World War II.” “Death of Former 
Greek Prime Minister Papandreou,” http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/death-former-greek-prime-minister-papandreou, Accessed 
June 21, 2014. 
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endorsed 70
th
 anniversary as well as an annual ceremony in the nation’s capital.  Pilgrimages that 
included notable individuals such as ministers and the former mayor of Wellington, Kerry 
Prendergast
43
, travelled to the island to attend that parallel commemoration. The previously 
mentioned curriculum material has Crete as its focus.
44
  A splinter New Zealand veterans group of 
the Returned Serviceman’s Association was established in 1960 with close associations with the 
island and its people.
45
 The 1991 television documentary In Rich Regard 
46
 brought the ongoing 
specific Crete- New Zealand relationship into the living rooms of New Zealand.  That the State 
sponsored an oral history on the battle of Crete rather than Greece, or Greece and Crete, in time for 
the 60
th
 anniversary, is further evidence of the hierarchy of remembrance.
47
  A journal review by the 
New Zealand Defence Force official historian further reinforces this: “The Battle for Crete in May 
1941 has always loomed large in New Zealanders' memories of the Second World War because of 
the nature and intensity of the fighting on the island, the narrow margin that separated victory from 
defeat and the relationship that developed between our country and the people of Crete.”48 
 
Commemoration is sometimes accompanied by public argument, with pointed emotional reaction. 
During the 2011 Crete celebration, war veteran General Sandy Thomas laid the responsibility for 
the loss of Crete at the feet of his country’s commanders rather than as a result of the overwhelming 
German air supremacy and fighting abilities of the its airborne soldiers.
49
 Popular historian Matthew 
Wright publicly dismissed discussions on culpability and responded proudly with an account of 
revenge killing against the German forces later in the war.
50
 Popular works with publication dates 
nestled around the 70
th
 commemoration still dissect the issue of responsibility.
51
  
 
The deliberate State profiling of the Crete battle has already been discussed in scholarly 
publications.  Sir Howard Kippenberger, head of the Official War History project, placed the State-
produced 1953 Crete as the centrepiece. Kippenberger told Dan Davin, accredited historian in a 
                                               
43See for example Wellington City Council Strategy and Policy Committee Pilgrimage to Crete 2006 Mayor's Report, 
http://www.chania.gr/files/2/12746/mayor_report_wellington-chania_sister_cities_2006.pdf, Accessed June 25, 2014. 
44 Bennett, Shelter from the Storm. 
45 Walter Gibbons, “Whakatane Crete Veterans Association,” Historical Review Bay of Plenty Journal of History 40,1 (1992). 
46 In Rich Regard, ([New Zealand]: Wild Sweet Productions, 1991). DVD; See also “In Rich Regard” – a One Hour Documentary 
for Television Treatment by Peter Hawes Wild Sweet Productions June 1990 papers: Short Film Fund Film Applications /Proposals, 
Piers Davies Collection MA 2650 0606. New Zealand Film Archive (Wellington). 
47 Megan Hutching, et al., Unique Sort of Battle: New Zealanders Remember Crete (Auckland: HarperCollins New Zealand in 
association with the History Group, Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2001). 
48 John Crawford, “Review of Unique Sort of Battle: New Zealanders Remember Crete,” New Zealand International Review, XXVII, 
4 July/August (2002): 30. 
49 Tim Donoghue, “Officer Breaks Rank over the Battle of Crete” Last updated May 14, 2011. 
.http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/5003191/Officer-breaks-rank-over-the-Battle-of-Crete , Accessed , July 4, 2014. 
50 Matthew Wright, “Battle for Crete part of a slow-evolving Kiwi legacy” Dominion Post, May 24, 2011. 
51 David Filer, Crete: Death from the Skies : New Zealand's Role in the Loss of Crete (Auckland: David Bateman, 2010); Also see 
“Commentary on Heinz Richter, 'Operation Mercury', Invasion of Crete,” Journal of New Zealand Studies 16 (2013), Ron Palenski, 
Men of Valour: New Zealand and the Battle for Crete (Auckland: Hodder Moa, 2013). 
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team-based project, the “Crete story [...]can be one of the heritages of our people.” 52 The effect was 
not lost. Decades later, cultural historian Angus Calder thought Davin had possibly depicted “a 
rising nation.” 53  
 
While this depiction may arguably be an example of intent and outcome, it came years after the war 
and in the form of a major project of deliberate construction. One does not know the extent to which 
the State had already gone in elevating Crete prior to 1953. As this study illustrates, during the war, 
Crete was not always in the forefront of State thinking and actions over greater Greece.  
 
Greek/Cretan Civilians – Marginalising the Military and Partisans  
The Greek military are largely eclipsed by New Zealand emphasis on civilian counterparts in 
official memory.
54
  So is the Greek armed resistance. This is despite varying degrees of 
involvement with New Zealand in the post-1941 period. A few published fragments of ongoing 
interaction between the regular armies provide glimpses of the regular forces in the Middle East 
during 1942
55
 and at least up until September 1944 in Italy. The last was the shared victory of their 
affiliated forces at the battle of Rimini.
56
 At one point, Freyberg had also asked Peter Fraser for 
something that would “safeguard me”57 when the Greeks joined his command during the month 
prior to that battle. It is seemingly far from a healthy relationship. Politics were intruding. It was 
evident at other times.  Writing about New Zealand and Greek soldiers serving together in the 
Middle East, a former senior New Zealand officer wrote in an official volume after the war: 
“Greeks are by nature politically minded to a degree unheard of among British communities. The 
Greek forces were riddled with politics, their natural tendency being reinforced by the dissensions 
among the politicians in exile.” 58  New Zealand's discomfort was eventually superseded by 
disengagement from the Greek soldiers just before liberation in late 1944.
59
  That these few 
                                               
52 Keith Ovenden, Fighting Withdrawal: Life of Dan Davin, Writer Soldier, Publisher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 241. 
The quote is from a letter to Davin, December 1947. 
53 Angus Calder, Disasters and Heroes: on War, Memory and Representation (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2004), 183. 
54 For example, in 2010 Veterans’ Affairs Minister Judith Collins emphasised civilians over the military: "The local people of Crete 
took huge risks to provide food and aid to Kiwi troops. The actions of those brave people, and those of the soldiers defending Crete, 
are still remembered and appreciated by both New Zealanders and the citizens of Crete alike." 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/minister-honours-kiwis-who-fought-battle-crete,. Accessed July 2, 2014. 
55 Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939–45: Volume I I (Historical Publications 
Branch, Wellington, 1949). Freyberg to Fraser, Telegrams 134, March 21, 1942. 
56 U Series 14760 “New Zealand Troops with the Greek Army” (Sound Recording) February 5 1942, New Zealand Sound Archives 
(Christchurch); Robin Kay and N.C. Philips, Italy: Volume II. From Cassino to Trieste (Wellington: Dept. of Internal Affairs 
Historical Publications Branch, 1967). 
57 Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939–45: Volume II. Freyberg to Minister of 
Defence, Telegram 425, August 13, 1944. 
58 W.G. Stevens, Problems of 2NZEF (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1958), 135-136. 
59
 Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939–45: Volume II, Telegrams 427-432. Also see 
F.L.W. Wood, New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs (Wellington: War History Branch, Dept. of Internal 
Affairs, 1958), 365. The Greek military and government-in-exile had been indicating to the New Zealanders they wanted them to join 
them on their return. The British formally asked the New Zealand to send troops to Greece when the country was liberated. 
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published instances were part of the official histories adds to the irony but reinforces the argument 
that the State has largely dominated writing about the war. When it comes to New Zealanders and 
partisan forces, there is a greater amount of published material. But, as shown in a later section, it 
has a much lower profile than the 1941 Crete/Greek episode. 
 
What is lacking is a detailed historical examination of the relationship between the two armies 
during the whole of the war - in terms of New Zealand attitudes both at the time and afterwards 
during the construction of an official memory. 
  
Suffering and War Crimes 
While the price paid by the civilians assisting New Zealand soldiers to avoid capture or to escape 
from the enemy is widely acknowledged in New Zealand, there are no published accounts of the 
New Zealand response at the end of the war to the atrocities committed by the Axis, when the 
perpetrators could face retribution. What is more, there are also incidents of Cretan atrocities 
against German soldiers during the battle for Crete. While relativities blunt any call for comparison 
(a genocidal regime murdering millions, while villagers attack individual German paratroopers) the 
practice seems almost accepted by the New Zealanders. For example, a high-profile veteran General 
(ret) Sandy Thomas wrote in his memoirs of the “ghastly work” made of German paratroopers who 
fell into the hands of Cretan women.
60
  
 
So, while there is considerable public expression of the human cost for the Greek and Cretan 
people, there is no assessment of the New Zealand response to the general issue of war crimes trials 
following the end of the war. Nor is there any evaluation of New Zealand’s official reaction to 
Cretans whose ferocious defence of their homeland led to actions that would be condemned if they 
had been committed by the invader. It is another example of where rhetoric versus action needs to 
be examined to determine the historical reality. 
 
Selective Inclusion of New Zealand Soldiers 
As introduced in the previous section, New Zealand soldiers remembered in the relationship are 
dominated by the regular forces (with a particular amplification of those evading capture or 
escaping). This is despite the New Zealand participation in forces, mostly Special Operations 
Executive (S.O.E.), who carried out sabotage missions; some considered the most significant in 
occupied Greece. For example, two New Zealand officers laid the explosive charges during the 
                                               
60 W.B. Thomas, Dare to be Free (London: Cassell, 2005 orig. 1951), 24. 
     13 
 
sabotage of the Gorgopotamos Viaduct, an event commemorated by Greece to this day in 
monuments and in the “National Day of Resistance”.  Another British clandestine body with a New 
Zealand presence was “A Force”, a British rescue/escape organisation.   In New Zealand, the only 
public memorials related to S.O.E. in Greece are a component of the New Zealand-Greek memorial 
in Wellington and an official one (part of a larger effort including all special forces) at Papakura 
Army camp. The New Zealand-Greek memorial element is to Dudley Perkins, who died in Crete – 
the centrepiece of New Zealand's official public memory. The Papakura memorial appeared in this 
millennium. This research project shows that the apparent minor residual memory place given to the 
clandestine efforts by S.O.E. belies what was originally planned decades ago.  There has to be an 
examination of State decisions concerning the clandestine forces – both at the time and afterwards - 
in the national story-telling. 
 
It is not that the size of a group solely determines remembrance. While the number of New 
Zealanders serving with S.O.E. in Greece may have been small 
61
 a similar-sized group has been 
fixed firmly in New Zealand war memory. This is the group of New Zealand soldiers escorting the 
King of Greece, George II, during his escape from the invading Germans on Crete. The event was 
first reported in the New Zealand press and newsreels at the time. 
62
  It also attracted a seven-page 
Appendix in the official Crete volume by Davin
63
 and is available on the government-provided New 
Zealand History Online website.
64
 Yet the king was a controversial figure with his own people – he 
was in exile for decades, and even after his return, a plebiscite on the retention of the monarchy was 
carried out in 1946. The persistent memory of his protection by the New Zealanders needs to be 
placed within the overall context of the politics of the period. 
 
Politics 
The official published narrative of wartime politics and diplomacy makes scarce mention of the 
politics of Greece during the war and places New Zealand as a neutral in the maelstrom.
65
 
Nevertheless, its military were encountering Greek politics in the Middle East. Those on 
secondment to the clandestine organisations have left memoirs that are drenched in the volatile and 
                                               
61
 McGlynn lists 9. M.B McGlynn, Special Service in Greece (Wellington: War History Branch, 1953). 
62 Return from Crete [video recording] (Wellington: NZ National Film Unit,1941) 
http://audiovisual.archives.govt.nz/wiki/index.php/RETURN_FROM_CRETE, Accessed July 13, 2014; “King’s Gratitude” Evening 
Post, July 18, 1941.  
63 Dan Davin, Crete (Wellington: War History Branch, Dept. Internal Affairs, 1953), APPENDIX II. The appendix was written by 
W.E. Murphy. 
64 “New Zealanders Rescue King of Greece,” http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/video/new-zealanders-rescue-king-greece Accessed 
July 13, 2014. 
65 F.L.W. Wood, New Zealand People at War, 365. 
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violent politics of the Greek resistance.
66
 In respect of their experiences, the official history is slim 
and almost anaemic on the topic of politics. There are therefore indications of an extended 
involvement and/or attitude toward Greece throughout the war years, and subsequent State 
assessment for inclusion (or exclusion in this case) in the official memory begs examination.   
 
Humanitarian Aid Emanating from New Zealand – Ill-Defined  
While there was undoubtedly a wider relationship that goes beyond the temporal boundaries of the 
celebrated 1941 battles and subsequent assistance from civilians, there is another thread that is 
suggested by non- State publications. This is about the enterprise of wartime humanitarian aid.  The 
involvement of the Greek-New Zealand community in such work is also indicated by a few 
paragraphs in a self-published work by a member of the New Zealand-Greek community.67 More 
oblique is the history of the New Zealand Council of Organisations for Relief Services Overseas 
(C.O.R.S.O.)
68
. The State relief effort may find its way into new books on the battle of Crete
69,
 but 
the extent, nature and evolution of that contribution are not discussed anywhere in the current 
literature (State, academic or public).  
 
A further ingredient in the mix is the possible impact of the political priorities of those at the point 
of delivery/use of aid to Greece.  Non-New Zealand studies on the Greek relief operations during, 
and immediately after, liberation depicted schisms between the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency (U.N.R.R.A.) and the British authorities.70  The official history of 
C.O.R.S.O. limits its discussion to delivery of aid supplies at liberation while, despite mentioning 
the subsequent civil war, it does not illuminate its experience of that violent and divisive period.71 
The whole question of State humanitarian wartime aid to Greece therefore needs to be examined in 
terms of its extent and influence by external factors. 
 
The above tropes are not mutually exclusive and are sometimes blended and/or applied with minor 
deviations.  For example, Dudley Perkins, who died on Crete fighting as an S.O.E. operative, is 
                                               
66W.S. Jordan, Truth about Greece (Melbourne: Araluen, 1946); John Mulgan and Peter Whiteford, Report on Experience 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2010 – original 1947); W.S. Jordan, Conquest without Victory (London: Hodder & Stoddard,  
1969); Arthur Edmonds, With Greek Guerillas (Putaruru: Author, 1998). 
67 Zisis Bruce Blades, Wellington's Hellenic Mile ([New Zealand]: Author), 2005. Ch. 5. 
68 R. Thurlow Thomson, New Zealand in Relief: Story of C.O.R.S.O. (Wellington: New Zealand Council of Organisations for Relief 
Services Overseas Inc., 1965). While Chapters 1 and 2 deal with legislative impacts on C.O.R.S.O. and the C.O.R.S.O. contribution 
to Greece, there was no contextualizing using the drivers of this thesis study. 
69 David Filer: Interview Radio New Zealand Sunday Morning, November 21, 2010. 
http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/sunday/audio/2435024/david-filer , Accessed July 13, 2014. 
70 George Woodbridge, U.N.R.R.A., History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration: Vol. 2 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1950) 99; Susan Armstrong-Reid and David Murray, Armies of Peace: Canada and the U.N.R.R.A .Years 
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 2008), 126-134; Florence Tsilaga, “UNRRA Mission to Greece : the Politics of International Relief, 
October 1944 - June 1947” (Ph. D Thesis, Kings College London, 2007). 
71 R. Thurlow Thompson, New Zealand in Relief. 
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remembered in the Greek-New Zealand memorial, and it has been announced that a motion picture 
is being made about him.
72
   In the non-State literature Damer and Frazer’s 2006 monograph is 
concerned with civilian aid provided to New Zealanders and Australians evading capture on Crete 
(but not on the mainland).
73
   
 
ORIGINALITY – PREVIOUS THESIS AND EXTANT LITERATURE 
This study’s originality is ensured by non-duplication of the author’s Master of Arts (Research) 
thesis
74
, gaps in extant literature and awareness of other researchers’ agendas. This current thesis 
effort differs from the previous M.A. thesis, in that the latter looked at the period 1941-1945 and 
specifically at the New Zealand civil-military relations and the area of Special Operations Executive 
(S.O.E.). It used primary sources for one chapter which was concerned with one of the New 
Zealanders involved, John Mulgan, his brief contact with the Wellington administration and 
subsequent investigation of his death.  This new effort encompasses the national elite and agencies 
(beyond Freyberg and Fraser), a period much greater, and the discovery and public presentation of 
New Zealand involvement in clandestine work in both occupied and liberated Greece, and focusses 
more on the making of official memory and its omissions.  
 
Academic Literature 
In terms of the New Zealand- Greek relationship, the academic offerings are very limited. Maria 
Hill’s Diggers and Greeks: the Australian Campaigns in Greece and Crete75 was, as the title 
suggests, primarily focused on Australia-Greece relationship and is based upon her Ph. D thesis for 
the University of New South Wales. Its scope is limited to the battles of 1941 and, as per the title, 
with ownership of the campaigns attributed to the Australians as against Allied or Commonwealth 
troops, it well might attract criticism of Australian chauvinism.  The Australian ownership is 
reflected in the minor level of New Zealand-related content (New Zealand does not even rate an 
entry in the index). The other monograph that utilises a scholarly approach is Damer and Frazer’s 
On the Run: Anzac Escape and Evasion in Enemy-occupied Crete.
76
 The authors, are a sociologist 
and a social anthropologist (the latter retired).
77
 Frazer is continuing his work about S.O.E. Axis 
                                               
72 Kevin Childs, “Lion of Crete’s Story to be shot in Alexandra,” New Zealand Herald, September 8, 2012. 
73 Sean Damer and Ian Frazer, On the Run: Anzac Escape and Evasion in Enemy-occupied Crete (Auckland: Penguin, 2006). 
74 Martyn Brown, “How Consistent were the Policies and Actions of the New Zealand Government and Military toward Greek Policy 
1941-1945” (M.A. thesis, University of Sydney, 2010). 
75 Maria Hill, Diggers and Greeks: the Australian Campaigns in Greece (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2010). 
76 Damer and Frazer, On the Run. 
77 It does not depict a universal harmonious relationship between Cretans and Commonwealth soldiers evading or escaping. Rather, it 
makes the point that assistance was often automatically expected by the evaders, expands the relationship to include resistance 
political dynamics and the pragmatics of Cretans avoiding possible execution for offering help but also staving off starvation as they 
share their food with commonwealth soldiers in hiding. 
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evaders on Crete, with an examination of the last lift from the island and the ensuing complications 
and controversy.
78
 It is partly a thread of the forgotten history but is still focussed on Crete.  
 
My own paper on John Mulgan brings into consideration
79
, albeit in very limited fashion, popular 
New Zealand protests against British actions in newly liberated Greece.  It is very much a treatment 
through a diplomatic history lens.  In this project, some aspects – especially the popular protests – 
are amplified. Any aspect which sees the non-state actors speaking of a relationship and the 
response of the national elite are evaluated. 
 
In terms of New Zealand official commemoration of war, the offering has been mixed between 
academic and government. Matthew Henry’s 2006 paper on ANZAC Day and New Zealand 
national identity goes only up until 1939 and is concerned with government using commemoration 
to fashion a form of present citizen behaviour.
80
 Unlike Henry’s efforts, Sorrow and the Pride 
(Maclean, Phillips and Willis, 1990) does touch upon the New Zealand-Greek relationship. In this 
non-academic study of New Zealand war commemoration and memorialisation, Maclean, Phillips 
and Willis include a chapter on the New Zealand-Greek community’s protest at the erection of the 
Ataturk Memorial at Tarakena Bay, Wellington.
81
 It is not concerned, however, with the Second 
World War. 
 
Finally, there are several attacks on official histories generated in New Zealand. The most recent is 
on the government-sponsored oral war history by Hall (2008). She attributes the war history drive 
by the Helen Clark government during this millennium (some of which included Greece and Crete) 
to counter criticisms about its reduction in defence spending and argues that the techniques 
undertaken have made for “unprecedented spectacle and photo opportunities”.82 Oral history can be 
used for “political ends”,83 more specifically, ”to better fit our nationalistic mythology”.84 She 
focuses on the Vietnamese conflict. A wider critique of the State and also of some academic 
scholars is made by Montgomerie (2003).
85
 Dealing with the whole gamut of the country’s war 
historiography, amongst other things, she quotes various present authors and their utilisation of war 
                                               
78 Personal discussion, May, 2012, Wellington, New Zealand. 
79 Martyn Brown, “Political Context of John Mulgan’s Greek Wartime Life and Death,” Journal of New Zealand Studies 10, (2011). 
80 Matthew Henry, “Making New Zealanders through Commemoration: Assembling Anzac Day in Auckland, 1916–1939,” New 
Zealand Geographer 62, 1, (2006). 
81 Chris Maclean, Jock Phillips and Debbie Willis, Sorrow and the Pride; New Zealand War Memorials. 
82 Claire Hall, “Silence to Celebrity: Oral History and the Political and Public Recognition of War Veterans in Aotearoa New 
Zealand,” Oral History in New Zealand, 20, (2008): 16. For an overview of the re-emergence of major government promotion of war 
remembrance under Helen Clark see Graham Hucker, "A Determination to Remember: Helen Clark and New Zealand's Military 
Heritage," The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society 40, no. 2 (2010). 
83Hall, “Silence to Celebrity: Oral History and the Political and Public Recognition of War Veterans in Aotearoa New Zealand,”: 14. 
84 Ibid., 17. 
85  Deborah Montgomerie, “Reconnaissance: Twentieth Century New Zealand War History at Century Turn,” New Zealand Journal 
of History 3, 1 (2003). 
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for nationalism.  Their utterances, she finds, are never argued through by the authors.   Speaking of 
State efforts, she discusses the official Battle of Crete oral history project and the lack of 
historiographical technique.
86
 More dated is McLeod’s (1986) Myth and Reality87. An output from 
his Masters Degree thesis, it questions the martial spirit and subsequent mythology of the New 
Zealand military during the Second World War. He deals with Crete and Greece but not with the 
Greek-New Zealand relationship. Bell’s 2012 Ph. D thesis88, from Massey University, deals with 
several official history volumes but does not concern itself with the Greek relationship. 
 
As the above shows, the academic publishing record on the New Zealand – Greek relationship is 
very sparse in terms of history and works on official public memory. Popular histories and memoirs 
have followed suit with the same emphasis. They are cited in the later sections and chapters. 
 
Forthcoming Planned Research 
The only active academic researchers involved in the Greek- New Zealand relationship are Ian 
Frazer and Sean Damer. Their study of New Zealand and Australian soldiers evading capture is 
currently being researched for a second edition.
89
  
 
State Breadcrumbs amongst the General Output 
As indicated earlier, ironically, State-generated publications (as opposed to academic publications) 
from the late 1940s onwards show that there was ongoing military and political interaction during 
the entire war. These indications are sparse and are not, except for the area of secret intelligence and 
sabotage work, accompanied by any non-State publications.
90
 The State’s path in generating these 
texts will be examined at length in Chapters 3 to 6.  
 
                                               
86 Ibid., 70-71. 
87 John Mcleod, Myth & Reality: New Zealand Soldier in World War II (Auckland: Reed Methuen, 1986). 
88 Rachael Bell, “Memory History Nation War: Official Histories of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-1945” (Ph. D 
Thesis, Massey University, 2012). Bell selected four official volumes. The emphasis is on analysing four individual volumes. The 
thematic lenses are different for each.  One is simply “history” as it was written by a peacetime historian, another is concerned with 
“conduct of war”, lessons and criticism of strategy and commanders in national history”. Individual, collective and national memory 
types forms another. Davin’s Crete. forms one chapter and is of the “nation” lens. It focuses on the loss of the battle and various 
interpretations and their permeation into non-state histories. There is no emphasis on Greeks or Greece. 
89 Personal conversation, April, 2014. 
90 These include the previously mentioned memoirs of Edmonds and Jordan. Recent popular histories include Mathew Wright, 
Behind Enemy Lines: Kiwi Freedom Fighters in WWII (Auckland, N.Z.: Random House New Zealand, 2010). Wright discusses not 
only Greece but other occupied countries in which New Zealanders found themselves with resistance groups. McDonald focuses on 
the exploits of Don Stott, one of the more controversial personalities in Greece but has a wider scope than Greece. Gabrielle 
McDonald, New Zealand's Secret Heroes: Don Stott and the "Z" Special Unit (Auckland N.Z.: Reed, 1991). Stott and Crete-based 
Dudley Perkins are also discussed in Glyn Harper and Colin Richardson, In the Face of the Enemy: the Complete History of the 
Victoria Cross and New Zealand (Auckland: Harper Collins, 2006). 
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METHODOLOGY 
As stated in the introductory section, this is a mono-directional perspective – that is, only New 
Zealand and not a comparative study.  As the sub-title the “politics of forgetting” and previous 
sections suggest, at one level, this works as a project in the area of memory studies. The topic 
wording is generated by Renan’s oft-cited argument that a nation often “forgets” as much as it 
remembers in order to enable national cohesion.
91
  It is what the scholar Olick termed something of 
an “epochal generalization” in the “memory-nation connection”.92  It examines the wartime 
relationships between the two countries and focuses on the actions of the New Zealand national 
elite. The ability of such groups “to shape political outcomes by influencing the way in which the 
past is perceived and interpreted is a well-known characteristic of public life.”93   
 
This study also examines the response of the New Zealand national elite to other elites, especially 
the Greek and British governments and civil groups (such as the Returned Services Association, and 
U.N.O.) in this fashioning. Commensurate is an elimination of memory patterns belonging to those 
groups, as detailed below. 
 
Exclusions 
Largely omitted from this study are the internal deliberations and respective memories (published or 
otherwise), of societal groups concerning collective memory much in the tradition of Halbwachs.
94
  
These might be community type (for example, peace, religious and the New Zealand Greek 
community), veterans’ associations, and various levels of non-central government civic and foreign 
aid bodies.  An exhaustive study of the wider community is not possible within the limits of time 
and textual space available.  Also the previously mentioned continued work of Frazer and Damer 
may impact on any thesis investigation. 
95
 Examining the historical record of the national elite and 
its State agencies does provide the opportunity to determine its response to such groups. These 
groups are therefore only considered when they interact with the Nation State – that is, the latter is 
the pivot around which the former are considered. Using this approach means that, again, the State 
is the focus of the study. The exception to this constraint is the presence of the Greek-New Zealand 
community. State responses to its presence and their initiatives attract more analysis. This offers 
                                               
91 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London:  Routledge, 1990), 11. “Forgetting, I 
would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation”. 
92 Jeffrey Olick, States of Memory: Continuities, Conflicts, and Transformations in National Retrospection (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003), 4. 
93 John Coakley, “Mobilizing the Past: National Images of History,” in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 10, 4, (2004): 531. 
94 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed, Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). 
95 This is Dr Ian Frazer who co-authored Anzacs on the Run. I appreciate Dr Frazer’s communications with me and his sharing of 
Research Statement. E-mail communication September 6, 2011.  
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additional insight into how the state’s proclaimed bonding with a people extends into a diasporic 
presence. 
 
More straightforward is the degree of inclusion of cultural artefacts. The lack of a large New 
Zealand popular culture industry leads to a dearth of these to examine. Hence, the rigorous 
examination of (non-existent) novels, plays, and monument designs is absent. However, what little 
there exists is mentioned in the context of their challenge to official memory. This is especially so 
during the late 1940s, with the Greek civil war raging.  Given the above, it is considered that an 
examination of official memory in the New Zealand context is more appropriate than consideration 
of any wider memory type. 
 
Characteristics of Official Memory versus History 
The discussion so far has used terms such as State “memory” and what the State calls “history” 
interchangeably. This will continue, but a refinement will now be introduced. This is informed by a 
model based upon Wertsch’s and Roediger’s (2008) work,96 and is presented in Table 1.1. It is 
another effort to calibrate the thesis within the ill-defined area of memory studies.  It is evident that 
the State’s efforts were intended to be consistent with the attributes in the left-hand column but also 
utilised some attributes from “analytical history”.  Examples are provided in the following chapters. 
Where applicable are also where the state used other the practices from the historian’s toolkit. 
Typically this is interpretation of historical facts and triangulating testimony with archives. This 
observation gained through researching this project correlates with academic commentators who do 
not always see the characteristics of memory and history as being mutually exclusive. For example, 
a theme of commemoration has been recognised in the official New Zealand war histories by both 
the editor of the New Zealand Journal of History, Montgomerie,
97
 and unsurprisingly, perhaps, the 
long-serving General Editor- War History, Ministry of Culture and Heritage, McGibbon
98
. 
Naturally, this writer's own endeavours seek to utilise the framework of analytical history (Table 1). 
                                               
96 James V.   Wertsch and Henry L Roediger, “Collective Memory: Concepts and Theoretical Approaches,” Memory 16,3, (2008). 
321. The model is an attempt to conceptually bring together a wide diverse number of definitions from memory studies. It lies in 
contrast to others. For example, Roussou, op. cit. 
97 Deborah Montgomerie, “Reconnaissance: Twentieth Century New Zealand War History at Century Turn”. 
98 Ian McGibbon, ‘‘Something of Them is Here Recorded.” 
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Table 1.1 Official Memory versus Analytical History - Based upon Wertsch and Roediger (2008)99 
Official Memory 
 
Analytical History 
 
Involves an identity project 
 
Aspires to arrive at an objective account of 
the past, regardless of consequences for 
identity 
Impatient with ambiguity 
 
Recognises complexity and ambiguity 
Ignores counter-evidence in order to preserve 
established narratives 
 
May revise existing narratives in light of new 
evidence (from archives etc.) 
Relies on implicit theories , schemas and scripts 
that simplify the past and ignore substantiated 
findings that do not fit the narrative 
 
Is generally constrained by archival materials 
(as against pure testimony or other sources 
such as newspapers) 
Conservative and resistant to change. Can change in response to new information. 
 
Knowing and Forgetting 
What a national elite strives for is an unproblematic past so as to ensure stability and its own 
legitimacy to govern.  However powerful the State elite may be, though, it is not omniscient. It is 
subject to power relations as well as taking advantage of them. Accompanying power is access to 
information. The New Zealand national elite relied on various sources during the war for what it 
“knew”. Externally, the sources were nearly entirely the British government or the general press. 
“Internally”, its sources included distant Dominion military and diplomats as well as the NZEF 
official war correspondents and radio broadcast unit. When it came to writing the official histories, 
some of those same limitations applied, some not so much, For example, individual soldiers came 
forward with recollections that sometimes shocked those who were given the task of shaping the 
official memory. These subtle differences become very apparent in later chapters. 
 
                                               
99 James V. Wertsch and Henry L. Roediger, "Collective Memory: Conceptual Foundations and Theoretical Approaches."  
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MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION 
At the most basic level, there is a missing narrative of the apparent multiple threads between two 
countries during the war years. This study will illuminate not just their particular interaction but 
also the greater discussion of Anglo-Greek relations and internal Dominion dynamics. 
 
Secondly, what makes the Greek-New Zealand connection more pronounced and engaging for 
exploration is its overwhelming celebration in memory, with hardly any accompanying historical or 
cultural angst. The exceptions are memoirs of clandestine service personnel (described in Chapters 
4 and 6) and Hensley’s (2009) work, Beyond the Battlefield- New Zealand and its Allies 1939-45.100 
The treatment is in contrast to the Pacific island nation’s ANZAC tradition or mythology, there has 
been much heated dialogue over the New Zealand-Australian wartime experiences.
101
     
 
Besides the missing narratives, which might have been beneficial to both New Zealand and Anglo-
Greek historiography, there is the area of memory studies.  An analysis of the memory treatment of 
an ally in war, seemingly valuing some of its members over others, and with largely no previous 
large-scale connection, may illuminate pathways for further research and/or validation of previous 
outputs in the field. There is also the state’s interaction with diasporic groups relating to that ally. In 
the case of New Zealand it is the New Zealand Greeks. Their profile and level of impact during the 
war years is described later. 
 
SOURCES 
This section complements the bibliography and is intended to alert the reader to some of the 
limitations of available primary and secondary sources and consequently research findings.  
New Zealand Government Records 
New Zealand depositories provided the bulk of the primary material (others included United 
Kingdom, Australia, Greece and the USA). However, there are some peculiarities of the wartime/ 
                                               
100 Gerald Hensley, Beyond the Battlefield- New Zealand and its Allies 1939-45 (Auckland: Viking, 2009). While the author states 
the Greeks “fought bravely” against the Italians, the whole debacle of the 1941 Commonwealth adventure is due to “the eccentric 
dispositions of the Greek Commander-in-Chief”, 116. 
101 Kathryn Hunter writes of a New Zealand memorial in Canberra depicting a “seemingly unproblematic ANZAC relationship” 
Kathryn Hunter, “States of mind: remembering the Australian-New Zealand relationship,” Journal of the Australian War Memorial, 
36, (2002), http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j36/nzmemorial.asp Accessed July 13, 2014. This observation of constructed memory 
contrasts with the literature.  “As is often the case with Australian writers on such matters, the NZ in ANZAC tends to be overlooked 
Ian McGibbon, “Oxford Companion to Military History [Review],” New Zealand International Review, XXVII, 2, (2002): 31. See 
also John Crawford, “Forgotten ANZACS: Campaign in Greece [Review]”, New Zealand Journal of History, 42,2, (2008):227; In 
the lead-up to the centenary of the outbreak of World War One Glyn Harper made the same point about that conflict. “Professor aims 
to Keep War Record Straight,” Manawatu Standard, March 1, 2012. Professor Fred Wood, who wrote an official War History 
Volume on external affairs, felt Paul Hasluck’s volume on Australia in World War Two could have been improved. He placed it in 
national context: “A New Zealander, however, might be permitted a mild complaint. Rich as is his documentation, it is a pity that he 
did not glance at New Zealand materials.” F.L.W. Wood “Review of Australia in the War of 1939-1945: Government and the People 
1942-1945,”n New Zealand Journal of History 7, 2 October (1973): 197. 
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early post-war administration that impede scholarly research. Robust record keeping was lacking in 
certain critical political areas
102
, the most important of which are Cabinet meetings.
103
 Such a 
situation leads one toward more focus on manuscript collections. Equally lacking are some 
parliamentary-related speeches. The New Zealand Parliamentary Library Service asserts that “many 
sessions during the war were reported neither in Hansard nor in any newspaper, for security 
reasons.”104 On the other hand, the war history project saw very thorough planning, policy 
formulation, and record keeping and classification of armed forces records.
105
 
 
Army 
New Zealand Defence Force Personnel Archives has a relatively open policy on its personnel 
records.
106
 However, New Zealanders relevant to this study were also on secondment to British 
forces.  The situation with service personnel in the United Kingdom is not as liberal as New 
Zealand, and policy is inconsistent. The Special Operations Executive personnel files are available, 
but not those of the regular armed forces. Hence, access to the New Zealand officers who were on 
secondment to British aid organisations or Army intelligence is not permitted.  To an extent, the gap 
is addressed through locating living relatives of these personnel or by them providing access to 
private diaries and other material.  
 
Ash Wednesday in Cairo and Impact for Historical Research 
Military security of another sort has placed a challenge in the way of research. As Rommel thrust 
into Egypt in mid-1942, British authorities in Cairo destroyed many of their records during “Ash 
Wednesday”.107 The research problem is understandable, as the Greek and the New Zealand forces 
were under overall British direction during the Second World War. A consequence for this project 
is that certain material pertinent to the New Zealand training of Greeks and possible joint soldiering 
is likely to be missing.  
                                               
102 For example, Wellington contacted its Liaison officer in London, Cecil Day, for “important documents” that were not in its files. 
The details were known but the actual material was absent. They pertained to the decision to declare war and the consideration of 
Dominion independence. McIntosh to Day, January 18, 1945. McIntosh Papers Personal correspondence to Cecil Day. Ms-papers-
6759-270 Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL).  Again, five years later, telegrams had “disappeared” and this time it was suggested the 
British authorities could be asked to provide copies IA 1 3392/181/53/5 Pt 1 (ANZ) War History- Publishing and Printing of official 
histories- Documents, Volumes 1-3 . Perm Head Prime Minister’s Office to Editor in Chief, New Zealand War Histories, August 24, 
1950. 
103 Memorandum for Prime Minister Cabinet- Review of Procedure September 1949 p. 3 MS-Papers-6759-050 Papers Relating to 
Foreign Affairs (A15) Alister McIntosh Papers (ATL). . As the Secretary to Cabinet wrote to the incoming National Party Prime 
Minister in September 1949, “At the moment there is no minute of Cabinet discussion; the decision is only noted. In other 
Commonwealth countries a procedure has been developed whereby brief minutes are taken.” 
104 Email Parliamentary Library Service, February 7, 2013. 
105 WAII 1 360 DA488/1- DA488/2, Archives New Zealand (ANZ), War Archives Memoranda, progress reports etc.  (ANZ). These 
files show the rigorous approach taken. 
106 Proof of death allows access (without any vetting) to all record content (including medical) of New Zealand service personnel 
serving during the war. 
107 It is a situation that is at least as frustrating to modern Greek military historians. Meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Dimitrios 
Katsikostas, Historian – Middle East, Hellenic Army General Staff Army History Directorate, Athens, November, 2012. 
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Deliberate Post War Destruction  
Destruction by the British Foreign Office also impinges on consideration of the New Zealand-Greek 
connection. The loss of the records of the Allied Screen Commission, a body operating in post-war 
Greece and led for a time by a New Zealander with connections to the Wellington government, 
affects efforts to illuminate this area of recognition of Greek assistance to Commonwealth soldiers. 
As a former British colleague in the Commission wrote, "the inexorable Foreign Office procedure 
for weeding old records had consigned them all to the shredder.”108 Similarly, a scholarly article has 
identified poor record keeping by S.O.E. and widespread destruction of files.
109
 
 
Mitigation 
Conducting interviews is one way of countering these gaps, as was applying a particularly wide 
search of archives and manuscript collections – New Zealand, Australia, United Kingdom, Greece 
and the United States. These are listed in the bibliography. A research visit to US National Archives 
and Records Administration (NARA) archives and the John Poulos papers manuscript depository 
was aimed at trying to alleviate the loss of British records. The former had records cited in various 
studies on Allied - Greek wartime politics. The latter was a Greek-American journalist well-known 
at the time. Although research was hampered by the US government closure of October 2012, some 
additional material was retrieved. 
 
Language 
While this is a New Zealand-focused study, as indicated above, Greek archives were consulted. So 
were Greek secondary sources. The latter were selected according to critical gaps. Hence, the 
published memoirs of several key Greek officers
110
 were examined. Some primary data contained 
English-language material, others not. Secondary sources were all in Greek. Identification in both 
archives and secondary sources using the surnames of New Zealand figures (such as Freyberg, 
Aked etc.) was used, as well as generic terms such as “New Zealand” in Greek. English translations 
were provided by Dr Anna Efstathiadou, a teacher at UQ Institute of Modern languages and Mr 
Nikolas Pissis, a lecturer at the Freie Universität of Berlin. 
 
Newspapers 
The ongoing digitisation and free on-line public access to New Zealand’s newspapers by the 
National Library of New Zealand enabled easy access to three national and local newspapers 
                                               
108 Michael Ward, Greek Assignments: S.O.E. 1943-1948 UNSCOB (Athens: Lycabettus ; London : Zeno Booksellers, 1992), 257. 
109 Duncan Stuart, “Of Historical Interest Only: Origins and Vicissitudes of the S.O.E. Archive,” in Special Operations Executive: a 
New Instrument of War, ed. Mark Seaman (London: Routledge, 2006). 
110 For example, commander of the Greek Brigade in Italy during late 1944, Thrasyvoulos Tsakalotos. 
     24 
 
covering the war years, that is, up until the end of 1945.
111
 In-house developed library indexes and 
vertical files were used to search other newspapers (New Zealand Herald, Dominion, and The 
Press) past this date.  
 
Site Visits 
On-site observations were made of the 2011 Battle of Crete commemoration in Wellington, as well 
as the Greek-New Zealand memorial there. The Gorgopotamos Commemoration in November 2012 
was observed. Field inspections were made of the Crete battlefield where the New Zealanders 
operated. It was not possible to be at the Crete-based commemoration of the battle. 
 
Meetings with Historians 
Historians such as Richard Clogg (U.K.), Heinz Richter (Germany), Thanasis Sfikas (Greece), John 
Crawford (New Zealand) and Andre Gerolymatos (Canada) met with me. These meetings were in 
addition to further interactions through conferences and seminars in New Zealand, Australia and 
(via video) Poland. 
 
Interviews  
Interviews with relatives of persons mentioned in this thesis are listed in Appendix Two. 
 
THESIS STRUCTURE 
The chapters are listed below. 
 Introduction – This provides the thesis setting, justification, methodology and challenges to the 
proposed research. The importance of the Second World War history and nation building to the 
New Zealand nation’s elite is further placed in context. Public expressions of a positive special 
relationship are placed in contrast to published traces of a contentious and darker wartime 
connection. The thesis argues that the elite of a nation seek to legitimise their leadership in 
official memory and must have made decisions about Greek related connections so as to achieve 
this end.  
 
 Historical Context – Commonalities, differences and changes between the two countries are 
examined so as to contextualise touch points during the war and afterwards. This informs the 
reader of the driving forces and constraints (especially British-imposed or accepted) that New 
                                               
111 The service is Papers Past and is provided by the National Library of New Zealand, http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-
bin/paperspast Accessed July 13, 2014. 
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Zealand decision-makers faced in their actions over Greece. Areas covered include socio-
economic, political, military and officially produced State memories.  
 
 Giving Meaning to the Disasters of 1941 – Here, the thesis examines the early wartime 
connections showing there were earlier encounters than the main memory strut of the campaigns 
of early 1941. These involved State and non-State actors who would influence the wartime 
connectivity and exceptionalism towards Greece. While I examine the State’s decisions over 
what to project at the time and afterwards about the arenas in Greece and Crete it fought in, I 
assert that one individual New Zealand figure emerged who championed the ensuing 
development of real connectivity across both military and civilian domains.  Other Dominion 
State actors had policies that impeded special treatment of the Greeks during the war. This is an 
early indication of one thread of my argument, that while on the one hand Greece was a nation 
fraught with extreme dissension, New Zealand was not a homogeneous entity either when it 
came to dealing with Greek matters.  
 
  Martial Efforts after Crete: Marginalisation and Amplification – New Zealand enthusiasm, 
cynicism and a lack of co-ordination in soldiering with the regular Greek army in the post-Crete 
era form part of this chapter.  Added to this are individual New Zealanders, willing or 
otherwise, to fight alongside Greek and Cretan partisans.  Here I further pursue the theme of the 
elite champion but introduce an additional observation. This is the use of several memory struts 
emanating from experiences of 1941 to deflect attention from New Zealand involvement, real or 
perceived, in the publicly known explosive Greek political scene. This occurred both during the 
events themselves and during subsequent memory making years.   
 
 Humanitarianism and Retribution – Again, the same single personality is seen to effect a major 
change in State exceptionalism towards Greece, this time, in terms of humanitarian aid to a 
population suffering under occupation. That change and later post-war efforts, linked to 
utilitarian commemoration, demonstrate another theme of the relationship - the divergence 
between the citizenry, soldiers and veterans and the national elite over Greek issues.   Also 
included is a dissection of efforts and policies to materially compensate Greeks and Cretans who 
had assisted New Zealand soldiers. New Zealand involvement in seeing the enemy face charges 
of war crimes against Greeks and Cretans is also dealt with. 
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 Taking Sides – Although the impact of politics is touched upon in several of the previous 
chapter narratives, here I condense and augment them. Specifically, where, when and in what 
context New Zealanders – members of the leadership, citizens, soldiers, political activists or 
novel writers – chose which Greeks they would support in the political crises that dominated the 
post-1941 decade. The disagreements demonstrate once again that one could not treat New 
Zealand as a single unified whole.  The elite were out of step with sections of its citizenry and 
military forces. Also, within the leadership there was no unity. The contradictions abound both 
during the events themselves and what the state could have projected to enhance its image. 
 
 Conclusion – Here I summarise observations but with qualifications and suggest further areas of 
study. 
 
In summation, New Zealand celebrates a special bond with Greece, a bond formed during the 
Second World War. That conflict and the bond were later used as a vehicle in a significant 
fashioning of an official memory conducive to a national imagining. It was a usable past based 
on heroic New Zealand military feats in a Mediterranean landscape rich with historical and 
mythological associations. Arguably, it was a Kiwi Iliad, in which, predominantly, Greek 
citizens figured as helpers or fellow combatants in one early struggle. But the Mediterranean 
country experienced massive dislocation and fracturing from enemy occupation and from 
internal Greek and Anglo-Greek dynamics. What options and constraints faced the New 
Zealand national leadership (military and civil) at the time? How did they navigate through such 
a world? Later, what decisions were made in the official war history project and 
commemorative deliberations to promote a positive New Zealand national narrative? This is 
what the following chapters explore.  
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
This chapter expands upon initial observations made in the Introduction. It contextualizes the touch-
points between the two nations and supports the succeeding chapters. Hence, what would initially 
appear to be a wide and varied miscellany is actually a further reinforcement that there were multi-
threaded links between New Zealand and Greeks during the war. The approach also emphasizes that 
fact that the Dominion and its ally were not in splendid isolation, as possibly intimated by the 
phrase “special relationship”. There were external bodies and forces acting upon them, before, 
during and after the Second World War.  That world-wide conflagration was subsequently replaced 
by another confrontation, the Cold War and, depending on the interpretation, the Greek Civil War. 
How they influenced New Zealand in its actual and remembered relationship with Greece needs to 
be examined. 
 
The coverage in this chapter is slanted more toward the war years and immediate aftermath. That is, 
it follows the previously stated period of focus.  The amount of attention given Greece is greater. 
This is due to New Zealand having already been discussed in the Introduction. Also, between the 
two, Greece changed the most during the war and succeeding years. This alteration attracts more 
explanatory text. As its basic framework, the following emphasizes commonalities, differences and 
changes. 
 
WARS 
While the world war is identified as the nexus of Greco-New Zealand dynamic, there was another 
conflict both countries were involved with: the Greek Civil War.  New Zealand’s world war ran for 
six years - September 1939 to the signing of the surrender document of Japan in the same month, 
1945. As Chapter 6 will show, the end date is significant in terms of delineating one thread of the 
official memory. What constituted Greece’s period in the Second World War is just as easily 
defined – from the Italian invasion in October 1940 to 1945. The Greek Civil War is a different 
proposition. The Greek Right see it as starting in 1943 while the Left see it three years later in 1946 
and lasting until 1949.
1
   The Left see the pre-1946 struggle as being against Axis collaborators. The 
Right view the Left-controlled wartime resistance was primarily seeking to implement a Communist 
coup d'état.  Some Dominion officers came to their own conclusions about agendas of the internal 
Greek forces during the Occupation at least. These will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
                                               
1 Bisser Petrov, “Problem of Collaboration in Post-War Greece 1944-46,” Etudes Balkaniques 3 (2005), 16.  
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The view of the right has both the civil and world wars running concurrently. The allocation of the 
term Civil War “Round” (described later) by historians also makes the definition more challenging. 
Regardless of the interpretations, the almost continual conflict during the decade in Greece led to 
the 1940s (invasion, occupation and civil war) being a particularly dire period. This has attracted 
special assessment from scholars of modern Greece: “The decade of the 1940s was the darkest in 
Greece’s independent history.”2  Furthermore, “The worst aspect of the 1940s, however, was the 
fact that it polarized Greek society for decades, for nearly every individual had been traumatized by 
political violence.”3 New Zealand began a direct involvement in the turgid civil conflicts during the 
world war. It was still associated with them up until virtually the climax of the civil war in 1949.  It 
has never promoted its role in any public forum associated with history or memory. Nor has any 
writer examined the area. 
 
The latest development in the Greek academic discourse about the Greek Civil war sees one side 
arguing that large structures such as government and Communism in historical discourses are 
irrelevant.
4
 Local village dynamics and feuding, take centre-place. This particular interpretation 
finds some resonance in the case of the Dominion recognition of civilian assistance. A pale version 
of community rivalries was used as an excuse to blunt intended Dominion recognition of individual 
Greeks (Chapter 5).  
 
Defining the Greek Civil War 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Greek Civil War is considered to have begun in October 1943 
with the outbreak of fighting between left- and right-wing partisan groups on the mainland. This is 
the so-called “First Round”. The second round consists of fighting in Athens during December 1944 
i.e. the Dekemvriana.
5
 This round saw the British openly joining one side (its long-sponsored Greek 
government-in-exile and right wing partisans).  Both rounds were reported in the New Zealand 
press and diplomatic channels from London. There were also New Zealanders involved in the 
fighting. The final round lasts from 1946 until 1949. One might call it the civil war “proper”. It was 
fought by government troops, still with British and then American support, against the communist 
Democratic Army of Greece (D.S.E.). “Communist” was often concatenated with “bandits” by 
supporters of the right-wing government. It was also used in letters to the New Zealand government 
                                               
2 Richard Clogg, Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 142. 
3 Nicholas Doumanis, History of Greece (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 205. 
4 The most prominent advocate is Stathis Kalyvas of Yale University. For a critique of his work see Thanasis D. Sfikas and Anna 
Mahera, “Does the Iliad Need an Agamemnon? History Politics and the Greek 1940s,” Historein 11 (2011). 
5 For example, the subtitle in Iatrides’ work: John O. Iatrides, Revolt in Athens: Greek Communist “Second Round” 1944-1945 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Also the more recent Andre Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, Black Terror : the Greek 
Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry, 1943-1949 (New York: Basic , 2004). 
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from local community leaders in Greece during the post-war period seeking aid.  Chapters 4 to 6 
explore the involvement of New Zealand against this backdrop. 
GREEKS IN THE PACIFIC AND MEDITERRANEAN 
The Greeks based on the mainland and Crete on the other side of the world are the ones emphasised 
in official memory, but there had been Greeks living in New Zealand since the 1860s.
6
 They were 
small in number during the war. The estimated size of the community was “about 600” in early 
1939, with a Greek school in Wellington teaching Greek language history and religion to 40 
children. There was no community newspaper.
7
  Most members of the New Zealand Greek 
community lived in Wellington, which made them physically close to the seat of government and 
administration. Many ran food service establishments, such as cafes. Today the numbers are in the 
low thousands. Their post-war immigration profile challenges the notion of a special bond 
(Chapters 3, 5and 6).  
 
In terms of community representation, the Greeks had a non-Greek as Honorary Consul General.  
When he was appointed on 5 March 1938, Thomas Youd Seddon was employed in a civil service 
capacity. He was also the son of a former New Zealand Prime Minister.
8
 The previous incumbent 
had been his brother-in-law, another non-Greek. Seddon stayed in his position for a little over 20 
years. He was firmly entrenched in the establishment. While there were Greeks serving in other 
related roles, Seddon was the main conduit to the Wellington government. It appears to be very 
much a state sponsored arrangement. Despite this, the New Zealand Greeks in some instances 
(Chapter 5) would break with preferred State inclinations over post-war aid support. 
 
Egyptian Greeks 
The Greek diaspora also included Greeks living in Egypt. The degree to which they interacted with 
New Zealanders will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
                                               
6 Zisis Bruce Blades, Wellington's Hellenic Mile ([New Zealand]: Author, 2005). 
7 MS-papers 1619-180 Correspondence and papers re T E.Y. Seddon's service as Vice-Consul and Consul of Greece: 1937-1965 
Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington (ATL), Seddon to Simopoulos February 22,1939. Estimates of the size of this community 
(there were no state calculations of the annual population statistics) are drawn from official correspondence emanating from their 
own representatives. 
8 Seddon’s background is set out in various correspondence in this file.  
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LAND  
When New Zealand soldiers first experienced Greece in early 1941, they noticed how, 
topographically, there was some similarity with their homeland.
9
 There was also an emphasis on an 
agricultural economy, just like home. It was conducive to establishing an initial affinity. In contrast 
were primitive Greek farming methods and the dominant social organisation.  Villages and small 
towns, rather than larger urban centres and provincial centres, were the main geo-spatial social unit 
New Zealand soldiers encountered. After the war, the Wellington administration interacted 
intermittently for years with the same type of body (Chapter 5). But this was within a much more 
mixed milieu of emotions (including anger and frustration) than the sympathy and friendliness their 
soldiers often expressed about their 1941 introduction.  The villages, often in remote areas, appear 
in a fabric of soon-to-arrive wartime terror, armed resistance and refuge for New Zealanders. They 
are often the precise focal point of attention in remembrance and celebration. New Zealand groups 
after the war sometimes “adopted” villages so as to offer aid. 
 
Besides hospitality, warm and almost universal welcome, the abject poverty, and lack of social and 
economic development of the Greeks was clearly evident and something recorded by individual 
soldiers or those writing about it.
10
 It was an inherent socio-economic problem. As one United 
Nations relief authority wrote after the war, “In the best of circumstances, conditions on Greece are 
not good”11 with only 20% of the land being suitable for cultivation. 12   Greece needed to import 
foodstuffs so as not to starve.
13
 This was a major contributing factor in the famine that engulfed the 
country from late 1941. That situation was publicly known in New Zealand, where State and wider 
community concerns and actions are discussed (Chapter 5).  Furthermore, Greece could not even 
pay for its pre-war food imports.  
 
                                               
9
 For example, Angus Campbell Burgess, “Farming in Greece,” New Zealand Journal of Agriculture 70,1 (1945): 3; Peter Cox et. al., 
Good Luck to all the Lads : Wartime Story of Brian Cox, 1939-43 (Christchurch: J.J. Angerstein & Associates, 2008) 101; Fred 
Cleland Fleming, Marie I. Farquhar, "Dear Cousin, - Cheerio, Fred : Censored Letters (Wellington: Marie I. Cleland, 1971), 1a. 
10 Some examples follow. Piraeus was “desolate and poverty-stricken”. Winston Sargent, Palms Bend Down (Christchurch: Caxton 
Press, 1945) 94; “The people here are much poorer than on the Athens side of Olympus” Edward Arnott Anderson, Life's 
Roundabout (Christchurch: Whitcombe & Tombs 1974), 142; “If New Zealanders thought they had seen poverty at home during the 
Depression of the thirties, they were to see real poverty in Egypt and later in Greece. Now they were to see it at close quarters in 
Crete” Walter Gibbons, “Whakatane Crete Veterans Association,” Historical Review Bay of Plenty Journal of History 40,1 (1992): 
31. 
11 George Woodbridge, UNRRA History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Vol II (New York: 
Columbia University, 1950), 94. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Violetta Hionidou, “Famine in Occupied Greece: Causes and Consequences,” in Bearing gifts to Greeks: Humanitarian Aid to 
Greece in the 1940s, ed. Richard Clogg (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).17. 
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Poverty continued after the wars into the 1950s.
14
 It improved in subsequent decades through 
diversification – especially tourism.  Greek and Cretan poverty were evident to New Zealanders 
from the outset. But the poverty was aggravated by the war – due to Axis Occupation policies – and 
also because of Britain, as the following shows. 
 
WAR AND ECONOMY 
For the Greeks, the war and occupation were catastrophic.  The Axis, led by Germany, basically 
plundered the country.
15
 Financing the German North African campaign further heightened the 
demands placed upon the Greek economy. It was a continuation of disaster.
16
 War with Italy, 
Germany and Bulgaria and the horror of occupation and civil strife led to 8% of the population 
dying between 1941 and when the Germans departed in 1944.
17
 Added to this was the initial British 
food blockade imposed on the enemy and the occupied countries. Greece, being a net importer, was 
especially vulnerable to these war restrictions, which contributed toward its starvation. It was a 
controversial policy,
18
 but not for New Zealand, given its attitude (Chapter 5).  At the 1946 Paris 
Peace Conference on Reparations, the estimated destruction in the country was put at US$8500 
million
19
. The ensuing fighting from 1946 further exacerbated the situation. 
 
In contrast to Greece, New Zealand was never invaded, nor did it suffer real shortages of food that 
led to famine. Its economic wealth grew from the war. The Dominion’s “Official overseas debt was 
virtually eliminated during the Second World War”.20 The end of hostilities saw the beginning of 
the “long boom” until the 1980s. Assimilating returning soldiers were assisted “in large part to full 
employment in the economy as a whole.”21  It also shifted from predominantly British markets to 
others (including Greek). This brought with it increased direct contact and representation with other 
countries – including Greece. This involved both commerce and commemoration Chapters 3 and 4 
will illustrate. 
                                               
14
 It was observed by visiting New Zealanders, as a late 1950 story in the RSA Review shows: “I saw many signs of poverty in 
Canea.” Also “many widows” and “old men begging in the street were not uncommon”. “Fallen Kiwi’s mother tells of poverty 
among Crete islanders,” RSA Review Official RSA Journal XXVI, 12, (November 1950): 1 
15 Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: Experience of Occupation 1941-44 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
16
 Hein A. M. Klemann et al., Occupied Economies: an Economic History of Nazi-occupied Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Berg, 
2012), 103. However, the author makes the point that the claim by Gunther Altenburg, Nazi Plenipotentiary in Greece, that 114% of 
national income went into financing the North African campaigns was an exaggeration, 219. 
17 John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Greece: Modern Sequel from 1821 to the Present (New York: New York University 
Press, 2002), 295. 
18 Joan Beaumont, “Starving for Democracy: Britain's Blockade of and Relief for Occupied Europe 1939-1945,” War & Society 8, 2 
(1990); Richard Clogg, ed., Bearing gifts to Greeks Humanitarian Aid to Greece in the 1940s, (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
19 Flora Tsilaga, “U.N.R.R.A.’s Relief Efforts to late 1944 Greece: Political Impartiality versus Military Exigencies,” in Bearing 
Gifts to Greeks: Humanitarian Aid to Greece in the 1940s, 194.  
20 Geoff Bertram, “New Zealand Economy 1900-2000,” in New Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Giselle Byrnes (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 2009),551. 
21 David Green and John Singleton, New Zealand’s Audit Office 1840-2008 (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2009), 79. 
 32 
 
 
Following world war hostilities, the Dominion could afford to send funds and foodstuffs to other 
countries. But it still directed most to Britain: “The London Bound parcels dwarfed the flow to 
European refugees, who were in more need.”22 Some were bound also for Greece. This effort had 
boundaries imposed by the New Zealand State. It contrasts with other determined aid efforts. They 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
SEA 
The Pacific nation’s economy, however, was at risk during certain critical periods in the world war. 
It had to do with the sea and its markets. Greece would also become a destination for wartime New 
Zealand aid. Again, it was subject to both long-established relationships, as well as the demands of 
waging war (Chapters 3 and 5).  
 
The Dominion had no major merchant marine and so was reliant during the 1939-1945 war on the 
resources and directives of Britain. It was also a major wartime threat to be reliant on sea lanes with 
an enemy presence.
 23
 Priorities, levels of acquiescence and exigencies of world war, to varying 
degrees, affected a thread of the wartime connection and would test how New Zealand would act 
within the emerging special relationship.   
 
In contrast to its domestic economic production, Greece had one of the largest merchant fleets in the 
world.
24
 Although it lost a sizeable proportion (72%), levies on its income helped sustain the Greek 
government in exile during the war years,
25
  as did loans from Britain. The strength of the Greek 
merchant fleet, and the reliance upon it by its government, lies in contrast to the rebelliousness of 
the Royal Hellenic Navy, described later. In one instance, Wellington involved itself in the fate of 
Greek sailors condemned to death for mutiny. Its sympathetic attitude, again, has never been 
expressed in public.  It is an example from a number of related issues between the two countries to 
do with the mass politicisation of the Greek armed forces. However, localised interactions in the 
countryside between soldiers and Greeks/Cretans remained the mainstay instead of any sympathy 
toward aspirations of the ordinary soldiers and sailors. 
 
                                               
22 James Belich, Paradise Reforged: a History of New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000 (Auckland: Penguin, 2001), 296. 
23 Malcolm MacKinnon, “Equality of Sacrifice: Anglo-New Zealand Relations and the War Economy 1939-45,” Journal of 
Commonwealth and Imperial History 12,3 (1984): 58-59. 
24Gelina Harlaftis, History of Greek-Owned Shipping (London:Routledge,1996), Ch 8. Based upon Gross tonnage It ranked 9th at the 
outbreak of the war. 
25 Ibid. 
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POLITICISATION AND POTENCY OF THE MILITARY  
Greece 
The massive turmoil in the Greek wartime armed forces has been the subject of much scholarly 
examination.
26
  It has a history of thousands of soldiers and sailors engaging in widespread political 
agitation (involving thousands) during the war, as well as the machinations of the officer corps. 
This occurred outside of Greece, predominantly in the Middle East, and also later in Italy. New 
Zealanders were with them in both places but they are not mentioned in the literature. 
 
The period following the final evacuation from Crete was one of military ineffectiveness (the navy 
improved), with much internal squabbling in the free Greek armed forces. Politically, the popular 
left faction steadily grew in numbers and influence. This even extended to bringing about changes 
in the émigré government. In contrast, later efforts saw them starved into submission and subdued 
by force.  This all goes to stress that, in many instances, to be in close contact with Greeks meant to 
be in close geographic and/or temporal proximity to simmering politics. One influential New 
Zealand actor was oblivious to this danger until late in the war. This was Bernard Freyberg. His 
behaviour will be a major component in Chapters 3, 4 and 6. 
 
Before the war, the Greek officer corps sought patronage with various political groupings (Royalist, 
Venizelist, and so on.). Those circumstances, and the extent to which they were known at the time, 
form part of the next two chapters. But the war was a catalyst that saw the right-wing officers 
ascend partly via their own power-broking to the point where they erased the non-right from 
military politics.
27
 By 1949, for example, former army commander, Field Marshall Papagos, whom 
the New Zealanders interacted with through some of their secondary official military history 
research and a commemorative visit to Greece, could dictate military matters during the Greek Civil 
War “without recourse to political machinery”.28 His administration installed officers from the 
influential semi-secret right-wing I.D.E.A. (Sacred Bond of Nationalist Officers).
29
 I.D.E.A. was a 
major force, not just then but throughout post-war Greece. Its origins were during 1944, and 
                                               
26 For example, Hagen Fleischer, “Anomalies in the Greek Middle East Forces 1941-1944,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 5, 3, 
(1978); David Syrett, “British and the Greek Naval Incident in Chatham, 1944,” Journal of Hellenic Diaspora, 15, 1-2, (1988);  
Thanos Veremis and Andre Gerolymatos, “Military as a Sociopolitical Force in Greece 1940-1949,” Journal of the Hellenic 
Diaspora 17, 1 (1991); Thanos Veremis, Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy (Montreal: Black Rose 
Books, 1997); Evangelos Spyropoulos, Greek military (1909-1941) and the Greek mutinies in the Middle East (1941-1944), 
(Boulder/New York: 1999); Mark C Jones ,“Misunderstood and Forgotten: The Greek Naval Mutiny of April 1944,” Journal of 
Modern Greek Studies, 20,2,(2002); Andre Gerolymatos, “Road to Authoritarianism: Greek Army in Politics 1935-1949,” Journal of 
the Hellenic Diaspora, 35, 1 (2009). 
27 For an overview see Andre Gerolymatos, “Road to Authoritarianism: Greek Army in Politics 1935-1949”. 
28 Nicos C. Alivizatos, “Greek army in the late 1940s:Towards an Institutional Autonomy,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 5, 3, 
(1978) 42. 
29 Gerolymatos, “Road to Authoritarianism: Greek Army in Politics 1935-1949”. 
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founding figures served in the free Greek armed forces. It was a time when the New Zealand and 
Greeks armies were affiliated in Italy. 
 
New Zealand 
In contrast to the Greeks, New Zealand’s military were relatively stable.30 There was a much 
smaller grassroots episode during the Dekemvriana, which was related to Greek matters. Publicly 
reported at the time, it was not later included in any published official history. This is symptomatic 
of the Dominion’s treatment of contentious matters involving the Greeks. It will be dealt with in 
Chapter 6.  
 
 The commander of the New Zealanders in the Mediterranean throughout the war was General 
Bernard Freyberg. He never plotted to usurp government control, as the Greek senior officers and 
men did, but his commitment to ostensibly agreed policy with Wellington over Greece is open to 
criticism.  
Figure 2.1: Freyberg (Right) and one of his officers on Crete (Source: Alexander Turnbull Library C-006353-1/2) 
 
 
The same could be said of Prime Minister Peter Fraser. Neither was totally honest with the other. 
They were, in fact, often uncoordinated when it came to the military and political aspects of relating 
to Greece throughout the war.  It is an example of contradiction within the leadership that counters 
the simplistic memory of the wartime Greco-New Zealand connection. 
 
 
                                               
30 New Zealand popular soldier dissent was largely limited to the “furlough resisters” i.e. soldiers refusing to return to duty in the 
Mediterranean after extended leave in New Zealand. It was a subject the state was comfortable in relating in its official history. 
F.L.W. Wood, Political and External Affairs (Wellington: War History Branch, 1958), 254, 259-60, 267-9. 
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Figure 2.2: New Zealand Wartime Prime Minister Peter Fraser (Source: Alexander Turnbull Library) 
 
New Zealand’s senior officers maintained an influence after the war in the production of the official 
war histories. Veterans were employed as narrators, historians, editors and researchers. 
Commanders were invariably privy to drafts of the campaign histories, and their comments were 
sought out, which shows they had a different type of influence than the Greek form. Besides the 
obvious criticism that they would sanitise their own involvement, it could be said they were actively 
taking part in imagined nation building. This was their particular influence, whereas the Greek 
variety concerned actual power relations during events themselves. 
 
Following the German victory in early 1941, several Greek army Brigades were formed in Egypt by 
the Greek government in exile and their British sponsors. These units were comprised of men who 
had fled occupied territories and diasporic Greeks of the Middle East. The main force in the New 
Zealand armed forces was the 2NZEF (Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force). Its fighting 
component was the 2NZDIV (Second New Zealand Division). These were the regular formations 
that interacted with the Greeks intermittently from early 1941 until late 1945. That it carried its own 
extensive training arm, extending courses to members of non-New Zealand armies, is of 
significance to the New Zealand-Greek armies’ connectivity.  Their shared victory at Rimini, Italy, 
is celebrated by Greeks, in contrast to the New Zealand-focused emphasis on the defeat on Crete.  
The Greek nation’s leadership at the time required Rimini, as did Churchill. The context and 
Dominion involvement will form part of Chapter 4.    
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Clandestine and Partisan Warfare  
Besides the regular armed forces, there were Greeks and New Zealanders operating together in 
clandestine and partisan warfare (Chapter 4). New Zealanders served with at least two secret British 
organisations. One was Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.). It has been the subject of 
considerable analysis and argument – both in the scholarly output, and in memoirs and the public 
press. 
31
 That its commander, decorated for his early military success there, was subsequently 
removed for criticising British Foreign policy – particularly support for the Greek King - shows the 
acute convergence of politics and military matters in wartime Greece.
 32
 It is the same monarch 
whom New Zealand troops had escorted off Crete - celebrated then and still so today. The other 
organisation was “A Force”, a part of M.I.9, the British escape route organisation. It has received 
far less treatment in the publication record. But, like S.O.E., it was aware of the changing nature of 
politics inside Greece.
33
 The various resistance groups had their competing post-war aims.  
 
Greece became a world of occupation and terror. Amongst this, acronyms appeared that would 
engage New Zealanders, their national leaders and historians. While the pre-war opposition to the 
monarchy came from Republicans – especially the Venizelist variety- the newly emerged and 
largest of the armed resistance groups had a Left/Republican profile. This was E.A.M. (Ethniko 
Apeleftherotiko Metopo) or National Liberation Front and its military wing E.L.A.S. (Ellinikós 
Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós) or National Liberation Army. EMA/ELAS was influenced, or 
controlled, depending on your point of view, by the Greek Communist Party of Greece- 
Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas (K.K.E.).   
E.A.M/E.L.A.S. had, as its main adversary within the mainland armed resistance E.D.E.S. 
(Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos, the National Republican League). E.D.E.S. was a 
personality-dominated group. Its leader, Napoleon Zervas, switched his organisation’s political 
aims (from Republicanism to supporting the monarchy) and thereby gained support from Britain 
and the Greek government- in- exile. His opportunism encompassed collaboration with the 
occupying Nazis at one point.
34
 
                                               
31 Mark Seaman, ed., Special Operations Executive: A New Instrument of War (London: Routledge, 2006), 1. 
32 This was Brigadier Eddie Myers. For his own account see E. C. W. Myers, Greek Entanglement (Gloucester: Sutton, 1985). 
Mazower has documented the tortuous path of imposed censorship that Myers followed to publish his book. Mark Mazower, “The 
Cold War and the Appropriation of Memory: Greece After Liberation,” East European Politics and Societies 9, 2, (1995): 281-282. 
33 Its commander “Simonds was naturally aware well aware already of the intense politicisation of every aspect of Greek resistance, 
as indeed of most of Greek life.” M.R.D. Foot, J. M Langley, MI9 : Escape and Evasion 1939-1945 (London: Biteback, 2011), 223. 
34 Heinz Richter, “Lanz Zervas and the British Liaison Officers,” South Slav Journal 12, 1-2, (1989). 
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Ordinary New Zealanders learnt of these groups, and others, through reading newspapers at a 
distance and also by direct experience. Cretan-based groups received much less exposure, and they 
never openly rebelled to the extent of the mainland counterpart. It was something reported on 
favourably during the time of liberation by New Zealanders. E.L.A.S. was operating there, just like 
on the mainland. There was no E.D.E.S., but there was E.O.K. (National Organisation of Crete). 
They both shared a British-supported line. Political leaders in Wellington also received diplomatic 
updates about Greek affairs from London. They, too, included information about the politics of the 
armed forces but also the changing profile of Greek authority and the question of legitimacy. In 
contrast to their New Zealand public expressions at the time and subsequent official published 
memory, the Dominion’s leadership entered this discourse. It was one involving numerous actors, 
including sections of New Zealand society and returned soldiers (Chapter 6). 
 
GOVERNMENTS 
Multiple Greek Governments  
During the war years there were, at one time, three competing administrations, each claiming its 
own legitimacy to govern Greece. The Greek government-in-exile was recognised by the Allies. 
Initially still carrying vestiges of the pre-war Metaxist dictatorship (in the form of legislation and 
personalities), it changed its profile to some extent through including more democratic elements.
35
 
But the monarch King George II remained. His positive place in New Zealand memory has been 
resilient, but challenges to him, and the institution of the monarchy in general, were numerous 
during the war. Especially odious to his enemies was his support for the establishment of the pre-
war dictatorship of General Ioannis Metaxas. To some individual New Zealanders, this was also 
odious.  
 
Inside Greece, there were successive collaborationist administrations.  The first was headed by 
General Georgios Tsolakoglou, who was a senior general fighting at the front when the New 
Zealanders arrived in 1941. This regime, like its successors and the paramilitary force of Security 
Battalions raised in 1943 by the third collaborationist administration,
36
 received a New Zealand 
treatment that challenged a view of them as easily definable as the “enemy”. 
 
                                               
35 Richard Clogg, Anglo-Greek attitudes: Studies in History, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), Ch. 7. 
36 Andre Gerolymatos, “Security Battalions and the Civil War,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 12, 3 (1985); John Hondros, “Too 
Weighty a Weapon: Britain and the Greek Security Battalions 1943-1944,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 15, 1-2, (1988). 
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Besides the collaborationist Athens government, another type appeared in the mountains of the 
occupied mainland in early 1944. Its appearance and policies were reported in the New Zealand 
press. This was the P.E.E.A. (Political Committee of National Liberation or Politiki Epitropi 
Ethnikis Apeleftherosis). It was established by E.A.M. in March 1944.  P.E.E.A. was superseded by 
a National government established just a few months later. This government was led by George 
Papandreou, who formed a government of national unity, including members of E.A.M. It was this 
government that returned to Greece in late October 1944, at the time of liberation. Papandreou was 
one of several Greek political personalities Peter Fraser met. Those encounters during the war and 
immediately afterward showed an attitude more involved and engaged with Greek politics than the 
little that was generated by the State in its writing of diplomatic history.  
Following the trauma of the previously mentioned Dekemvriana the most significant political event 
following liberation was the elections of March 1946 and plebiscite in September that year. The 
former was “a critical turning-point for they represented the last chance of a peaceful evolution 
from the nightmare of occupation and civil strife.”37  The Left boycotted the election, and the 
accuracy of the electoral registers was suspect. New Zealand had its own opinion on these matters 
(Chapter 6). 
 
New Zealand’s Labour Government 
The government that led New Zealand in the Second World War, and thereby involved itself with 
Greek matters, and then, subsequently, the official war history project was a Labour one. It came to 
power in November 1935. For most of that time, Peter Fraser was Prime Minister. It lost office to 
the National Party in late 1949. In its 14 years in office, Labour had only two Prime Ministers. The 
first died in office in 1940.   The stability of the New Zealand political situation lies in stark contrast 
to the instability of the Greek situation, which was observed from afar by Wellington.   Wellington, 
with a perspective and passion vastly different from that held in 1941, contributed its views and a 
possible degree of on-site participation in post-war Greek political events (Chapter 6).  It was 
another thread of the connection but, again, has never been explored. 
 
Just like the armed resistance during the occupation, civil war in Greece from 1946, i.e. the Third 
Round, generated another challenge to the Greek government in the form of armed Communist 
partisans and also another government in the mountains. The war ended in the same year as the 
                                               
37 Richard Clogg, Concise History of Greece, 3rd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 137. 
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Fraser/Labour government lost office to the Conservative Holland government. In both the final 
phases of the war and the Labour administration’s term, historical instance of déjàvu and 
catastrophe would alarm the leadership of the Pacific nation. It would take place in a new context of 
international power relations and diplomacy.  But their deliberations appear in stark contrast to the 
Greek venture of early 1941. This will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
AMONGST GREAT POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
Britain had a major influence on both Greece and New Zealand before and immediately after the 
war. It had direct financial investment in the former and long-held strategic interests in both.
38
  
 
Through the war years, it was the British coalition government under Churchill that led Britain. 
From July 1945, a few months before the Crete commemoration, Labour assumed power under 
Clement Attlee. Labourite New Zealand thought their British political equivalent might adopt a new 
approach to Greece. They were mistaken. Scholars have concluded that there was no change in the 
interventionist stance from Britain. The Mediterranean land was considered critical to British 
interests.
39
 Indeed, in early 1946, the idea was even raised of having the Mediterranean country 
become a dominion of the British Commonwealth.
40
  
 
The British linkages eventually weakened after the end of the Second World War. Britain’s 
admission to the EEC meant New Zealand looked elsewhere for trade markets. It found some in 
Greece. This interlaced with commemoration as did the Greek military dictatorship junta (Chapter 
3). 
 
Percentages Agreement 
In late 1944, an event took place in Moscow that added another dimension of controversy over 
Greece. This was the so-called “Percentages Agreement” brokered between Churchill and Stalin. 
The notion of European zones which major powers would control was common in the New Zealand 
press at the time
41
 but only in terms of the land of the defeated major enemy, Germany. However, 
the Moscow Agreement involved minor allies as well as former enemies. This single act has been 
considered by some as symbolic of major power cynicism and a watershed in the fate of Greece. It 
                                               
38 It was the German invader, however, who was the major Greek trading partner, even selling arms to the Mediterranean land in late 
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even led to one historian, critical of the role of Greek communists in the resistance, to show some 
rare sympathy towards them: “The hopes, ambitions, sacrifices, and pain inflicted by the Greek 
communists on their compatriots were consigned to a scrap of paper in which the British Prime 
Minister had sealed the fate of the Balkans until almost the end of the twentieth century.”42  While 
other historians
43
 have questioned the real impact of the Moscow exchange on subsequent major 
power agreements over Greece, it still reflects the overriding thrust of large power negotiations - the 
Greek government was not directly involved. The outcome of the Moscow meeting was known 
confidentially at the time to New Zealand and members of the Commonwealth (Chapter 6). It was 
communicated by the British authorities as an agreed upon and abiding stark division i.e. reflecting 
Churchill’s version. 
 
The New International Organisation 
In addition to the major powers, New Zealand had an interest and commitment to the United 
Nations Organisation (U.N.O.). The extent of its willingness to embrace this new organisation at the 
cost of the long-existing Commonwealth structure is open to debate, as one academic has argued
44
. 
However, the U.N.O, in terms of this project, offered a different venue for New Zealand to engage 
with Greece. It was external to years of direct British-controlled diplomatic channels. The United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (U.N.R.R.A.) was also one of the humanitarian agencies 
New Zealanders would find themselves interacting with. One of its first tasks was to assist Greece 
after liberation. The U.N.R.R.A. history there is one of controversy, especially concerning its 
relations with the British military.
45
  The U.N.O. also figured in New Zealand post-war attitudes 
toward Greece. It provided a venue both for engaging with Greek politicians and also a diplomatic 
framework that conceivably might prove dangerous to the Pacific Dominion. 
 
All the above political and diplomatic post-war developments took place while New Zealand was in 
the gestation of its official histories. 
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COLD WAR AND OFFICIAL MEMORY 
In 1948, a pamphlet titled Why I Fight Communism
46
 appeared in New Zealand. Carrying a 
foreword by Peter Fraser, it was purportedly authored by one of his Ministers, Bob Semple.
47
  It 
attacked communist party presence in the country’s trade union movement, a long-standing battle in 
itself. It also incorporated the 1941 Crete campaign. Demonstrating the drive to make the battle a 
key underpinning of the nation, the booklet reinterpreted the New Zealand Communist Party’s 
(N.Z.C.P.) stance on British imperialism as an insult. The Party had once stated: "There shall be no 
more Cretes."
48
  The government’s anxiety and bellicose attitude over the communist threat was 
shared by Howard Kippenberger, head of its official history project.
49
  These official attitudes were 
in place when New Zealand was researching and developing its history of its soldiers’ wartime 
interactions with the leftist E.A.M./E.L.A.S. partisans (Chapter 4).  The same chapter shows the 
involvement of the communist party in actively supporting some Greeks over others. 
 
Greece  
The situation in Greece was far more bitter and lethal than in the far away Pacific nation. The 
communist threat was seen as emanating from just across the borders with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
as much as internally.  Open warfare (including napalm) was conducted against the communist 
rebel army. Political prisoners ran into the thousands, and internal exile was reintroduced.   One can 
again use this to show the contrast between the Greek situation and some of its more extraordinary 
use in New Zealand memory. In September/October 1945, Freyberg initiated the first 
commemoration of the Crete Battle.  His commitment was such that he transported a 100-strong 
contingent of his command from Italy and North Africa to attend. Less than two months later, the 
Greek political turmoil was again evident:  "At least half of the 18,639 persons [i.e. approx. 9,300) 
held in prisons in early November 1945 were imprisoned for political reasons."
50
 The numbers 
thereafter varied according to the internal situation but skyrocketed again under the Colonels’ 
Dictatorship. As Chapter 3 shows, a New Zealand contingent was on Crete again then. Their 
speeches were utilized by the accepted, comfortable and official war memory. 
                                               
46 Robert Semple, Why I fight Communism (Wellington: Author, 1948). Fraser wrote:  'Mr Semple does not attack any nation or 
people. He attacks the Communist doctrines and disciples.” I hope the pamphlet will have the wide circulation it so thoroughly 
deserves.' 
47 One official source argues the authorship was not guaranteed. Len Richardson. 'Semple, Robert', from the Dictionary of New 
Zealand Biography. Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 30-Oct-2012 
URL:http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/3s11/semple-robert Accessed March 10, 2014. 
48 Robert Semple, Why I fight Communism, 15. The quote emanates from the Party’s People Voice, June 27,1941. In keeping with a 
public stance on Greece at the time, the government-generated booklet completely omitted the controversial December 1944 fighting 
in Athens but focused on the “bloodshed” in Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Robert Semple, Why I fight Communism, 32. 
49 IA 77/ 1/ 6 Communist Party November 1948- December 1950 (ANZ). Kippenberger to Sullivan May 31, 1949. “The Communist 
Party in New Zealand is very much more dangerous than the public realise and it is doing its best to infiltrate into key positions 
everywhere, unless it is vigorously combated. Very surprising things might happen here within a few years.” 
50 Polymeris Voglis, Becoming a Subject : Political Prisoners in the Greek Civil War (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 163. 
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DIFFERING TRAJECTORIES OF OFFICIAL REMEMBERING 
Construction of respective Greek and New Zealand State official memories and the type and level 
of challenge to them again stresses the differences between the two countries and consequently, 
adds to the motivation to research New Zealand’s response to Greek turbulence.   
 
While New Zealand implemented a massive official war memory programme, Greek governments 
applied a severe imposition of silence during the early post-war years.
51
 The role of the leftist 
resistance force E.A.M./E.L.A.S. was ignored.
52
 Data gathering and organisation of archives may 
have been the mainstay of the New Zealand endeavour, but the opposite was true for Greece. 
Wholesale controversial destruction of files was carried out. This continued even during the 1980s 
by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, head of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (P.A.S.O.K.), 
who sought reconciliation, not without critical academic commentary, between the divisions of 
post-war Greece.
53
 But divisions are still evident, as the following section shows.  This was 
reflected in the media coverage of respective veterans. 
Into the New Millennium 
While in 2011 the New Zealand media ran stories about the 70
th
 anniversary of the battle for Crete 
and the previously mentioned lack of funding for the veterans to attend commemorative events on 
the island, the New Zealand Herald website carried a British video news item
54
 about another 
veteran of the war. Manolis Glezos was one of two young students who removed the German 
Swastika flying above the Acropolis on 30 May 1941 (as the defeated New Zealand and 
Commonwealth troops on Crete were being evacuated). Now a major figure in the anti-austerity 
protests and well known long-standing social activist,
55
 Glezos spoke on camera about the current 
crisis and invoked the memory of the Greek resistance to Axis occupation and the still-unpaid 
German reparations. According to the television item, he had been arrested multiple times during 
the occupation as well as being sentenced to death during the Greek Civil War and ‘dictatorship’ 
(possibly the military junta dictatorship of 1967 - 1974). This single Greek is accompanied in his 
anguish by an organization that had a major role in the two wars – world and civil. 
 
                                               
51 Mark Mazower, “Cold War and the Appropriation of Memory: Greece After Liberation,” East European Politics and Societies 9, 
2, (1995).  
52 Hagen Fleischer, “Authoritarian Rule in Greece and its Heritage,” in Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes in Europe, ed. Jerzy 
W. Borejsza (New York: Berghahn, 2006). 
53 David Close “Road to Reconciliation?: Greek Civil War and the Politics of Memory in the 1980s,” in Greek Civil War : Essays on 
a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silences,  ed. Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 273-5. 
54 “Greek Freedom Fighter in Action Once More” June 22, 2011. 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/video.cfm?c_id=2&gal_cid=2&gallery_id=119654 Accessed March 10, 2013. 
55 George Gilson, “Germans lived because Greeks died,” Athens News, March 13, 2011. 
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The Greek communists are still active following Glasnost and the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. They 
have a large headquarters in northern Athens and a much smaller one in Chania, Crete.
56
 Their view 
on the State-inspired commemorative efforts is illuminating: “The KKE does not participate in the 
“official” celebration of the government that because it falsifies and distorts both the history and the 
content of the national resistance.”57 
 
Recognised academic authorities on Greek war and post-war history have also entered the public 
arena during the recent Greek economic crisis.
58
 The experiences and memories expressed in the 
media indicate that the socio-political turbulence and violence that engulfed Greek society from the 
defeat of early 1941 until long after the end of the war still resonates in some Greek quarters.  It 
contrasts with the dominant New Zealand official memory of Greece. The most prominent public 
expression in that memory will be discussed in the following chapter, 
 
This chapter has shown two vastly different countries thrown together in world-wide and civil 
conflict. Exigencies of war, power politics, self-imposed constraints, long-standing priorities and 
divisions of different sections of New Zealand society would influence behaviour at the time 
towards the Greeks. The Dominion’s state had need for an officially endorsed memory that would 
ameliorate the tragic losses of early 1941 and salve the fractious New Zealand divisions over Greek 
politics. It had to achieve these outcomes as well as elevate New Zealand national imagining to 
confirm its legitimacy to govern. The tactics it used are now explored as is the multiple links 
between New Zealand and Greece. 
 
                                               
56 On-site visits by Martyn Brown to Athens and Chania, Crete. November, 2012. 
57 International Relations Section, KKE, email August 17, 2011. 
58 Damian Uladh, “Battle for Memory,” Athens News, November 14, 2010.  The newspaper interviewed Hagen Fleischer on the issue 
of memory in Greece. Besides, talking of the historical context, he also its use in current difficult relations with Germany. Both the 
German and Greek press attracted criticism over stereotyping and hyperbole. See also Richard Clogg, “In Athens,” London Review 
of Books, 34, 13 (2012): 28. 
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CHAPTER THREE: GIVING MEANING TO THE DISASTERS OF 
1941 
 
As illustrated in the previous chapters, the battles of early 1941 are prominent in New Zealand 
memory (official and otherwise) and continue to generate a discourse that shows no sign of abating. 
It was during these events that an individual State champion of bonding with the Greeks emerged. 
During the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, Lieutenant-General Bernard Cyril 
Freyberg had a major influence on establishing State-based linkages to Greece and the moulding of 
a particular form of public recognition of that country. His wartime reach extended beyond the 
Mediterranean into the Pacific country, and it did not just involve military matters but also a 
concern relating to Greek civilians. In one way, his own personality would provide a frame of 
thinking that avoided recognising the political turmoil that he was aware of in the Greek camp. In 
this, he was adding to the dominant sanitised official memory. 
 
Freyberg held sway with Peter Fraser over Greek matters. But this was, arguably, to the point of 
recklessness. By this, I mean not the 1941 events but in 1944.  However, in that latter year of 
liberation and increasing Greek-related turmoil, both would subtly use the memory of those earlier 
1941 events to navigate a path to avoid any charge of taking sides in Greek politics.   But the two 
would also differ in some ways, and exchange of information was not always forthcoming. It was 
all part of a sometimes slightly opaque or cryptic formulation of the intricacies of the connectivity, 
as against the singular view so evident in present memory.  
 
There would be other New Zealand State and non-State actors who would shape the association 
with Greece. They were already active in the period immediately before the fighting of 1941.  
Unlike Fraser and Freyberg, who would change to a certain extent, these would remain steadfastly 
rooted in a particular attitude.  These other parties are not dealt with in any great deal in the 
literature. The nature of one would preclude it from both contributing to New Zealand 
exceptionalism toward the Greeks; indeed, it worked against it. Another community-based one 
would be more successful initially, despite State-imposed limitations. 
 
The decision to go to Greece, and the ensuing catastrophes of that year, would see, at the time, an 
avoidance of the nature of the political system there. The leadership of the subsequent major official 
memory exercise would go to considerable lengths to overshadow all other considerations about the 
decision by stressing one empirical record and the demand to adhere to a set historiographical 
methodology. It was an example where the tenets of historiography were put to use in creating a 
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comfortable memory. Thus, the stark division between the two, as indicated in a previous chapter, 
does not entirely hold true for all situations. It is another form of complexity in considering history 
and memory. Other episodes, especially concerning Crete, would see other tactics used. 
 
IGNORING FIRST CONTACTS 
While 1941 would become the officially declared year of the genesis of the relationship, there had 
been earlier efforts. They were not about fighting. 
 
Aid from New Zealand to Greece in 1940 
As against the forthcoming large-scale and direct commonwealth military involvement in 1941, 
1940 was a year of aid - financial and clothing. . These were efforts following the Italian invasion of 
October 1940. New Zealand endeavours had a mixed level of success. Failure lay on the side of the 
national elite and State bureaucracy as opposed to the Greek New Zealanders, who had also made a 
contribution. The causes of failure were being part of a large and distant British-dominated military 
machine and a lack of control in managing overseas wartime transportation. These constraints 
would be prevalent during the rest of the war. One can also see in these early examples certain State 
behaviours that would remain constant during the war and others that would not. One constant was 
having a single military entity in the Mediterranean, as the following shows. 
 
An Army belonging to the Nation  
On 25 November 1940, the country’s newspapers carried a story from the United Press Association 
that “mixed units of British, Australian and New Zealand troops have gone to Greece” and that 
some had been carried shoulder -high through the streets by the Greeks.
1
  There was a denial by the 
government: “It can be authoritatively stated that there is no truth in the London report that New 
Zealand troops have been sent to Greece”. 2 A few weeks later the Prime Minster announced that 
the troops, albeit small in number, were indeed already there.
3
  
 
In its official history the state included the incident. 
4
 Avoiding piecemeal deployment of its army 
was a theme in official memory. It emphasised the national profile. However, a later chapters show 
how this was not inclusive of all New Zealand soldiers.  At home in the Pacific, there was another 
strategy employed during the war. This was nation-building Dominion domestic aid structures and 
policies. 
                                               
1 “Official Denial NZ Troops in Greece,” Evening Post, November 25, 1940. 
2 Ibid. 
3 “NZ Troops in Greece Special Men in Greece,” Evening Post, December 9, 1940. 
4 W.G. McClymont, To Greece (Wellington: War History Branch, 1959), 91-2. 
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As the following illustrates it also impacted on the Greek connection, as did London directives and 
the diasporic Greek New Zealanders.   
 
British Drive and New Zealand Responses 
Initiatives to connect with Greece through aid, like the military, still came from London, but in 
1940 there was non- State Dominion interest in doing the same. The former was unquestioningly 
accepted, the latter subjected to severe restrictions. The constraints were argued by the State on 
financial grounds, but as the following sections and chapters show, they would remain more for a 
sense of national cohesion amongst citizens. It was a domestic manifestation paralleling the unified 
New Zealand army overseas in the Mediterranean.  
 
First, the London-initiated request.  Britain wanted the Commonwealth Dominions to “contribute to 
Greece’s war effort” and asked that New Zealand should consider sending warm clothing, blankets 
and sheets for use in Greek military hospitals.
5
  The Dominion was still following at this stage. That 
is, it was not initiating any special efforts for Greece. 
 
Pragmatics and policy then came into play in Wellington concerning domestic needs and existing 
overseas commitments. Bureaucrats thought the “New Zealand civilian market is bare” 6 of 
blankets. The needs of its own military and promised shipments to India also had to be considered. 
7
 
The condition of second- hand items, lack of uniformity and delay in gathering them meant they 
were precluded.
8
  In the end, stores were found in the Army pool. However, availability meant one 
thing, payment was another.  
 
The source for funding was the National Patriotic Fund, a bureaucratic entity, relevant throughout 
subsequent parts of this study.  
 
National Patriotic Fund- Ensuring the Idea of the Nation at Home 
The Fund was a quasi-government body with a central board paid by public funds but with 
voluntary provincial committees. It aimed at providing community-level support for the war effort.
9
 
                                               
5 IA 1 3105 172/206 Pt 1(ANZ), Patriotic Funds Assistance for Greece. New Zealand High Commissioner London to Prime Minister, 
November 27,1940.  
6 Secretary of Supply to Minister, November 29, 1940, in ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Heenan to Fraser, December10, 1940, in ibid.  
9This included collecting monies, printed guidance for civilians on how to send parcels overseas, establishment of recreational clubs 
for servicemen to prize money for the war history eyewitness accounts competitions held in the Middle East during the conflict itself. 
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Donations of money came from various organisations
10
 and individuals.
11
 The Fund held policies 
that would concentrate home-based war funding through a funnel clearly defined as belonging to 
the nation. It would, with one future brief deviation, marginalise diasporic-based fund drives. It was 
an internal driver of the notion of “the nation”.   The Fund’s activity or non-activity over Greece, 
especially from late 1942 onward, is where it began to conflict with the general New Zealand 
population.  
 
Despite some internal dissent, officials of the National Patriotic Fund agreed to provide the finance 
for purchase of aid goods. In the end the government paid to ship the consignment for the Greek 
army. The 10,000 army blankets, an equal number of pairs of socks and 2,000 pullovers never made 
it to the Greek soldiers. For some reason, the journey stalled in Sydney. When they eventually made 
it to the Middle East, they were lost amongst the stockpile of goods held there in British Army 
warehouses. Nearly a year after they left, and 5 months after the Germans had conquered Greece 
and Crete, some reached the Greek Red Cross. The Dominion newspaper called the whole saga a 
“muddle over blankets”.12  
 
In its first inter-nation interaction (albeit via Britain) the New Zealand state had been unsuccessful 
and embarrassed.   
 
Greek New Zealand Community Success  
In contrast to the Nation State, the New Zealand Greeks had succeeded in sending NZ£2,418 
(approximately 24% of the value of the government shipment) to the government of Metaxas. 
However, the funds were collected only from its own community members. This was due to policy 
emanating from Walter Nash, the Minister of Finance. He argued that the war-time situation made 
conservation of sterling reserves paramount. A larger funding drive, as requested by the Greeks of 
the country, was denied.  Apparently the same argument was made to a similar request from the 
Dutch living in the country.
13
 While these were the bare financial arguments, the Patriotic Fund had 
an influence. With its one nation/one people- funding mentality, ethnic groups could only collect 
from their own community. That is, there would be no broader funding drives. The Fund collected 
and spent money under the mantle of New Zealand. Again, it was a way of building positive 
national imagining but a long time before the major official war history enterprise.  The episode 
                                               
10 “Patriotic Funds,” New Zealand Herald, January 16, 1941. For example, in this piece one could read about, the Public Service, 
New Zealand Rugby Football Union, Church of England Military Affairs Committee. 
11 “National Patriotic Fund Board,” Bay of Plenty Beacon, 26 July, 1940. A “Miss E.F. Gilbert.” As well as the Massey Agricultural 
College Students Association, a staff collection at Modern Plastics (NZ) Ltd, Niue Island school boys.  
12 IA 13105 172 206 Pt 1 Patriotic Funds for Greece. (ANZ). A copy of the article is held on a government file. 
13 EA1 3105/172/206 (ANZ) Patriotic Funds Assistance for Greece.  Extract from Minutes National Patriotic Fund Board November 
19, 1940. 
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also shows the New Zealand government placing limits on itself and its own citizens in providing 
economic aid to the Greek nation. But it was not negative exceptionalism; it applied the rule to all 
ethnic communities. 
 
Besides these early efforts, a discussion of the extent of public and government knowledge about 
the pre-war and early wartime Greek administration (as against a Greek nation or “people”, that is, 
the stuff of public recognition of the bond) further illuminates the dynamics of the time and 
subsequent kinetics of the relationship.  
 
Public Descriptions of the Greek Regime 
Dominion newspapers had been providing accounts of the Metaxas regime since the General’s 
ascendancy to his dictatorial role in August 1936. Within several days of assuming power, he had 
carried out “ruthless action against labour organisations” that had involved mass arrests and 
“maltreatment”.14 The new ideological direction of the country was made evident within a month. 
Metaxas was shaping a society “along the lines of Italy and Germany”, and a return to 
parliamentary democracy was not being considered.
15
 The excuse of a communist plot was the 
justification.
16
 By early 1938, “a new period of severity which is without pity” had been reported. 
This centred on the banishment from Athens of opposition parliamentarians.
17
 Later in the same 
year, a revolt broke out in the republican stronghold of Crete.
18
 The role of the Greek monarch, 
George II of the Hellenes, in establishing the military regime was also noted – “the miniature 
dictator” had ascended through King George II’s approval.19 In these stories, one can already see an 
historical context that New Zealand would have to eventually contend with in its own national 
story-telling.  
 
Of the Confidential Variety 
In Commonwealth diplomatic communications, the unsavoury aspects of the regime were also 
raised, but not by New Zealand. It was also symptomatic of the nearly exclusively one way traffic 
about Greece – it flowed from London (nearly always the same communication sent to all the 
Dominions at the same time). In early 1940, while it seemed Greece might ally with Britain (and in 
turn the Commonwealth) against the Axis, a British diplomatic circular received in Wellington 
asked, “Can a regime admittedly so unpopular (as a result of its despotic and arbitrary treatment of 
                                               
14 “Anti-Labour Action,” Evening Post, August 8, 1936. 
15 “On Fascist Lines,” Evening Post, September 2, 1936.  
16 “Dictatorship to Avert Red Revolt,” Auckland Star, August 6, 1936. 
17 “All Banished,” Evening Post, January 29, 1938. 
18 “Outbreak of Revolt on Island of Crete,” Auckland Star July 30, 1938; “Revolt in Crete,” Evening Post, July 30, 1938. 
19 “In the Public Eye,” Evening Post August 29, 1936. 
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its opponents and critics) be trusted to lead the nation into war?”20 The analysis concluded it was 
best to continue support, and indeed strengthening of the regime. It argued, “We had better shut our 
eyes to the disagreeable elements of the regime”.21 This included a very active secret police headed 
by Konstantinos Maniadakis, whom the British ambassador called the “’Himmler’” of Greece”.22 
Also, implying the history of military involvement in Greek politics, the British military attaché 
was looking at fidelity: “no evidence that the army is not loyal”. In the light of possible military 
action with the enemy, a broadening of the government was advisable as against any “violent 
change”. 23  
 
While there was an optimistic picture of the regime as a new ally, New Zealand’s own London-
based representative, Cecil Day, also argued there would be “business as usual” following the death 
of the Greek dictator Metaxas in early 1941.
24
 The New Zealand government’s silence over the 
Metaxist dictatorship would naturally assist forming a palatable public “relationship” – one free of 
criticising the Greek internal situation but despising the foreign Axis invader.  
 
There is no evidence that the New Zealand government carried out any internal discussion about the 
Metaxas regime - including its foreign policy (especially in response to Italian expansionism). 
Indeed, even when Italy invaded Greece in October 1940, the archives show communication was all 
one way from London authorities to Wellington.  At the time, and subsequently, in official New 
Zealand histories, the Italian invasion of Greece rates very brief mention. The emphasis is all on the 
venture and battles in early 1941. 
 
Nature of the Greek Regime Reaches into Wellington City 
While Greece, the new ally, was on the other side of the world and there had been negligible direct 
contact from the Wellington government, the new alignment generated a minor domestic incident 
that reflected the strife of the Greek divisions. In February 1941, the month prior to the embarkation 
of the New Zealand and other Commonwealth troops to the Greek mainland, the Wellington police 
had been told by “a reliable person” that a certain Greek “who spends most of his time at the Greek 
                                               
20 EA1 201/2/82 pt. 2 b (ANZ) Department of External Affairs United Kingdom-External Relations-Greece. Balkan States February 
26, 1940, 1. 
21 Ibid., 2, 3-4. 
22 Ibid., 2. 
23 Ibid. 
24 AAEG 950 132e 345/4/1 1b Country Series – Greece (ANZ). Extract from Cecil Day’s Notes, January 30, 1941. His replacement 
was a minister in the regime and “in that capacity he has been the leading force in organising the social reforms introduced by the 
dictatorship of his Chief.”  
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Club” in Wellington is “definitely anti-British”25. It went on to say that “grave concern” had been 
expressed by other New Zealand Greeks about his behaviour.  
 
Subsequent investigations showed a virulently anti-Metaxist individual. The dictator had “split the 
Greek people”, and the interviewee and like-minded Greeks had suffered “great hardship”. 26  
Hence, being anti-Metaxist was synonymous as being “anti-British” by some. The State response 
reflected the demands of wartime allegiances. The person was interviewed by police and subjected 
to onward monitoring. A later chapter shows how this isolated case was eclipsed by mass public 
protest about Greek affairs from New Zealanders without Greek ethnic attachment. It was an 
indication of both a celebrated bond and politics being on the public agenda. The latter marred 
projection of the former.  
 
GIVING MEANING TO A DISASTER 
From the above, if one were looking to, one could dent the New Zealand national stature by arguing 
that going to Greece involved aiding an authoritarian regime that was being threatened by others of 
a similar persuasion (namely, Italy and Germany). The New Zealand leadership salved the 
association with the Greek regime by emphasising its moral involvement in a world-wide battle 
against totalitarianism.  
 
1941 – National Greek Sovereignty as Against a Form of Society 
Less than six weeks after the allied defeat and evacuation of Crete, Peter Fraser addressed the 
National Union of Railwaymen’s Conference in Swansea, Wales. As reported in the New Zealand 
press, Fraser told the audience “that Australia and Greece fought in Greece and Crete to retain the 
structure of social democracy.”27 The story subsequently states he was referring to the Pacific 
Dominion, rather than the Mediterranean land. While the old left-wing campaigner and former 
radical may have been playing to the crowd, his avoidance about Greece is symptomatic of an 
emphasis on considering the Mediterranean country only in terms of its sovereign borders with a 
menacing and eventually invading Axis.  The October 1940 Italian invasion led Fraser to send 
Metaxas a message: “The Government and people of New Zealand extend cordial good wishes to 
the Government and people on the struggle into which Greece has now been forced by unprovoked, 
ruthless aggression.”28 That fight was “to defend and restore international order and justice.”29 The 
                                               
25
 New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service, Wellington (NZSIS).  File released to the author September 2011.Surveillance files on 
individual members [names with-held] Greek New Zealand Community (1940 -1943) Memorandum February 20, 1941.  
26 Report February 21, 1941. Name of individual withheld by the Privacy Act 1993 and Official Information Act 1982. 
27“Mr Fraser’s Tour,” Auckland Star, July 17, 1941. 
28 “Message from New Zealand to Greece and Belgium,” Auckland Star, November 6, 1940.  
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story appeared in the press. New Zealanders were being told national sovereignty overrode other 
considerations of the socio-political makeup of Greece. Ancient Greek contributions to democracy 
were alluded to as well.
30
 The attitude would eventually change in the years ahead, and, ironically, 
Fraser wanted intervention to ensure Greek society would change to one with genuine free 
elections. But from late 1940, it was a new ally at a critical time in the war. Avoiding mention of 
the Greek regime was part of justifying the disasters of 1941. 
Making the Greek State Palatable through Official Memory 
While the New Zealand State ameliorated its association with an undemocratic Greek regime 
through silence and a narrow definition of “freedom”, the contents of a telegram constituted another 
strategy during the Official War History and commemoration enterprise. Before then, there was also 
an arm of the State which during the war itself showed New Zealand’s commitment to using the 
war for national imagining. 
 
Early Endeavours 
The first official monographs for popular consumption that underpinned the argument to go to 
Greece appeared during the war itself. These are much less cited than the post-war writing 
endeavours and were a series of “interim histories”31 first published in 1943 by the New Zealand 
Army Board and “written for a New Zealand public”.32 The items themselves are of interest for 
several reasons. First, they are an early indication of a State institution’s treatment of the 1941 
venture and battles. Second, they promised a future major history (again, proof of the national 
commitment). Third, and perhaps surprisingly, they show some acknowledgement of principles of 
empirically-based historiography – but the interpretation was, naturally, supportive of the State. 
 
The histories on Greece and Crete both appeared in 1943. Freyberg himself introduced the latter and 
was quoted over the limitations of the work. He noted, “At this stage it is not possible to write an 
official history since many documents and much data cannot be used by the historian until after the 
war.”33 It is recognition of the availability of records or archives in the vein of “history”. This is an 
early example of how the State can, on one level, be obsessive about using stored records to write 
its history, but on another it will shape it into one uniform simple message or “memory”. For now, 
it still pursued the acceptable New Zealand involvement as an idealistic and morally justified 
                                                                                                                                                            
29 Ibid. 
30 “Our Fight New Zealanders in War,” New Zealand Herald, April 23, 1941. “Greece, with her great traditions, had taken a stand 
and had won the admiration of every freedom-loving person in the world.” 
31 The phrase is in the Foreword of New Zealand. Army Board, Campaign in Greece: New Zealand Division in Action (Wellington: 
Author, 1943). 
32 Ibid, Foreword. 
33 New Zealand. Army Board, Battle for Crete: New Zealand Division in Action (Wellington: Author, 1943), Foreword. 
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episode: "Never could people have called for help with greater need or greater justice.”34 The New 
Zealanders were going not as part of the Commonwealth but with a distinctly separate identity: 
“That the New Zealand Division was an important part of this army should be a source of pride to 
the people of a young democratic nation, whose sons were thus granted the honour of fighting for 
Greece alongside the people and in the land which first made the cause of free men the finest cause 
in life.”35 Explicit is the thought of an imagined New Zealand with integrity – its unified martial 
arm committed to defending an ally from invasion. Implicit is the national sovereignty perspective 
of Greece again, as was a reference to freedom. These ideas were reinforced by the official war 
history project after the war.  
 
The “Moral Cause” 
In 1949, before the directly relevant Greece and Crete campaign histories and the equally extensive 
volume on external affairs were produced, the State-sponsored war history project published the 
banally titled Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War 1939-
45 Volume I.
36
  Review copies and a letter from Kippenberger were sent to major newspapers, 
journals and broadcasters.  Amongst other things, he pointed out what he believed to be a 
“remarkable message” from Peter Fraser to Churchill and the latter’s response.  The two were 
“perhaps among the most notable documents in New Zealand’s history.”37  The cablegrams in 
question showed Fraser’s willingness to proceed in the Greek venture, despite the increasing risks.  
The political leader argued that New Zealand “cannot contemplate the possibility of abandoning the 
Greeks to their fate, especially after the heroic resistance with which they have met the Italian 
invader. To do so would be to destroy the moral basis of our cause and invite results greater in their 
potential damage to us than any failure of the contemplated operation.”38 Churchill responded with 
a typically embellished communication; one that both belied his adherence to British preferences as 
well as his sense of history: “We are deeply moved by your reply which, whatever may be the 
fortunes of war, will shine in the history of New Zealand and be admired by future generations of 
free men in every quarter of the globe.”39  
 
                                               
34 Campaign in Greece : New Zealand Division in Action, 3. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War 1939-45: Volume I, (Wellington: War History 
Branch, 1949). 
37 IA 1 3392 181/53/5 Pt 1 (ANZ) War History-Printing and Publishing of Official Histories –Documents Vol 1-3, (ANZ). 
Kippenberger to editors of Christchurch Star Sun, Southern Cross, Christchurch Press, Evening Post, Listener, Otago Daily Times, 
Evening Star (Dunedin), Southland Times, New Zealand Herald, R.S.A. Review, Auckland Star, Weekly News, Timaru Herald, 
Freelance, Freedom, Supervisor of Talks, N.B.S. Wellington, Supervisor, Programme Organisation, Commercial Division, New 
Zealand Broadcasting, Wellington.  
38 Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War 1939-45 Volume I, Telegram 353. 
39 Ibid., Telegrams 354. 
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These telegrams were later used by Professor Fred Wood, the author of the official External Affairs, 
published in 1958
40
.  As an academic, his approach in analysing the decision to go to Greece was in 
a manner closely aligned with analytical history.  He told the reader about “facts”, documents and 
the actors who used them, understanding motivation (“non-military and “political”), complexity and 
stated that his assessment was based “on existing evidence”41 In other words, the written history 
may change with newly available data. There were also various contributing factors that point to 
complexity: Despite expressing much that fits with analytical history, projecting a singular moral 
underpinning still dominated: “The emphasis on moral issues was characteristic of New Zealand 
policy.”42  This again ensures a positive national imagining.43  
 
Ensuring One Simple Memory 
That the official Wood interpretation stressing idealism about Greece was the one to be followed 
was made quite clear to the writer of the 1959 official volume on the Greek mainland campaign, To 
Greece. This was W.G. McClymont.
44
 Kippenberger sent him a draft of the relevant chapter by 
Wood. He added instructions: "I enclose a copy of Fred Wood's Chapter XIV dealing mostly with 
the "preliminaries to Greece". I am satisfied that he has the story as nearly correctly as we can 
expect to get it. I do not remember exactly what you said on this subject, but after reading this you 
may feel that some alterations are called for. We don't want to give two versions, or 
interpretations."
45
 That the editor saw a variety of interpretations (a characteristic of 
historiography), but at the same time wanted conformity, shows both an understanding of the 
historical method but at the same time a drive toward one “story” that was acceptable. 
Theoretically, it is another example of where the demarcation between history and memory (in this 
case, almost commemorating a morally based fatal decision) are blurred to an extent, as per the 
previously mentioned observation by Montgomerie in Chapter 1. But the intent was evident, data 
would be used selectively to set a simple message that was acceptable, and one the citizens of the 
nation would be proud of. 
 
                                               
40 F.L.W. Wood, Political and External Affairs (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1958), 185. Wood looked at several 
factors in sending the troops to Greece – including the political one of keeping Greece in the war but the moral stance was 
paramount. 
41 Ibid., 184-5. 
42 Ibid., 185-6. 
43 However, this acceptance of the general idealistic drive has been challenged by one recent academic study. Fifty-one years after 
Wood, Watson and Crawford argue the Dominion had a stronger acceptance of appeasement than Chamberlain. J. Crawford and J. 
Watson, “Most Appeasing Line': New Zealand and Nazi Germany, 1935-40,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 38,1 
(2010). 
44 W.G. McClymont, To Greece.  
45 WAII 3 3 16b (ANZ) Campaign in Greece 1941, correspondence files W.G. McClymont's correspondence while writing a history 
of the campaign in Greece. Kippenberger to McClymont August 23, 1956 (ANZ). 
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Academic Endorsement and Internal Scepticism  
When McClymont’s volume on Greece came out in 1959, Wood and other professors were listed as 
an Editorial Advisory Panel.
46
 Academic endorsement would make acceptance of this history more 
widespread in the general community and student cohorts. The telegram that anchored New 
Zealand’s moral stance was quoted in full and described as a “memorable statement”.47 McClymont 
was personally cynical about the published stance he had taken. During the writing of the work, he 
wrote semi-privately to a colleague: “Public opinion in wartime is very important - and the 
protection of the noble Greeks had not to be neglected. I quite agree when you say of my earlier 
reference: ‘Very nice proper and moral- but bloody rot.’”48 The published study still included the 
moral justification. And, just as Kippenberger continually sought to legitimize the mainland venture 
with New Zealanders years after the event, McClymont pointed out, again to the same colleague, a 
more self-serving reason: “my newspaper friends tell me that morale and public opinion during 
wartime are of incredible importance. The general public or rather nations in wartime could do and 
think some very queer things. So if we made some appearance of assisting Greece, all would be 
well.”49 
 
Consciously, then, there were efforts to steer a suitable path within what was being publicly 
presented as “history”, despite some of the historians being sceptical of what the received version 
would be. Internal resistance was overcome. 
 
ON THE GROUND  
While the above discussion focussed on political rhetoric and the subsequent histories of the prelude 
to the Greek campaign, the soldiers being transported to the Balkan Peninsula from North Africa 
faced a dubious venture,
50
 cruel realities of war and their first encounter with the Greek people. 
Blindness to the regime replaced the earlier newspaper reporting when their commander addressed 
them.  Freyberg looked to historic ancient Greece to help frame the Greek expedition for his troops 
and was published in the press
51
 as well as some of the State histories.
52
 He told his men that Greece 
                                               
46 Besides Professor F.L. Wood Victoria University of Wellington, they included Professor N.C. Phillips, University of Canterbury 
and Professor J. Rutherford, University of Auckland. McClymont, To Greece, 539. 
47 W.G. McClymont, To Greece, 113. 
48 WAII3 1 15 (ANZ) Campaign in Greece 1941 correspondence files. Correspondence of WG McClymont .McClymont to Wards 
undated  
49 Ibid., He also pointed out the Germans would have taken advantage of the Commonwealth not going to the aid of the Greeks. 
50 WAII 3 3 16b Campaign in Greece 1941(ANZ), Correspondence files W.G. McClymont's correspondence while writing a history 
of the campaign in Greece. Ian Wards who wrote the narrative of the Greek volume told McClymont that "I have a feeling that 
surviving NZ soldiers will be grateful for a clear account of what was for them a somewhat baffling experience." Wards to 
McClymont, April 21, 1954.  
51 “Full Confidence Dominion Troops,” Evening Post, April 10, 1941. 
52 New Zealand. Army Board Campaign in Greece : the New Zealand Division in Action, 8; Documents Relating to New Zealand’s 
Participation in the Second World War, 1939-45: Volume I,  Item 341; McClymont mentions it in passing, McClymont, To Greece, 
119; Wood does not include it. 
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was “the birthplace of culture and learning.”53  Although he would remain quiet for the remainder 
of the war about the regime, ordinary soldiers would not. They saw it at first hand as well as the 
poverty and the Greek predilection for politics that would affect interaction with New Zealanders. 
 
Ordinary Soldiers  
One soldier wrote after the war, “Jack the farmer had `the whole situation sized up. All the people’, 
he told me, ‘are fair dinkum Communists, real Reds. The village and its land all belong to the whole 
gang. The Lord Mayor allots the work to each man. Everything produced is shared up equally 
amongst the people, and right there in the village they make 95% per cent of everything they 
require".
54
 Later, on a more sophisticated level, John Mulgan, using his experience in Special 
Operations Executive (S.O.E.), made some similar observations. In his posthumously published 
Report on Experience, he noted “there is a good deal of co-operative law and custom already in the 
villages.”55 Economic exchange was often via barter56 rather than currency exchange. Besides this 
social cohesion, there was the pervasive interest in politics. Mulgan, coming across a slogan-
chanting boy, wrote “As with most Greeks, politics was to be his alphabet.”57 Decades after, in the 
documentary In Rich Regard, a New Zealand veteran spoke about the incessant political discussion 
in Cretan cafes.
58
 Individual New Zealanders in various roles would be experiencing these social 
organisations and politics. To many, Greek society brought survival. For others, acute political 
conflict caused their death. Regardless of politics, the suffering and dire situation of these villages 
would become a major focal point of New Zealand public concern during the war and for years 
afterwards.  
 
The pre-occupation with the economic situation was also apparent to everyday soldiers.
59
 The 
poverty seeped into the Greek military as well. The average New Zealand soldier, it was noted, 
received approximately 70 times the pay of his Greek counterpart.
60
 The extensive use of livestock, 
instead of mechanisation, by the farmers was also evident in the land armed forces.
61
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Helm, Fights and Furloughs, 120. 
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Naturally, pre-war poverty of Greece was not a concern of New Zealand except where it affected 
military matters. During the enemy occupation, the State would initially also stay aloof from the 
plight of the Greek civilians but then change. That discussion will form a major part of Chapter 5. 
 
Encounters with the Greek Authoritarian Regime 
Some soldiers had passing encounters with vestiges of the authoritarian Metaxist regime. One 
Greek soldier related to a New Zealander how his advancement had been retarded by his being “a 
socialist”.62 There were also several innocuous encounters with the Metaxist youth63, their Nazi-like 
salute being the only disturbing part for one New Zealand soldier.
64
 Everyday New Zealand soldiers 
therefore seem to have had little direct contact with vestiges of the still largely functioning 
authoritarian regime.  
 
Similarly, by virtue of their place in the chain of command during the mainland campaign, Freyberg 
and his senior officers were not privy to the senior meetings between the British and Greek 
leadership, where the dynamics of the authoritarian regime mixed with long-standing tensions 
within Greek society.  One key example follows. The other raises the issue of collaboration. Their 
treatment by New Zealand State authorities in writing its history show strategies of selectivity, but 
in the case of the latter also an unwillingness to engage in any substantial way with that whole area.   
 
Meeting at Tatoi Palace and Saving the Commonwealth Troops 
A critical meeting at the Royal Greek Palace occurred on 19 April when it was obvious the invading 
Germans would be victorious. The post-war memoirs of British General Wilson
65
 include an 
account of the meeting, cited in To Greece by McClymont. With a rapidly crumbling military 
situation, George II offered the post of premier
66
 to Venizelist Republican General Mazarakis.  
67
  
He refused. The reason given in the official volume was via a quote from Wilson’s book: 
“Mazarakis decided that ‘he had been called in too late to retrieve the situation and that evacuation 
                                                                                                                                                            
Army on the move… I was astonished to see that their front line transport was composed entirely of ox wagons and pack animals 
which of course could only travel a very limited distance in a day at a very slow speed – actually at a slower pace than troops could 
march.” 
62 Helm, Fights and Furlough, 116. 
63 W.B. Thomas, Dare to be Free (London: Cassell, 2005), 133; Wheeler, Kalimera Kiwi, 67. 
64 Wheeler, Kalimera Kiwi, 67. 
65 Henry Maitland Wilson, Eight Years Overseas (London, Hutchison, 1948).  The Australian official history also includes the 
incident. Gavin Long, Greece Crete Syria (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1953), 132. 
66 After the death of Metaxas, Alexandros Koryzis assumed the role. He committed suicide on April 18, 1941 during the German 
onslaught.  
67 McClymont, To Greece, 365. McClymont alludes to the fate of the Republicans, through the persona of Mazarakis. He “had taken 
little part in public life after the dictatorship of Metaxas had been established in 1935.” 
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was the best solution.’68 In reality, the New Zealand volume ignores a more complex recollection, 
again, unsavoury for those not willing to take account of the Greek political dynamics. For in his 
book Wilson argued the Venizelists would only agree if the dreaded head of the secret police, 
Maniadakis was stood down. Wilson and his British entourage vetoed the move.
69
 The political 
colouring had bluntly been avoided in the official volume. It was in the vein of non-comment. The 
filtering out of Greek politics even went as far as the issue of collaboration. 
 
Question of Collaboration - 1941 and the Epirus Army 
As Chapter 2 discussed, Greek historiography has, as one point of contention, the definition of 
collaboration. Chronologically, the earliest and well-known case is the illegal surrender made by 
one senior general during the German offensive. Astonishingly, when mentioned in the Army 
Board-generated 1943 history, the latter receives implicit acceptance at a time when the acuteness 
of war and losses to New Zealand demanded otherwise. Hence, the illegal removal of the Greek 
commander of the Epirus Army by future collaborationist Prime Minister Georgios Tsolakoglou is 
described as being “without reference” to the overall Greek commander, Papagos. The perpetrator 
of the illegal act was justified in his actions: “he had no choice but to capitulate”.70  Already by 
early May 1941, there was a New Zealand press report about Tsolakoglou as heading the first 
collaborationist government.
71
  That a fellow traveler of the enemy should receive such treatment 
seems incredible, especially given that the struggle was still underway.  Later, McClymont used the 
stronger term “deposed” in the major official history.72  Both avoid the evolution of the Greek 
general into a collaborationist Premier during the occupation. The treatment lies in contrast to the 
denunciation of him in the memoirs of Field Marshall Papagos, the Greek Army’s Commander-in-
Chief against the Italians and also the Germans.  The War Project had a copy of the book, 
73
but the 
publicly known stain of collaboration had been ameliorated.  
 
The Greek military leader and future Prime Minister’s inclusion of the internal Greek dynamics 
might reflect his own preoccupation, but it was a blatant omission of a key factor in the New 
Zealand presentation of the exit from Greece. From the examples above, there was a tendency in 
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state exercises about the 1941 venture for Greek politics to be subject to wholesale removal or at 
least dilution in New Zealand official history/memory. This ensured a straight-forward and 
patriotically appealing account of honourable military actions without complication. 
 
CENTREPIECE OF CRETE –CLOSER TO GREEKS THAN ON THE MAINLAND 
Besides being the historian for the mainland Greek volume, McClymont wrote the original narrative 
of the Battle for Crete. He has been overshadowed in the revision by Walter Murphy, future 
associate professor in political studies at Victoria University of Wellington
74
, by input from general 
editor Howard Kippenberger, and by the final efforts of historian Dan Davin.    
Besides suggesting some variables that might contribute toward elevation of Crete above the 
mainland, the following section introduces some of the further attitudes of key actors that would 
influence the strength and nature of wartime connections with Greece. It also challenges the Greek 
soldier/civilian and war crimes/suffering tropes introduced as well as the image of pristine New 
Zealand “leadership” of the Greek forces. It is a specifically targeted analysis rather than a 
comprehensive examination.  
 
Concentration and Forced Focus – Time and Space 
For the New Zealanders, the battle was condensed into the west of the island. The intensity of the 
fighting took place in just 12 days.  Crete was in fact the largest concentrated mass interaction 
between New Zealanders and Greeks during the war or after. The New Zealanders were also 
working more closely with their Greek military counterparts than in the earlier mainland venture. 
The relative small size of units on Crete as against the much larger formations on the mainland 
might make for the possibility of stronger direct contact and resulting adhesion.
75
 Similarly, they 
were amongst a civilian population whose home was in small towns and villages that formed part of 
the battlefield rather than a line of fortifications away from populated areas.  On the most basic 
level of social interaction, therefore, one might say Crete offered a more conducive environment for 
New Zealand soldiers to mix with Cretan civilians and Cretan/Greek soldiers than had the 
mainland.  
 
There were other factors that would naturally lead to a perception of exceptionality of Crete for the 
New Zealanders. It was a unique type of battle (mostly airborne). It was also fought under New 
Zealand military leadership – at several levels. It was also, for the Pacific Dominion, the first major, 
                                               
74 W.E. Murphy was a lecturer in political science since 1962. In 1969 he reached associate professorship. Email communication 
from Special Collections Librarian Victoria University of Wellington, March 21, 2013. 
75 The physical surroundings were a different matter as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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but not the greatest,
76
 New Zealand bloodletting of the war.  Sacrifice was therefore not a sole key 
determinant in elevating Crete. It was a combination of the previous factors. The Cretans’ own long 
history of resisting invaders would also contribute to a fight that lay in contrast to the earlier 
mainland battle where little actual fighting had taken place.  
 
Leadership, given by Britain and endorsed by the Greek government, would bring with it exposure 
to Greek political dynamics, questionable treatment of Greek soldiers as well as the grey area of the 
brutality of both the allies and the invader.  
 
Assuming Leadership 
Freyberg’s assumption of overall command of the island’s defence, the establishment of martial law 
as well as the placement, to an extent, of New Zealand training/command roles with Greek army 
units, was something which naturally lends itself to a supportive national stature (if one takes away 
the obvious outcome of the battle - failure). It was also something of a precedent for military 
interaction during the later years of the war.  It also brought him and some of his officers and men 
into direct contact with senior Greek personages. 
 
Freyberg met an increasingly explosive internal political situation on Crete with his personality-
driven tactic of avoidance. It perfectly matched the official diplomatic silence of the New Zealand 
government at the time.  He was also assisted by conscious Greek decisions to avoid disrupting his 
chain of command when the new Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos defended his new placement 
of Republican elements in the Greek camp.
77
 Crete would require other silences – not just over 
politics - when it came to ensuring a New Zealand official memory of integrity when dealing with 
Greek matters. 
 
Setting Patterns of Behaviour at the Time 
In the immediate aftermath of the loss of Crete, one New Zealand officer made a provocative 
statement in his official report about the Greek government during its time on the island. He argued 
one of the reasons there had been less Fifth Column activity on the island than the mainland was 
                                               
76 For example, a recent study states “If the casualty rate for the Crete campaign had stunned families in New Zealand, the lists for 
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77 K 51 Tsouderos papers General Archives of Greece, Athens (GAK) On May 11 whilst at Chania, Tsouderos wrote to an unnamed 
British minister: “I must explain that I do not mean the military organs in respect of which the Commander in Chief General 
Freyberg has free authority.”  
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“The gradual elimination of doubtful elements in the Government.”78  One was undoubtedly, as the 
Greek diplomat, poet and 1963 Nobel Laureate, George Seferis observed at the time: “the hated 
chief of police, Maniadakis,” who now “went everywhere with an armed escort.”79 Another was 
Diacos, who the British consul in Canea reported to London, had “arrived in Crete a broken and 
terrified man, constantly imploring me to assist his departure. He was afraid of being shot and went 
under an assumed name.”80  At least one New Zealand officer encountered Venizelist Republican 
revolutionary civilians in his sector.
81
 The commander of the Cretan Division arrived in the area 
without his troops and was shot by a local amidst much vocal demonstration. This all points to an 
underlying layer of discontent amongst the Cretans.
82
 
 
This type of disquieting information was not included in the regular traffic from London to 
Wellington, nor from Freyberg (whether or not he did know is another matter) to the government. 
The opening comment on this section came from Bell, an Intelligence Officer with the New Zealand 
Division.  While officers in the New Zealand Division had met King George II, cabinet ministers 
and army officers at the Piccadilly Restaurant several weeks before the attack,
83
 it might be said that 
intelligence officers attached to senior staffs might be more inclined, and have the opportunity, to 
observe diplomatic workings and tensions. That would certainly be the case with other New 
Zealand intelligence officers on Freyberg’s staff  in the post-Crete period. These attitudes are 
discussed in later chapters. The General’s stance was a different matter. 
 
Freyberg and the Greek King 
The General stayed quiet about the unappealing aspects of the Greek monarchy and government. 
The extent of Freyberg’s direct involvement with the political drivers through the tense pre-invasion 
military situation is not ascertainable, given the records available. He was officially open to the 
British about his own limitations about high diplomacy.
84
 He was equally expressive in his official 
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report to the New Zealand government: “I am no judge of diplomacy or of political questions, 
especially “Haute Politique.”85  
 
To his own troops, he showed how extreme and potentially embarrassing this political naiveté could 
be. Shortly after Crete, he told an audience of non-Commissioned Officers in Egypt that the Greek 
Gendarmerie was “a type of modified Gestapo.”86 One might be inclined to consider he was being 
critical of the Greek leadership - likening the Greek police with the feared enforcement arm of the 
enemy – but other behaviour and statements strongly suggest otherwise. 
The General personally defended the Greek monarch, who had endorsed the dictatorship of 
Metaxas, and his Prime Minister very strenuously in his official Crete report. “I want to make it 
quite clear that neither the King nor the Cabinet wanted to leave Crete”. Later, “I may claim to be a 
judge of men in the raw and after twenty days’ close and intimate collaboration in difficult and 
dangerous times, I pay my homage to the gallant way both the King and the Greek Prime Minister 
faced up to all the many difficulties and dangers that beset them.”87  Finally, he paid “tribute” to 
them and the Greek commander “for their unfailing help in times which must have been tragic and 
difficult.”88 In Freyberg’s attitude toward the King and Tsouderos, the New Zealand-Greek bonding 
seemingly had another thread to strengthen it.  Historians have not been as kind as Freyberg 
concerning the King’s and his political leader’s personal bravery89.  At its most basic then, the 
General was supporting Greeks. That is, he was contributing toward establishing a New Zealand-
Greek connection. He would keep on doing so during the forthcoming years. 
 
Indication of a Longer and Personal Relationship 
While in the government arena Freyberg had promoted the king and his premier, he also apparently 
developed an ongoing personal relationship with King George.
90
 This friendship may have 
influenced the General’s subsequent actions over the Royal Greek Army in the Middle East, as 
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discussed in the next chapter. This relationship is not explored in any of the biographies,
91
 and the 
General himself never publicly spoke of it. One may take Freyberg’s key words of friendship 
towards Crete and that the King “loved the New Zealanders”92 as support for the New Zealand 
Greek connection. 
 
That George II managed to be elevated into a key component in New Zealand memory is an 
example of both the longevity of certain events (a characteristic of “memory” as per the theoretical 
model used in this study), an elevation that, as previously discussed, lies in contrast to a sizable 
section of Greek society who questioned his remaining as monarch.  
 
King George II in the New Zealand Official Memory  
As the following section and subsequent chapters show, over the forthcoming years in the public 
domain the Dominion state apparatus embraced, ignored and then re-embraced its involvement with 
the Greek king and the royal family. The recurring theme was that the nexus was the Battle of 
Crete, and more specifically, the escape across the mountains. It was a reference point that satisfied 
the need to elevate the status of the nation state i.e. rescuing European royalty. At the same, while 
there were anti-Royalist feelings, they were hidden from the New Zealand public. 
 
Freyberg’s attitude could only make more palatable for some the elevation of the King’s escape, 
aided by New Zealanders, from the invading Germans.  One week after the surrender on Crete, the 
Public Relations Unit of the NZEF reported to John Paul, the government’s Director of Publicity in 
Wellington, that “This story covering a European Royal House, naturally has strong European 
appeal, and I felt that it was accordingly worth a sound interview to amplify its scope.”93 The result 
was a newsreel (not shot by New Zealand) combined with a filmed sound interview (conducted by 
New Zealand) with the New Zealand officer who had led the New Zealand bodyguard. The escape 
went on to become part of the 1953 official war history volume.
94
  It is still a mainstay in official 
and wider memory. New Zealanders, from being members of a small dominion on the other side of 
the world, had become bodyguards to a monarchy escaping from the common enemy. The use of 
this in raising New Zealand national status was evident. The King was now joined to the common 
New Zealand soldier. It was adding to the notion of a bond across social divisions. 
                                               
91 For example, there is the biography written by his son, Paul, who first had access to his private papers. Paul Freyberg, Bernard 
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These sentiments may be in tandem with the New Zealand military leader’s attitude, but they would 
not be with its political leader’s. It is also an example of how the State can construct a memory 
around an individual while, at the same time, a key elite member is dismissive of the same and 
eventually makes him a target for removal from power (as shown in later chapters). In 1941, Peter 
Fraser masked his dislike with silence. 
 
Peter Fraser’s Encounter with George II –Not a Celebration of the Bond 
On the same New Zealand newsreel as the royal escape story was Fraser’s meeting of the troops in 
Egypt and a sombre address about the recent battle and losses. The Labour Prime Minister had met 
the Greek monarch, albeit fleetingly. He was apparently not sufficiently enamoured of the king as to 
publicize this encounter.  The encounter between the two was not planned nor sought after. Far less 
amenable for official memory-making than the dangers and suffering on Crete was his losing his 
room at the British embassy in Cairo to the monarch who had escaped the Germans with the aid of 
some New Zealand soldiers. Physical endurance by the Royal party over the Cretan White 
Mountains and risk-sharing between the escapers did not extend into formal diplomatic protocol 
between senior members of State.  
 
In response to a phone call from George II, on May 29, while the battle on Crete was still taking 
place and after the king had escaped, the British Minister to Egypt, Lord Killearn, was told the 
monarch “proposed himself and some of his family to come up and stay”.95 Killearn had a shortage 
of accommodation, and as Fraser, who had been in Egypt for several days, “had the only big room 
with a bath room which I felt I could give to a Crowned Head”, he was asked to vacate it.96 The 
Prime Minister did so with good cheer and moved out to a hotel, accordingly. Following the defeat 
on Crete, Fraser, Freyberg and George II also attended a “big lunch” on June 4 at Killearn’s official 
residence. These Cairo-based encounters were never publicised then or afterwards. Fraser’s 
message to Wellington concerning the King’s rescue was relayed to the reading population via the 
acting Prime Minister, Walter Nash. He said he had received thanks from one of the Greek 
Ministers who had “called on him” during his Cairo stay.97 The silence over King George would 
eventually change to confidential condemnation, but that was years away, with the monarch’s 
position becoming ever more precarious with his own people. The fact remains that the national 
leader, even one as forthright and domineering as Peter Fraser, condemned a personage in contrast 
                                               
95 Sir Miles Lampson 1st Baron Lord Killearn Collection, St Anthony’s College Oxford Middle East Centre Archive, Oxford. Diary 
Entry May 29, 1941, June 4 1941. 
96 Ibid 
97 “Deep Appreciation,” Auckland Star, May 27, 1941. 
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to his publicity machine and then history project. It is also another example where the New Zealand 
State again appeared to its citizenry to hold no opinion on Greek politics. The ability to 
simultaneously hold two contradictory attitudes is also apparent regarding the King in official 
memory.  The State-produced Crete by Davin stated that “danger to the Government was feared”.98 
This was not from the external enemy but from the Cretans – the particular Greeks uppermost with 
New Zealanders. The tensions were inescapable, but the emphasis comes (an entire appendix as 
against fleeting references) down on the side of excitement and the New Zealand role in saving a 
monarch.  
 
The archives trail demonstrates that while key members of the leadership differed over their 
attitudes about the King, the manifestation of a state-endorsed memory was paramount with any 
reservations hidden. In the years to come there would be much internal Dominion angst about the 
king from Fraser but it was never made public. The need for the association with a monarch, linked 
with his subjects, in a desperate battle against an invader, remained dominant thrust.  
 
That the escape of the king stays resilient as a positive event in the memory of Crete conforms to 
the characteristic of the model used in this project – that is, “conservative and resistant to change”.  
Deliberate silences and a social psychological trait are evident within the State in dealing with the 
elite of Greece. They were characteristics evident elsewhere in dealing with other situations, as was 
the General’s enthusiasm. At the risk of seeming piecemeal, examples are given in the following 
passages concerning Crete. However, extensively analysing the battle and treatment in the official 
history project is self-defeating. It re-emphasises the place of that struggle while sacrificing 
discussion of the wider connectivity.  
 
TWO ARMIES - THE HURDLES OF FRICTION AND LIAISON 
The 1943 interim history of Crete stated that “great progress”99 was made by New Zealand training 
of the Greek soldiers on the island prior to the German invasion. This was part of the leadership role 
also emphasised by Davin’s official war history volume published in the following decade, “The 
Greeks were eager for their troops to come under British command, which would arm and feed 
them.”100 A broad brush-stroke was applied to the Greek soldiers: “most part untrained, ill-
                                               
98 Dan Davin, Crete Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939-45 (Wellington, N.Z.: War History Branch, 
Dept. of Internal Affairs, 1953), 35. 
99 New Zealand Army Board, Battle for Crete-New Zealand Division in Action, 11. 
100
 Davin, Crete, 40. 
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equipped, and unorganised.”101 Freyberg had to “drain off from his own inadequate forces officers 
and N.C.O.’s” 102 to remedy the situation. It all looks like the Dominion was a saviour for the 
Greeks. But the relationship was not so clear-cut at the time, and challenges to imposed New 
Zealand authority were evident.  The practicalities of two culturally different bodies of fighting men 
also brought with it difficulties that would be felt for years to come. When it did come to writing the 
history of the Greeks fighting on Crete (both soldiers and Cretan civilians), they were often 
portrayed as brave and inflicting casualties but also suffering many because of inexperience - 
despite their having officers. But when a similar-spirited New Zealand event takes place at the 
much remembered counter-attack at Galatas, it is applauded. Many war cries and traditional hakas 
paint a stirring moment. Added to this was the ubiquitous bayonet.
103
 Countering this view is the 
consideration that, as one post-war veteran and peace activist observed, a clamorous barrage of war 
chants  told the enemy that an attack was imminent and from what direction.
104
 Bayonets cannot 
counter automatic weapons. Wild abandon in Greeks/Cretans is dangerous; in New Zealanders at a 
critical moment, it is to be applauded. 
 
Question of New Zealand Control of the Greek Military 
While Freyberg seemed intent on preserving Greek authority in some military matters,
105
 there was 
also a 36-member New Zealand liaison staff
106
 team attached to four Greek battalions on Crete. It 
was the beginning of one strand of a relationship that would last intermittently up until the time of 
Greek liberation. On Crete it was a subtle form of leadership acquisition, but it did not go 
unchallenged.  
 
Post-war New Zealand interviews with veterans from these teams and several wartime reports threw 
up situations that made the allied melding of forces confounding to the celebrated view.  The extent 
of the challenge varied – from frustration to potentially serious damage. To Major Wooller with the 
second Greek regiment, the Greek officer commanding the unit he was with “appeared to resent our 
presence”.107 Both officers escalated the issue, with the result that a Greek stayed as commander, 
with Wooller as second-in-charge. There was also friction in other Greek units the New Zealanders 
were with. At Kastelli in the West, there was “serious trouble” on several occasions with the Greek 
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officers (according to the senior New Zealand officer there, Geoff Bedding, due to poor New 
Zealand diplomacy).
108
  The 8
th
 battalion in the South was a particularly sensitive issue that is 
discussed separately. 
 
When battle did ensue, even non-verbal signals did not guarantee required responses. When a signal 
was given to the 6
th
 Greek battalion to advance – “waved in British army style for the Greeks to 
follow”- the New Zealander had gone 50 yards before realising the Greeks had not understood and 
had not moved at all.
109
 These are early indications of an ongoing impediment to martial melding - 
language. 
 
Freyberg Champions Everyday Greek Soldiers  
While his officers later recalled such difficulties years later, just as he supported the Greek King 
and leadership of the administration, after the battle Freyberg pursued promoting the Greek rank 
and file.  In an August 10, 1941 memo headed “Greek Gallantry in Crete” he attached two reports 
from his New Zealand commanders who had Greek army units attached to them
110
. 
 
One of the reports concerned the formation led by Howard Kippenberger
111
, future editor of the war 
history project. While he wrote that the Greek soldiers who fought in his vicinity “always advanced 
cheerfully”,112 he was at a loss over the fate of the distant 8th Greek Battalion and its training team, 
led by Clifford Wilson. Although some of the Greeks reached another unit, “no word was ever 
received and nothing is known of the fate of Major Wilson and his NZ NCOs.”113 He shared this in 
the press five months after Crete.
114
   
 
The fate of the 8
th
 Greek Battalion confronted New Zealand years after the war. Recollections 
would not gel with the New Zealand image. It was much more provocative than a failure in 
application of military leadership (the basis for much of the debate over the loss of Crete). It was 
directly relevant to the New Zealand-Greek connection at its most basic level – soldiers fighting 
side-by-side.  
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Question of Failed New Zealand Leadership and the Greek 8th Battalion 
The New Zealand officer leading the team attached to the 8
th
 battalion was Clifford Wilson. He was 
an experienced soldier, having been a member of the territorials since the early 1930s and was part 
of the mainland Greek venture before going missing on Crete. In the ensuing years, he was awarded 
the Greek Military Cross, like a number of his fellow officers
115
 attached to Greek units, and was 
mentioned in dispatches. By October 1941, he was classified as dead.
116
 His grave was eventually 
found and his remains eventually re-interred at the Suda Bay Commonwealth War Cemetery.
117
 
 
Similarly to the 1941 newspaper story, Kippenberger’s 1949 war memoirs mentioned Wilson: “No 
news ever came back from Cliff, and long afterwards we learned that he had been killed. He is still 
remembered with warm affection, and in him the Division lost an officer of great promise.”118 
Kippenberger thought Wilson’s position was precarious on Crete: “Cliff thought his Greek officers 
useless and he felt very lonely. He would be cut off by any landing, and I could only try to 
encourage him, and tell him in the worst case to fall back into the hills and try to work round to 
rejoin us via Suda Bay. I did not tell him that I had argued elsewhere that 8 Greek Battalion was 
only a circle on the map—8G—and that it was murder to leave such troops in such a position, and 
had been told that, in war murder sometimes has to be done.”119  Just who had said this is not stated 
– but the overall role of the New Zealand Division in that part of the island would point to the New 
Zealand command. 
 
A year before Kippenberger’s post-war memoir was published, the official war history researchers 
interviewed at least three (Brown, Davison and MacNab)
120
 of the surviving training team. 
However, given the detail of testimony, Davison seems to have been the only one with the team 
throughout the whole attack and up until they surrendered the day after the German paratroopers 
arrived.  The New Zealanders had separated themselves from the Greeks, gone to a predetermined 
rendezvous point (a pumping station), and surrendered the next day. Their degree of actual fighting 
and fidelity to the young mostly untrained Greek soldiers was at the heart of a pointed internal 
disagreement when it came to writing the official history.    Walter Murphy concluded: “They [New 
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Zealanders] did no fighting, and Major Wilson was shot in the back after venturing out of the door 
of the pumping station on 21 May and firing about three shots – Major-General K’s [Kippenberger] 
story, is, I fear, wide of the mark.”121 Kippenberger’s response was a curt “Don’t agree.”122  
 
Accentuating the tension about the episode was the fact that Wilson had intended to leave the 
Greeks and move only the New Zealanders to Commonwealth lines i.e. a variant of Kippenberger’s 
directive.
123
 Kippenberger’s response to Davin and Murphy was “Wilson’s decision was unknown 
to me until now, and I would not have approved. He only told me that his Greek colonel was useless 
and I told him to deal with him as requisite, but I see that he fought.”124 It was a criticism and yet a 
qualified acceptance. Putting aside the dependence purely upon testimony 
125
- a practice widespread 
in the Crete volume as stressed by Bell
126
 - the reaction of the project staff showed a similar mixture 
of assessment but the overriding judgement of Kippenberger in at least one of the aspects.  It does 
not take much imagination to see how even this one, that is, a planned strategy, could make the 
New Zealanders seem they were deserting the mostly untrained Greeks. 
 
Having said the above, there was the risk of relying on interviews years after the event. Although 
Brown provided a sketch map and the most extensive interview, he showed one of the flaws in 
testimony – he called the 8th Battalion, the 6th throughout his rendition (his interviewer picked this 
up)
127
. For his part, Davison could not be certain about who exactly comprised the New Zealand 
detachment during a critical time.
128
  But at the same time, Kippenberger had accepted from 
testimony the accuracy of the order to leave without the Greeks.  
 
When the official Crete volume appeared, it read “Wilson had decided beforehand that when battle 
began it would be best for the New Zealanders to concentrate separately; for there was reason to 
fear that otherwise the Greeks would disregard their own officers and, as the New Zealanders knew 
no Greek, the system of command would be dislocated.”129 At the envisaged rendezvous point of 
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the pumping station, there were also two to three days of water and rations for the New 
Zealanders.
130
 That again is mentioned in the officially endorsed version. Accounts concurred that 
Wilson had decided the New Zealanders would leave the Greeks when the expected German assault 
began.
131
 Both also stated language difficulties as one of the reasons.
132
 Davison added a darker 
reasoning. The ordinary Greek soldiers were wary of their own leaders “all officers over the rank of 
lieutenant were 5
th
 Columnists.”133 
 
Now, the official account subtly deviates from the testimony. Those who were in the pumping 
station were “surrounded” and “forced to spend the day and night there.”134 They were “unable to 
rejoin the Greeks or take any important part in the fighting.”135 That the only available testimony 
(Davison)
136
 indicated the group was hiding inside the enclosed and roofed station is not stated.  It 
seems more of a hiding place than a point from which they would fight. It was thought a German 
mortar was operating from the roof at one point. They had been lying in silence and in the dark. It 
“was a nerve-wracking situation”.137 When they finally emerged the next day, Wilson had been 
killed, charging enemy soldiers.  
Figure 3.1 Draft Map showing separate position of New Zealanders. The map is the same as the one in the Crete volume. 
Source: WAII 1 247 DA 401.22/1 Pt 5 (Archives New Zealand) 
.  
While the 8th Battalion episode could provide grist for critics of New Zealand integrity, it also 
threw up the question of them carrying out war crimes. Davison raised the issue with his war history 
project interviewer.  He maintained that some of his surviving command told their German captors 
that the New Zealanders had been “told not to take prisoners”.138 Davison obviously survived the 
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ensuing German inquiry. This was one instance, amongst others, where New Zealand training teams 
and New Zealanders in general were accused of war crimes by the enemy.  An examination shows 
the Greek-New Zealand connection dented and also obliquely, a reinforcement of Freyberg’s 
reticent behaviour over certain Greek matters. 
 
German Accusations of War Crimes at Kastelli and Elsewhere 
Given the general genocidal nature of the Nazi regime, questioning the crimes of their opponents 
and victims against them is not something that comes easily.
139
 On Crete, there would also be 
atrocities committed against Germans by Cretan/Greeks. One major one at Kastelli in Western 
Crete was related after the war by the New Zealand Liaison officer there, Bedding.
140
A newspaper 
interview decades after the events provided further clarification that tested the notion of having 
New Zealanders and Greeks morally separated from the German enemy.  Again, it is testimony, but 
there is collaborative data from a German study. 
 
An extended period of Cretan violence against German prisoners of war happened at Kastelli. On 
the first day of the battle, civilians began attacking captured Germans. The latter were encircled by 
a protective line of New Zealanders. One of them was bayoneted above the eye by a Greek. The 
Germans were eventually taken away to a jail “with orders that the NZ personnel guard the gaol and 
let no Greeks near.”141 Two days later, Bedding thought the local populace “had calmed down so 
that I considered it safe to hand over guard duties to Greek soldiers and police though I visited 3 
times daily.”142 Later, Bedding, like the Cretans at Kastelli, was accused by the victorious Germans 
of crimes of war. The German wounded had all disappeared, having been taken by the Greeks. 
Furthermore, he was subjected to “some anxious moments” before his former German prisoners 
spoke up for him. He was also subsequently charged by the Germans with “mutilating the dead”.  In 
a later account run by a local paper, Bedding related how the Cretans had been executed and he 
survived thanks to the testimony of the Germans he protected.
143
 In relating the events at Kastelli, 
the question of mutilation had been ignored. It is an area that has attracted some attention from a 
German scholar.  
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A 2011 study by historian Marlen Xylander used German medical records to ascertain the extent of 
atrocities committed against members of the German armed forces during the Crete invasion.
144
 She 
found a high incidence at Kastelli (40 cases) but could not state there had been a concerted regular 
occurrence across the island (only 3 or 4 cases at Rethimnon). But there nevertheless was 
supporting evidence of the mutilations.  
 
As suggested by the opening sentences in this section, one can disregard a minor incident 
perpetrated by a victim of invasion. However, that a New Zealander survived thanks to the 
testimony of a German, while Greeks were executed, is a small blurring of the distinction between 
invader and defender. It is alien to the framework of the celebrated New Zealand-Greek bond. In 
Davin’s Crete, Bedding’s report is cited145 but the ferocity of the Greeks watered down. Hence, the 
locals had “an angry bearing”,146 acquitted themselves bravely with “fierce and fiercely resented [by 
the enemy] guerrilla warfare”.147 The New Zealand response to German war crimes against 
Greeks/Cretans is dealt with in a later chapter. In the case of Kastelli, one New Zealand operational 
command would not tolerate the Greek variety. It was a different attitude to that of those at the top.  
 
New Zealand Military Leadership and War Crimes against the Invader 
The acuteness of Freyberg’s silence on Greek politics (thereby contributing to an unproblematic 
Greek connection) seems extreme when compared to another episode he wrote about. This 
concerned New Zealand war crimes against German prisoners of war. It comes with the 
qualification that the General just lost a battle and suffered a huge dent to his reputation (including 
possibly being sacked by Fraser) but he had reports about Germans using civilians and his own 
soldiers as human shields during the battle.
148
 
 
In the month following Crete, Germany claimed war crimes had been committed against their 
troops on Crete. British army authorities wanted “evidence in refutation”149 That is, they were not 
concerned whether or not it was true. Freyberg sought reports from two of his senior officers. The 
first was Edward Puttick, who commanded the 2NZDIV whilst Freyberg was away in charge of the 
overall defence and who would later become chief of the Army General staff in Wellington. The 
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other was Brigadier James Hargest. In his official response Puttick was dismissive of the 
accusations, as he was of those aimed at the invading Germans
150
  
 
Freyberg’s stance was made clear when he passed on Puttick's formal report to Hargest: “Please 
read through this letter and see what Puttick has said. I do not see any reason to minimise the 
fierceness of the fighting between ourselves and the parachutists. We have no regrets. The Germans 
apparently got more than they expected.”151 It was a comment one could easily take as a line to be 
followed. Hargest responded” “There are NO [his emphasis] records of the men in this brigade or 
under my command having treated German prisoners with other than reasonable care.”152  
 
In addition to the above official paper trail, the episode also included a deft exercise in 
organisational communication as well as Orwellian double-think. For Freyberg also had a 
handwritten note which Puttick had added to the officially typewritten report. There, he added that 
there was a “story” that “German prisoners working at Suda Bay were all killed when our troops 
withdrew”. He had checked with the officer there, and the charges had been “without 
foundation”.153 Also Lieutenant “Sandy” Thomas had told his commander that he had killed a 
German prisoner with his rifle butt when he intended just to stun him.
154
 A few days later, another 
handwritten note arrived for Freyberg from Puttick.  This one was more definite about New Zealand 
war crimes. It revolved around the use of explosive bullets by the Germans. The damaging effects 
of this ammunition had been observed: “Someone has told me that the Germans dashed for cover 
frantically when we fired upon them with their own M.G.s [machine guns], because, apparently, of 
this ammunition.”155  Puttick, one of New Zealand’s most senior officers, then suggested: “This 
seems to me, a rather serious matter, justifying our shooting out-of-hand any German found with 
explosive bullets for any weapons used against personnel.”156 There is no recorded response from 
Freyberg, but the suggested course of action hardly follows the rules of war. Given Freyberg’s 
expressed views, it is doubtful if he would have objected. The cited documents clarify accusations 
and counterarguments that have ensued in academic publishing up until this day.
157
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In the case of Kastelli, memory makers found a situation where New Zealanders had been bonded 
with Germans through the recognition of the rules of war. They were in opposition to the Cretans. 
Such an episode had to be shrouded. The Freyberg-related episode (seemingly never known to 
Kippenberger’s project) showed the General's willingness to put in writing that he condoned the 
breaking of international law. This lies in contrast to his silence of Greek related politics which was 
seemingly more sensitive to him. His reticence would contribute towards the gradual construction 
of the celebrated New Zealand-Greek edifice. 
 
SPREADING THE OFFICIAL WORD-AUDIENCES 
As shown above, public expressions at the time and the officially endorsed Greek and Crete history 
wove a pattern supportive of a national imagining. A simple observation also demonstrates how 
sometimes Greece and Greeks were considered as prepared ingredients to a successful national 
story rather than a partner in history making. Inside New Zealand, in keeping with the distribution 
of news stories to the country’s media, thousands of copies of each official volume above were 
distributed internally in the country. They also went to overseas institutions and persons, but none 
to Greece. Some recipients also had both tangential involvement or had direct participation. 
158
 
Unlike direct participant countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom, Greece was not 
included in the exchange of draft official histories for comment or argument. As such, they were not 
a party to heated arguments and imposed censorship with others that ensued.
159
   The above might 
be explained by New Zealand’s frustration at the lack of any official Greek records.160 Their 
absence in the distribution of a permanent published memory remains is an example of New 
Zealand negative exceptionalism toward Greece but one that does not fit within the type of special 
celebratory relationship New Zealand had formed. Similarly, although Freyberg was very vocal in 
his comments and even dismay at some of the content of the draft histories, he never promoted the 
Greek army as he did during the war itself. It is another contradiction in the memory of the relevant 
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events.  He and the Dominion’s leadership preferred widespread exposure to the Greek population. 
One can use the 1945 commemoration on Crete as a way of introducing this strategy as well as an 
indication of a more complex interaction during the war years. The specifics are dealt with in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
FIRST COMMEMORATIVE CEREMONY- INDICATIVE OF AN ACCEPTABLE 
MEMORY CONSTELLATION  
In September/October 1945, it was Bernard Freyberg, unsurprisingly, who initiated what was the 
post-war official commemoration of the Greek and Crete campaigns.
161
  Indeed, it seems, he was 
the catalyst for the whole episode, more so than the British or Cretan/Greeks. Approximately 100 of 
his command converged on the island from Italy, London and North Africa.  It was a major effort 
that seemingly demonstrated his passion for Crete, the prominent component of official memory. 
But this is deceptive. Although he tried to have a ceremony on both the mainland and the island, 
only one eventuated. This was seemingly so because of a slow response from the British embassy in 
Athens.
162
 The Dominion’s public were never told this in his press releases for Greece and New 
Zealand.
163
 Crete was elevated. An included message from Fraser raised several other pervasive 
struts of the relationship evident in later commemoration. A particular humanist thread was evident: 
“We are deeply conscious of New Zealand’s debt to the Greek nation for their gallantry and self-
sacrifice in sheltering many of our men.”164  The press releases to the Greeks were, in a way, a 
direct way to individual Greeks and villages. New Zealand plans for the distribution of thousands of 
certificates of appreciation, with the same wording, to them in the forthcoming year, was also in the 
same vein. Similar sentiments were stencilled on humanitarian food supplies sent to newly liberated 
Greece in the previous year. These are discussed further in Chapter 5.  
 
To the Greek elite on Crete, he had a different message. He spoke of an ongoing involvement with 
the Greek army from Crete onwards. It was something “we were very proud to maintain.”165 It 
stretched through the Middle East to Italy. The reasons given were not Hellenic martial prowess but 
“because of our very great admiration for the Greek people and of our very great gratitude for their 
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kindness to us in Greece and Crete.”166 This was again an early shadowing of the Greek army by 
their civilian counterparts. Freyberg was accurate in his speech when he related the joint force in 
Italy during 1944, but he was extreme in his deception when he claimed the Greek Army had fought 
in “many of the desert battles under the command of the New Zealand Division.”167 There were no 
battles in the desert campaigns, only frustration, despite the General’s and Greek officers’ attitudes. 
All the interaction was played out against growing and ever more public tensions and conflict 
involving Greek politics. These will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. But by following here the 
post-1945 timeline of the New Zealand involvement commemorative events involving 
Crete/Greece, one can see how some of the unresolved Greek civil issues continued to influence 
New Zealand’s official memory enterprise as well as predilections of the State in the way it would 
mould the memory. 
 
Figure 3.2 Lieutenant General Bernard Freyberg, Commander of the New Zealand Army in the Mediterranean throughout 
the war, speaking at 1945 Crete Commemoration. (Source: National Army Museum New Zealand. DA 9990) 
 
LONGER VIEW OF COMMEMORATIVE EVENTS– STATE RESONANCES AND 
SILENCES  
Assessing the longer view of joint commemoration, a form of official memory, sees the New 
Zealand side both holding onto key facets of its memory of the relationship and marginalising other 
episodes emphasised by the Greek nation state when they did not calibrate with the national 
imagining of the Pacific country. It also shows the limits of New Zealand exceptionalism toward 
Greece by its absence from initiating ongoing shared commemoration. Reading the following, one 
would also be forgiven in thinking the New Zealand nation state had not changed its reticence about 
                                               
166 Ibid. 
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Greek politics. This is far from what happened after 1941. It will be explored in Chapter 6.  What is 
consistent is the focusing on one battle in 1941.  
 
After Freyberg’s efforts the next two major commemorative events were initiated from Greece 
and/or the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. New Zealand preferred to expend its energies 
internally on the war history project i.e. its own population. This is most evident when a constructed 
New Zealand memory artefact in Crete would finally appear 70 years after the battle.  
 
1952 Athens Event 
Just over half a decade following the Freyberg-inspired Crete event, Field Marshall Papagos, now 
Greek Prime Minister, invited representatives from the New Zealand, Australia and the U.K. to 
attend a commemorative event in Athens.
168
 Probably because he was still Governor-General in 
New Zealand, the Foreign Office vetoed Freyberg’s attendance at this major commemoration.169 
Attending for New Zealand were Kippenberger and Charles Upham, a veteran of Greece and Crete 
and decorated war hero.  
 
There was much socialising on the mainland and Crete as well as visits to sites where the 
Dominion’s army had fought or travelled through.170 Kippenberger spoke of the “moral” motivation 
for New Zealand committing troops to Greece in early 1941 when he took the podium at the main 
ceremony.
171
  He quoted Fraser’s telegram he placed so much emphasis on with the Dominion’s 
press. But there was also evidence of ongoing tensions in post- Civil War Greece. His official 
report, considered for public release, fleetingly mentioned an armed guard being in the hall at the 
Athens Hotel.  At a private presentation to members of the Ministry for External Affairs in 
Wellington,
172
 he was much more expansive on the underlying unease. It was, however, mixed with 
experiences and complimentary comments from Royalty that he would utilise to make more elevate 
the New Zealand profile in the Greek wartime experience.   
 
Kippenberger related how soldiers and plainclothes policemen kept the crowd “at grenade-throwing 
distance” while the royal party (with George’s death Paul as king and Frederika as Queen) left by 
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car “with no more protection than a couple of outriders and an armoured car behind, with a couple 
of military police in the back, followed by about a company of infantry.”173 Having said this, he 
thought the royal couple were “both extremely attractive” and came from “the remarkable 
Glucksberg family”.174 In Kippenberger’s view, the New Zealanders were “the most popular of the 
visitors.”175 The Athens experience was a microcosm of a mixed relationship: New Zealand 
embracing Greece, savouring its standing while at the same time moving through subtly politically 
charged atmosphere (topics of conversations in Athens and questions from the Wellington official 
presentation audience included the American presence in Greece and also thousands of children 
“kidnapped”  by Communists there) . It was an unusual blending of attraction yet alertness to 
violence. Such a combination is not unusual, as following chapters demonstrate. 
 
1961 Athens Revisited 
The charged atmosphere Kippenberger found was not repeated in the next major commemoration in 
1961,
176
 but there was still a residue of turbulent Greek politics. One found it in headstones.
177
  
Arthur Hubbard is buried in the Phaleron War Cemetery where the ceremony took place. He was 
killed in October 1943 by left-wing Greek partisans during the first round of the civil war. That 
event and the lack of New Zealand official interest in it then and after, is dealt with in later chapters. 
At the ceremony, dominant official memory, again expressed by a message from the New Zealand 
Prime Minister, was read out by Freyberg.  It included the common threads of 1941, “warm 
associations and friendly ties”178 and the “magnificent assistance to those of our servicemen left 
behind during that period.”179  A pattern of memory was again evident. 
 
More Direct Diplomacy and Remembering 
In the decades following the Athens ceremony, there was eventually no need to utilise 
commemorative representatives like Kippenberger for political intelligence.  New Zealand 
established its own diplomatic presence in Greece- first with a consulate in 1964 and then elevation 
to an embassy in 1979. Growing trade between the two countries was the justification. 
180
 By 
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1967/68, commerce was favourable to New Zealand.
181
 It was part of a new configuration between 
the two countries.  But internally, the genesis of the wartime bonding and the special relationship 
permeated communication amongst the New Zealanders.
182
  A mercenary bent was sometimes 
added: “Underlying our relationship at every level has been the memory of the wartime association. 
We can still make use of this for the foreseeable future, and each succeeding generation of Greeks 
loves to live on the triumphs of the past.”183  
 
Certain commemorative events reported during this New Zealand presence are described below. 
They have been included so as to emphasise the ability of New Zealand to accommodate Greek 
politics and also maintain its prioritised official memories. 
 
Politics and Greek Sovereignty  
The elimination of Greek politics was most evident during the Colonels’ Junta.  In 1970, one of the 
senior members of the Greek dictatorship, who was also a Cretan, spoke at the Battle’s anniversary. 
The New Zealand representative from Athens reported this and his own attendance at a locally-run 
ceremony at the village of Galatas (epicentre of New Zealand remembrance). The latter event was 
not intended to “disseminate government propaganda” and was “impressive and moving”.184  
Projecting the State’s seminal work on its wartime national imagining was still evident - he quoted 
Davin’s Crete. This was in contrast to the Junta spokesman, who had the “style same as 
‘revolutionary leaders’ and the message, no matter what the occasion, is seldom varied”.185 The 
grating aspect of the dictatorship - 1,700 political prisoners on the islands with more on the 
mainland, intellectuals on trial for sedition
186
- was reported on, but there was New Zealand comfort 
at continued commercial stability with Greece.
187
 It was an echo of the earlier 1940/1941 attitudes 
that Greece was a sovereign State, but now combined with both remembrance and also a real 
commercial connection.  
 
The decision to go to Greece also resonated with the diplomatic staff. Hence, melodramatically, in 
1981, the embassy spoke of its diplomatic representation at the Crete anniversary thus: “It is 
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absolutely certain that our decision to send men to Greece was as correct in 1981 as it was in 
1941.”188 They were also only too well aware of the long-term tension in the country, the 
dictatorship being a symptom rather than the exception. As late as April 1989, Ambassador Woods 
wrote that he was stationed where there was “some homogeneity” in a “complex country” that had 
been “suffering deep internal divisions which could still erupt into renewed instability.”189 
 
Part of the then current situation was the direction of Andreas Papandreou, leader of the socialist 
P.A.S.O.K. In terms of official remembering, the Gorgopotamos commemoration – part of the 
National Day of Resistance - he established was, in contrast with Cretan anniversaries or the 
relationship overall, noted by Athens-based New Zealand staff in a measured and clinical way at the 
1982 occasion: “our nationals had participated in the original action” and that the staff had laid 
wreaths.
190
 The New Zealand attendance seems to have been a perfunctory action. The size of the 
general attendance also suggests a lack of consideration of the event’s importance: “a surprisingly 
large crowd estimated at 10,000”.191  It was also “boycotted by the main opposition party” and by 
former members of the British-preferred right wing resistance group E.D.E.S. The different 
emphasis placed by the two nations on Gorgopotamos, however, highlights that different drivers 
and needs caused un-correlated war commemoration.  
 
Resurrection of the Battle for Crete Commemoration in the World’s Eye 
New Zealand’s lukewarm reception at Gorgopotamos was in contrast to another which was to be 
raised to new heights by a Cretan. This concerned Crete. While Freyberg had initiated and driven 
the 1945 commemoration, and the battle for Crete was the centrepiece of the following official war 
history project, it was the Cretan/Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis who resurrected it 
to the international stage in 1991. Mitsotakis’ planned scope of events for the 50th anniversary was 
so expansive that the New Zealand representative at the planning meeting expressed misgivings that 
the whole project “will run out of control” unless “nailed” and “scaled down”.192 Indeed, it did in 
some ways. Over twenty years later, his planned commemorative centre occupying 10 acres and 
seating capacity for 700 persons
193
 lies unfinished at its Galatas site.
194
 The contrast between that 
and the New Zealand one at the same village is not just that the latter is complete but that it 
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illustrates a long-established strategy of New Zealand when it comes to official memory and 
Greece/Crete.  A simple plaque under a Pohutukawa tree at Galatas inaugurated by Prime Minister 
Clark at the beginning of the new millennium, lies in contrast to the much greater investment in 
official New Zealand internal societal war remembering at the time.  An oral history, school essay 
competition and publicity were reminiscent of the early efforts decades before by the official war 
history project. It can be said that both the official war history project and Clark primarily directed 
their efforts inward, that is, towards their own citizens
195
 rather than investing in a constructed 
memory in Crete or Greece. This even extended to the State also never materially contributing to 
commemorating the anniversary of the final “lift” from the island of its soldiers evading capture. 
That was left to veterans’ families, individuals and Cretan local governments.196  At home in the 
Pacific, the relationship was also not commemorated in an angst-free environment of mutual 
respect. 
 
New Zealand-Greek Memorial, Wellington  
In 1991, during the 50
th
 anniversary of the battles of Crete, a press release stated that a new project 
that “was the brain child of Mr Arthur Helm of the first Echelon Association”197 had started. This 
was the building of a monument (the original plans were much more expansive) celebrating the 
Greek-New Zealand connection. Funds for the venture were to be provided by the New Zealand and 
Greek governments, veterans groups, the Greek community and Wellington City Council. Despite 
the State involvement it was the links between common peoples (that is, not the nation) that were 
stressed, as well as the post-war period. It was “was not about the battles in 1941 but the 
relationships that were established between New Zealanders and the people of Greece, and 
particularly Crete, following the battles.”198 Having said that, even the most cursory inspection of 
the memorial finds that it remembers the battles and the New Zealand S.O.E. presence on Crete and 
not ensuing interactions (especially the victory at Rimini). As a gauge of the New Zealand elite’s 
interest, there is its financial commitment, but the project really pivoted around the local Wellington 
authority. The placement of the memorial was especially fought over. Greek community preference 
lost out.
199
 Just as the Greek New Zealanders had been marginalised in the wartime fund raising, so 
had they in the official nation-state memory endeavours. It is another limit of the relationship. 
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In chapter summary, while the dominant events of early 1941 were catastrophes, encounters with 
Greeks were subject to a memory filtration. The appeal to idealism in assisting the victim “Greece” 
and the use of silence assuaged assisting an authoritarian regime. Losing Crete was countered by 
heroism and New Zealand leadership.  Dispensing with the question of losing the battle, the 
multiple levels of that New Zealand assumption of authority brought with it painful testimony of 
accusation of desertion and also humane treatment of New Zealanders at the expense of the Kastelli 
civilians.  A pristine New Zealand-Greek connection was not the case. Subtle editorial work and 
and/or decisions about validity were applied in the official memory of the battle. This has to be 
weighed against the lack of empirical data as against testimony. In another example of utilisation of 
memory, the Greeks never had the opportunity to comment or respond on the New Zealand story. 
The longer view of commemoration described above, together with the background provided in the 
introduction, show how the endorsed memory seeped even into internal diplomatic exchanges. At 
the same time, the nation state put limits on what it would support. A joint memorial in Wellington 
and commemorating Tripiti did not attract the same national imagining efforts as did other efforts. 
But it would also simultaneously claim a special relationship to a nation governed by values in 
conflict with its own.  In the following chapters, this becomes more apparent as do the complexity 
and contradictions in the inter-nation connection. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: MARTIAL EFFORTS AFTER CRETE -
MARGINALISATION AND AMPLIFICATION 
 
Simplicity is part of memory, as is the identity-related treatment. Even in their confidential 
communications decades after, New Zealand diplomats incorporated the official narrative and 
undervalue the Greek celebration of the resistance.  That war in occupied Greece is dealt with in 
this chapter, as is ongoing linkage between the respective armies of the two nations. 
 
In the Hellenic War Museum, Athens, there is a note written by Bernard Freyberg to the staff of a 
Greek military hospital which was based in Italy during late 1944.  It ends with the following: “We 
in the New Zealand Division have the greatest respect and affection for your country and everything 
Greek.”1 These words were characteristic of Freyberg’s attitude over the three plus years he and his 
command had been intermittently soldiering with the Greeks i.e. regular military connection did not 
end with Crete. Furthermore, he had also nearly always matched supportive rhetoric with action 
during that period, seemingly faltering only when the political situation was out of his control.  
Freyberg’s outlook was in contrast to that of some of his own New Zealand officers, who were still 
showing cynicism about the royal family and mixed feelings about being in the front line with 
Greek soldiers.  Also, in Italy, the General’s unqualified acceptance of the Greek soldiers combined 
with his lack of political skill to arguably attract criticism of near-recklessness.  It certainly showed 
non-adherence to agreed Dominion policy, which had belatedly appeared during the year of 
liberation, 1944. On the broader front, in 1943 the General’s influence also instigated changed 
government commitment to sending humanitarian relief to the Greeks suffering under the 
Occupation. That will be dealt with in the next chapter. Freyberg was the catalyst for the real 
strands of the connection to Greece during these years.  Yet he was silent about another strand, the 
British-run clandestine organisations. Contradictions permeate these two military strands. This was 
shown both in the behaviour of the main individual and state actors at the time and during the 
subsequent formation of the official written history.   
 
During the war years, these military connections had varying degrees of visibility to both the New 
Zealand leadership and the general public.  Ironically, after the war, the state would pursue the more 
controversial one of clandestine warfare (even known in the country’s press) as it strove to fashion 
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its memory, such was the pull of celebrating military successes involving individual New 
Zealanders in that secret arena. It overshadowed both the contentious politics and also non-interest 
of Freyberg and Wellington in the fate of their soldiers in those covert roles. But interest was one 
thing, level of actual output another.  Like the Greek commemorative ceremonies revolving around 
the resistance, and discussed in the previous chapter, the official published history gave marginal 
presence to the work carried out by secret agencies. What attention it gave the interworking of the 
two armies was negligible and also sometimes critical in nature.  
 
NEW ZEALAND AND GREEK REGULAR ARMIES 
The regular armies of both New Zealand and Greece were, to varying degrees, intertwined in the 
Middle East and Italy after Crete, from 1941 to 1944. The reasons for this are not always clear. As 
the following shows, certain players from each country did work towards achieving a continuation 
of soldiering together after the mainland and Crete. There was, however, ambiguity on the New 
Zealand side as far as New Zealand attitudes to Greece were concerned. 
 
In the Middle East 1942-1943 
During February of 1942, New Zealanders read, and heard, of a continuation, and an enhancement, 
of their country’s link to the Greek army. In Egypt, the Anglo- ANZAC –Hellenic Association had 
been established “with the object of fostering and developing friendships formed during the Greek 
campaign”.2  Dan Davin, serving with the 2NZDIV, also noted in his diary for 5 June 1942 that he 
“will probably go to the Anglo-Greek ANZAC party tonight.3  He added wryly “will not enjoy” but 
did not elaborate.
4
  It was still operating in February 1943, but the organisation remains obscure.
5
   
 
In addition, there are fragments, published and otherwise, of encounters with the wider Greek 
diaspora community. Davin made a diary entry about a “Greek Club”,6 while in the following year 
John Mulgan, a New Zealander then serving in the British Army, wrote to his wife from Cairo that 
in the evenings he was regularly drinking wine in a “Greek café”7 and that “All the cafes are Greek 
here.”8 A British Pathé newsreel (whether or not it was shown in New Zealand is unknown) shows 
                                               
2 “Memories of Greece,” Auckland Star, February 4, 1942. The Association had an elitist character. It was only open to officers who 
had taken part in the Greek campaigns “as well as civilians of these countries” [i.e. Australia, Greece and New Zealand]. 
3 MS-Papers 5079-160 Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL) Daniel Marcus Davin Literary Papers Diary Entry June 5, 1942. 
4 Ibid. 
5 WAII 8/13 V Archives New Zealand (ANZ) Miscellaneous Personal Correspondence. Prince Peter to Freyberg, February 8, 1943. 
Despite onsite searches and enquiries to archives of the countries concerned, only a brief note in Freyberg’s papers has offered up 
any additional evidence, and this was simply a change in New Zealand representation. 
6 Ms-Papers-5079-157 (ATL) Daniel Marcus Davin Literary papers Diary entry August 5, 1942. 
7John Mulgan and Peter Whiteford, A Good Mail: Letters of John Mulgan (Wellington, N.Z.: Victoria University Press, 2011), John 
Mulgan to Gabrielle Mulgan September 1, 1943. 
8 Ibid. 
 84 
glimpses of the signature “lemon squeezer” hats of the New Zealand army amongst the crowd at a 
Greek National Day ceremony and parade in the Middle East
9
.  In one photograph (Figure 4.1), 
Freyberg appears at the same event with Greek dignitaries, including the clergy. The General’s 
personal life was also apparently enhanced by local diasporic Greeks.  Mary Kapetanaki, a 
housekeeping supervisor at the Beau Rivage Hotel, Alexandra, told her family that she taught 
Bernard Freyberg how to knit during his stays there. The association also included him carrying out 
some match-making between her and one Greek officer who was attached to his division.10 Against 
these specks of a greater social involvement, there is a more discernible military relationship. 
 
Figure 4.1: Freyberg and Greeks at the Greek National Day March 1942. (Source: National Army Museum, New 
Zealand, DA1719) 
 
Training Again 
In February 1942, a 30 minute radio broadcast informed the New Zealand public about the role its 
soldiers now had with the free Greek army stationed in Palestine.
11
  It contained emotionally 
charged utterances, such as the genesis of an “undying friendship between our two peoples” and 
“greatest harmony prevails in this pleasantly situated camp amongst green fields familiar to Greek 
and New Zealander alike.”12 It is the language and public expression that comfortably pervades 
current-day commemorations of the New Zealand-Greek relationship. It was still a sparse projection 
(there are very few press articles on the subject) of a continuation of something that was important 
                                               
9 “King George of Greece in Egypt 1942” [Videorecordingl] British Pathe 1942. http://www.britishpathe.com/video/king-george-of-
greece-in-egypt-1942 
10 Interview AAA1. January 8, 2014. 
11 U series 14760 New Zealand Troops with the Greek Army [Sound Recording] 5 February 1942. Radio New Zealand Sound 
Archives, Christchurch (RNZSA).  
12 Ibid., Similarly, a short newspaper piece published nearly a year later about one of the New Zealand trainers speaks of the “great 
mutual admiration” that resulted from the battles in Greece and Crete in the 1941. “Greek Gunners trained by NZ Sergeants,” 
Auckland Star, February 22, 1943 
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at one level – New Zealanders and Greeks were together.  It would also seem rhetoric about Greece 
now automatically included expressions about “a bond”. 
 
Yet it would be nearly two and a half years following the broadcasts before the New Zealand public 
would hear of a combined force of their countrymen and Greeks fighting closely together in a 
shared victory.  It would take place in autumn-swept northern Italy rather than sandy deserts. The 
reasons for this are discussed in the following sections. Firstly, however, the mechanics of the 1942 
situation are now described. With a dearth of archival sources, the previously mentioned broadcast 
is relied upon to sketch much of the early situation following Crete. At least one memorandum 
shows that, by the beginning of July, 1941 – just over a month since Crete, Freyberg had agreed to 
supply three training teams, each composed of six New Zealanders.
13
 Apparently, some would be 
interpreters. It also seems in the following month some Greek officers were going to be attached to 
a New Zealand unit.
14
 
 
Specific Organisation of the 1942 Arrangement 
A Major Samson related how a New Zealand Training Team (N.Z.T.T.) had been established to 
assist the Greeks.
15 
There were apparently 60 – 70 personnel on attachment altogether. The 
Dominion’s team was part of the British Military Mission’s 210 British Liaison Unit (210BLU). 
While the N.Z.T.T. would eventually fade out during the Middle East venture, the 210BLU would 
not. It holds a particular significance later in Italy. There, it would have a New Zealander in a senior 
and critical role. 
 
The new chain of command and structure showed the New Zealanders with a less prominent part 
vis-à-vis the Greeks than they had on Crete, namely because New Zealand was once more 
subsumed to an extent under direct British command. According to Samson, Freyberg recently 
expanded the contingent.  
16
 After the war, the relevant official war history volume reinforced the 
previous encounter. It saw it as a natural continuation of an arrangement (or bond) established on 
Crete: “As a result of the operations in Greece and Crete, there was formed a strong link between 
the Greek and New Zealand forces, so that it was understandable after the campaigns were over that 
the GOC [Freyberg] should offer to provide the training staff for such Greek forces as remained in 
the Middle East.”“17 
                                               
13 WAII 1 DA 21.1/9/G21/6 (ANZ) 2NZEF - Headquarters NZ Division (G Branch) - Attachments - Training of Free French Forces - 
Personnel for BMM [?] (Greek Brigade). General Headquarters Middle East, to Headquarters 2 NZEF, July 4, 1941. 
14 Main HQ 13 Corps to 30 Division and 2 New Zealand Division, August 24, 1942. 
15 U Series 14760 (RSANZ).New Zealand Troops with the Greek Army [Sound Recording], February 5, 1942.   
16 Ibid., He added three officers and 20 other ranks. 
17 W.G. Stevens, Problems of the 2NZEF (Wellington: Reed, 1958), 135. 
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N.Z.T.T. was one of several arms that would constitute the training link with the Greeks. It was 
placed inside Greek army establishments. The other would shortly be the New Zealand School of 
Instruction, based at the huge New Zealand camp at Maadi, on the outskirts of Cairo.18 The final 
component was Bernard Freyberg, still seemingly interested in pursuing the New Zealand-Greek 
link but within British-set limits. However, he held the senior supervisory role when it came to 
training the Greeks. 
 
Expansion, Leadership and Undue New Zealand Optimism 
The expansion of training undoubtedly stemmed from a British initiative, the Anglo-Greek Military 
Agreement, signed on 9 March 1942, which established the military basis upon which the British 
and Greek governments and their armed forces would cooperate during the war. Again, the 
Dominion was subject to British inclinations and it was following rather than initiating a 
strengthening of the connection. 
 
Freyberg was very positive about the potential of the Greeks. He jotted in one of his own files: 
“Material good”19 and wrote to one of his senior officers on 6 April 1942: “I am certain that from 
what everybody tells me the younger Greek officers and men are excellent material.”20  In this view, 
he was joined by Brigadier Steve Weir.21 In a private letter home, the artillery commander wrote “I 
found my Greek gunners very apt students indeed and the best of folk to work with. I admired their 
spirit and got to like them immensely.”22  
 
Freyberg, however, was sceptical of the abilities of the senior Greek commanders, as were their 
own government23 and the British military hierarchy.24 If they proved “not up to the mark”25 then the 
Greek King and Greek commander in chief would be approached. The General was also confident 
that his new broom would do the job: “I had a further talk with the King, and I am certain that the 
policy as outlined, if pushed with the energy I hope it will, will be much more successful than the 
                                               
18 Alex Hedley and Megan Hutching, Fernleaf Cairo: New Zealanders at Maadi Camp (Auckland: Harper Collins, 2009). Maadi was 
“New Zealand” territory with pie and ice cream factories, two YMCAs and an amphitheatre. It was the conduit through which 
members of the New Zealand armed forces were processed on their way to war in the Mediterranean throughout the war.  
19 WAII 8 T Part 2 (ANZ). Royal Greek Army.  
20 Freyberg to Comd. NZ Maadi camp (Probably Stevens), April 6, 1942. 
21 Weir had a long career in the military and later an advisory role with the New Zealand government. J. A. B. Crawford, “Weir, 
Stephen Cyril Ettrick “– Biography, from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography. Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, 
updated 1-Sep-10 URL: http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/biographies/5w17/1 Accessed July 21, 2014. 
22 MS-Papers-9271 (ATL) Weir, Gerald Hill Papers-Letters from C E Weir 1944-1946,1942.C.E. Weir to G.H. Weir 14 November 
1942. 
23 Evangelos Spyropoulos, Greek Military and the Greek Mutinies in the Middle East, (Boulder/New York:  Columbia University 
Press, 1993). 
24 Hagen Fleischer, “Anomalies in the Greek Middle East Forces 1941-1944” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 5,3 (1978): 9-10. 
25 WAII 8 T Part 2 (ANZ) Royal Greek Army. Freyberg to Stevens (probably), April 6, 1942. 
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one in operation before we came into the picture.” 26  The Dominion’s military commander was 
undertaking a quasi-leadership role, with the Mediterranean country as the junior partner.  
  
Figure 4.2: New Zealand instructor and Greek pupil. (Source: Alexander Turnbull Library DA: 01714-F). 
 
 
Freyberg and the Royal Family 
There was also the ongoing relationship Freyberg had with Greek Royalty. It projected a 
continuation of the Crete scenario, one component of which - the escape - was then and 
subsequently fixed in long-term commemoration. None of the public criticism or challenges (from 
armed anti-Axis Greek resistance or the general idea of a plebiscite) from Greeks themselves about 
the monarch had emerged by this time. From the earlier quote by Freyberg, it is obvious he also saw 
George II and his administration as having more influence than they actually did. The General was 
probably still in a Crete frame of mind, where he had been on sovereign Greek soil and where there 
was still some semblance of stronger Greek independence than now in 1942. This goes against the 
view held by scholars of Anglo-Greek relations who saw a much diminished Greece.27 That the 
General had met the King in Palestine during early 1942 and not shared some of his discussion with 
                                               
26 Ibid. 
27 Clogg states that “The Greek government-in-exile, then, was a classic example of a “’penetrated political system’”. Richard Clogg, 
Anglo-Greek Attitudes: Studies in History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 148. 
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the representative British diplomatic representatives28 adds to the argument that, at least at this 
stage, he saw a special relationship between him and the Greek Royalty.  
 
Expectations of Great Things 
To the New Zealand government, Freyberg presented a scenario reinforcing the future of the 
relationship and but with Dominion seniority: the Greeks “will then come under our operational 
command.”29 However, just less than two months after that communication was sent, and during a 
visit by the Greek King to inspect the Greek troops on 13 May, the British seemingly quashed the 
General’s ambitions. New Zealanders were not present but  “The C-in-C [Auchinleck] made it clear 
that he had no intention of incorporating the Greek troops in the N.Z. Division to whom they had 
been affiliated for training purpose only, and the Greek Brigade Group was formed as a self-
contained Independent Group in order that they could retain its identity.”30 The British intention for 
non-integration of the New Zealand and Greek forces is further demonstrated by a directive given to 
Freyberg, nearly a month after the Wellington telegram.  It concerned possible operations in then-
neutral Turkey.
31
  So, while the New Zealand army was pursuing an exceptional relationship with 
the Greeks, they were denied it by British predilections. 
 
The Turkish scenario (Operations Sprawl and later Octagon) never eventuated. Instead, Rommel’s 
offensive of 6 May and his subsequent threatening advance into Egypt caused the New Zealanders 
to rush into operations in that seminal struggle.  The Greeks remained in Syria.  The common 
enemy, in the form of Erwin Rommel, was therefore another hindrance to any joint arrangement. 
But there was interest from New Zealand in pursuing an ongoing relationship with it as a leader of 
the two. It was both an intertwining of a bond and elevation in real terms of New Zealand  national 
presence. 
 
Level of New Zealand Investment   
While planned joint unit-level exercises in Syria never eventuated, teaching Greeks through the 
New Zealand School of Instruction continued. The school, which started training them in March 
                                               
28 WO 32/17213 (TNA) Morale of Greek Forces in the Middle East.  The official British report reads thus “…the King and Ministers 
had a meeting here yesterday with General Freyberg and discussed certain requirements (unspecified) with General Freyberg and 
hope these will be duly adjusted”. High Commissioner to Secretary of State for the Colonies, April 5, 1942.  
29 Documents Relating to New Zealand’s Participation in the Second World War 1939―45: Volume II, (Wellington, N.Z.: War 
History Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, 1949). Freyberg to Minister of Defence, Telegram 134, 21 March, 1942. Published 
telegram matches the original. 
30 K51 Tsouderos Papers General State Archives Athens (GAK),  Report No 3 on the Royal Greek Army in the Middle East for the 
month of May 1942. A copy is also on WO32/17213 (TNA) Morale of Greek Forces in the Middle East. 
31 WAII 8 Box 3/23 (ANZ). Libyan Campaign – Prospective Operations from Syria, February-June 1942.  Mid-East to NZ Division, 
April 15, 1942.  The British Middle East Forces High command told him that they intended an Indian brigade, rather than the Greeks, 
to join any prospective excursion into Turkey (whether or not British forces would enter Turkey to counter a German threat if 
Stalingrad fell). 
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1942, devotes an entire chapter in its unpublished history describing the Greek training. Its 
prominence is not matched by attendees from other armies – another indication perhaps of a special 
place for the Greeks.32   The issue of language led to the courses being doubled in length and 
training material, standing orders and so on being translated. There was also an increase in the 
instructional staffing level at the School
33
 When the training was completed nearly 10 months after 
it started, 1,124 students had attended some 68 courses.  If one adds to this other Greeks who were 
sent to New Zealand units for training, then the total is nearly 2,000. It is indicative of the nature of 
desert warfare that courses related to transport collectively comprised a major proportion of course 
attendances.
34
 The numbers and the emphasis on transport show its importance in desert warfare. 
An ongoing lack of it dogged the continuing relationship between the two armies, as shown in the 
next section. 
 
To a degree, a reconstituted N.Z.T.T. continued with the Greeks, apparently up until the New 
Zealanders shifted operations from North Africa to the Italian theatre in September 1943. In 
appreciation of their efforts, Panayotis Kanellopoulos, the new Greek Deputy Prime Minister and 
War Minister since May, thanked the New Zealand trainers. His words stressed an ongoing 
relationship: "With the hope that this will add still more to the profound understanding and sincere 
friendship between New Zealanders and the Greeks not only during this war but for many years to 
come after victory."
35
 Like the broadcast from Palestine seven months previously, they were the 
emotive stuff of public bonding. As the following shows, it never matched the reality of the Middle 
East period – either for the ill-fated Kanellopoulos or any significant joint force. 
 
UNCONSUMMATED ENTERPRISE 
Despite all the enthusiasm and the training delivered, the Greeks and New Zealanders never fought 
together in the North African campaign. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Major General 
Bill Stevens (effectively in charge of all the 2NZEF administration) commented on the New 
Zealand involvement in the training in a post-war official publication: “Never was a well-meant 
offer more regretted.”36  Upon reading this, one might think Stevens was referring to some of the 
practical language challenges that were encountered. Indeed, in contrast to the optimism of the radio 
and Freyberg, in May/June, the official war correspondent had written a less positive assessment of 
the training programme. It was carried in several newspapers. The lack of a common language was 
                                               
32 WAII 1 DA 164/15/1 (ANZ) GP Scott, NZ School of Instruction- 2 NZEF Middle East Force. The courses included, but were not 
limited to, chemical warfare, weapons training, intelligence and transportation and maintenance. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.  
35 WAII DA 164/1/22 NZEF School of Instruction War Diary September, 1942. Kanellopoulos to King, September 8  1942 
36 W.G. Stevens, Problems of 2 NZEF, 135. 
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a major issue:  “It takes time and unlimited patience to give a lecture”. 37   When verbal instructions 
are replaced by the printed variety, “ludicrous complications” arise.38  Part of the latter problem was 
the multiple languages used by the Greeks (many of the new recruits came from the various Greek 
communities in the Middle East). The other was undoubtedly a residue of the poverty of mainland 
Greece. In April 1943, the British Council reported that, while the majority of the 13,000 Greek 
forces were “Greek Greeks”, two-thirds of them were illiterate in their own language.39  
 
But Stevens was concerned solely with the political dimension: “Greeks are by nature politically 
minded to a degree unheard of among British communities”, and “the patience of the training team 
was strained almost to breaking point, for it was difficult to get any continuity, beginning with the 
Greek commander, who seemed to change every full moon.”40   This represents the only published 
reference to the political dimension that the New Zealanders began to encounter in the Middle East.  
Stevens’ feeling was so intense that he refused to reconsider any softening of them during the 
writing process of the official history: “My remarks are strong, but I think justified.” 41 
 
This assessment, however, is an over-inflation of New Zealand’s exposure to the then-changing 
politics inside the Greek military. Also lacking is the obvious commitment by the Greek 
commander at least to join the New Zealanders in the front line and, paradoxically, Freyberg’s new 
found, but passing, ambiguity. Nevertheless, the Greeks had been criticised, and at a socio-cultural 
level, rather than criticism being levelled at any organisational or leadership target.  Kippenberger’s 
attempt to subdue Stevens was unsuccessful during the gestation of the official volume. As for 
Freyberg, Stevens had visited him and also given him a draft of the monograph. The General, 
champion of the Greeks, “passed so much without comment.”42 This is one of the contradictions 
between actual behaviour and later State history/official memory. As shown already in this thesis, 
and as will be discussed in the next chapters, Freyberg invested much during the war to promote the 
Greeks.  But he never followed through with any of the same passion or interest when it came to 
writing the New Zealand histories and their part in them. 
  
                                               
37 “Good Instructors,” New Zealand Herald, May 29, 1942; Also see “Training Schools,” Ellesmere Guardian, June 2, 1942. 
38 Ellesmere Guardian, June 2, 1942. 
39 CAB 104 255 (TNA) Allied Liaison in the Middle East Misc. Reports. British Council Educational Cultural and Welfare Section 
of the Dependent Allies in Persia/Iraq and Middle East Commands 11 April 1943. 
40 Stevens, Problems of the 2NZEF, 135-136. 
41 IA1 3391 181/52 Pt 2. (ANZ) War History – Narrative & Lessons Administration (New Zealand Expeditionary Force) – Stevens.  
Stevens to Kippenberger, May 14, 1956, 4. 
42 IA1 3392 181/53/12 (ANZ). War History- Printing and Publishing of Official Histories – NZEF- Major General W.G. Stevens. 
Stevens to Kippenberger, March 12, 1956. 
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Battle for Egypt – a Chance for a Joint Force in Action 
Greek requests to join the New Zealanders following their departure from Syria need to be placed in 
context of the acute situation facing the Allies from Mid-June in Egypt. The enemy’s rapid advance 
had brought them into Egypt and threatened Alexandria.  Freyberg himself was severely wounded 
in the neck on 27 June. He entered hospital and convalescence. He was out of an operational role 
from the end of June until at least the end of August. As such, he was out of direct operational 
contact with the Greeks. It would not be the first time his injuries would do this. The difference was 
that the second time elicits more evidence of his support for the Greek army. Now, he became 
temporarily equivocal – both from his sick bed and immediately afterwards.    
 
Besides the battle seriously damaging him physically, loss of men in Freyberg’s command was 
extreme in the least. 
43
 Despite such catastrophic losses, the Greeks were not in Freyberg’s 
consideration for bolstering his depleted force. Ironically, this was at a time when the training 
regime continued at Maadi and the N.Z.T.T. remained with the Greek units.  A lot of Dominion 
effort was going into preparing the Greeks for battle, but with no apparent future with its forces. 
Their non-inclusion was evident in New Zealand’s discussion with the British army at the time.44 
Also, the New Zealanders shifted from planned exercises with the Greeks in Syria to those with 
non-Greek formations in preparation for the second battle of El Alamein. For example, on 
September 26 they engaged in a mock attack in readiness for the change from a defensive to 
offensive scenario with the Axis forces.
45
  
 
While this dire situation did not generate any New Zealand approach to have the Greeks with them, 
it would be the opposite at a later time and in a different theatre on the other side of the 
Mediterranean. North Africa is therefore another contradiction in the connection – one that is 
explored below. 
 
Greek Frustration and New Zealand Ambiguity 
The non-consideration of the Greeks went hand in hand with their own efforts to be included with 
the New Zealanders. They saw the impediment as being lack of equipment, not attitude.   The First 
Greek Brigade was one of two formed and was the most mature organisationally. As early as 15 
June, days after the sudden dash of 2NZDIV from Syria to Egypt had begun, Colonel Pausanias 
                                               
43 WAII 8 Box 14 AA 1942 Miscellaneous (ANZ). Freyberg to Barraclough, October 4, 1942.    He wrote to the commander of the 
Pacific-based New Zealand force that "Things were very difficult here during the last battle. We have had between 6000 and 7000 
casualties, 239 of them were officers. It has been murderous for senior officers[...] The prestige of the Division stands very high but 
we cannot go on taking the heavy casualties that have been without feeling the effect.” 
44 See for example, WAII 8 Box 4 25a (ANZ) Libyan Campaign Light Foot Supercharge Sept-Nov 1942. Memorandum to Command 
30 Corps and also circulated to New Zealand Brigadiers  October 27, 1942 
45 WAII8 Box 21 25 Part1-2 (ANZ). Libyan Campaign Light Foot Supercharge Sept-Nov 1942. For example, the Greeks never 
figured in preparations such as a “Full-scale divisional rehearsal”  
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Katsotas, commander of the First Brigade, asked the NZ Headquarters to let Freyberg know that 
“the Ist Greek Brigade asks to follow the New Zealand Division in order to take part with them in 
whatever action they may be involved.”46 Freyberg was duly informed, but he was still recuperating 
from his wound. He replied on 9 July, essentially offering no definite plan or guidance but simply 
placating the Greek – “your role is an important one”- but the current stage of the battle made it 
impossible for the two units to operate together.
47
  Undeterred, the Brigade commander once again 
tried on 17 September, saying that they now had artillery but were “still deficient in vehicles”. 
Knowing a new offensive was coming and that “mobile operations” were a key component, 
Freyberg was asked for his help so as to satisfy the “desire of the Brigade and of myself to fight by 
the New Zealanders under your command.”48 The General directed his staff to provide a polite 
response but made no commitment. Deception was applied: “You can depend on me to do all I can 
do”.49 On the Katsotas note, he wrote “No Further Action” to his staff50. 
 
This exchange is in contrast to the genuine interest and support that had been expressed publicly 
and privately by Freyberg (and indeed, it would continue). For example, when the Greeks did come 
to the front, they relieved the New Zealanders in the front line. The British on the spot noted the 
General said he wanted to fight with the Greeks.51 A few days after being relieved, he told one of his 
brigadiers that “I am glad we were there just long enough to see the latter [i.e. Greek Brigade] go 
in.”52 When he was wounded, he seemed genuinely touched that, whilst in hospital he had “a large 
quota ”of Greek army visitors who were “most attentive and bring me great bouquets of flowers.”53 
It all points to an interest in the Greeks but a lack of accompanying action at that time.  Months 
before, there had been previous efforts by New Zealand54 and the Greek Brigade commander55 to get 
the Greeks equipped. Like the sought-after affiliation, it was another indication of a willingness for 
New Zealand and Greece to be together, but was again thwarted by circumstances beyond the main 
actors’ control.56 Trucks were evidently out of the question. If they could not be allocated the 
                                               
46 WAII 8/19/ PPP Part 2 (ANZ). Personal Papers. Katsotas to Head Quarters New Zealand Division, June 15, 1942. 
47 WAII 8/19/PPP Part 3 (ANZ). Personal Papers.  Freyberg to Katsotas July 9, 1942. 
48 WAII 8 T part II (ANZ). Royal Greek Army. Katsotas to Freyberg, September 17, 1942. 
49 Freyberg to Katsotas, September 21, 1942. 
50 Handwritten notation on Katsotas letter to Freyberg September 17, 1942. 
51 WO 178/42 (TNA) 210 BLU War Diary.  September 10, 1942 . before this final letter, the 210 BLU war diary noted. 
52 WAII 8 V (ANZ). Freyberg to Inglis, September 14, 1942. 
53 WAII 8 PPP Part 3 (ANZ). Personal Papers. Freyberg to unknown addressee, July 11, 1942 (ANZ). 
54 WAII 8/13 V (ANZ). Miscellaneous Personal Correspondence. Freyberg to Harding, March 21, 1942.  On the same day Freyberg 
cabled Fraser he informed a senior British general that he was attending the Greek National Day celebrations to make an assessment 
of the Greeks and that after that he wanted to “round the table” meeting with British staff to work through the equipment 
requirements.  
55 Tsouderos 51 (GAK). Report No. 3 on the Royal Greek Army in the Middle East for the Month of May 1942 Point 3. Katsotas did 
virtually the same thing with the commander of the British 9th Army (Syria was part of his geographic area of responsibility).  
56 WO 201/134 (TNA). Raising and Training of Greek Units in the Middle East Nov. 1940- Feb 1943. Notes on Equipment of Greek 
Forces by CLIO, 25 July, 1942. Despite such efforts there was little headway. For example, on 25 July, a British discussion took 
place where the possibility of providing pack animal transport was still being raised. It looked like the decision makers were going 
around in circles. 
 93 
equipment, then it had to be borrowed. Hence, as early as June, lack of radio equipment could be 
solved if the New Zealanders could provide it.
57
 Even when the Greeks had finally made it to the 
front line in Egypt they had, as one British officer later related, “come to ask for the loan of our 
anti-tank guns”.58 These examples with the First Brigade were part of a wider picture with the 
Greeks. Even as late as July, the N.Z.T.T. was having difficulties with equipment resourcing of its 
training task with the Second Greek Brigade.
59
 It could be reasonably argued that the size of the 
problem or reluctance to equip the Greeks dampened any New Zealand thought of helping. This is 
reinforced in the last letter from Katsotas. In it he related how he made equipment deficiencies 
known to the 8
th
 Army and also to the British Corps he was then attached to.  As these were 
commands senior to Freyberg, it would seem reasonable to assume he would not interfere with their 
decisions. 
 
The expanse of the ongoing operations in the desert also made a difference to any ongoing 
persuasive arguments. By 16 October, with his Division ever more distant from the training grounds 
where his instructors were working with the Greeks, Freyberg successfully asked to relinquish his 
overseer role but allowed the involvement of his men to continue.
60
 Against all of this was the 
forced prolonged absence resulting from Freyberg’s wound. All these contributing factors would 
explain Freyberg’s reticence. But he would continue his interest in working with the Greeks, as 
illustrated in later sections. 
 
Greeks fight without New Zealanders 
The Greeks did fight in the second battle of El Alamein. In contrast to earlier British suggestions, 
they were part of another larger unit, the British 50
th
 Division. They undertook patrols in strength 
and in a very complimentary view of their exploits, the British division reported that they had 
advanced “over 110 miles” in 5 days.61 It was the stuff of national pride, with the Battle being 
remembered in public at such venues as the Athens War Museum
62
 and the Historical Museum of 
Crete in Iraklion.
63
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New Zealand and Greece - Largely Without the Direct Complication of Politics 
The times in the Middle East and North Africa did not throw up any political challenges to the New 
Zealand-Greek military connection. While he was not officially privy to the deliberations between 
the senior British military, Foreign Office and Greek decision makers about revitalising Greek 
military forces (and the exits of senior Greek commanders), Freyberg had some idea of the wider 
context that had led to it. Although not on the distribution list for a 29 January 1942 communication 
from Auchinleck, in charge of Middle East Forces, to the War Office in London, he had his own 
copy, with the handwritten annotation “For General Bernard Freyberg (For Personal Use only)”.64 
Changes to the senior levels of the Greek military in the Middle East were “recommended by me 
[Auchinleck] in the interests of military efficiency but there are also political and security 
reasons”.65 These were being communicated separately to London. The opening paragraph of the 
communication suggests one of the contributing factors –“dissension in and unfitness for war of 
Greek forces”.66  
 
Incompetence of some senior officers was also interlaced with competing ideologically driven 
officer factions within the Greek forces.  It was a shadowy interplay involving the monarch, his 
government, their British sponsors and the officer corps. The Greek officer Freyberg would have 
the most to do with, Katsotas, was thought to be “independent politically” by the British.67 The 
results from these assessments were never seemingly passed on to the New Zealanders by them. It 
was a way of insulating the Dominion from what they were dealing with. It was a practice that 
would continue in Italy. The British veil fitted in North Africa, complementing Freyberg’s attitude 
toward politics. 
 
Against this official silence was the growing power of the leftist Antifascist Military Organisation 
(A.S.O.) in the Greek forces. It began to openly challenge the Greek government-in-exile’s 
authority. It contributed toward the dismissal of Minister Kanellopoulos, an energetic liberal-
minded reformer and the same figure who had sent thank-you letters to the School of Instruction for 
its efforts with the Greek soldiers. The leftist organisation then went on to meet with senior British 
military and demanded purges of the rightists in the army.
68
 They were successful.
69
 That the 
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minister, who had been responsible for getting the First Greek Brigade to El Alamein, was nearly 
“lynched” by the aggravated soldiers (egged on by rumours that he was bringing Metaxist security 
chief Maniadakis back into the scene) shows how wildly the political fortunes could swing with the 
Greeks as well as the ever-present vehemence of feeling about Metaxists. While there is no 
evidence of the British sharing any of this with Freyberg, one of his senior officers was aware of 
some of the inner workings. This was Dan Davin, the future author of the official Crete volume. He 
never discussed it in the New Zealand forces. The context will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
In reality, New Zealand had not experienced any of these early Greek convulsions. From the time of 
the radio broadcast the previous February there had now been two changes of command (Katsotas 
went as a result of the events of early 1943 because he had vacillated in his political commitment) 
in First Brigade and the newly formed Second had just lost its commander as well. The main New 
Zealand force was many miles away in Tunisia from the Syria-based Greeks who were engaging in 
protest. Maadi was also distant, and its training of the Greeks there had also just about ended. The 
only unit that was within the geographic ambit of the Greeks during the troubles was seemingly the 
N.Z.T.T. But, from Greek history scholarship endeavours, one can see there is at least some 
indication that the events of early 1943 did not impact training activities, speaking in the widest 
terms, completely.
70
 The one post-war official New Zealand publication, i.e. Stevens, mentioned 
earlier in the chapter, that touches upon the whole training scenario, does not add anything further. 
But as discussed later in this chapter, he spoke in general terms about the Greeks, their political 
inclination and frustrations of New Zealand trainers.  His intolerance lies in contrast to Freyberg’s 
ongoing affinity for the Greeks (despite the General’s equivocal behaviour). 
 
Middle East Thread Dissolves 
Regardless of the March upheaval, the Greek impetus to join the New Zealanders seemingly petered 
out long before then. The surviving document trail accessed by this project cannot illuminate what 
has to date frustrated earlier published efforts.  Historians are left grasping to explain the non-
continuation of the First Greek Brigade, with or without the New Zealanders, in the pursuit of 
Rommel.
71
 The only contributory factor this study has found is the eventual polite non-action by the 
New Zealand commander.  For its part, despite the non-appearance of any meaningful joint Greco-
New Zealand force, the British had discovered benefit in having the Greeks and New Zealanders 
together.  Just days after the 2NZDIV began its move from North Africa to Italy in late 1943, Major 
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General Beaumont Nesbitt, the Chief Liaison Officer, noted that “the New Zealanders are popular 
with the Greeks, and they have already worked successfully together” [sic].72 What exactly defines 
“success” seems dubious. But the British attitude would continue in the New Year, as would 
Freyberg’s receptiveness. This, despite what was a very limited interaction between the two 
probably best illustrated in a non-archival way by the lack of any mention of the Greek Brigade in 
the memoirs of ordinary soldiers.
73
 
 
VIEW FROM THE WELLINGTON GOVERNMENT 
On 8 March 1943, Wellington learnt of the mass-based political left in the Greek armed forces and 
how they had made their first open challenge to the Greco-British decision-making in the Middle-
East: “Serious political disturbances have broken out in two brigades of the Greek army stationed in 
Syria.”74  Although it also mentioned mass resignations of rightist officers, it was the actions and 
demands of the left that comprised most of the communication. In this short communication, the 
New Zealand administration learnt about the “underground agitation” of the left against “reputedly 
Fascist Greek elements in authority”.75  Also that “soldiers committees” ” that were “consisting of 
N.C.O.s and junior officers” had usurped the military chain of command.  The demands of the 
soldiers were primarily around pursuing the war effort more vigorously. To that end, they wanted a 
new government formed, removal of officers who displayed lack of interest to fight and ”expressed 
themselves in favour of dictatorship or said that German discipline was best for the Greek Army.”76  
 
Changes demanded by the mutineers were implemented but, as communicated by London, the core 
of Anglo-Greek policy remained unchanged.77  But the idea of a plebiscite was also raised.78 The 
monarch who the New Zealanders had a part in rescuing in Crete held a steadily deteriorating hold 
on his future in Greece. Opposition was emanating from Greeks fighting and suffering under the 
enemy Axis. For example, by September 1943, the New Zealand press reported that a plebiscite was 
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demanded by resistance leaders. The possibility of civil war was also raised.79 Greek matters were 
becoming complicated, but the Wellington administration remained silent over developments. 
 
That Wellington was reliant on London, and the press, for its diplomatic information was not 
entirely due to just a pre-determined Commonwealth constraint. In the immediate aftermath of 
Crete, the Greek government had requested, via Britain, the establishment of a diplomatic mission 
in New Zealand. Fraser, showing how he was not matching Freyberg’s enthusiasm in the 
Mediterranean, thought the notion “completely out of proportion”.80 Although the New Zealand 
response included provision for possible further discussion, London erased that part when it passed 
on the message to the Greeks.
81
 It was another incident of British preferences having an effect; and 
also one that highlighted the differing attitudes within the New Zealand elite, namely, the General 
versus the Prime Minister. It was another dimension of complexity that would continue but never be 
discussed in any literature. 
 
The Middle East and North African interlude has attracted negligible official public expression, at 
the time or after, in New Zealand. Freyberg’s passion for soldiering with the Greeks would continue 
during the war but would never reappear in the process of writing subsequent histories. In this, he 
was following the same pattern over Crete. Brief paragraphs in correspondence between 
Kippenberger and Stevens during the 1950s are the limits of State interest about the Greeks. Some 
of this could be attributed to the lack of actual fighting involving the two.  The elevation of the New 
Zealanders to train (to “show” the Greeks how it is done) was never applied to any national 
imagining. By itself, it was not enough. Blood and combat were required. Similarly, New Zealand 
participation in El Alamein and the defeat of Rommel is far more conducive to use in national 
imagining than frustrations and false starts with the Greeks. Yet if the disasters of 1941 could be 
incorporated, it could be argued the training commitment and, to a degree, Freyberg’s attitude, 
could be included as well. At the heart of the omission was that, in the martial arena, Crete was 
going to be paramount in remembrance. 
 
The New Zealand leadership was uncoordinated when it came to the Greeks and New Zealand 
troops soldiering together. Only the previously quoted telegram from Freyberg to Fraser exists. This 
is despite Fraser being informed of the explosions in the Greek camp. Freyberg was given his head.  
It could be reasonably argued that the critical events at the time – threats from Rommel and the 
rapid Japanese expansion in the Pacific - made for a lack of any discussion between the leadership 
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at the time. That would change in Italy. Ostensibly, co-ordination should have been better there. It 
was, but only to a limited degree. And the Greek army was just as politicised as it was in the Middle 
East. It just took a different form. 
 
ITALY –DANGER AND SHARED VICTORY 
“Princes now are like tonsils, even if they are any good, not much use.”82 So jotted Dan Davin in his 
diary on the 13 February, 1944 
  
in southern Italy, where the New Zealanders had been since late in 
the previous year. Left behind in the Middle East were the Greek military forces.  Davin, the
 
major 
New Zealand literary figure and future acclaimed historian of the official monograph on the Battle 
for Crete, was serving as an intelligence officer with the 2NZDIV when he wrote those words. The 
member of royalty he was referring to was Prince Peter of the Hellenes, one of the Royal party that 
had escaped capture on Crete thanks in part to New Zealand soldiers.  The Prince was paying an 
official visit to the Division in his role of Greek Liaison Officer to the British Army. According to 
Davin, the cynicism was apparently shared with one of his New Zealand colleagues, Paddy 
Costello, who, thinking of the fact that the Great powers had imposed a monarchy on Greece, 
commented “Speaks quite good for a German.”83 Davin’s diary does not offer any reasoning for his 
and Costello’s poor assessment of Peter’s effectiveness. But the Greek Prince had been under a 
cloud early in the previous year. British authorities found him a “disturbing element in the Middle 
East”.84 The Americans (the Prince was also a Liaison officer with them as well as the British) 
believed that he was going to be “relieved of duties” because of “Greek political indiscretions”.85 
He never was. The Foreign Office could not separate his personality traits from any political 
intrigue, but they were happy about the possibility he might relocate to a part of the world other 
than the Middle East.
86
 To the Americans, his cousin King George II argued it was Irene, Peter’s 
mistress, who was the main culprit with her “disloyal activities.”87 According to the monarch, these 
included being “an accomplished blackmailer” and also “a threat to himself”.88 The Royal family’s 
behaviour, like the growing demand for a plebiscite, would never adversely affect George II’s place 
in New Zealand’s Crete story. It was a resilience of memory. 
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Helping Pave the Way to Italy  
Regardless of whether he knew of any veil of suspicion about the Prince, and scepticism of other 
officers at his own headquarters, Bernard Freyberg interacted at length with the Prince during the 
visit.  In his own way, he was still pursuing the idea of a special relationship. His semi-official GOC 
Diary was not so forthcoming in detail about his doings with the Greek royals. It notes that, from 27 
January to 20 February, the Prince intermittently visited the New Zealanders in Italy. Given his 
senior military liaison role with the British, this was not unusual.  The Diary noted he was there on 
“attachment” and how, on the day the Prince left, he “seemed to have enjoyed his visit”. The entry 
continued: “He wants to bring over the Greek Brigade” and was off to talk about it to General 
Maitland Wilson.
89
 This was essentially the same military unit (i.e. the First), that had received the 
New Zealand training two years previously in the Middle East.  
 
The Greek record of the meeting (one and a half pages long) reveals a much more extensive 
discussion than Freyberg’s diary suggests. According to it, on 2 February, Freyberg raised the 
notion that the Greek Brigade join the New Zealanders “as he was informed, the brigade was about 
to be deployed to the Italian front”.90 The Prince then visited Field Marshall Harold Alexander, who, 
hearing of Freyberg’s offer, said “he was very pleased from the request of Major General Freyberg, 
which he completely approved, adding that this would facilitate greatly the proper use of the Greek 
forces”. Freyberg was then informed of the successful visit. It would seem that, to give the 
proposition the best chance of success, he then asked Peter to raise it with Field Marshall Wilson, 
Supreme Commander Mediterranean. The Prince did just that, six days after leaving Freyberg’s 
command. Like Alexander, Wilson was supportive. Apparently, the Prince’s arguments about the 
strong bond between Greece and New Zealand helped to overturn a previous plan to place the 
Greeks with the Free French forces and keep them far from the front. Freyberg had planned that the 
Greeks would join the New Zealand brigade commanded by Howard Kippenberger.91  
 
It is very clear from the Greek account that Freyberg was more than an observer, as indicated in his 
note taking. At its most basic, he was “helping” the Greeks and at the same time still being an active 
agent in pursuing the New Zealand-Greek relationship. Having said that, it is an episode which he 
seemingly did not relate to his fellow officers nor to Wellington.  Nor did he promote it publicly, 
then or after - even in the official history. It is a subtle omission at the time, possibly because of the 
deteriorating Greek scene and a reluctance to be seen helping émigré Greek authorities, especially 
royalty. The first Civil War round had also started several months previously, in October, and the 
                                               
89 WAII 8/6/ 46 Part IV (ANZ) GOC Diary. Entry for 20 February, 1944. 
90 Emmanouel I Tsouderos, Historiko Archeio 1941-1944: Vol 4 (Athena: Phytrakēs, 1990),1130-1131. 
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King’s future was now uncertain. In his own way, the General was projecting neutrality – essential 
in creating an unproblematic connection at the time. The same would follow from other New 
Zealand actors in public, both during the events themselves and in published histories. 
 
Freyberg’s offer seemed to have overcome the British generals’ initial reluctance to have the Greeks 
in Italy. The British had even considered sending the Greeks to Britain92, and Alexander did not 
want any more “foreign armies at the front”93 in Italy.  This was in conflict with Churchill’s 
persistent drive to have them there.94 While the British were having some internal disagreements, 
both Alexander and Churchill had a frame of thinking that recognised the political benefits to the 
Greek administration of having troops fighting. For now, Alexander noted that “national prestige” 
would also drive the use of the Greeks in the Italian theatre, and undoubtedly into the front line. 95 
Later events and interventions would show just that. It brought anger from the protective Freyberg.  
 
Three Months in Late 1944 – New Zealanders and Greeks Soldier Together  
It took six months for the discussions of February between Freyberg and Prince Peter to come to 
fruition. The Greek and New Zealand armies were finally affiliated in Italy in August. It had also 
been two years since the General and the then Greek field commander had pursued such an outcome 
in North Africa. The Greek formations, with the Third Greek Brigade as its core, arrived on August 
11 and stayed until 7 November, when they left for liberated Greece. During the months in Italy, 
except for a temporary change in operational command under the Canadians, it trained with and 
fought alongside the 2NZDIV. When the two armies finally went into battle together, it was without 
Freyberg. He had been badly injured in an aircraft crash and was hospitalised. What happened with 
the Greeks while he was absent caused him some dismay.  
 
In August, Freyberg and his officers provided a luncheon event for the newly arrived Greeks96 and 
the same 210 Liaison unit that had been with them for the past several years, from at least the days 
of the desert war.  According to a British officer, “They [New Zealanders] also have many mutual 
interests with the Greeks, and all are getting on very well.[sic]” 97 In addition to the earlier 
comments by senior British generals, some bond was now being recognised by more junior ones- 
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the same officer hoped the Greeks would not leave the New Zealanders.
98
 What makes the ongoing 
willingness to be with the Greeks more pointed was that the Greek army had very publicly engaged 
in widespread mutiny between the February visit and its arrival in Italy. The First (the unit most 
prominent in the Egyptian episode) and Second Brigades had been disbanded, their soldiers put 
through a political sieve, and a new Third (or Mountain) Brigade formed. British directions to 
Freyberg following this explosion led to an adjustment in his attitude.  
 
A New Pattern Emerges 
The post-war memoirs
99
 of the Greek commander, and subsequent civil war senior government 
military figure, Thrasuboulos Tsakalotos, noted some details of Freyberg’s welcome to the Greeks. 
The General’s speech to the assembled troops placed them in a secondary position as against their 
civilian Greek compatriots.  He told the Greek soldiers that his command “had agreed to have their 
unit with them because of the assistance Greek civilians had provided to New Zealand soldiers 
when Greece and Crete had been overrun by the Axis enemy.”100  The long-evident desire of 
Freyberg for his command to be with the Greek military was dispensed with by him at this first 
public encounter for years between the two armies. It was a remarkable turnaround, unless one was 
aware of the immediately preceding events, and also Freyberg’s personality. It is evident that the 
General did not want his acquiescence to serve with Greeks to be perceived as any public 
endorsement of their latest political colouring. A later instance of this would occur in the first public 
commemorative events in Crete. It will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Appearance of the Limits to the Military Relationship  
A change in the General can also be found in a small number of telegrams to the New Zealand 
government in early August. They were published in 1951 as part of the official volumes of 
documents mentioned earlier. The exchanges seemingly have never attracted any extended narrative 
or internal discussion. This in itself shows where and how New Zealand was seen in this aspect of 
the relationship. They present a New Zealand interested in Greeks, but in a politically neutral frame. 
They also show an instance of independent thinking by New Zealand and suggest it was wary of a 
recurrence of punitive measures previously applied by the British and Greek émigré government. 
Thus, despite the acute situation, the New Zealanders were not prepared to discount the Greeks as 
“troublemakers”. It was a sympathetic episode. Again, it shows Freyberg’s hand. 
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Figure 4.3 Freyberg greets the Third Greek Brigade in Italy (Source: Alexander Turnbull Library DA-06565) 
 
 
Here is the initial telegram: 
I have been asked by the Commander-in-Chief, at the request of the Greek 
Government, if we would be prepared to take the Greek Brigade under our 
wing. The purpose would be first to direct their training and make them 
battle-worthy, and later, I understand, the intention is that they should fight 
under our command. I have told the Commander-in-Chief that the matter 
would have to be referred to the New Zealand War Cabinet. 
 
As you will realise, having the Greeks with us would have certain 
advantages. It would mean an extra infantry brigade and consequent 
spreading of casualties. I also believe it would be a great help to the 
Greeks, who have always shown a desire to serve with the New Zealand 
Division. 
Could you advise whether the proposal meets with the approval of War 
Cabinet.
101
 
 
The same characteristics of training and affiliation are present as they were in previous encounters. 
New Zealand would also have a leadership role. It was the raw material for a complementary New 
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Zealand imagining. As, in one way, was the subsequent telegram five days later (it was published in 
the same volume). Freyberg wanted the following dictated message sent from Wellington so as to 
“safeguard” him in case of “political difficulty”: 
 
War Cabinet agree provisionally that you should help train the Greek 
Brigade and also take them under your command, but in view of the history 
of this force in the last twelve months with political difficulties and the 
military mutiny, you are to keep us informed of the situation, and if there is 
any recurrence of political difficulty you are to report it here and act on our 
instructions. Will you convey our good wishes to the Commander-in-Chief 
with this message.
102
 
 
The government concurred. There had been a distinct change in the factors considered in the 
proposition - no politics in the first, but saturated with it in the second. The abrupt change is 
explained by a visit Freyberg received after the first communication had been sent. That is one 
aspect, but New Zealand was also seemingly willing to take an independent line if there was 
trouble. It was never utilised in the imagining process. 
 
Blunt British Instructions and a Change in Attitude  
British Brigadier Hennessy, of the Allied Liaison Section, Middle East Forces, visited Freyberg on 
9 August.
103
  It was after the latter had sent the first telegram.   He also provided a written directive 
concerning the Greeks. It contained a “warning” to expect future difficulties with the Greek 
government in exile and its general staff over a British refusal to their request to send a Greek 
headquarters to Italy with the Brigade. He added: “any efforts by Greek Politicians to visit Greek 
units should be most strenuously resisted since it only upsets them, and serves no useful purpose”. 
George II may be permitted to visit them, but only for “the purpose of presenting colours.” Even 
this would be “the subject of a high level decision in due course”.104  Any semblance of Greek 
royalty having influence with the powerful must have now evaporated in Freyberg’s mind. Finally, 
the unsavoury possibilities of serving with the Greeks unfolded before him. Hence, the second 
telegram with “provisional” acceptance of the Greeks as well as the caveat that he would be acting 
on directions from Wellington rather than London if political difficulties occurred.  For the General, 
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there were clearly identified risks. But it had taken blunt formal British orders to finally make him 
realise there were dangers in soldiering with Greeks.   What is more, the anticipated military 
benefits must have diminished considerably when the visiting liaison officer passed on the news 
that the Third Brigade had only “existed in its present form for a few weeks and cannot, therefore, 
be compared to a formation which has been together as a whole for several months.”105 The ranks of 
the infantry even included “a certain percentage” of former gunners who were included “on their 
reputation of reliability rather than on their military qualifications.”106 
 
Freyberg may have been embarrassed by what had happened on this occasion – Hennessy arrived 
later than expected to meet with the General at his Italian Headquarters to give the briefing.  Italy 
also showed there was still a degree of un-coordination in the New Zealand camp. Although well 
aware of developments in Anglo-Greek camp, Fraser had simply taken the initial request from 
Freyberg to have the Greeks on face value, without placing it in the overall context of 
developments.  New Zealand’s willingness to assert itself over a Greek-related matter in Italy never 
received any official narrative treatment. An obvious contribution to positive national imagining 
was not pursued. There were other Greek-related ones, as will be shown in Chapter 6. 
 
WELLINGTON GOVERNMENT AND THE RECALCITRANT GREEKS 
The recent history of the Greek armed forces was well known in New Zealand. Greek-related 
diplomatic traffic and the press ensured that.  The left-wing soldier organization ASO had grown in 
strength since early 1943. It liaised with other semi-secret organisations in the Greek armed forces, 
especially in the navy, and advocated a departure from the monarcho-government in exile. In 
March/April 1944, what began as a protest grew into a widespread mutiny throughout the 
Mediterranean to Britain itself. New Zealand was told of the convulsions that engulfed the Greek 
émigré government during this period as well as of the mutiny.107 In early April, there appeared in 
the resistance-controlled Greek mainland a “political committee in the Greek mountains”108 This 
was in fact the Political Committee of National Liberation (Politiki Epitropi Ethikis Apeleftherosis 
or P.E.E.A.). This was a united front organ established by EAM/ELAS. It had, London argued to 
Wellington, been “subverting Greek armed forces in [the] Middle East”.109 
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The crisis was at first restricted to the political arena. Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos, who 
had been part of the party escorted to safety by New Zealand troops on Crete, fell first and was 
quickly followed by Sofoklis Venizelos. He, in turn, lasted a matter of days and was replaced by 
George Papandreou, who had come out of occupied Athens. Although he had some credibility 
through staying on following the Axis victory, he received British support to cement his hold. 
Fraser was privy to some of the British intrigue in stabilizing the Greek émigré government by 
protecting the latest Greek Prime Minister. The New Zealand Prime Minister was told by London 
authorities, “arrests were carried out with the knowledge of Papandreou, but this fact is not to be 
disclosed, as it is most undesirable that the latter should be associated in any way with the 
arrests.”110  
 
By April 24, London had told Wellington the Greek government-in-exile had lent their support to 
using force to quell the mutiny.111  The key army unit involved was the First Greek Brigade, which 
New Zealand had trained years before. It was described as being “under [the] control of [an] 
extremely fanatical minority of about thirty per cent and position in fleet is probably similar.”112 By 
27 April, London stated the situation had been “happily terminated with a minimum of 
bloodshed”.113 The tactics that had been employed were then outlined. The Greek Brigade had been 
subjected to a “blockade of the camp… no food or water being allowed to pass in”.114 Similar 
measures had been used with the Navy. In the end, though, it was armed force which terminated the 
dissent. Loyal sailors under Greek command assaulted one of the ships. There were twenty 
casualties. One British officer was killed while his unit carried out a preliminary operation against 
the First Greek Brigade camp. 
 
New Zealand Assumes a Stance of Sorts  
The mutineers were defeated, and the question of punishment arose. It was over this that Prime 
Minister Peter Fraser would break the largely one-way telegraphic traffic from London about 
Greece. It came down to either commuting death sentences to prison terms or carrying out 
executions of ringleaders.115 Fraser stated; “With opportunities I had of meeting Greek Prime 
Minister and other leaders in recent weeks, I would like to offer as my personal opinion the belief 
that the first alternative appears to be the proper course and indeed represents the best hope of 
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solidifying the Greek people.”116  This meeting occurred when Fraser was touring the Middle East. 
Also a part of the extended trip was the Prime Minister’s meeting in London during May. 
Implicitly, Fraser was dismissive of the Greek monarchy in his telegram to the British. “Other 
leaders” meant the Greek Royals. Not allocating a name reflects Fraser’s pointed disdain for the 
monarchy.  In contrast, the Dominion’s press presented to the New Zealand public a series of 
meetings between Fraser, the royals and George Papandreou.117 The relationship between the two 
countries was stressed by Fraser: “Mr Fraser spoke of the strong bonds of comradeship and mutual 
affection linking Greece and New Zealand”.118 Greek divisions were now seeping into the arena: “he 
urged her people to preserve unity within their borders and to concentrate all their energy on driving 
out the Germans.”119 Subtly, Fraser had also set a boundary of New Zealand connection – while 
Papandreou had spoken of the “throbbing hearts”120 of his countrymen awaiting the return of New 
Zealand soldiers as liberators, Fraser was silent on the matter. New Zealand had changed an earlier 
public stance about returning since, as will be described in the next chapter.  That Fraser was going 
against the wishes of Papandreou, who wanted the executions to take place, indicates he was not 
adverse to ignoring even the Greek political leadership, as well as being disdainful of the monarchy. 
Other than this implicit attitude, there is no evidence of any internal Dominion discussion about the 
new government or any of its political personalities. That would come in the new year. 
 
Fraser never shared his mutineer telegram with Freyberg – it was sent just a month before the 
Italian exchange. This is a symptom of the lack of coherence within the national elite that would 
become more evident through the critical year of 1944. Different leaders with varying attitudes 
would be saying one thing to each other and then doing another. Yet, on another level, they would 
be voicing some common messages publicly. They were making an acceptable publicly depicted 
relationship at the time that relied on specific previous events, simplified and palatable. It was the 
sort of stuff official memory is made of. Freyberg had already instituted using Greek civilian aid to 
deflect any charge that New Zealand was taking sides. Fraser was stressing the need for Greeks to 
stay unified, although he himself was driving toward eliminating the monarchy, a development 
which the following chapters will explore.  
 
New Zealand Public and Growing Exposure to Greek Divisions 
Reporting of the April unrest was not confined to New Zealand official circles. At the beginning of 
April, ordinary New Zealanders read of the catalyst for the Greek armed forces protest.  This was 
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the appearance in occupied Greece of "a provisional government"121 within the area controlled by 
E.A.M./ELAS. Although not named as such, this was the PEEA introduced earlier.  
 
By late April, New Zealanders were opening their newspapers to find stories of Greek sailors and 
soldiers who had been engaged in mutinous action during the preceding weeks. A common theme 
was the demand that a new government of unity be established.122 The army component of the 
disturbance was also reported. Again, it was the First Greek Brigade, the unit immersed in training 
with the New Zealand division in the previous years, that was named.123 
 
In the aftermath, the intended fate of the mutineers was also reported. In June “Three members of 
the crew of a Greek destroyer” were given the death penalty.124 Seven others got hard labour. By 
mid-August, 12 members of the navy had received the same sentence.125 While the ringleaders had 
their sentences commuted, the remainder were held in “concentration camps”.126 None of these 
stories seemingly elicited comment such as letters to the editor or to the government. Fraser’s stance 
on the death penalty was never revealed publicly.  Outwardly in New Zealand society there was 
seemingly total official disengagement with Greek affairs. This deceptive public image was 
persistently repeated during the events taking place and also in official memory. The reality was far 
different and much more provocative than the desired depiction of an uncomplicated relationship. 
Fraser would be taking an ever assertive stance against British policies, and ironically, his soldiers 
were involved in the volatile and violent resistance politics in occupied Greece. Shortly members of 
his regular army would also be entering an explosive episode in Greek politics. Italy also brought 
with it cause for a martial celebration.  Its reception and subsequent treatment shows that national 
image-building vies with expressions of a special relationship. 
 
BATTLE OF RIMINI – SHARED VICTORY 
“An historic occasion”127 was how a radio broadcast described the joint New Zealand-Greek force 
that had taken the Eastern sea town of Rimini. It was “a reminder of the heroic days of gallant 
action in Greece and Crete”. 128 Tellingly, it was the New Zealand “battle” at Thermopylae – not any 
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Cretan battle – that was also named in the broadcast. Crete was put aside and the mainland stressed 
in this episode. It was a sign that the island was still to be fully elevated. That the BBC claimed the 
Greeks had entered Rimini first (also reported in a different story)
129
 would rankle the New Zealand 
official memory exercise in the future. 
 
For the new Greek Premier, George Papandreou, the victory was also to be celebrated. Leaflets 
were dropped on Greece announcing it. The import was not the same as the victory over the enemy, 
and it did not mention New Zealand. His priority was to unify the Greeks under his leadership.  
Papandreou stated “Out of the ruins of the mutiny of April last, our Mountain Brigade rose. And the 
day before yesterday they presented us with the great glory of Rimini, which renewed the Albanian 
Epos, and once again provoked universal admiration for the Greek name.”130 The Greek premier 
was seeking his own national imagining. It is an example of where two nations can take the same 
event and mould it to their respective needs. 
 
Decision to Use the Greeks 
Victory may not have been a given at the outset of the battle for Rimini, but the Greek participation 
was, despite (ironically) Freyberg’s views on the matter.  Initially, the New Zealanders stayed in 
reserve of the major offensive that saw the Greeks enter the front line. The Greeks were pulled 
away from them and assigned to the Canadians, who would be in the early fighting. The separation 
order came from Oliver Leese, the commander of the British 8
th
 Army, who wanted the Greeks “to 
gain battle experience.”131  The early use of the Greeks is clearly dictated by the political needs of 
MANNA, Churchill’s plan for a rapid entry into Greece and installation of the preferred 
Papandreou government. 
132
 General Wilson had told him that he wanted them to be “blooded” first 
and that “If they do well I anticipate that it would be wise and practicable to pull them out and send 
them to Greece.”133  That is, following the mutiny, there was a need to gain military credibility to 
strengthen the claim of the returning and British-supported Papandreou government that, just like 
the left-dominated armed resistance, they had been fighting Germans.  
 
The Brigade went through its first action and suffered heavy casualties. A New Zealand liaison 
officer with the Greeks, Ted Aked, called in New Zealand support. The Greeks continued with the 
New Zealanders in their victory against the Germans at Rimini. According to the subsequent 
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Official New Zealand history, on 21 September, the mayor of the town presented a surrender 
document written in English, Greek and Italian.134 Also that: “The Greeks were jubilant and 
signalled their success by hoisting flags at various points in the city.”135  A recently victorious 
Greek army was much more attractive than a mutinous one.   Churchill told Wilson that “On 
political grounds there seem to be great advantages in having a contingent of Greek troops” for 
MANNA.
136
  
 
New Zealand Response to Use of Greeks  
The Greeks going into battle threw up a mix of emotions in the New Zealand Division but, again, 
resurrected Freyberg’s unflagging attachment to the Greeks and protectiveness. The General 
thought the use of the Greeks premature, and it was something he would later privately criticize to a 
British general: “I had no intention of allowing them to be used offensively until they had had some 
further training.”137 Obviously, he was not within the British arena of political trust and only saw 
poor military management, not political desirability.  Whether Freyberg could, or would, have 
influenced things is also a moot point. He was still recovering from air-crash injuries when the 
Greeks went into battle. His views did not match those of his temporary replacement, Steven Weir. 
When the Greeks pointed out that they were told they could “expect to be in reserve for 10 days” 
and that their soldiers were on leave or visiting hospitals, Weir did not deviate from his plan to use 
them in a post-Rimini fight. He told them they were “essential” to the operation.138  
 
After the war, the researchers working on the official volume on the Italian Campaign contacted 
Ted Aked about the Greeks and the battle. Aked had been appointed to the 210BLU, and thereby 
the Greeks. He told them “I was given my orders personally by Col Bill Thornton… and General 
Weir, acting Div commander, to make them fight but save them casualties.”139 To reinforce the 
latter: “General Weir had instructed me to contact him if in my opinion the Greeks were being put 
into shows without sufficient support.”140 It was a diverse mixture of concern combined with 
forcing them into action – a twist external to “safe” remembering by eliminating politics. 
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Writing about Rimini 
The question of who exactly could claim first entry into Rimini was a question pursued by the post-
war-researchers.  It was relevant to building a martial profile commensurate with a proud nation. 
One commentator was not convinced. Aked had an ongoing involvement with the Greek Brigade 
when it returned to Athens. He wrote “If it is the intention of the W.H. [War History] Branch to 
incorporate the return of the unit to Greece and its part in the fighting there, then it will be quite a 
job”.141 The official response was “it has been decided to cover only the activities of the Brigade 
during the period it was under New Zealand command.
142
 
 
It is quite understandable that the official war history project would not pursue the Third Brigade 
and Aked’s subsequent experiences in Athens. After all, there were no Germans there when the 
Brigade arrived. Aked would end up fighting alongside the Brigade against E.L.A.S. partisans. That 
will be discussed in a later chapter. But this development is indicative of the complexity of the 
relationship between Greece and New Zealand as against the distilled military connection and 
political neutrality being projected in semi-public and public by Freyberg and Fraser.  
 
The actual official history narrative of the time the Greeks and New Zealanders were together made 
fleeting references to the mutinous precursor
143
 to the former’s arrival. Their hard fighting was also 
included.
144
 Freyberg’s annoyance at the Greeks being sent into battle appeared in the form of a 
citation. It quoted his letter of complaint to Nesbitt, the British general.
145
 That same letter 
introduces Bernard Freyberg crossing the line between unqualified acceptance of the Greek soldiers 
and support of their use as in the military-political struggle that was about to erupt in newly 
liberated Athens. The context of this is set out below. There was no internal discussion amongst the 
official historians other than the limitation indicated to Aked. Examining the archival record shows 
the relationship between New Zealand and Greece was becoming ever more complex.  
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Figure 4.4:Greek and New Zealand soldiers mix at Rimini 1944 (Source: Alexander Turnbull Library DA-06690-F) 
 
NEW ZEALAND AVOIDS RETURNING TO GREECE 
In addition to the immediate issues of battle in Italy, Weir, Freyberg’s temporary replacement, 
noted a greater strategic development hinted at by the Greeks. On 30 September, senior Greek 
officers had engaged in “Much talk on return to Greece – present Greek Brigade to be under NZ 
Div and march past King George Hotel Athens.”146 The Greeks clearly wanted the association to 
continue upon their return to a land where a probable clash of both Greeks and British forces was all 
too evident. New Zealand differed on the matter. The willingness to return, described in the next 
chapter and linked to Dominion humanitarian exceptionalism toward Greece, had evaporated as the 
Greek political situation became more volatile and indeed had exploded in open mutiny. The 
Greeks in Italy may have been soldiering with New Zealanders, but the idea of returning with them 
to Greece was only supported by the British.  
 
Towards Liberation – British Intentions and the Special Relationship 
Besides the Greeks, the British were looking for other troops to support MANNA, their planned 
return. General Maitland Wilson drafted a request to Freyberg for a contingent of up to 300 New 
Zealand troops to join the British upon their return. The small number was not a limiting factor: “I 
consider the popularity of New Zealand forces with [the] Greek civil population would have [an] 
advantageous political effect out of proportion to the numbers sent.”147  It was again obvious that 
the British had recognised something of a special link and were incorporating it into their strategic 
Anglo-Greek planning. When the cable was eventually communicated in late September, it was 
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lacking the political point.
148
  Wilson had refrained from sharing with Freyberg the motivation for 
the request. Again, Britain had not confided in the Dominion how New Zealand figured in British 
secretive interactions with Greece.
149
  
 
In terms of the Wilson request, Freyberg told his Prime Minister that “As you know, there are 
several factions in Greece, with all of which we are on friendly terms, and if we were to involve 
ourselves at this stage in support of one or other of the parties we might prejudice our very friendly 
relations with the rest of the Greek people.”150 Fraser introduced the spectre of armed intervention. 
There was “the possibility of strife breaking out between various Greek factions, which might 
involve our interference.”151  Freyberg suggested, and the New Zealand War Cabinet subsequently 
concurred, that they decline the offer, using not the political reason but the manpower constraint; 
specifically, that New Zealand did not have the troops to spare. He also told Fraser that there were 
“very few” of the original Greek campaign veterans available.152  In this, he was using the latter as a 
very specific manifestation of remembering the past – living veterans.  Again, as with the speech to 
the Greeks in the Italian fields, memory (in this case the living variety) had been utilised to avoid 
charges of political involvement. The British offer was declined. From the wording in the 
cablegrams, it is obvious that the General and the politician had discussed the Greek situation 
during Fraser’s visit to Italy earlier in the year. Not only was New Zealand now feeling the 
gravitational pull of the Greek political scene through the fear of mutiny, it now had the possibility 
of engaging with the left-wing partisans as well.  
 
Indeed, the New Zealanders had had earlier indications of the growing probability that they would 
be asked to make a contribution to a Greek venture. Four weeks before the Wilson request was 
received and three weeks before he had initially directed his own staff to analyse a possible 
contingent from New Zealand,
153
 Freyberg alerted Wellington to the possibility. On 21 August, he 
cabled that he had had an informal discussion with Harold Alexander on 6 August and that “it had 
been suggested the NZ Division might be sent to garrison Greece for a short time and then go 
home.” He recommended to Fraser, “As there are many sides to the Greek question I feel careful 
consideration should be given before this proposal is agreed to” and that he wanted to know if “you 
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wish me to keep you in touch unofficially with these embryo plans and if you wish me to give you 
my personal views on definite proposals if and when they are made.”154 Fraser responded, 
welcoming his future input and any updates.
155
 By the end of the month, in a wider discussion, 
Fraser also told Freyberg that his Division would not be providing garrison troops “anywhere after 
the armistice”, but they still wanted to be kept informed of any plans placed before the General.156 
Such a general policy may have been decided, but it was Greece that had prompted Freyberg to 
contact Wellington. Austria had also been suggested by Alexander in their early August encounter; 
Greece was where the perceived danger lay. 
 
There would appear to be no single incident that caused Freyberg to raise Alexander’s proposal 15 
days after the event.
157
 Freyberg told Wellington about the informal approach by Alexander.  It is 
possible that Freyberg, now having the Greeks under his command and being in the senior military 
command structure, realized the time of liberation was drawing closer. 
 
 New Zealand sends a Military Adviser to Greece  
When Freyberg learnt the Greek Brigade was returning home, he approached the British with the 
notion that Aked remain with the unit. He did this indirectly and verbally through the junior officer. 
Beaumont Nesbitt, of the Liaison Section at Allied Forces Headquarters, met with Aked on 21 
October. This was a month after the Freyberg-Fraser exchanges about avoiding returning to Greece.  
According to the Briton, despite the New Zealand policy, Aked “tells me that you wish him to 
remain with the Brigade for a further period - at least that you are prepared to let him remain until 
their future is more certain.”158  Beaumont Nesbitt’s plan was to send Aked to Greece for “two to 
three weeks at the outside.”159 In effect, Aked stayed with the Brigade for months, including right 
through the street fighting of the Dekemvriana that would erupt in Athens within weeks. In this 
action, Freyberg was still pursuing his passion for all things Greek. This was despite the shakeup 
the British directive about the Greek Brigade had caused him and his agreement with Fraser about 
staying away from Greece. 
 
                                               
154 Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939―45: Volume II, Freyberg to the Minister of 
Defence, August 21, 1944, Telegram 387. 
155 Ibid., Fraser to Freyberg, August 25, 1944, Telegram 388. 
156 Ibid., Fraser to Freyberg, 28 August 1944, Telegram 389. 
157 Piers Dixon, Double Diploma- the Life of Sir Pierson Dixon Don and Diplomat (London: Hutchinson, 1968), Ch. 6. The main 
political player in the Greek planning, Churchill, was in Italy and also visited Freyberg and his officers whilst there. He never went 
near the Greeks.  The visit fell amongst the MANNA planning meetings but only after Freyberg told Wellington about the informal 
approach by Alexander. 
158 WAII 8/ Box 8 /76 (ANZ). Special Files – 3 Greek Mountain Brigade. Beaumont Nesbitt to Freyberg, October 21, 1944.  
159 Ibid 
 114 
Freyberg argued the continuation was necessary to the British because “Aked has really been Chief 
of Staff to Tsakalotos, and as such has saved them hundreds of casualties”160  The General never 
shared his actions concerning Aked with the Wellington authorities. With Freyberg’s step, a fissure 
had appeared in the New Zealand leadership over Greece. The Greek Brigade boarded ship for 
liberated Greece on 6 November. The New Zealand army stayed in Italy. 
 
As indicated earlier, Ted Aked was in the December fighting. Before that erupted, he was involved 
with one of the seminal moments in Greek political history – the emergence of a new form of the 
far right in the Greek officer corps. It is an incident, the import of which was unknown at the time. 
Aked seemingly kept it from the New Zealand establishment. 
NEW ZEALAND INVOLVEMENT IN FURTHER GREEK MILITARY INTRIGUE 
While the Greeks were fighting alongside the New Zealanders at Rimini, elsewhere the British were 
contemplating the future use, and fidelity, of the two armies when Greece was liberated. The case of 
New Zealand has been discussed above; the following primarily focuses on the Greek Brigade 
during the same period. 
 
Even after Rimini, communications between Churchill, Wilson and Alexander show a continued 
hesitancy about the loyalty of the Brigade to their sponsored Greek government. 
161
 But at a 
conference on 2 October, Alexander told Wilson the Brigade’s loyalty was “satisfactory”.162  In 
their caution, the British obviously shared Freyberg’s earlier assessment to Wellington that political 
turmoil was still a possibility.  
 
New Threat from the Far Right 
The renewed confidence was short-lived. Before the end of October, the 210 BLU reported that 
officers from the brigade had been meeting with “friends and political associates” posted at the 
Greek Mediterranean Base and Training Centre (G.M.B.&T.C.) in Italy and were openly criticising 
the Papandreou government, especially its inclusion of E.A.M. representatives in its administration. 
Furthermore, “plans for the overthrow of the present Greek Government have been openly 
discussed – the intention being to set up some form of Government excluding all parties save that of 
the extreme Right.”163 Wilson also let Churchill know that, by 4 November, the Brigade’s reliability 
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had diminished to that of being “generally trustworthy” and that General Ronald Scobie, then 
implementing MANNA in newly liberated Greece, together with the “Greek Government [would 
screen] untrustworthy individuals as necessary on arrival in Greece.”164  
 
Scobie also sent two officers from Greece to investigate the conspiracy in Italy. One was Ted Aked, 
Freyberg’s appointee. He was accompanied by Colonel Laios of the Free Greek Army165. In this 
episode, the New Zealander had a lesser role than Laios. In Italy, interrogations were conducted and 
declarations were made by the visitors about the stability of the Papandreou government, the 
irrelevance of E.A.M., E.D.E.S. “or political groups of that nature” in administering the country and 
that unity was necessary for the benefit of Greece. The result was that “any hopes of effective action 
by Greek Officers on reaching Greece [had] been completely dispelled” and the officers “look very 
chastened and are at least beginning to realize that there is no room at present in Greece for political 
nonsense”.166  
A New Zealander and the Genesis of I.D.E.A. 
The right-wing coup attempt against Papandreou did not materialize; but Laios and Aked had 
unwittingly witnessed a moment in the gestation of the extreme Greek right-wing army group 
I.D.E.A. (Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon). This was one point in a major historical 
development that no individual party involved at the time could have realised.  
 
I.D.E.A. would evolve into a force that would affect Greek politics and society for decades after the 
war.
167
  In Italy, as part of the Aked-Laios investigation, the British reported that Major Karayannis 
of the Greek Brigade was “probably the leader of [the] present conspiracies” and was removed from 
the Greek camp.
168
 Karayannis would indeed eventually write about his experiences in I.D.E.A., 
and his memoirs would provide historians with some material for their studies of the society.
169
 An 
examination of the work shows no mention of the New Zealanders.  Aked tried to meet Freyberg 
                                                                                                                                                            
undercurrents were at play) or simply using a ruse, the GMB&TC‘s Greek commanding officer also requested an extraordinary 
amount of ammunition (1 million rounds) to fight EAM and protect the Greek government. 
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166 Ibid. 
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during his inspection with Laios, but the latter was in Cairo at the time.
170
  He did, however, send a 
number of letters from Athens. None of them ever mentioned the Italian episode.  
 
WRITING IT UP 
The above shows that, after Crete, there was continuity of soldiering between the New Zealand and 
Greek armies. The training was continued and, one could say, remained in place right up until Italy 
(the Greek Brigade went into a New Zealand-managed field exercise there). There was never any 
common fighting in North Africa, and later, the time together was relatively brief when compared 
to the length of the whole war. It was filled with anxiety about Greek politics, contradictory actions 
at pushing them into battle and at the same time seemingly a pastoral care role. Constant throughout 
was Freyberg’s unwavering support of the Greeks. Years of inaction did not influence him, and he 
was not backward in denigrating other countries’ armies.171 He also showed them a degree of 
protection not always present in his dealings with his own men.
172
 The period of mid to late 1944 
was one where New Zealand was facing the difficult realities of the increasingly intense dynamics 
of the Greek situation. Liberation was coming and also, as the leadership realised, confrontation. 
Seemingly, they steered a path that avoided their involvement but at the same time saw them being 
receptive for caring for Greeks (of one type) and at one level. 
 
Public expressions of celebration about the Rimini victory (the only shared one during the whole 
war) never matched the same level of passion that the Battle of Crete did. Also, Dominion 
independent decision-making if the Greeks revolted could easily have been adapted into a positive 
national imagining. It also accommodated a sense of responsibility toward the inter-nation 
connection. Freyberg’s passion for the Greeks in Italy would also never flow into the writing of the 
official war histories – there are no comments from him about them. But at the time, he, and Fraser, 
had shown common disinterest in another area of the Greek struggle against the invader that 
involved New Zealanders – the armed resistance. In this thread of the New Zealand-Greek 
connection, individual New Zealanders were immersed in contentious politics.  
 
 
                                               
170 WAII 8 Box 8/ 76 (ANZ). Special File – Third Greek Brigade. Aked to Freyberg, November 16, 1944. 
171 “I have never felt that the Italians amounted to anything and I have always thought that they were never intended for war.” entry 
WAII8/6/48 (ANZ) GOC Diary Misc. Collected Jottings. September, 24 1940. He was grossly mistaken about a second country “I 
have always thought there were two nations that I would not like fighting, Russia and Italy, in neither case are they a serious 
proposition.” 
172 A soldier remembered seeing a postcard in North Africa of Freyberg depicted as a butcher hanging “plucked dead kiwis”, Jim 
Henderson, Soldier Country (Wellington: Millwood Press, 1978), 112.  The nickname was also mentioned in derogatory fashion in 
the documentary series Freyberg V.C., New Zealand Film Archive (Wellington). For a fictional account on how he tested his 
officers’ physical bravery See Dan Davin, “General and the Nightingale” in Salamander and the fire: Collected War Stories 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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1944 was a year of considerable Dominion deliberation and action over Greece. As Chapter 6 will 
show, there was more to come even after that. Yet there was no official pursuit of projecting any 
imagining using the above incidents by the nation state – either during the events themselves or 
afterwards in published histories. The telegrams between Freyberg and Fraser were included,
173
 but 
there is no connecting narrative. One is left with a vague incident from the early 1944 
Commonwealth Prime Minister’s conference in London and brief references in the political affairs 
volume by Wood
174
. The Balkans was a “seething mass of factions”,175 and investing in Allied 
landings there was a waste of energy. Avoiding sending troops to Greece was “unwillingness to 
take sides on Greek politics”.176  The reality was different, as shown above and in the next chapter.  
 
BRINGING INTO FILTERED LIGHT THE OUT-OF-SIGHT – CLANDESTINE 
SERVICES  
Ironically, when it came to the direct, significant and extended New Zealand involvement in the 
contentious Greek politics in occupied Greece, the official war history project showed no hesitation 
in entering the arena.  There were two organisations concerned. One was the Special Operations 
Executive (S.O.E.). It was involved with sabotage and interaction with various armed partisan 
groups and other resistance cells. The other was “A Force”, a part of M.I. 9, and a provider of 
escape routes in occupied territory.   
 
Which New Zealanders? 
One published comment
177
 by a New Zealand officer who served with S.O.E. in Greece suggests 
that Freyberg had at least some high-level awareness of the involvement of his New Zealanders in 
clandestine organisations. However, official New Zealand personnel records from the day record 
them being on, for example, “special service”, “seconded”178 or “special duty”179 and little else 
except for promotions and decorations.  There is not even any notation that informs one of the exact 
recruitment process. By the record and attitude of the New Zealand leadership, they simply 
evaporated from their view. It was a different matter when it came to writing the official history – 
then they were embraced. It is another form of contradiction made by the State. But this one showed 
its extreme adaptability in utilising facts in positive national projection. 
 
                                               
173 As already cited from Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War 1939―45: Volume II. 
174  F.L.W. Wood, Political and External Affairs (Wellington: War History Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, 1958). 
175 Ibid., 284. 
176 Ibid., 365. 
177 William Jordan, Conquest without Victory (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1969), 139. Written as if the author was with Freyberg, 
the authenticity of the claim is questionable. 
178 PF 2124 New Zealand Defence Force Personnel Archives, Trentham (NZDF). Sergeant Donald George MacNab   
179 PF 20475 (NZDF). For example Lieutenant Wilfred Arthur Hubbard.  
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The work being carried out by New Zealanders in clandestine operations was not probed by the 
country’s authorities during the occupation and immediately after liberation, even when, as in the 
case of Arthur Hubbard in mainland Greece and Dudley Perkins in Crete, it had cost them their 
lives. The different perpetrators of their deaths (Greek communists and Axis enemy respectively) 
reflect the multiple tensions faced by British Liaison Officers (B.L.O.s) working in occupied 
Greece.  New Zealanders were in this role for years.  Hubbard was designated as a “New Zealand 
officer” in an October 1943 telegram that was sent to Wellington government about his shooting by 
E.L.A.S., the left-wing partisan group.
180 
The death occurred during the first round of the civil war. 
The British initially told the Dominion that they were pursuing the death penalty for those 
responsible.
181 
Although Hubbard was again not named, another communication sent directly to 
Wellington one day later again made it clear it was a New Zealand officer who had been killed.
182
 
While Wellington showed no interest in pursuing the details of the death, it was a major issue with 
the British (including Churchill and Anthony Eden)
183 
and Greek governments.
184 
A joint British –
Greek Court of Enquiry decided it was an accident.  For another individual New Zealander, it would 
become something of an act of public remembrance. In post-war years, he would pursue, in contrast 
to his own country’s silence, commemoration of the death of Hubbard. This was Bill Jordan, 
another New Zealander serving with S.O.E. in Greece. His public actions will be discussed in a later 
chapter. To the New Zealand public in the same month of Hubbard’s death, it was an “Allied 
Officer”185 and a “New Zealander”186 who was killed at the time.   
 
Perkins perished in a German ambush on Crete. Tragic though it maybe would appear, it raised no 
discussion inside the New Zealand military-government apparatus at the time.  Both British and 
New Zealand archival records show no politically framed consideration of his death.
187
 The only 
thought of it being so came from conjecture by a post-war New Zealand biographer.
188
 Written in 
1987, without the aid of S.O.E. archives, the biography suggested that local E.L.A.S. was the 
culprit.  
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In contrast to the silence from the senior State actors, the official New Zealand war correspondent, 
when he visited Crete immediately following liberation, wrote an extensive and celebratory piece 
on the dead Perkins. It appeared in the New Zealand press in late 1944. The Cretans had christened 
him “Kapitan Vassilli”, and the whole treatment is one of heroism and one of the “legends of 
modern Crete.”189 Post-1941, Crete was obviously not in the vista of officialdom in its official 
memory. This is in contrast to the battle of 1941. So while the New Zealand State apparatus initially 
had practically no data on the activities and whereabouts of its soldiers serving with S.O.E. in 
Greece, the press had been reporting their activities and experiences after liberation.  
 
Official Post-War Story 
Neither the fate of Hubbard nor that of Perkins received any exposure when it came to the official 
history project’s work on the Greek scene. It was published in 1953 and written by M.B. McGlynn. 
The title was taken from the administrative tag in personnel records previously mentioned; Special 
Service in Greece.
190
  In fact, Perkins is not mentioned at all, while Hubbard receives a brief entry 
(noting his death at the hands of E.L.A.S.). As well as himself, there are five others listed, not 
mentioned in the text proper itself. They include all the members of “A” Force, as well as John 
Mulgan. Mulgan came from a high-profile family of journalists and authors. He was also someone 
the New Zealand government went to in early 1945 to obtain political intelligence on the Greek 
situation.
191
 Whether or not Kippenberger or any of his staff knew that, the sabotage exploits of the 
future iconic Mulgan were not included.  When a draft copy of the monograph was sent to his 
father, it included a covering note which in part read “You’ll realise the booklet is merely a 
condensed summary of many experiences and that valuable work such as that accomplished by your 
son’s party gains only a reference in the Appendix because of the emphasis on other operational 
areas.”192 The booklet was 32 pages long. Physical size was deceptive of the original planned scope 
and efforts initially envisaged. 
 
Planned versus Actual 
The McGlynn study focused on two sabotage operations involving a significant New Zealand 
presence. The first was at Gorgopotamos Viaduct, “Operation Harling” in November, 1942. Two 
New Zealand army engineers set the explosives at the base of the structure while the rest of the 
British small S.O.E. force and partisans fought the Italian garrison. The other was the destruction of 
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the Asopos viaduct in June 1943. This involved a small force of S.O.E .operatives; the most notable 
being Don Stott. The two operations were, as Christopher Woodhouse wrote, “the two most 
important operations undertaken during the first year of guerrilla activity.”193 The third and last 
exploit was named “Stott and Morton” and was concerned with a controversial encounter in 
occupied Athens between New Zealanders and collaborators and the occupying Germans over an 
enemy-initiated separate peace. The incident also enabled intelligence gathering by the New 
Zealanders. 
 
The limited focus of the published study was also something communicated to Arthur Edmonds, 
one of the saboteurs at Gorgopotamos sabotage operation in November 1942.This was one of the 
operations dealt with in the McGlynn booklet. Edmonds had been corresponding with Kippenberger 
since early 1950 about possibly publishing his memoirs as part of the war history project.
194
 His 
writing, as well as written material by Tom Barnes, another of the New Zealand force at 
Gorogopotamos, were being considered. Kippenberger had been supportive and replied to Edmonds 
thus: “The services of New Zealand officers with the Greek Guerillas are of course part of the 
history of our war experience, but not within the restricted limits of my instructions, being 
essentially individual stories.”195 But the point about the New Zealanders in the secret forces not 
working as a team or group with a distinct New Zealand identity ran against any sense of building a 
war history through major building blocks of units. In the end, the possibility of a separate 
publication of the Edmonds memoirs was not possible. Kippenberger again: “I have not been able to 
get Cabinet consent”.196 This was the National government that replaced Labour in 1949.  As 
identified in Chapter 1, its enthusiasm for war memory/history was less than that of the former 
government. 
 
Arthur Edmonds’ work was, however, seemingly the foundation of the final study. The year 
following the drawing of the curtain on a separate publication, McGlynn sent a draft copy to a 
relevant party, saying he had depended “for most of my information” on the Edmonds 
manuscript.”197 This gets a mention in the work itself, as does the other material used – secondary, 
primary and testimonial.  Just as with Crete, the project research threw up some disturbing 
questions for the nation’s official war memory exercise. Complicating matters was the elevation of 
the first two New Zealanders with S.O.E. in Greece to senior liaison positions with different 
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resistance groups during the occupation.  At the most basic level, they could be considered as 
contributing toward an elevation of New Zealand in any memory project, but at the same time, 
some of their views were drenched in the heated Greek political scene.     
 
Sources of Data 
When Arthur Edmonds raised the possibility of publishing his manuscript, he mentioned the issue 
of secrecy, and also implicitly the awkward reality that he and his colleagues had actually been 
separated from New Zealand accountability. He had given an “undertaking” to the British War 
Office not to publish anything without their prior approval.
198
  This is undoubtedly the Official 
Secrets Act. This very limitation had impacted on the memoirs of Eddie Myers, the first commander 
of the British S.O.E. in Greece.
199
  Even this was two years after the New Zealand On Special 
Service appeared. In contrast, Chris Woodhouse, his deputy, produced the Apple of Discord with the 
support of the Foreign Office, and it became “an authoritative analysis of wartime British 
policy.”200 The Woodhouse work is cited in the New Zealand study.   
 
Besides this, there were numerous other secondary publications and, unexpectedly in light of the 
issue of security, there are the internal S.O.E. reports of Tom Barnes. Barnes had died before the 
McGlynn work came out but had given his reports to Kippenberger. They comprised 55 typewritten 
pages in total.
201
 The editor had told Edmonds he might be able to publish both the reports and 
Edmonds’ manuscript.202  It is an astonishing intention, given some of the contents of the report.  
 
Controversial New Zealanders  
Like official British policy and also many of the S.O.E. liaison officers, Barnes was anti-E.L.A.S.
203
 
and pro-E.D.E.S.. He was also an admirer of its partisan leader, Zervas. He was in favour of 
continuing the first round of the civil war when an end to hostilities was imminent: “In order to stop 
the civil war, we unfortunately put Zervas in [a] disadvantageous position several times, by ordering 
him not to counter-attack when it was militarily imperative he should do so. I still feel this was a 
mistake (Even more so now).”204 His dislike of the left even led him into supporting the para-
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military units created by the Quisling government. The collaborationist Security battalions “[…]are 
hiding arms so that when they are disarmed by the Germans they will be organised and can re-arm. 
I feel certain they will be whole-heartedly on the side of any Allied Invasion Force.” He then 
recommended “…although they are admittedly doing the work of the Germans, I think we should 
avoid publicly denouncing them in such terms that the way to a later reconciliation is irrevocably 
closed.”205   
 
Similarly, one of the New Zealanders interviewed for the post-war project stated that the 
proposition of making a separate peace with the Germans over Greece was a sound one. This was 
part of the treatment of Don Stott’s meeting with, as the relevant section in the official volume 
stated, “Colonel Loss, chief of the Gestapo in South-East Europe”206 concerning “a local peace 
proposal for Greece.”207 The idea never went anywhere, but Charles Mutch, an S.O.E. colleague of 
Stott’s, argued, “If Britain had accepted the German proposal it could have averted the civil war in 
Greece, saved thousands and thousands of Greeks being killed and their country being wrecked by 
years of strife and hatred, and the cost was a possible disagreement with Russia which we have had 
ever seen since so the cost boiled down to nothing.”208 The final published official New Zealand 
history includes the Stott episode. It mentions Mutch in terms of his personal recollection of Stott’s 
Athens events (and even that was seemingly gained in the third person). Testimony was indeed 
heavily relied upon in the official work on the New Zealanders and their special service.  But there 
were few other sources to triangulate with.  
 
With such events and views held, it is not surprisingly that McGlynn wrote in an official letter, “I 
have kept away from the confusing tangle of Greek politics and confined myself to two outstanding 
operations.”209 These were the sabotage operations at Gorgopotamos and Asopos viaducts. Political 
factions such as E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. are mentioned, as is civil war. But the focus is on the 
partisans, and any internal Greek divisions are solely dealt with by their actions and not by wider 
political actors (especially British). 
 
 Having said that, as introduced earlier, the combined sabotage-related and peace deal episode in 
Athens was also included: “I have also described very briefly the peace proposal incident in which 
again Don was the prime mover [sic].”210 It was one that was not purely politics but had the 
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characteristics of a motion picture – Stott had walked around enemy-controlled Athens in full 
British uniform and had gathered military intelligence as well. As an aside, the New Zealand study 
quoted Woodhouse in a way that inadvertently highlights the dubious political credentials of Field 
Marshall Papagos, host of the Athens event Kippenberger and Upham attended and also author of 
the volume consulted by researchers writing To Greece. Woodhouse stated he was from the 
“extreme right”211 and a member of the Greek/German clique Stott met in Athens. It was an implicit 
reminder of the political legacy. The New Zealand State applied another Greek figure of authority 
to salve the inflammations of Greek related politics. It was perhaps inescapable to include such a 
high profile incident such as Stott’s activities.     
 
Applying Greek Endorsement of a Sort  
As mentioned in a previous chapter, Kippenberger’s Athens report alluded to the complimentary 
comments from Greek royalty about New Zealand soldiers. He included this in his Editor’s Note at 
the front of the McGlynn study: “The Greek people think your soldiers were all gentlemen. They 
were brave and kind.”212 Putting aside the slight variant (only “gentlemen” was included in the first 
report, but the overall positive royal attitude was the same), Kippenberger had apparently extended 
the Queen’s original assessment. As originally reported to Wellington, it was the battles of 1941 
that she was alluding to. Kippenberger expanded this to include not only the “New Zealand 
Division, which fought with high credit in the brief campaign of 1941”213 but also those who were 
evading or managed to escape. Finally, he also included “the volunteers who returned to Greece on 
desperately hazardous ‘Special Service’. It is a great satisfaction to put on record the services of 
some of these brave soldiers.”214 Hence, the distinct S.O.E. and highly charged political roles and, in 
Hubbard’s case, deadly posting, was diluted by this introduction. It concluded with one of the 
emerging and unproblematic memory struts: “New Zealand should be grateful to the Greek people 
who helped and sheltered her men regardless of the deadly penalties they risked.”215 Besides playing 
down the political dimension, the introduction and the volume itself was deceptive about the New 
Zealand presence in British clandestine operations. Not all were volunteers, and one instance of 
service had been forgotten. 
 
Serving in Greece – Question of Choice 
While Hubbard remained an unknown to the New Zealand public, Stott had made the news in early 
1942. This involved his escape with a fellow New Zealander and their evading recapture thanks to 
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the assistance given by Greeks over subsequent months.
216
 Stott’s comments about the Greek 
suffering and starving while at the same time they risked all for him and his associate hold some of 
the facets of the publicly expressed relationship. He stated “These people are suffering untold 
tortures and privation” and that “Now that I am safe, I think of my many good friends in Greece, 
and hope they survive to see the British reoccupy their country.”217  
Figure 4.5 Don Stott (far right) and other New Zealanders evading capture in mainland Greece June 1941. (Source: 'National 
Army Museum, New Zealand DA 1149) 
 
 
He pursued his desire by joining S.O.E. As his recorded wartime conversations stressed, “My whole 
ambition was to get back to Greece and help the people who had helped me.” 218 His affection for 
the “Greek people”, however, had led him into a new dynamic where there were various groups of 
Greeks exhibiting various degrees of animosity between each other and the B.L.O.s amongst them.  
Correspondingly, he found suspicion from the Greek communists he first met - “absolutely 
hostile”.219 He, like the other BLOs, was now not so much a New Zealander amongst Greeks as a 
representative of British policy and inclination. However, he did not discard Greek communists to 
the dustbin of the unworthy. When he first arrived, he thought, “the further away we got from 
headquarters, the better the Communists got”.220  But the over-riding affection was still there. “It 
was lovely to get among the Greek people whom I knew and loved.”221 The controversial Stott again 
shows a mixture of emotions about the New Zealand bond to the Greeks – sentiment and 
appreciation with simultaneous political consideration. 
 
Stott’s expressions of affection for the Greeks are matched by a fellow countryman, John Mulgan. 
His posthumously published Report on Experience is a long-standing public testament to it. Perhaps 
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more poignant are words from his suicide note: “I remember with pride that I managed to be in 
friendship with a lot of different and differing Greeks.”222 While critical of the Greek communists 
he, like Stott, but with much more deliberation, was receptive to there being a broader variance in 
the Greek “communist monolith”. He wrote, in a private letter, of British reluctance to see “good 
people in these left movements”.223 Again, it is a combination of respect and affection for Greeks, 
but with a cutting political intrusion. 
 
Besides sometimes offering, in their private recordings, a more heterogeneous assessment of the 
composition of the armed resistance, some New Zealanders showed a dislike for their politically 
charged work.  At one point, Barnes told S.O.E. Cairo that he was “fed up”, and they could “replace 
me as I came here for operations and not as a political monger”.224  Even Stott, who attained 
historical notoriety through his political actions, believed when he arrived that he would be engaged 
solely in sabotage. He was soon set straight: “We allot an area to an officer and he is called a 
Liaison Officer, a member of the British Mission to Greece, and then he sees to any sabotage in any 
area. Politically, militarily and financially responsible in that particular [area].”225 At one point, he 
was acting as an adjudicator in one of the local village elections.
226
 
 
Two of the New Zealanders who served in the celebrated Gorgopotamos operation stayed on in 
Greece for the remainder of the occupation. These were Barnes and Edmonds. The former’s 
bitterness was evident in his official reports. He had preferred to return to his unit as promised, as 
did others.
227
 Edmonds was the exception, staying out of personal loyalty to his commander Eddie 
Myers, although he would later relate his feelings as being “indescribable”.228 Greeks serving in 
occupied Greece with S.O.E. were therefore a mixture of volunteers and press-ganged individuals. 
 
Absence of Crete 
Whilst researching the work on the clandestine services, McGlynn told a correspondent that, in 
terms of Perkins, he was finding “very little on his life with the andartes [Greek partisans]”.229 
Indeed his personnel files with both the New Zealand army
230
 and Special Operations Executive
231
 
                                               
222 FO 841/524 (TNA). Consular Court Cases. This file holds the letters found at the scene of his death. 
223 Quoted in Martyn Brown, “Political Context of John Mulgan’s Wartime Life”: 104. 
224 Barnes Diary September 30, 1944. Benaki Historical Archive, Athens.  
225 Woodhouse Papers 2/7 (LHMA). Stott Narrative, 13. 
226 Ibid., 30-31 
227 WAII 1 DA 491.2/12 (ANZ). C.E. Barnes, Final Report on Activities and Observations in Greece Period 1 October 1942 – 27 
February 1945, 4. 
228 AAA2 Immediate Family member of Major Arthur Edmonds Special Operations Executive. Interview and Response to Questions 
concerning Col Edmonds, December 21, 2013. 
229 IA 1 3393/181/58 Pt 2 (ANZ). War History-Escapes- Greec and Crete. McGlynn to Moir, October 17, 1951  
230 PF 1772 (NZDF) Staff Sergeant Dudley Churchill Perkins.  
231 HS 9/1170/2 (TNA)  Dudley Churchill Perkins born 23.02.1915. 
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are very sparse. There was not much to add from memoirs or interviews, as Perkins was operating 
as the only New Zealander with S.O.E. on Crete. Noted British S.O.E. operative Stanley Moss did 
not even name him in his 1950 memoirs but noted a “New Zealander” had been killed by the 
enemy.
232
 Similarly, although it was published nearly 40 years after the McGlynn study, the official 
British S.O.E. report on Crete includes only brief references. Some are complimentary about his 
leadership.
233
 
 
When Perkins’ adventures were mentioned, it was in an appendix in the Davin work on Crete.234 
The Davin and McGlynn works appeared in the same year. Including Perkins in Crete may have 
been a result of simple convenience, but the end result was to align him with the memory centre-
piece. 
 
New Zealand S.O.E. involvement on Crete was minimal. In the narrow terms of military 
achievement, efforts of the mainland totally overshadowed those on the island.  Perkins’ time on 
Crete is obviously more conducive to any uncomplicated New Zealand-Greek scenario. He had 
fought in the 1941 island battle. His sole biographer noted “Cretans were his people”.235  His death 
might be one of the drivers for his inclusion on the Greek New Zealand memorial in Wellington – 
not a State-driven venture, but evidence that Crete had permeated the wider community, an 
indication of the greater sociological aspect of the memory of the war. His demise is part of the 
sometimes involuntary and more volatile and complex environment on the mainland. Indeed, the 
official New Zealand volume that included Perkins does not include any mention of the various 
political factions operating there .There was an E.L.A.S. group on Crete as well as the larger 
nationalist E.O.K. (National Organisation of Crete), but open civil war never erupted on Crete. To 
what extent Perkins had involvement in Cretan politics is only speculative. Stripping Crete of 
politics was, of course, in tune with presenting that place as devoid of intra-Greek conflict. Perkins’ 
absence from the official record may be explained by lack of data, but his exile to a footnote is an 
inexplicable contradiction. 
 
Missing “A” Force 
In The National Archives, London, an internal newsletter of a British-run clandestine organization 
states that a force member called Redpath, who recently shifted assigned, “is sadly missed as there 
                                               
232 W. Stanley Moss, Ill met by Moonlight (London: Harrap, 1950), 158. 
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of Internal Affairs, 1953), 494-8. 
235 Murray Elliot, Vasili: the lion of Crete, 117. 
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is a saying in the office that ‘ask Redpath he knows the answer’ and he always does.”236 The same 
high regard was evident in a 1945 reference by his British commander to the New Zealand army, 
but that “The greater part of Redpath’s activities since September 1941, must of necessity remain 
unstated, in the interests of security, but some aspects may be stated.”237 Secrecy was again 
impeding the writing of the official memory. 
 
Jack Redpath was a New Zealander whose experience as a successful escaper, like other New 
Zealanders, qualified him to work with A Force of M.I.9. Such an appraisal as the opening 
paragraph would, naturally, have attracted attention and endorsement if harvested by New Zealand 
State researchers. But they were not available (except for citations for decorations). As a post-war 
letter from one of the researchers to Redpath stated about the “hush-hush” aspect, “During the war 
and also immediately after it, those things were very secret.” When the issue of security arose, “we 
generally leave it to the discretion of the Editor-in-Chief [Kippenberger] to give an opinion on the 
matter.”238 
 
There were no seemingly no memoirs or other published material to remedy the dearth of material. 
British authorities were not approached. It was testimony,
239
 and often citations, that was relied 
upon. A major academic monograph study on M.I.9.
240
 appeared in 1979, over 25 years after the 
official New Zealand publication on Special Service appeared. Therefore, there was no equivalent 
to the Woodhouse one for S.O.E.. A new edition of M.I.9. work was published in 2011. The index 
still does not mention any of the New Zealanders who were involved. It was not that the wide New 
Zealand history project information gathering had not touched A Force while it was operating. But 
this was about New Zealand escapees, and not those who actually worked for the organisation: 
“Sgt. E.V.W. Wilson, 2 NZEF is temporarily in the office as official historian for the New Zealand 
Army Service Corps [… ]He is collecting data from our files regarding New Zealand personnel who 
escaped from enemy-occupied territory”241    
 
Within the limits of this project, it has not been possible to define the exploits of the New 
Zealanders with “A” Force as it has been with S.O.E.  One, Don MacNab, who was in the Wilson 
                                               
236 WO 208/3417 (TNA) Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, and Directorate of Military Intelligence; Ministry of 
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party attached to the 8
th
 Greek Battalion before joining the Force, is noted as undertaking screening 
duties ensuring no enemy agents infiltrated the organization.
242
 A Jack Stuart is also listed, and his 
fate at the hands of his Italian captors is dealt with in the next chapter, under war crimes. 
 
Efforts were made by the New Zealand official history project to alleviate the scarcity of material to 
generate a narrative of this lesser-known secret organization. Kippenberger was to find and 
interview a number of individuals (nearly all Greek) during his previously mentioned Athens visit. 
Redpath provided the names. McGlynn told him: “I prepared the list of names you gave me and 
added the brief background details. The list is now in the General’s private papers, and he will have 
it when he moves around Athens. On the General’s return it will be interesting to find out if he met 
the people in the list.”243 The planned meeting(s) seemingly never took place. There is no mention 
of them in the report and presentation made by Kippenberger upon his return. Enquiries to his 
family, although met with polite response, have not illuminated the incident.  
 
Kippenberger’s researchers did at least generate a brief summary description: “The soldiers who 
volunteered to go back to Greece and Crete to help the men still hiding there came under the control 
of a Branch of British Military Intelligence (M.I.9.) and were given the designation of “A” 
Force.”244 A Force still faced political issues.  Demands from the émigré Greek government that 
Greek personnel in occupied Greece were required in the Middle East were met by subtle resistance 
from E.A.M./E.L.A.S. They were, as one of the unavailable British reports of the time stated, “non 
persona grata”. Lack of support from the left resistance meant they had to be sent a longer, and 
presumably more dangerous, route because of “interference”245 from E.A.M. MacNab was at least 
sympathetic to E.A.M./E.L.A.S. and did not dismiss them out of hand. In 1966 radio interview, he 
stated that the December 1944 fighting in Athens had disturbed him because “I had friends on both 
sides.”246 But it is still a brief piece of testimony in a historical situation still to be explored. 
MacNab’s colleagues Redpath and Craig are mentioned in the next section.  This was not in regard 
to any combative record but in terms of New Zealand’s humanitarian aid to Greeks. 
 
Distribution 
When the Special Service booklet was distributed, it was not sent to any Greek national or body.
247
 
Overseas recipients included well-known military leaders such as Freyberg and Montgomery and 
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the American Mark Clark, as well as Royal Air Force Marshall Tedder. Overseas institutions 
included museums and government-based publications units, as well as British defence 
departments. Inside the country, they went to family members as well as distribution of hundreds of 
copies into organisations such as the New Zealand Education Department (750.)
248
 The publication 
went out with a major editorial fault. A photograph of the communist Ares was incorrectly 
captioned as being that of his enemy, Napoleon Zervas.
249
 
 
That Greeks were not included in the distribution is, as seen in previous chapters, not unusual. The 
sensitive nature of clandestine work is not apparently an intervening factor. But again, the New 
Zealand State, through its non-interest in sharing their wartime story with the Greeks, was showing 
it was not committed to sharing its martial official memory. It was a limitation to the relationship 
and, again, adds to the complexity of the interconnection, this time, its memory. 
 
LONGER VIEW 
Following the official war history effort, there appeared to be no major specific New Zealand effort 
in officially remembering the clandestine activities of its soldiers in Greece. Besides the annual 
Greek-run Resistance Day commemoration at Gorgopotamos, the Special Forces Club in London 
contributed toward a 50
th
 anniversary of the sabotage mission. This was focussed at the Stromni 
cave, where the Gorgopotamos S.O.E. sabotage team first took refuge.
250
 Arthur Edmonds, the only 
surviving New Zealand member, attended. The occasion was in 1992. Much later, as guest of 
honour, he was at the 2004 opening of the Special Operations Executive memorial at Papakura 
camp in the North Island of New Zealand.
251
 
 
There is still no official regular commemoration in New Zealand as there is for Crete, or any 
oblique mention of Gorgopotamos or Rimini.  While places like the Greek War Museum carry 
major displays of the Resistance, Rimini and North Africa
252
, the New Zealand Army Museum 
stresses Crete. There is no separate display for the others just mentioned. 
                                               
248 Ibid. 
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 Figure 4.6 Shield of the Descendent Unit of the Third Greek Brigade. Rimini appears at the bottom. Source: www.army.gr 
Accessed September, 1944. 
 
 
Each nation has stressed its own battles. The shared victory at Rimini has not led to a sense of 
lasting official memory, even though at the time the press gave it considerable importance. North 
Africa is another matter. It was essentially a non-event in terms of a fighting New Zealand-Greek 
force. Celebrating New Zealand involvement in the armed resistance has also not enjoyed much of a 
half-life. In addition, there can be seen to be contradictions at multiple levels. Freyberg’s passion 
during the actual events never transferred to post-war official history discussions. His and Fraser’s 
avoidance of New Zealanders fighting with the resistance was followed by intense interest by the 
State’s war history project, who were animated about telling their story. The end product was much 
smaller than intended and also stripped of politics.  There was also a mixture of emotions towards 
the Greeks. In the regular army, they ranged between the extreme of Freyberg to a degree of 
cynicism or a mixture of concern and tolerance for non-fighting.  In a different way, the attitudes of 
New Zealanders serving with S.O.E. at least show a more piercing standpoint. This will be further 
explored in Chapter 6. 
 
There are other aspects to the New Zealand-Greek relationship that attracted considerable effort 
and, in one case, publicity during the war. They include humanitarian aid and the question of Axis 
war crimes against Greeks. They never transferred into the State’s concerted memory project and 
are discussed next.
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CHAPTER FIVE: HUMANITARIANISM AND RETRIBUTION 
 
One trope of the New Zealand official memory concerns the suffering of the Greek and Cretan 
people during the war. Starvation and reprisals for assisting Allied soldiers are mainstays in New 
Zealand appreciating the inter-nation connection. There is ample evidence that much official 
emotion, both in public and privately, went into recognising the cost to the civilian population 
during the war years and immediately afterward.  
 
However, the State’s various symbolic and utilitarian commemorative plans had mixed results. As 
well as this, there were differences between it, New Zealand aid advocacy groups and wider 
community (including Greek-New Zealanders). At one point, the New Zealand population were 
subject to state misrepresentation of State contributions toward the Greeks.  Early State enthusiasm 
has also not been followed by a more permanent official memory such as that for the 1941 battles, 
clandestine work and the Rimini victory.  One cannot find any narrative in the official war history 
that concerns itself with this humanitarian strand. In the same way, pursuit of war criminals is also 
absent. This was despite some genuine Dominion effort to see the enemy held accountable for the 
fate of Greeks and Cretans.  An analysis of aid and legal justice provides a complex and sometimes 
contradictory history of the relationship, as the following illustrates. 
 
Aid During the Axis Occupation 
As shown in Chapter 3, wartime aid to Greece began with the nation state and Greek New Zealand 
community contributions in 1940. The amount, the nature, and the intended recipients changed 
during the war. Initiators widened to include more actors, such as the London-based Greek émigré 
government headed by Tsouderos and the wider diasporic population based in Australasia. The 
level of integration displayed by the Dominion state apparatus during this phase is reminiscent of its 
much-examined and criticised decision-making over the Greek campaign – lack of consistent 
coordination.  Several things make the context different.  Firstly, there is the extended timeframe 
over which these developments took place (conducive to more thorough State analysis and 
consequently decision making). Secondly, the number of New Zealand “owned” sensory points 
(mostly military) which could pass on relevant information from the Mediterranean and elsewhere 
in the Allied machinery had increased. Thus, the Dominion’s improved position should have 
enabled it to more readily express in a real way the growing expressions of admiration for the Greek 
people. 
 132 
 
 
 
While the Wellington government read diplomatic communiques about the increasingly volatile 
political agitation amongst the free Greek forces, the internal situation of occupied Greece was also 
changing, in terms of both everyday life expectancy and the politics of the resistance forces. 
However, the New Zealand State entered the arena of humanitarian relief to Greece before it did the 
political (overtly, anyway, through decisions and statements).  
 
New Zealand Relief and Greek Famine 
By early 1942, there had been no direct State aid sent to the Greeks since late 1940. What reached 
them from the State got there by being remainders of failed previous shipments, held in the Middle 
East and passed on to the Hellenic Red Cross Cairo.
1
 
 
But following the defeats of early 1941, famine had quickly emerged in Greece. The New Zealand 
press had carried stories about the starving Greeks from late in the same year. The previously 
mentioned radio broadcasts from the Middle East in early 1942 also mentioned it. On 27 October, 
1941, the Evening Post pre-empted the massive deaths to come through the approaching winter. A 
visiting Turkish merchant captain who had recently been in Athens stated, “The people there live a 
spectral, hungry existence. The food situation was desperate.”2 By late November, skeletal men 
fought for scraps with dogs.
3
 In January 1942, two thousand Athenians had perished in a single 
day.
4
  One month later, 40,000 deaths in 4 months for the whole of Greece were reported.
5
 Often, 
the occupying enemy were depicted as causing/exploiting the situation
6
. A British food blockade of 
Europe was in force. Its effect on the Greeks was noted
7
 in the press, but there was no interest by 
Wellington in questioning its use. This was in contrast with other Allied governments of the day, 
who had been growing in their criticism over the strategy.8  
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2 “Athens a Dead City,” Evening Post, October 27, 1941. 
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4 “Starvation in Greece,” Evening Post, January 29, 1942. 
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8 Joan Beaumont, “Starving for Democracy: Britain's Blockade of and Relief for Occupied Europe 1939-1945,” War & Society 8, 2, 
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Figure 5.1 Non-UNRRA Funds (£NZ) Allocated to Aid Greece 1940-1944. The amounts were these sent through or to 
institutions as against community and individual parcels sent. (Source: AAYO W3120 National Patriotic Fund Board 
Minutes, Archives New Zealand) 
 
Commencement of New Zealand State Funded Famine Relief to Greece 
 In March 1942, the New Zealand government committed NZ£5,000 
9
 for relief to Greece. It was 
the first time the nation state had entered into directly providing aid from its own central funds, as 
against the Greek community or the wider New Zealand Patriotic Fund base.  However, the 
shipment was a result of Greek initiative – both at home and overseas.  The timing of the 
announcement matches the Greek National Day. The deliberations over the proposal inside the 
government apparatus had been short and the challenges to implementation noted.  
 
On 19 February, the Wellington administration told their London-based High Commissioner, 
Jordan, of an approach from Seddon, Greek Consul General in New Zealand, about the possibility 
of the government “offering relief to the people of Greece” but that “apparently there is no prospect 
of arranging shipping”. Wellington wanted enquiries to be made to the London-based Greek 
government in exile about a strategy to get the shipment through.
10
 In response, Jordan had to set 
out the details of the situation with the British food blockade of Europe. This had been “relaxed 
only to the extent of allowing cereal shipments”11. These had been arranged by the Greek 
government in exile or International Red Cross with the approval of the Germans and Italians. 
Although goods could be purchased in neutral countries, he suggested a straight financial 
contribution. This is, in fact, what happened.  
 
                                               
9 “Greek Gratitude,” Evening Post, March 27, 1942.  
10 EA 1 209 / 58/345/1 1a (ANZ) External Relations - Greece - General 1940 - 1949 (ANZ). New Zealand High Commissioner, 
London to Prime Minister, Wellington, March 3, 1942. 
11 Ibid. 
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New Zealand Exceptionalism towards Greeks  
One can make several observations concerning this episode. First, as already indicated, the Fraser 
administration was not motivated to start the relief process.  According to Seddon’s records, the 
sum of money that left for the London- based Greek government was one of a two-part request for 
assistance that emanated from the local Greeks and the Archbishop of Australasia, the Most 
Reverend Timotheos Evangelinides.
12
 The original request included money and meat product. The 
latter was never sent. Secondly, the focus was on suffering Greeks. At that stage, there was no 
moral obligation expressed for assistance to New Zealanders evading capture that would eventually 
be part of the Greek-New Zealand formula.  Lastly, Fraser seemed unfamiliar with the whole issue 
of the food embargo and its ramifications, only asking about the pragmatics of available shipping. 
New Zealand had shown no interest in raising the embargo. It finally began to be phased out in 
February 1942.  
 
While the government had made its first aid donation for Greece, it would be more than two years 
before the next one was shipped.  Furthermore, Greece did not attract any exceptional treatment in 
the government’s relief activities in 1942. For example, in a public announcement a month before 
the Greek shipment announcement, it promised the same amount of money to the Chinese Red 
Cross.
13
 The low ranking of Greece continued, as reflected in the early 1943 figures for the National 
Patriotic Fund’s efforts Table 5.1). It was number four on the list of destinations of aid. It followed 
Britain, Russia and Poland. In fact, the Fund had not sent anything new since the late 1940 
shipment. There was therefore no exceptionalism shown toward Greece by New Zealand up until 
and including 1942. 
                                               
12 Ms-Papers-1619-180 Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL). Correspondence and papers re T. E. Y .Seddon's service as Vice-Consul 
and Consul of Greece: 1937-1965. This is indicated in the document Summary of the Work Accomplished by the Greeks of New 
Zealand to Relieve the Distress in their Homeland during the Struggle and Afterwards. (1940-1946).The money amount and date of 
announcement matches but the mentioned tinned meat is not recorded anywhere else. 
13 “£5,000 for Chinese Red Cross,” Evening Post, February 9, 1942. 
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Table 5.1: Published Destination of New Zealand National Patriotic Fund Aid to Allied Nations [Reported Auckland Star 
April 3, 1943].  
Country Amount (NZ£) 
Britain (London Distress) 206,834 
Russia 28,750 
Poland 20,377 
Greece 10,500* 
Malta 7,000 
France 6,726 
Belgium 2,500 
Norway 622 
Total: 283,309 
*The figure for Greece does not include the NZ£2,000 received by the Greek Red Cross, sent by the Dominion Red Cross, but 
from monies donated by the Fund. 
New Zealand Greeks 
While the government had made its first step and the Fund remained fixed in its lack of special 
consideration of Greece, New Zealand Greeks recommenced their efforts. Again, the National 
Patriotic Fund was the conduit through which they channelled their donation. The New Zealand 
Greeks had also been sending their own individual parcels, but in October 1942, Seddon was 
discussing with Hayden a NZ£500 donation from the New Zealand Greeks directly to Greece to aid 
civilians. He was turned down because “neither the British government nor the New Zealand 
Government will agree to money being forwarded to countries occupied by the enemy”.14 The 
alternatives were sending goods themselves or directing the money to a body (such as the 
International Red Cross) which would do the purchasing for the New Zealanders and ensure the 
supplies were sent.   
 
Unfortunately, what happened was something similar to the blanket/woollen goods scenario of 
1940/41. Seddon told Hayden at the National Patriotic Fund that the Greeks now wanted to send 
goods rather than money,
15
 that is, they were falling in with the Fund. The Dominion’s Red Cross in 
turn told Hayden they could deliver via the various overseas Red Cross organisations. For some 
reason, that line of action was dropped. The government’s War Purposes Committee would ship the 
dried milk to the New Zealand High Commissioner in London, who would then organise forward 
delivery. After the arrangements were made, the Commissioner reported that the goods were 
shipped from the UK to Canada, there to be loaded onto one of the regular relief ships that travelled 
                                               
14 IA 1 3105 172 206 Pt 1 (ANZ) Patriotic Funds-Assistance for Greece. Hayden to Seddon, October 2, 1942. 
15 Hayden to Joint Secretary, Joint Council of the Order of St. John & N.Z. Red Cross Society, November 10, 1942. 
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to occupied Greece. The New Zealand Greeks’ donation had in effect travelled half way around the 
world to the UK then twice across the Atlantic before reaching Greece through the Mediterranean. 
The doubling back had contributed to a process that led to the shipment taking 12 months
16
 from 
proposal to actual delivery. It also involved the pragmatics of additional costs. It is no wonder that 
the London-based New Zealand authorities told Hayden that “complications might be avoided if 
shipment were made direct to Canada in the first place.”17 While the food blockade had been largely 
lifted, any items sent directly to Greece had to be cleared by Britain. This did not stop the sending 
of a second, smaller shipment from the New Zealand Greek community. Again, there were 
difficulties, with the Minister of Internal Affairs telling the High Commissioner that “the Greek 
committee responsible for the gift… would prefer despatch of milk powder if possible via Canada 
otherwise leave it in your hands to distribute as you think advisable.”18 
 
In 1942 then, the initiatives of the State itself, and in conjunction with the New Zealand Greek 
community, show a revitalisation of aid from the Dominion to Greece. Unlike the earlier efforts 
which went to the Greek military or government for pursuit of the war, these were directed 
primarily, but not entirely, into humanitarian aid for Greek civilians - a case of comforts for Greek 
troops in the Middle East arrived at about the same time Seddon raised the much larger milk 
shipment.
19
 Good intentions, however, have to be balanced against the repeated failure to find an 
efficient and diplomatically acceptable (British-approved) avenue through which relief from the 
Dominion could reach the intended recipients.  
 
In the new year of 1943, the nature of State-sponsored aid to Greece would change. A public 
commitment would see the beginning of a practical contribution that sought to overcome the 
failures and complications of the previous years. The period of arrangement would be drawn out 
and continue into 1944, possibly because of the major Allies’ priorities but also with caveats 
initially placed on it by the Dominion’s national political leadership itself. In the immediate period, 
the greater community sought to engender a wider commitment. 
 
Idea of a New Zealand Food Ship 
At a State luncheon for General Bernard Freyberg in late June 1943, Fraser announced a special 
food ship for Greece. On this occasion, the General was quiet about the Greeks, preferring to talk 
                                               
16 Letter from Greek Red Cross to Official Secretary Dominion of New Zealand Naval Affairs Office, April 6, 1944. 
17 Skinner to Hayden, 22 September, 1943. 
18 Parry to Jordan, January 19, 1944. 
19 Extract from Report of Overseas Commissioner No. 47, October 7, 1943. 
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about his own soldiers. His admiration and idea that there was a bond between his men and the 
Greek people would, however, be quoted in the press.
20
 He repeated it in the New Zealand 
parliament. Freyberg, on a whirlwind tour, spoke not of the Greek army but of civilians who 
assisted New Zealand soldiers: “A word about those who were left behind. To them, the people of 
Greece and Crete gave food and shelter and were assisted to escape back to Africa in boats. In 
defeat, they never complained that we were leaving them to their fate but always with magnificent 
hope and faith were thinking of the day when we would return.”21    
 
At the luncheon, Fraser more than compensated for the military leader, but it was evident that 
Freyberg, and his officers, had been the catalyst despite earlier press front page entreaties to 
recognise the Greeks.
22
  Fraser said: “The General can testify that Greece and Crete and the people 
of Greece and Crete have been enthroned in the hearts of our soldiers.”23   He also alluded to 
returning soldiers and to recollections gleaned from them: “discussing with some of our soldiers or 
officers”24 It was these exchanges that had led the Prime Minister to make a “special mention” of 
Greece at the luncheon as well as to raise the notion that it would be “a splendid thing” that the 
“first ship” to enter liberated Greece would be a “New Zealand ship with New Zealand food to help 
the people”. 25  It was a public commitment that would be pivotal to official recognition of the 
special place of the Greeks for decades to come.  The intended shipment was in addition to the 
mandatory contribution to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (U.N.R.R.A.). It 
was a “gift” in that sense, but it initially came with a caveat. The ship would only go when Greece 
was liberated.  This would be another 16 months but Fraser may have been thinking that the 
Balkans, rather than Italy would be the scene of the next Allied offensive during 1943.  
 
The idea of the food ship plan was also publicly expressed in the USA to the American Greeks by 
the NZEF official war correspondent, Robin Miller. On 15 August, he told the Greek Orthodox 
Church of Saint Constantine and Helen in Washington of Fraser’s commitment of a ship “laden 
with New Zealand milk and flour and meat.”26 He also touched upon something which was being 
expressed in the country’s diplomatic service but which would in the next year prove to be a highly 
                                               
20 “The great bond which the men of the Second NZEF felt to exist between them and the people of Greece was emphasised by 
Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg.” “Greek People Food ship proposal,” Auckland Star, June 28, 1943. 
21 WAII 8 44 & 45 GOC Diary. (ANZ) 
22 On 29 March 1943 the Auckland Star spoke of “the kindness and spirit of a gallant people” and “succour they gave to the soldiers 
who were “left behind”. The way to repay the debt was by “food” via relief. “New Zealand and Greece,” Auckland Star, March 29, 
1943.  
23 State Luncheon for Bernard Freyberg 1943 [Sound Recording].  New Zealand Sound Archives, Christchurch (NZSA) 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid 
26 WAII I DA 404 I3 (ANZ) 2NZEF - Talk by NZ War Correspondent to Greeks at Greek Orthodox Church of Sainte Constantine 
and Helen in Washington - Robin Miller 
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dubious proposition. This is the possibility that the New Zealand army would return to liberate 
Greece: “It is the fondest hope of all of us that General Freyberg and his New Zealand Division will 
be chosen for the task of driving the enemy from Greek borders and setting Hellas free.”27 The same 
sentiment was reported that same month by the New Zealand Commissioner in London - “I learn 
from several sources that it is the keen desire of our General and members of the New Zealand 
Forces to return to the country to free its people”.28 But this was before the outbreak of civil war in 
Greece in October 1943. The face of Greece was changing and, as shown in the previous chapter, so 
did New Zealand attitudes towards military commitments to being part of the re-entry. 
 
Wider Community Support 
The national leadership’s emotional expression and exceptional treatment of Greece did not extend 
to the National Patriotic Fund, which still stood by its policy of not allowing any country-specific 
funding drives. However, unlike earlier years, it was now being approached by New Zealanders 
who had other ideas.  
 
In early December 1942, months after the first government-sponsored aid, and before the food ship 
commitment, the Fund had been contacted by the Dominion Federation of New Zealand Women’s 
Institutes about a remit from its Waimate sub-federation. The women wanted to establish a “freewill 
thank offering fund to provide extra comforts for the women of Crete and Greece.”29 The response 
was simply a reiteration of the standing policy of not appealing for specific purposes.
30
  However, 
the possibility of liberation now entered the frame of the Fund with the suggestion that there would 
be “big duties” (as indicated in the above letter of response) to perform to those countries that had 
been occupied by the enemy. But again, Greece attracted no special mention. The same behaviour 
of declining approaches from various community groups, even the New Plymouth Mayor, to have 
Greek-specific appeals continued into the New Year.
31
 Placing constraints on any Greek-related 
relief was also followed by one of the most vocal and high-profile figures – Freyberg. In the Middle 
East, one of his officers had suggested “a fund be inaugurated in order to assist refugee Greek 
children”.32 The General was agreeable “in principle”, but the current time was inappropriate, and it 
                                               
27 Ibid. 
28 EA2 107/103/3/6 Part 1 (ANZ) Relief and Rehabilitation – Disasters and Relief – Greece and Crete. Jordan to Fraser,  August 27, 
1943. 
29 IA 1 3105 172 206 Pt 1 (ANZ) Patriotic Funds-Assistance for Greece. Secretary, Dominion Federation of Women’s Institutes to 
Secretary, National Patriotic Fund, December 8, 1942. 
30 Hayden to Secretary, Dominion Federation of Women’s Institutes to Secretary, National Patriotic Fund, December 22, 1942. 
31 Gilmour to Hayden, April 9, 1943. “Greek Relief Fund” was mentioned in the letter although Mayor Gilmour was unsure if it 
existed. 
32 Hayden to Gilmour, April 15, 1943. Hayden told the mayor the intended fund raising concert for relief to Greece could go ahead 
but that the collected monies should be placed into the Fund’s “all purposes appeal”. Gilmour, however, told the community member, 
 139 
 
 
could be reconsidered at a later date.
33
 It would seem that the General was not as unquestioningly 
committed as other actions, which involved the Greek military, indicated. 
 
Path of the Food Ship Enterprise  
Fraser’s decision to send the food after liberation attracted some public criticism from the 
parliamentary opposition. In a debate, they had argued the shipment should be sent earlier, citing 
the example of Canada “which was sending 15,000 tons of wheat monthly to famine-stricken 
Greece.”34 But the government seemingly stayed firm for the moment. 
 
With an allied landing not in the Balkans (including Greece) but in Sicily and then Italy, Peter 
Fraser had to postpone delivering his publicly promised food ship. More to the point, the previous 
reporting of Allied and neutral relief being sent, combined with an unfulfilled New Zealand 
promise, made for a potentially embarrassing public situation. Criticisms of waiting until liberation 
were coming home to roost. As the Auckland Star reported, “Since the end of August 1942 relief 
work has proceeded without intermission on an increasing scale, despite serious difficulties.”35  
Prime Minister Fraser now did two things. First, he softened his previous stance on not sending the 
ship until after liberation.  Second, he differentiated Crete from Greece in internal Commonwealth 
communications. 
 
Exploring a Shipment during the Occupation 
In a telegram on 11 March 1944, Fraser told his High Commissioner in London to raise with the 
British the possibility of contributing to the flow of supplies that was already finding its way from 
North America to occupied Greece.
36
 This undoubtedly referred to the protected supply routes that 
had been operating for years. Fraser still linked this humanitarian act with the previously mentioned 
symbolic element: “We had cherished the hope that it might have been possible to send a vessel 
from New Zealand which would have been amongst the first to enter a Greek port with relief 
supplies.”37  But he admitted this might be “impractical”.38 Apparently, the Prime Minister thought 
that the thousands of tons that had been arriving already from other countries would not detract 
                                                                                                                                                            
who had already carried out the concert appeal, that she still might contact the Fund to try and get the funds paid toward powdered 
milk to Greece. He told Hayden he would be complying with the Fund’s policies over general fund raising in the future. 
33 Report from Overseas Commissioner No. 33, December 3, 1942. 
34 “Food for Greece,” Auckland Star, June 26, 1943. 
35 “Relief for Greece,” Auckland Star, March 18, 1944. Also see “Supplies to Greece,” Evening Post, January 4, 1944; “Food for 
Greece,” Auckland Star, February 11, 1944 and “Food for Greeks,” Evening Post, March 18, 1944. 
36 EA2 107/103/3/6 Part 1 (ANZ) Relief and rehabilitation - Disasters and relief - Greece and Crete. External to High Commissioner 
London, March 11, 1944 
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid 
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from the significance of his own country’s contribution. To him it was still suggestive of a special 
place for Greece in the New Zealand mind. A London meeting, where the Dominion was 
represented by diplomat Richard Campbell produced no outcome. Various options were considered 
with the British Ministries of Food and War Transport – via Turkey or through Canada. In the end, 
it did not meet with success.
39
 No shipment would be sent prior to liberation. British preferences 
overrode New Zealand aspirations in this instance. 
 
Publicly, Fraser also still pursued his idea of the New Zealand ship being the first one in liberated 
Greece.
40
 He also began to incorporate more of the central pillar of the celebrated Greco-New 
Zealand relationship– Crete. While he had mentioned both the island and mainland in his 1943 
parliamentary speech, he now expanded on it internally. In his 11 March cablegram to Jordan, he 
had spoken of the “assistance afforded by the people of Greece and Crete [my emphasis] to the men 
of our forces during the time the Division was engaged there.”41 He publicly projected the same a 
few months later. In a radio broadcast from London, where he was attending a Commonwealth 
conference, he spoke about the food ship being first and also that it was the third anniversary of the 
battle for Crete.
42
 Within the limits of newspaper coverage indicated in the introductory chapter, 
this is the first anniversary mentioned by Fraser in the press. Recognition of the protection of New 
Zealand soldiers by Greek/Cretan civilians and the sending of food aid was now linked to Crete. 
While it was a stance by no means totally exclusive of the mainland, it did reflect a lack of other 
possibly acceptable adhesive Greek surfaces that New Zealand could attach to. The military venture 
in the Middle East had come to nothing, and since October there had been civil strife in the 
mainland between the ideologically opposed partisan groups. Just why Crete began to appear in 
public and private expressions may be conjectured with some very tentative suggestions. Mainland 
Greece was embroiled in inner Greek turmoil; Crete was not. With a defensive war now superseded 
by an offensive one, discussion about what was essentially a loss was more acceptable than before 
the change. 
 
Willing Hands but Into Civil Strife  
Inside the relief machinery that would first enter liberated Greece were several New Zealand 
officers. Brigadier Tom King was on secondment to the British 9
th
 Army in the Middle East when 
                                               
39 New Zealand Supplies to Greece. June 9, 1944. New Zealand wanted asked if the goods could join the flow coming out of Canada. 
The British response was that it should come out of Turkey but that was “difficult. 
40 “Food for Greece- New Zealand may send first Shipload,” Dominion May 27, 1944. 
41 EA2 107 103 3 6 Part 1 (ANZ) Relief and rehabilitation - Disasters and relief - Greece and Crete. External to High Commissioner 
London, March 11, 1944. 
42 “Gesture to Greece,” Evening Post, May 27, 1944. See also “Help for Greece New Zealand Offer,” Auckland Star, May 27, 1944. 
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he was asked to take up a post with British Military Liaison (M.L.).
43
 He was in charge of the 
Supplies and Relief Branch. But M.L. would also have a major role in British plans to ensure 
E.A.M./E.L.A.S. was frustrated in its ambitions to have a place in governing post-war Greece. It 
does not appear that King was aware of this. 
 
M.L. had a dominant role in the Greek relief operation, even elevated above the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (U.N.R.R.A.). The international organization was to act as an 
agency for M.L. during the initial liberation period.
44
  In January 1944, King told Freyberg that he 
had managed to have another New Zealander, a transport/logistics expert, Ken Crarer, brought back 
from New Zealand, “to take part in such a wonderful work.”45 For himself, King believed he was a 
New Zealand “representative” and that “I can assure you [Freyberg] that I am fully conscious of my 
responsibility to New Zealand as well as the Greek people, and it will not be for want of zeal and 
enthusiasm if my part of the show doesn’t function efficiently.”46 King was passionate about 
Greece. 
 
The New Zealand-Greek nexus was obvious in early and ongoing communications between King 
and the nation’s leaders and as well as through his later comments in the New Zealand press. He 
also pointed out that the senior British general in charge of the relief operations had recognized the 
benefits of having someone from the Dominion in his command. “General Hughes was most 
anxious to have a number of New Zealanders with him, knowing our particular affection for 
Greece, and how highly the Greeks regard New Zealanders.”.47 It was further British validation that 
there was some sort of bonding between New Zealanders and Greeks. King’s emotional 
commitment was further evidence of expressions of a bond. It would be tested in the months to 
come. It would remain steadfast, but he would be selective as to which Greeks should be given New 
Zealand endorsement. His predilections did not match all of his countrymen’s, as shown in the next 
chapter. 
 
                                               
43 Originally ML but changed to Allied Military Liaison (AML) when the United States joined. The latter subsequently withdrew 
which, in turn, led to the organisation reverting to its original name. 
44 By the end of the year, relations deteriorated between ML and the UNRRA to the point where the latter pulled its staff out of 
Greece. This is placed in context in the next chapter. 
45 EA2 107 103 3 6 Part 1 (ANZ). Relief and rehabilitation - Disasters and relief - Greece and Crete. King to Freyberg, January 21, 
1944. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid.  
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Further Permeation into New Zealand Thinking by the Greek Political Scene  
King noted what had become obvious in public awareness as well as confidential planning: “There 
is one other very, very big snag, and that is the political situation.”48 That the armed resistance was 
a factor to be considered in the establishment of post-liberation governing bodies was accepted by 
King. 
49
 He saw the then inter-partisan fighting between E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. as “a form of civil 
war”.50 
 
Besides the various resistance groups, the Greek émigré government was mentioned. In a footnote 
to a statement that M.L. was keeping them fully informed, King noted “We have not, however, 
gone into detailed planning with them as we do NOT [his emphasis] want to be compromised 
should some other government be in power.”51 This was written to Freyberg just days before the 
General was assisting a senior representative of that same monarcho- government through a path of 
British army bureaucracy to get the Greek army to Italy. Conflicting behaviours amongst the New 
Zealanders were again appearing. The degree of difference was influenced by the relative positions 
in the Greco-British and Dominion matrix and individual inclinations. King was reflecting the wider 
practices of the British machinery. Freyberg was the same; in that he made a request to British 
authorities: he could not just let Aked accompany the Greeks on his own authority. However, his 
efforts were questionable, given the agreement he had with Fraser.  
 
The month after King’s letter went to Freyberg and just prior to the massive Greek military political 
mutinies in early 1944, Fraser was publicly joining Greeks in the celebration of their National 
Independence Day. The factional fighting in the mainland was put aside. He sent a message to 
Emmanuel Tsouderos, the Greek Prime Minister, who had been part of the party escorted off Crete. 
The text, reproduced in the Evening Post, included phrases such as the “suffering of the people of 
Greece” and how the people of New Zealand “watched with sorrow the suffering” and with 
“deepest admiration their refusal to submit”.52 Again, the promised food ship was mentioned “as a 
practical expression to our sympathy.”53 Fraser kept his efforts for a pre-liberation delivery secret.  
In response, the political leader received messages from Garland
54
, member of the local Greek 
community, as well as Tsouderos.
55
  
                                               
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., As the partisans were still fighting, the Brigadier thought “the only people we can negotiate with is the Hellenic 
government.” That there may be multiple administrations overseeing different parts of the country was raised.  
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid. 
52 “Mr Fraser’s Message,” Evening Post, March 25, 1944. 
53 Ibid. 
54 “Greek People’s Thanks,” Evening Post, March 27, 1944. 
55 “Greek Government’s Thanks,” Evening Post, March 28, 1944. 
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King and Crarer amongst the Britons 
As suggested by an earlier quote to Freyberg, the New Zealanders in the British M.L. apparatus had 
a degree of direct communication with their own government. This was unlike their countrymen 
serving with clandestine organisations. Letters to Freyberg were kept confidential, but the 
correspondence with Fraser was transparent to the British.
56
 British authorities were given copies 
or, more correctly, they were official communications through their communication channels. In 
one respect, King showed a degree of candour in his correspondence about Greek politics with 
Freyberg and Fraser. It would intensify.  He would also show an intense emotionalism about 
Greece, but the pragmatics of the shipment preoccupied him in the earlier period of his office. 
 
Pragmatics of the Relief Ship 
The “when” of the food ship delivery had been dictated by the British authorities; the “what” and 
“when” now had to be addressed. King initially told Wellington that, ideally, the promised shipment 
should be entirely composed of the equivalent of 45,000 metric tons of liquid milk. In this, he had 
considered the needs of the Greeks as well what New Zealand produced.
57
 If such a shipment was 
not possible, then “blankets or warm underclothing”58 should be sent.  
 
When the shipment left in October, the profile of the cargo was considerably different. Commercial 
constraints were accepted by the Wellington administration from the outset as a memorandum to the 
Director of Export Marketing from the Secretary of the War Cabinet indicated ”without thereby 
reducing the quantity of foodstuffs available for export to the United Kingdom”.59 It was a 
restriction communicated to and appreciated to a degree by the British Ministry of Food in 
London.
60
 Fraser told King of this, as well as the need to maintain supplying the “Allied Forces in 
the Pacific.”61 
 
On October 22, the New Zealand food shipment left for the Middle East on the Tekoa. From there it 
would be forwarded on to Greece. It was a shipment of “1,080 tons gross”.62 This tonnage differs 
from other figures for the same consignment but, given the technical discussions, it is highly likely 
                                               
56 WO 204 9179, The National Archives (TNA), Gifts of food from New Zealand Government July 1944 –July 1945.  
57 EA2 107 103 3 6 Pt 1 (ANZ). Relief and rehabilitation - Disasters and relief - Greece and Crete. King to Fraser, July 31, 1944.  
58 Ibid. 
59 Secretary War Cabinet to Director Export Marketing, August 15, 1944. 
60 Secretary for Dominion Affairs to Minister External Affairs, September 20, 1944. The communication noted that the shipment had 
included items “in very short supply” in Britain but that the Greek shipment did not “prejudice” “other commitments”. 
61 WO 204/9179 (TNA). Gifts of food from New Zealand Government July 1944 –July 1945. Fraser to King, October 17, 1944.  
62 EA2 107 103 3 6 Part 1 (ANZ). Relief and Rehabilitation - Disasters and Relief - Greece and Crete. External to Fernleaf, October 
26, 1944. The actual weight differs in several instances. It would seem the technical measurements being applied by the various 
parties differed (as shown by the remaining archives). 
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the differences are due to the measurement methods. The cargo comprised milk (condensed and 
powder), canned vegetables, meat, honey, chocolate, oatmeal and clothing. The ship left four days 
before the government had approval from the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (C.C.A.C.), a 
governing body associated with the Allied relief effort.  When the response arrived, it was in the 
affirmative. The shipment would be acceptable and would not be deducted from the mandatory 
U.N.R.R.A. contribution by member nations.
63
 As intended, it was indeed a “gift” in that sense. The 
foodstuffs were worth NZ£80,000.  
 
Shipping 
Assembling the shipment was one thing; getting it to Greece was another. It had been decided to 
ship the goods to the Middle East. Stockpiled there, they would be forwarded on to liberated 
Greece. Originally, the ship Dunnottar Castle had been tasked with carrying the supplies from New 
Zealand, but on 18 September, just a month before the liberation of Greece began, the London-
based New Zealand High Commissioner told Wellington that the British Ministry of War Transport 
had notified him “all space not required for Middle East is being filled with cargo [for] United 
Kingdom.”64 It looked as though the promised food shipment was in jeopardy. Fraser escalated the 
matter with London. He wanted the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to take a direct 
“personal” interest in the matter and to discuss it with Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport, 
and Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. The response was conciliatory, and alternative shipping was 
made available.
65
 In a way, the loss of the Dunnotar Castle in the New Zealand relief exercise was 
fortuitous. Unhygienic conditions on the latter vessel led to a massive protest by 2,300 New 
Zealand troops, who marched on parliament in Wellington.
66
.   
 
After accepting that it could not send a shipment before liberation, New Zealand had obviously 
driven its special Greek relief contribution forcefully through 1944.  It shows a level of commitment 
to the relationship. 
 
                                               
63 New Zealand Minister, Washington to Minister of External Affairs, September 17, 1944. 
64 High Commissioner for New Zealand, London to Minister of External Affairs, September 18, 1944. 
65 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Minister for external Affairs, September 20 & 23, 1944. 
66 One soldier would later recall: “In protest, they broke through the wharf gates, and led by sailors with a piper playing, marched to 
Parliament to tell Prime Minister Peter Fraser about it.”  Jim Henderson, Soldier Country (Wellington: Millwood Press, 1978), 14. 
Fraser contacted London and gave them the number of soldiers involved. He, and the Minister for Defence, personally inspected the 
ship and found “insanitary conditions and bed bugs”. WO 106/3496 (TNA), New Zealand Troops in Italy. New Zealand government 
to Dominions Office, November 15, 1944.  
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Ensuring Positive New Zealand National Imagining  
Wellington naturally wanted the Greek recipients to know that the special aid gift came from New 
Zealand.  In a March 1944 communication to London, Fraser said as much.
67
 At home, some basic 
steps were undertaken that would reinforce this. Time constraints and danger of labelling 
perishables for the journey led to the decision, made in consultation with a representative of the 
Greek community, to stencil the crates (rather than individual packets) with the message “A gift 
from the people of New Zealand to the people of Greece. With gratitude.”68 It was a long way from 
the original discussion that, at one point, included finding a way to erase “United States Army 
ration” on tins of biscuits for the intended gift.69 
 
A variant of the official message was repeated in a government newsreel of the ship’s departure.70 
The imagery and commentary focused on the calamities of 1941. The link was between two 
peoples, but it was soldiers who were highlighted through their loading of crates in a warehouse. 
The same was true for the ship’s captain and other dignitaries. The waterside workers were 
“invisible”- seen but not given recognition. New Zealand had fulfilled its commitment.   
 
Figure 5.2 Screen shot from the government newsreel about the Food Ship (Source: Archives New Zealand) 
 
 
Some of the crates intended for Greece were labelled differently. They simply said 'Πατριωτικός 
Σύνδεσμος Ελληνίδων Νέας Ζηλανδίας’ i.e. Patriotic Association of Greek Women of New 
Zealand. The containers contained woollen garments. Greeks living in the Dominion had been 
subsumed within the people of New Zealand in the film exercise. 
                                               
67 EA2 107 103 3 6 Part 1 (ANZ). Relief and rehabilitation - Disasters and Relief - Greece and Crete. Minister of External Affairs to 
New Zealand High Commissioner London, March 11, 1944. 
68 Meeting Minutes, September 15, 1944. 
69 Memorandum for Rt Hon. Prime Minister, August 28, 1944. 
70 Weekly Review No.166 Relief - Food Ship for Greece, Wellington: New Zealand National Film Unit, 1944, (Videorecording), 
http://www.ecasttv.co.nz/program_detail.php?program_id=955&channel_id=60&group_id=60 Accessed July 21, 2014. 
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Delivery Sites for the Special Food Ship – Following the Earlier Path of the New Zealand 
Army  
As shown earlier, Fraser had begun to differentiate Crete from “Greece”. But he left the distribution 
up to King.
71
 The goods would go to Iraklion (Crete), Piraeus (port of Athens) and Salonika in the 
North East. But the intended breakdown of amounts does not show a slant towards the island that 
would become a focus of the New Zealand war memory. It seems that the ports selected were in 
areas where, or near where, New Zealand troops had soldiered in the campaigns of 1941 - nothing 
to the Western part of the country. That Crete did not attract any elevation shows the way of 
thinking at the time. That same logic would cause disagreements amongst New Zealanders in 
forthcoming years. 
 
Table 5.2: Intended Distribution ports of New Zealand Food Shipment Source: WO 204/9179 (TNA) 
Site Amount (Tons) Percentage 
Piraeus (Athens) 653.45 75.54% 
Salonika (Northern 
mainland) 
153.4 17.73% 
Iraklion (Crete) 58.2 6.73% 
Total: 865.05 100% 
 
In Relation to Contributions from other Countries 
As indicated earlier, Fraser had wanted to expedite his own Greek shipment. In this, he wanted to 
join in with other countries.  One was Canada, whose army had never set foot in Greece but which 
had an involvement with the Greeks at the September Battle of Rimini. In, April 1944, the Fraser 
administration had been given some background and statistics from the Canadian representative in 
Wellington. Relief had been flowing from Canada to occupied Greece since the summer of 1942. 
72
 
A monthly contribution of 15,000 tons of wheat had begun at that time. It was “a gift from Canada 
to the people of Greece.”73 This had been recently expanded to include other items, such as fish, 
soup and canned milk. The monthly total was now 31,200 tons. New Zealand pales into comparison 
with its one-off shipment. Comparison may be difficult given the respective sizes of economy and 
individual circumstances. However, one thing about this shipment is that it shows the priority and 
preferred mechanisms for New Zealand relief.  It was a gift, in that it had not come out of the 
                                               
71 WO 204/9179 (TNA). Gifts of food from New Zealand Government July 1944 –July 1945. Fraser to King, October 17, 1944. 
72 EA2 107 103 3 6 Part 1 (ANZ). Relief and rehabilitation - Disasters and relief - Greece and Crete. Copy of Press Telegram from 
Department of External Affairs Ottawa to High Commissioner Wellington, April 6, 1944. Received by Wellington government, April 
12, 1944. 
73 Ibid 
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U.N.R.R.A. contribution voted in by the government that year. That organ and the special shipment 
would be the chief mainstays in the State’s arguments about its contribution toward Greece. That 
stance would be the response to local Greeks and communities from whom it would soon be 
receiving requests for aid. It was a limitation set by the administration itself with the reasoning that 
its U.N.R.RA. contribution was “for Greece” as well.  But the United Nations’ welfare agency 
involvement in Greece was a result of the major powers’ decisions and historical circumstances. It 
cannot be taken as proof of New Zealand exceptionalism towards Greece. Similarly, its special 
shipment lies in contrast to the record of other allies, who had been sending aid for years. 
Furthermore, it would not be long before the State would employ a subtle deception to strengthen 
its positive public profile regarding special Greek efforts towards Greek civilians. It was a mixed 
bag of behaviours, more in the line of complexity of history than the simple message of official 
memory. 
 
Actual Distribution of the Food Ship Gift 
After so much public expression and real effort, the planned distribution points of the New Zealand 
foodstuffs may have never eventuated. It would have been an outcome of the December 1944 
fighting.  A published news report of 3 January 1945, mentioning King and Crarer, from the 2NZEF 
Official War Correspondent, described how the outbreak of fighting in Athens in December 1944 
delayed offloading of the special food shipment.
74
 It also led to British intervention with the New 
Zealand gift. By the beginning of January, internal British documents show a shift, with a new 
emphasis on the capital, Athens: “the Capital district has suffered.”75  Two weeks after the British 
note, King reassured Fraser that “I have arranged for the New Zealand gift foodstuffs to be called 
forward” to the original three ports listed earlier.76 He also said that Crarer would report on the 
distribution.
77
 There the archives trail ends. Efforts to locate family members of Crarer and King 
have not been successful. King left Greece, also leaving a new and “most attractive” position. He 
turned it down because of “my desire to be of service to the Greek people.”78 After he left his 
position and returned to New Zealand, he continued to argue for more New Zealand aid for the 
Greeks.
79
 Besides the foodstuffs shipment, he also made a personal request to Fraser for clothing 
and footwear to be sent to the Greeks. This was done through using surplus army clothing as well as 
                                               
74 “Great Tragedy Hungry Greeks Food Distribution Impeded,” Evening Post, January 3, 1945. 
75 WO 204/9179 (TNA). Gifts of food from New Zealand Government July 1944 –July 1945. Internal memorandum, January 2, 
1945. 
76 EA 2 1947/41a 103/3/6 Pt 2 (ANZ). Relief and Rehabilitation-Disasters and Relief-Greece and Crete. King to Fraser, January 15, 
1945.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 EA1 688/90/9/2 (ANZ). Allied Nations Co-operation - Polish Children's Camp in NZ - Greece - Recognition of assistance given by 
Greeks to New Zealanders. Minister of External Affairs to Freyberg, May 20, 1945. 
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from community clothing drives overseen by C.O.R.S.O .(Council of Organisations for Relief 
Services Overseas) – an organisation to be discussed later. It was paid for by the Dominion’s 
U.N.RRA. contribution.
80
 It was evidence of further interest in Greece, but one with a clear limit in 
terms of funding: it was not originally intended as a gift. 
 
Non-State Support for New Zealand Relief – People and their Pockets 
The special food ship, United Nations commitments and an external comparison with other 
countries highlight the strategy, limitations and difficulty in determining degrees of New Zealand 
exceptionalism towards Greece. Internally focused State efforts show similar difficulties. They still 
did not entirely accommodate the direction the community as a whole was moving in. The National 
Patriotic Fund temporarily adjusted its policy of non-country specific fund raising by conducting a 
United Nations Week. The drive took place in mid-June 1944 and drew coverage in the national 
press.
81
 The end result clearly showed that aid to Greece was considered of more importance than 
aid to other countries. It attracted £12,867 out of £37,750 donated for specific countries.
82
 The next 
highest were Poland (£7,888) and Yugoslavia (£4,036).
83
 The monies collected would not form part 
of the liberation ship gift. They were used to subsequently purchase New Zealand woollen goods.
84
  
The outstanding amount of £1,473 was handed over by the Patriotic Fund to the Greek New 
Zealand community in June/July 1946.
85
 
 
The decision to send goods from New Zealand rather than via any other external body is an 
indication of the growing assertiveness of the New Zealand Greeks. The Greek ambassador to 
Britain recommended that any funds collected in New Zealand be sent to the Aid to Greece Fund 
with a British chairperson.
86
 The Greeks in New Zealand differed. The funds were used to purchase  
New Zealand goods, which were then shipped to Greece.
87
 
 
                                               
80 EA 2 238/103/3 6 Pt 2 (ANZ). Relief and Rehabilitation – Disasters and Relief – Greece and Crete. Extract from General Summary 
287, December 1, 1944; New Zealand High Commissioner, Canberra to Minister External Affairs, January 4, 1945. Records on this 
file show Wellington was very frustrated in navigating a path through the UNRRA and Greek ML quagmire.  
81 “Allied Nations Week’s Special Appeal,” Evening Post, June 8, 1944. 
82 “Allied Nations – Result of Special Appeal,” Evening Post, November 2, 1944. 
83 Ibid., I have used only whole pounds. The final figures were arrived at by taking both the country specific donations and adding an 
amount from the non-specified monies given. The formula was approved 4 months after the fund raising. National patriotic Fund 
Board Minutes, October 18, 1944 AAYO W3120 Box 6 Pt 2. (ANZ) National Patriotic Fund Board Minutes. 
84 IA 1 3105/172/206 Pt 2 (ANZ). Patriotic Funds Assistance for Greece. Schedule 187, December 4, 1945   
85 Gibson to Seddon,  June 28, 1946; Janis to Secretary National Patriotic Fund Board, July 10,1946  
86 IA 1 3105/172/206 Pt 1 (ANZ), Patriotic Funds Assistance for Greece. Gibson to Seddon, August 13, 1945 (ANZ). 
87 Seddon to Hayden, October 24, 1945. 
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The Fund still placed restrictions on its funding. In terms of foodstuffs, it would not release POW 
parcels for distribution to Greeks. The request came from Hayden, one of its senior officers who 
was on tour in the area.  The Fund voted that the 60,000 parcels go to Britain instead.
88
 
 
Allied Screening Commission 
At the end of December 1945, the New Zealand public read about a “military commission” that had 
been “set up in Greece to reward Greeks” who had helped evaders and POW escapers following the 
1941 battles. The appreciation to the Greeks was evident: “Many soldiers of the 2nd New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force owed their lives to the Greek and Cretan civilians who fed and sheltered them 
and assisted in their final escape, often at considerable risk to themselves.”89 That the body, the 
Allied Screening Commission, was commanded by a New Zealander, Major W. Lang, with 
apparently others of his countrymen involved, was an arrangement that reinforced a connection. 
 
The piece included content from an “official release” for the press. Rewards given included money, 
free transport, employment, and appropriation of German collaborators’ property.90  Veterans were 
encouraged to send details of their experiences with civilians to the Commission via the Army 
Headquarters, Wellington. There had already been instances of individual soldiers sending money, 
but the Commission “was in a position to give a comparatively generous recompense to helpers and 
also has much better facilities for tracing citizens in the upset conditions in the country.”91  Lang 
confidentially told Freyberg’s headquarters that he had learnt of the interactions between Greeks 
and New Zealand soldiers through “Telegraphic Intercepts and Censorship Reports”.92 To readers, it 
seemed that this was a positive supportive exercise that reinforced the idea of one nation 
appreciating and thanking another. The confidential background to the piece, however, throws up 
challenges to this image. 
 
The newspaper story lacks information on the source of the funds for recompense. They are British. 
The original press release included the origin: “from funds provided by the United Kingdom 
Government “.  That fact was removed (see scan of actual edit below) from the official release 
                                               
88 EA1 688/90/9/2 Pt 1 (ANZ). HQ Maadi Camp to Army HQ Wellington, August 4, 1945, Copy of NPFB Meeting minutes, August 
8, 1945.See also HQ 2 NZEF to Army Headquarters, December 31, 1945.  
89 “Reward to Greeks,” Evening Post, December 27, 1945. The role of New Zealand soldiers was again emphasised in the press two 
months later by Defence Minister Fred Jones “Greek Claims,” Evening Post, February 26, 1946. [Copies on file] 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 EA1 688 90/9/2 Pt 1(ANZ), Allied Nations- Polish Children’s Camp in New Zealand – Greece- Recognition of Assistance given 
by Greeks to New Zealanders. Lang to HQ 2NZEF, November 1, 1945.  
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referred to.
93
  There was none from New Zealand. The omission ensures the government could not 
be criticised. Lang was a strong proponent of government funds rather than veterans assisting the 
Greeks: “I feel that it is unfair to allow our men to make contributions out of their personal savings 
while in ignorance of the fact that official action is being taken.”94 The problem was that there had 
been no publicity about the Commission. It was an interesting observation, on one hand seeing a 
State responsibility, but totally out of step with what would develop in the years ahead as non- State 
bodies and community groups embraced supporting the Greeks. 
 
Figure 5. 3 Edited press release on compensation to Greeks.  (Source: EA1 688/ 90/9/2 Pt 1. Archives New Zealand). 
 
Having New Zealanders in key roles in a body like the Screening Commission was not without its 
challenges. They came from other New Zealanders, namely, Redpath and Craig of “A Force”, 
M.I.9. This was the force that would be researched by the official war history project but never 
discussed in the official published form. Craig was in New Zealand, and Redpath was scheduled to 
return from Greece.  
 
Craig attended a meeting (probably in May 1945) with Perry, Minister for Internal Affairs, Hayden, 
of the National Patriotic Fund, and Seddon, the Honorary Consul. Some of the matters were further 
discussed the next day with Tom King (another back from Greece) and another civil servant.
95
 
Craig told the others that “many New Zealand personnel”, including himself, “would do everything 
                                               
93 Draft Press Statement, December 24, 1945. 
94 Memorandum: Allied Screening Commission (Greece) to HQ 2NZEF, November 1, 1945. 
95 Shanahan to Nash, May 17, 1945. 
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they could” to compensate them for the cost of their providing assistance.96 Besides talking of those 
left behind in 1941 avoiding capture, he alluded to those in the clandestine forces: “These Greek 
families had given assistance to New Zealand paratroopers and others.”97 Besides his own 
commitment, what drove Craig was the fact that there was no scheme at that point. The Dominion 
government had obtained advice from its London-based staff that Britain initially did not intend to 
make any payments to the Greeks–it was “no less than their duty”.98 The policy changed and, as 
already noted, British funds underwrote the payments. However, the discussion in Wellington in 
May revolved around the possibilities of providing more aid and the avenues open to it, such as 
U.N.R.R.A. and the use of surplus prisoner of war parcels. It was a genuine discussion in addition 
to the special food ship. As such, Greece was, again, an exception for New Zealand. 
 
The Wellington administration went to Freyberg about the matter. He advised that he had “this 
matter in hand” and that he was working with “British forces” over compensating the Greeks.99 It 
was obvious that the whole funding mechanism was still in an embryonic stage. That did not stop 
members of A Force from pursuing the matter. Redpath, still in Greece, challenged the appointment 
of Lang and his staff. A letter to Wellington from Waite, a member of the National Patriotic Fund 
visiting Greece, stated that during his visit he had met Redpath. The latter “stated that the whole of 
the Screening Commission personnel were men who had no previous experience in Greece.”100 
While defending Lang, the New Zealanders agreed to Redpath’s request that he be allowed to stay 
in Greece to assist the Greeks. Another New Zealand soldier had voiced his desire to assist the 
Greeks, and the New Zealand State had engaged in discussion about possible ways to recompense 
the Greeks. This was superseded by the new British policies.  
 
Politics  
The observations of the individuals consulted above were not isolated in the various aid links to 
Greece. Before Lang and his Screening team dealt with each case, each went through an initial 
selection process. A post-war internal British exchange illustrates the process. In an effort to 
counter post-war criticism that nothing had been done for individual Greeks, a senior BBC 
representative asked the British Foreign Office about the matter.
101
 The latter wrote saying 
“preliminary sorting and classifying” of claims was carried out by the British Embassy in Athens. 
                                               
96 Relief-Greece, May 12, 1945. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Freyberg to Acting Prime Minister, May 30, 1945. 
100 Waite to Perry, August 7, 1945. 
101 FO 371/112902 (TNA), Question of compensation to Greeks who had suffered from being British agents during the Second 
World War, 1954. 
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Furthermore, “Great pains were taken at that time to see that these cases were properly and fairly 
dealt with.”102 While the intention of the Commission was to approve claims from Greeks who had 
specifically assisted Allied soldiers, it would seem reasonable to assume that, given the Greek 
policies of the Foreign Office and the open fighting of Dekemvriana, the Embassy would not be 
inclined to pass on any case that was obviously involving a  left-winger .  
 
One of the issues that had been part of that early New Zealand deliberation had been that to reward 
specific Greeks would lead to charges of discrimination as against a general compensation (as in the 
food ship). Another concern, not discussed at these meetings but certainly obliquely highlighted 
later when British payments were mentioned,
103
 was setting the amount of recompense. The issue is 
exemplified in the case of one Greek who formed part of a high-profile New Zealander’s literary 
work, the matter is a collision between this author’s estimation based on humanity and another’s 
less supportive stance. Both were New Zealanders. 
 
What is Suffering Worth? 
The posthumous 1947 monograph Report on Experience by John Mulgan (an S.O.E. officer in 
Greece mentioned in a previous chapter) confronts the question of suffering and compensation 
amongst the suffering of war. Mulgan’s much discussed place in the formation of New Zealand 
national identity
104
 subtly adds to the link between the Pacific nation and the Greeks. 
 
His 1947 work describes at length one such victim of the war, Janni Fafoutis.
105
 Mulgan dedicates 
nine pages to Fafoutis. It is a moving tribute to an elderly man who had endured the war and been 
tortured by the enemy occupiers. The New Zealander encountered the Greek when the former was 
administering compensation payments to civilians who had aided members of British clandestine 
forces during the occupation. Mulgan told his commanding officer, Dolbey, that he had 
“considerable affection” for the old Greek.106 He implicitly said the same to his wife in a letter, 
quoting his own Report on Experience manuscript and also called Fafoutis, “my friend”.107  
                                               
102 Cox to Hood November 19, 1954. 
103 EA1 688 90/9/2 Pt 1(ANZ). Allied Nations- Polish Children’s Camp in New Zealand – Greece- Recognition of Assistance given 
by Greeks to New Zealanders. At least the previously mentioned Waite gave some examples in an approving tone. 
104 See for example, Stuart Murray, “Oxford Man: John Mulgan and National Discourse”, Span, 39 (October 1994); Vincent 
O'Sullivan, Long Journey to the Border: A Life of John Mulgan. 2nd ed. (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2011). 
105 Noted by Whiteford, who edited the latest edition of Report on Experience. John Mulgan and Peter Whiteford, Report on 
Experience (London Wellington, N.Z. Annapolis, Md: Frontline Books;Victoria University Press; Naval Institute Press, 2010), 177. 
Whiteford relies on Sullivan’s biography of Mulgan. Vincent O’Sullivan, Long Journey to the Border, 334. 
106 Lieutenant Colonel Count Julian A Dolbey Dobrski Papers, 3/4, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College, 
London(LHC). Mulgan to Dolbey, March 28, 1945  
107 John Mulgan to Gabrielle Mulgan, April 17, 1945. Quoted in Peter Whiteford, A Good Read: Letters of John Mulgan 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2011). 
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When Fafoutis made contact with Lang of the Screening Commission and New Zealand Prime 
Minister Peter Fraser, it was a different matter. In August 1945, Fafoutis wrote to Peter Fraser and 
the Australian Prime Minster, amongst others, asking for financial assistance.
108
 His injuries, which 
he outlined in detail, still required treatment. The matter ended on 24 April 1946, when Fraser wrote 
to the Greek saying his matter had been investigated by the Screening Commission and he had 
received “appropriate recompense”.109 Lang, as he told Wellington, had cast aspersions over the 
Greek’s character. He had been “seen recently in various Athens taverns”110 and that he had ‘”lost” 
250 sovereigns during his war service. The Greek had also had his mail intercepted, and so it was 
known that he had been contacting other people. Lang recommended that no further funding be 
forthcoming. Indeed, he referred to the previously mentioned press release “to prevent our 
demobilized soldiers from being imposed upon by people like Fafoutis.”111 
 
Fafoutis had received some payment.  Reports emanating from the Commission often spoke of what 
it thought to be false claims. A later New Zealand-generated report noted “Experience showed that 
about half the claims were false or greatly exaggerated.”112 The Commission closed down in 
December 1946. Requests from Greeks and Cretans continued over the forthcoming decades, as 
shown later. Just like compensation, issuing of certificates of appreciation was problematic. 
However, in this case it combined with high profile and very public expressions to create a dilemma 
for succeeding New Zealand governments. 
 
Certificates of Appreciation 
Issuing certificates of appreciation to civilians who had assisted Allied soldiers was a common 
practice at the end of the war.
113
. In terms of the New Zealand ones Freyberg and his officers again 
initiated recognition of the Greeks. In late 1944 the General informed the Wellington administration 
of his intention to award “illuminated letters of thanks”114 to individual Greeks who had assisted 
New Zealanders. His enthusiasm was tempered by Deputy Prime Minister Nash, who wrote to 
                                               
108 EA1 688/90/9/2 Part 1 (ANZ). Allied Nations- Polish Children’s Camp in New Zealand – Greece- Recognition of Assistance 
given by Greeks to New Zealanders. Fafoutis to Fraser, August 2, 1945. 
109 Fraser to Fafoutis, April 24, 1946. 
110 Allied Screen Commission (Greece) to HQ 2 NZEF, December 10, 1945. The report was forwarded to External Affairs, 
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113 See for example WO 208/3420 (TNA). Blank copies Alanbrooke certificates; WO 208/3421 (TNA); Blank Tedder Certificates; 
and FO 170/1175 (TNA) Claims and awards: Allied Screening Commission, Alexander Certificates. 
114 EA 1 688/90/9/2 Pt 1 (ANZ). Allied Nations- Polish Children’s Camp in New Zealand – Greece- Recognition of Assistance given 
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Fraser in late June 1945 about the evolving proposal. Fraser was at the United Nations conference 
in San Francisco. Nash mentioned the General’s acceptance of an “oblique hint” that Fraser might 
be a more appropriate person to sign.
115
 In the end, the signatures of both the General and the Prime 
Minister would go on the certificates.
116
 On the 22
nd
 of September 1945, just before the first Crete 
commemoration, Fraser thanked Freyberg for an update on the certificates for “Greek Friends”.117 
 
Figure 5.4 One of the Distributed Certificates of Appreciation. (Source: Archives New Zealand) 
 
 
The wording on the certificates, as was to be expected, was emotionally charged. In a 22 June 1945 
telegram to Wellington, Freyberg provided draft wording. It also formed part of a 1954 government 
review of the whole Greek assistance issue.
118
 Then the effect of the certificates and public 
messages had becoming alarming.  The wording was slightly altered grammatically for the final 
version read at the September/October Crete service by Freyberg. It read: 
“I am sending this short message to remind you that the government and 
people of New Zealand remember with gratitude all that the Greek people 
have done to help those New Zealand soldiers who were left behind when 
                                               
115 Nash to Fraser, June 26, 1945.  
116 Nash to Freyberg, July 13, 1945.  
117 Fraser to Freyberg, September 22, 1945. 
118 ABHS W5242 950 Box 79 90/9/2 Part 3 (ANZ). War Affairs: Allied Nations Cooperation- Greece-Recognition of assistance 
given by Greeks to New Zealanders. New Zealand War Memorials in Greece and Crete and Recognition of Assistance given to New 
Zealanders in Greece and Crete, March 1, 1954. 
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your country was overrun by the German army in April 1941.We are deeply 
conscious of New Zealand’s debt to the Greek nation for their gallantry and 
self sacrifice in sheltering many of our men. We realise that the help which 
you gave was given at the risk of your own lives, and the New Zealand 
government has asked me to send you this message. We shall never forget 
all you personally and those associated with you have done for our men 
during the whole of this war from 1941 to 1945 both in Greece and Crete. 
We realize that you have fed and clothed our men when you were in want 
yourselves and that in doing so you suffered hardship and ran great 
personal risk. We send our sincerest wishes for the happiness and 
prosperity of your country from your affectionate and devoted friends and 
comrades in New Zealand”.119 
 
The actual certificates distributed were missing several key components of the approved version. 
The words “forget you personally” and the subsequent years, 1941 to 1945, were absent (Figure 
5.4), and that this was the version issued is confirmed by a post-war letter from Crete officials and 
Greek archives.
120
 1941 had once more been elevated above the other years and Freyberg once more 
showed he was the Greeks’ champion. 
  
To Communities, not Individuals 
The omission of the first component can be explained by issues with identifying intended recipients. 
In late June 1946, Brigadier Park, the New Zealand senior military liaison officer to the War Office,  
based in the U.K., told Wellington that difficulties earlier foreseen by New Zealand servicemen on 
the Allied Screening Commission were now being vindicated by more recent experiences. Now, 
according to the Allied Screening Commission,  that “Due [to the] difficulty of helpers being able 
[to] differentiate between Kiwis, British and Cypriots and consequent jealousy of New Zealand 
Commendation Certificates issued to helpers who did not assist Kiwis or overlooking those who did 
and for whom we possess no details[…] strongly urge Certificates be issued on [a] community 
basis.”121  In this proposal there was the “assumption” that where the Commission had paid helpers, 
                                               
119 Ibid, also EA1 688/90/9/2 Pt 1 (ANZ). Allied Nations- Polish Children’s Camp in New Zealand – Greece- Recognition of 
Assistance given by Greeks to New Zealanders.  Freyberg to Fraser, June 22, 1945. 
120 AD 1 1473 380/2/11 (ANZ), War Memorials-War Memorials-Greece and Crete. The letter was from the Galatas, Crete, 
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121 EA1 688 90/9/2 Pt 1 (ANZ). Allied Nations Cooperation-Polish Children’s Camp in NZ-Greece-Recognition of Assistance given 
by Greeks to New Zealanders. Park to Secretary External Affairs, Wellington, June 22, 1946. 
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“in each such village a Kiwi was helped.”122 It ended with “N.Z. reps here agree.”123 Park supported 
it. Subsequently, Freyberg, now Governor General, and Prime Minister Peter Fraser agreed.
124
 The 
omission of the post-1941 years is not explained by available records. However, the effect is to 
strengthen the emphasis on 1941 that is so evident in the New Zealand memory. 
 
The first of the certificates was issued by the Allied Screening Commission in August 1946.It was a 
far cry from the original plan of the New Zealand leadership. Indeed, just four months previously, 
they had allocated funds to more than double the number of blank certificates issued. The new 
amount was now 5,000.
125
  The best intentions of the leadership had been thwarted by various 
factors beyond their control.  The consequences were two-fold. Firstly, as an internal New Zealand 
government document observed in late 1950: “In fact, the certificates were sent to every village 
where payment had been made for help given to British forces. New Zealanders may quite well not 
have been helped by a particular village.”126 A Screening Commission report given to the New 
Zealand army authorities and government, for example, related how in Megara “many false claims 
are lodged”.127  Twenty-five percent had been rejected, with a “further 45% having to be drastically 
cut.”128  
 
During the month following the certificate issue, in response, recipients began sending letters of 
thanks and, in some cases, requests for help to Wellington. This flow was undoubtedly exacerbated 
by the inclusion of the wider span of communities receiving the certificates. Requests for assistance 
were often accompanied by reference (and even sometimes photographs or full text translations) to 
the wording of the certificates. The response to the influx can be seen within the longer, more 
permanent contribution some non-government actors wanted.  
 
While the food ship, certificates and compensation revolved around the core of army/government 
relations, there were other initiatives from the greater span of New Zealand society.  
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Volunteers 
On its “On this Day” web pages, the New Zealand Ministry of Culture and Heritage recognises 
August 16 1944 as the day the country’s foremost umbrella aid organisation C.O.R.S.O. (Council of 
Organisations for Relief Services Overseas) was established.
129
 One of its first roles was possibly 
post-liberated Greece.
130
 That this was just days after Freyberg and Fraser were strategising about 
the possible agitation in the Greek Brigade and weeks before the two leaders worked out how to 
avoid sending troops to Greece, demonstrates the multiple strands and sometimes conflicting  
agendas coming out of New Zealand.  
  
The Wellington administration had facilitated the establishment of C.O.RS.O. 
131
  The story of the 
organisation, from its conception until its volunteer team went to liberated Greece, is filled with 
bureaucratic competition, mainly with the National Patriotic Fund, frustration, public conflict and 
seeming indifference from the government over the body it had established. One parliamentarian 
prophetically wrote to Peter Fraser on New Year’s Eve 1944: “As C.O.R.S.O.’s operations grow, it 
will find itself as much in competition with Patriotic [Fund Board] as in cooperation, and this will 
almost inevitably lead to friction.”132 Fraser’s reply was typical of the government neutralist stance. 
He would be “very sorry” if this did eventuate.133 C.O.R.S.O.’s first major project involving Greece 
did not move the government or the National Patriotic Fund Board to attempt conciliation or, in 
terms of the national administration, arbitration.  This flies in contrast to public statements from the 
nation’s leadership about its support for the volunteers and that Greece, the bonded ally, was the 
intended recipient. 
 
C.O.R.S.O. and Greece 
As the anticipated Allied re-entry neared, the contribution of New Zealand volunteers was publicly 
promoted. A newspaper story quoted Carl Berendsen, the country’s delegate at a 1944 U.N.R.R.A. 
conference, thus: “New Zealanders hoped they would be among the first to enter Greece in relief 
operations, as they wished to repay the Greek people for their courage and the aid that was so 
                                               
129 “CORSO formed', URL: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/the-new-zealand-council-of-organisations-for-relief-overseas-corso-formed, 
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abundantly shown when New Zealand troops fought the enemy on Grecian soil.”134  Later that year, 
during the debate on the U.N.R.R.A. Bill in the New Zealand Parliament, Deputy Prime Minister 
Walter Nash added to the commitment to volunteers.  Again, it was via a public statement: “The 
Minister of Finance (Mr. Nash) said that in due course there would be openings for volunteer 
personnel to be sent from New Zealand. New Zealand had a particular interest in Greece, and, by 
geographical position, in the Far East.”135 In parliament, Nash had also alluded to Greece in the 
wider context of the debate over the U.N.R.R.A.  After pointing to Poland and Greece, he argued: 
“Can anyone doubt that we have a moral responsibility?”136 Also, “After all it is worth 
remembering that we in New Zealand have escaped the ravages of war.” He went on to emphasise 
the special relationship between New Zealand and Greece: “We in New Zealand would be very 
happy if we had a particular task given to us, and that task would be to concentrate on helping 
Greece; for there will be a link never to be forgotten or broken between that country and this 
Dominion.”137 
 
Initially, such public expressions were matched with efforts to make a viable relationship between 
the National Patriotic Fund and C.O.R.S.O. The Secretary to the Cabinet sought assurances from 
Hayden, the Fund’s chairman that C.O.R.S.O. could act as a collecting and expending agent.138 
Hayden responded in the affirmative. He did expect there to be some opposition from the provincial 
arm of the Fund because they were “not fully informed of the position” at the forthcoming national 
conference, but that could be overcome.
139
  Indeed, when C.O.R.S.O. requested NZ £500 for 
“publicity and incidental expenses” and NZ £10,000 to pay for “out of pocket expenses” and “to 
provide for dependants” of the proposed Greek Relief team, the smaller amount was approved, and 
the latter was made subject to further investigation.
140
   
 
It was an optimistic start, but relations between C.O.R.S.O. and the Fund degenerated over 
forthcoming months. The conflict was reported in the press.
141
 At one point, the Fund members 
demanded C.O.R.S.O. recall a booklet which, they said, misrepresented their relationship to 
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them.
142
  There was still no money forthcoming, even though it was acknowledged there was NZ 
£100,000 available for foreign relief.
143
  The Fund made an approach to Walter Nash, who had 
made the earlier-mentioned speech in parliament, that the government grant the requested funds 
directly to CORSO. Nash replied, saying the government supported UNRRA as well as “a limited 
number of volunteers”144 but “To support them from government funds would destroy entirely the 
voluntary nature of the contribution.”145 They similarly wanted C.O.R.S.O. exempted from the 
existing legislation framework that limited collecting and expending agents for relief to be the sole 
mandate of the Fund. Again, Nash declined. The National Patriotic Fund apparatus was to be the 
sole agent. While all this interaction may be seen to be concerned in a general way with 
C.O.R.S.O.’s place in government actions and policy, that Greece was involved did not sway the 
administration’s position. 
 
At the November 1945 National Patriotic Fund Conference, C.O.R.S.O. made its last representation 
to seek funds for its volunteers. One of the delegation commented that “the New Zealand unit 
should have been in Greece already, but the organisation was delayed because of lack of funds.” 146 
Aggravating the situation was the Fund’s decision to send monies to Britain. It was, as C.O.R.S.O. 
argued, from “a fund given by the New Zealand people, at the expense of our own New Zealand 
teams, especially when they are destined for a country to whom we owe a debt of gratitude we can 
never reply in full, for the succour and shelter given to our men, often at the expense of life and 
liberty to those who gave it.”147  Such an argument, again, did not change things. Their 
intransigence had delayed but not stopped C.O.R.S.O. Their own fund raising meant they had 
ignored the legal framework put in place. The disjuncture between the Fund and the Organisation 
continued.   When CORSO sought support for sending wool to Greece in 1946, their request was 
declined.
148
 
 
Final Departure and a Mixed Experience 
C.O.R.S.O .still managed to send a team to Greece. It launched its own public appeal in December 
1945. To the organisation, its lateness was a public embarrassment. Vice-Chairman White told the 
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New Zealand Listener that “I think I am right in saying that New Zealand is now the only principal 
member of the British Commonwealth not yet represented in this way in the field.”149 
 
Figure 5.5: C.O.R.S.O. farewell. Deputy Prime Minister Walter Nash is 3rd from left in the front row. Next to him is Dr 
Sylvia Chapman. Source: R Thurlow Thomson New Zealand in Relief: Story of CORSO, (Wellington: CORSO, 1965). 
 
The official farewell was 21 December 1945, over a year since liberation. Nash, Honorary Greek 
Consul Seddon and other officials attended.  The Evening Post wrote that Nash stated “Among the 
Allied people who owed so much to the Greeks… no name stood higher in their estimation than that 
of the New Zealanders.”150  Also that: “We must never forget what the Greeks did for our own 
men.”151 Given the denial of funding, these public statements show a considerable gap between 
rhetoric and reality.  
 
In Greece itself  
The delayed departure impacted on the team’s operations. They arrived in the year U.N.R.R.A. was 
leaving.
152
 Approximately 6 months after they arrived 16 members of the team arrived home. A 
report from the leader, Dr. Sylvia Chapman, related that the team been utilised as “individuals” 
rather than a cohesive unit
153
 and that there was “dissatisfaction emanating from members of the 
Greek Unit.”154 To mitigate this situation, the Executive decided none of the group was to give 
statements to the press without prior approval by C.O.R.S.O.
155
 The Greek experience was analysed 
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so as to better prepare the next relief team project – China.156 Chapman’s experiences, as mentioned 
earlier, also fed into the constructed utilitarian official memory proposal. That initiative never went 
anywhere, while the C.O.R.S.O. exercise was far less successful than planned. There was a distinct 
lack of New Zealand State commitment in both of these. 
  
Volunteers and the Politics of Greece 
In contrast to food shipment, the saga of C.O.R.S.O. is almost entirely lacking any impact from the 
Greek political situation. Nash provides a rare public instance, while the team leader, Dr. Sylvia 
Chapman, included it in the constructed memory project previously mentioned. At the C.O.R.S.O 
team farewell, Nash, as Acting Prime Minster, said of the Greeks: "Whatever might have been the 
political differences that developed later, they as a people remained a single unit in deciding that the 
German forces of occupation should not succeed."
157
 Essentially, the divisions of the civil war and 
ongoing tensions were forgotten. Treating the Greeks as a single entity made for a simple collective; 
cleansing the blatant violence, ignoring the British, and leaving only “differences”, makes for a 
simple scenario conducive to a memory, as does the image of a Greece unified against the invader. 
Again, collaborators, another type of Greek, are omitted. Incorporating the vagueness through the 
word “later” (skating over exactly when, the mutinies, October 1943 round of the civil war, 
Dekemvriana, ongoing tensions, mass imprisonments) again makes for a light anaesthetic applied to 
New Zealand, so the discomfort of feeling Greek civil disturbances is blotted out.   
 
Records of the experiences of the team with the political environment in Greece are extremely 
sparse. Chapman’s personal diary does not include any comment158 but, with a constructed memory 
proposal discussed later, she was not backward in raising the internal Greek political issue. In 
contrast, there was at least one extensive narrative provided to the official war history project that 
depicted a marked change in attitude through direct exposure to post-war Greece.  
 
One Single Volunteer and their Experience 
C.J. Leach, a former member of a New Zealand army ambulance unit, joined the British Red Cross 
in December 1944 and went to Greece earlier than C.O.R.S.O. His motivation was consistent with 
the humanitarian element of the his country’s relationship with Greece: “I was hoping to reach 
Greece; for the loyalty this stricken country had shown toward us during and after the evacuation of 
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1941 had been factors in giving rise in the heart of every prisoner of war who had passed through 
the prison camps at Corinth, Athens, and Salonika to a deep feeling of gratitude towards the Greek 
people.”159 Leach was told to remain in Egypt for months before “conditions became more 
tranquil.”160 
 
Leach’s journeys through Greece were subject to changing conditions. He began his recollection 
with wartime atrocities by Bulgarian occupiers and then E.L.A.S., with its “torture and murder”.161 
Fears of the latter’s return were expressed by villagers, and in one town there were stories they were 
plotting to blow up the cathedral. The time was also punctuated with conversations with the same 
E.L.A.S., who were at that time still circulating openly.
162
 
 
These early episodes were soon followed by realignment, through being introduced to the rightist 
terror, conducted with tacit British approval. Leach attended a regional gathering of the British Red 
Cross, which was addressed by its Assistant Commissioner for the whole of Greece.  Besides 
affronting Dominion national identity by using “Britain” to include all the workers in the country, 
the Commissioner also supported British intervention “to assert British influence on the internal 
politics as was the part played by the British forces.” 163 The role was to guide the country toward 
democracy. Leach was scathing of this assertion. His exposure to the dubious practices of the 
current regime grew considerably when he was made U.N.R.R.A. Prisons Welfare Officer for the 
eight prisons in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. 
 
E.A.M./E.L.A.S. prisoners were held on “trumped up charges” if bona fide ones of violence could 
not be found.
164
 Prisoners claimed clothing had been distributed according to political leanings of 
prisoners, and only right-wing and centre journalists could enter the prison, while the communist 
variety was prevented.
165
 A collaborator female inmate had been imprisoned for 11 months there 
and had her child during that period.
166
  Leach’s Greek experiences were captured by the ubiquitous 
War History project.  
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Orphans 
Despite taking in Polish orphans, the New Zealand government formally declined to accept any 
Greek ones in the immediate post-war period.
167
 It was another limitation to the aid New Zealand 
would show. A similar proposal had been made to Freyberg during 1942 by one of his officers. At 
that time, the General thought it was premature.
168
   
 
The initiative for resettling children came from the Greek government. As early as October 1944, 
the matter was raised with Archbishop Damaskinos of Greece. The children were those whose 
“breadwinners” had been executed by the occupying enemy. 169 The proposal was linked to the 
interest of Commonwealth nations whose soldiers had been assisted by Greek civilians. New 
Zealand was specifically mentioned. Any special attention New Zealand gave Greek children was 
seemingly limited to specific requirements in the special food shipment. It was yet another 
restriction to the relationship. When the state endorsed Greek migration wave of Greeks did later 
eventuate, it was those refugees from behind the Iron Curtain that constituted the expansion.
170
  
Again, a limit/preference had been made by the New Zealand state. 
 
 A More Permanent Contribution 
A more permanent form of official recognition of the assistance by Greek civilians had actually 
been raised with the government as early as January 1945. This was part of an initiative from the 
New Zealand R.S.A.
171
  Years of discussion involving the governments of Fraser and then Holland, 
the R.S.A., CO.R.S.O., the New Zealand Greeks and the British came to nothing. Besides the 
pragmatics of establishing a foreign-sited facility, other factors reflected both the limits of State 
willingness and also the intrusion of the Greek civil war. The nature of the non-urban Greek society 
had an impact. Treasury told Fraser and the army that “In general, this office feels that if any 
memorial is to be erected in Crete then it should be arranged on a Governmental level, and New 
Zealand should not deal individually with the various towns.”172 The underlying logic was Deputy 
Prime Minister Walter Nash’s. A separate document noted: “Mr Nash felt that if we granted 
assistance to one community in Greece, it would be difficult to refuse the grant of assistance to 
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many others, who would feel, because of their association with New Zealand troops, that they 
should be aided in constructing a memorial.”173 
 
A utilitarian memorial (such as a hospital or sanatorium) rather than a symbolic one was preferred. 
While the government had input from various parties and support from the Minister of Internal 
Affairs,
174
 in October 1945 Fraser initially used Freyberg’s forthcoming appointment as Governor 
General to delay a decision.
175
 The General was casting a long shadow, still. 
 
By August 1946, the idea of a suitable memorial appeared in the press under the headline of “Bonds 
with Greece”.176 Whether it was to be on the mainland or on the island of Crete, or both, was left 
open at the beginning. But in the end, Crete prevailed. Even the New Zealand Greeks who were 
mostly from non-Cretan backgrounds wanted Crete.
177
  
 
The government asked three volunteers who had been with the C.O.R.S.O. Greek team for their 
opinions. One was Dr. Sylvia Chapman, the head of the team. The others were Mrs. Grieg, then 
with the Greek Relief Association, Athens, and Mr Burns who had been administrative head in 
Greece. There were various factors in consideration, and the civil war also had an influence. 
Chapman was sceptical about building anything: “The present is no time for New Zealand to put 
money into buildings and equipment which at any moment may be destroyed as a result of rebel 
action.”178 She preferred other ways of aid. Burns said, “Crete possesses more political stability”.179 
Mrs Grieg stressed, “The difficulties of building operations due to the civil war, and the not unlikely 
possibility that a hospital, once built, may be damaged or taken over by the rebels for purposes 
other than medical.”180 She, like Chapman, looked for other avenues to channel New Zealand 
goodwill, such as a programme for blind children. 
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The change of government in 1949 did not bring any advancement of the utilitarian monument idea. 
The following year, new Prime Minister Holland commented, “We have plenty of problems 
already. Let sleeping dogs lie.”181 This followed the Labour administration’s long-held hesitancy. 
 
In March 1954, the government took stock of its promises and aid provided to Greece.
182
 Over a 
year before, J.V. Wilson made a proposal to Cabinet Secretary Shanahan that funds be allocated for 
“a single symbolic act of gratitude, and explain it as such.”183 The money should be to fund 
“schools and churches”.184 The seeds for what had become an embarrassing predicament were laid 
by Wilson at the feet of Freyberg and Fraser. Their messages and certificates to the Greek 
population had not been accompanied by a practical component. Hence, he asked about the 
awareness of the present Prime Minister, Holland, and asked "if he has had fully brought home to 
him the hollowness of the then Prime Minister and the Commander in Chief.”185 Wilson’s 
suggestion, “apparently came to nothing.”186 But the requests kept coming, right up at least into the 
1960s.  There was a clear boundary of war-related aid, linked to official memory that the 
government would not cross. 
 
Expressions of Political Developments by Greeks 
The New Zealand administration encountered a smattering of Greek politics through direct appeals 
to itself or via its own citizens. The majority of letters damned the communists. Thus, appeals from 
Greek and Cretan communities included statements such as, “Civil trouble caused by the Slavic and 
Communistic propagandas as well”. 187 Others included “gangsters [a synonym for the left-wing 
rebels] have brought to our people starvation and poverty”188 and “the gangr[en]ous leprosy of 
servile communism”189. One, however, spoke of the “help [...] the people in my village” and “ 
EAM” provided to ensure New Zealand soldiers were taken out of the country, while now former 
collaborators, “same persons as donned German uniforms”,190 remained free. The same 
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correspondent also mentioned forced exile to the islands. These statements did not generate any 
great internal discussion in the New Zealand administration. However, by the Third Round of the 
Civil War there was a subtle concatenation by some of the earlier Axis occupiers and the rebel 
Greeks. When discussing the adoption of villages in 1950, Seddon had told the Dunedin mayor to 
"be assured of the gratitude of the Greek government, which not only in the period of the 1939-
1945 war carried on the struggle for us, but is still bravely battling against the enemies of 
Democracy".
191
 The civil war was also in the mind of the Prime Minister during the same episode. 
He thought those communities which "suffered from civil war as well as in the occupation, appear 
to be particularly deserving of assistance."
192
 
 
At the same time, overt acts were to be avoided. A request from the “National Union of Victims of 
those Massacred by EAM and ELAS” to send a delegation to New Zealand and collect monies 
attracted the internal comment, “The risks of transferring Greek quarrels to New Zealand if this 
request is granted is obvious.”193 Overall, though, the attitude of the New Zealand government to 
post-war requests from the Greeks was that state assistance was to be avoided. This disengagement 
was not universal. The difference was when New Zealand’s own former soldiers became involved, 
as the following chapter illustrates. 
 
Mainland Greece versus Crete 
As indicated earlier, the first appearance of Crete in internal communications about aid was in early 
1944. The island’s allocation did not match the higher standing vis-à-vis the mainland that it would 
eventually gain in remembrance.  Where the island fitted in wartime and post-war relief eventually 
became an issue in official circles. 
 
Non-priority of Crete was in contrast to a “Mr Martin”, who was based in Crete and who had 
undertaken a major public promotion of aid for the island. C.O.R.S.O., working with an Athens-
based Save the Children co-ordinator, told Martin that “We note that Mrs Grieg [ the Athens 
coordinator previously mentioned] informed you that, although Crete has suffered desperately in the 
war, it had not been in nearly such a bad way as Macedonia and Epirus.”194  Martin was not the only 
one advocating Crete. So did Freyberg. In August 1950, during an exchange concerned with 
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British-initiated village adoption schemes, Seddon told the wife of the Athens-based British 
Ambassador that “No one is better fitted than our governor [general] to give this advice for he was, 
as you know, in command of our New Zealand Division in Greece and Crete and, moreover, he has 
a deep and abiding regard for the Greek people.”195 The general in fact wanted two factors to be 
considered – “villages where the greatest numbers of New Zealanders were helped during the war, 
and according to the degree to which the local people suffered.”196 He discussed the issue with the 
new Prime Minister, Holland. The latter agreed with Freyberg – it should be Crete.197 
 
In the end, these particular deliberations led to two mainland villages being adopted. The ultimate 
decision lay with the wife of the British ambassador in Athens, who was head of the programme. 
Her view differed with Freyberg, as reported in the press.
198
 The Dominion’s national leadership 
had not prevailed. Elsewhere, the elevation of Crete was being pursued by the Official History 
project. This was evident with the volume on the battle for Crete, but one cannot find it in the short 
monograph on escapes.
199
 There, the weight of ambiguity was allocated to the mainland more than 
to Crete when it came to civilian support. This was achieved during some final editing of the text. 
Hence, discarded sections included “Cretans were not particularly anxious to go on hiding escaped 
prisoners “200 and “Men returned to camp, by mutual agreement with their hosts that the danger was 
too great.”201  At the same time Crete was elevated in the published work. Here soldiers “found that 
their trust was seldom misplaced”.202 The mainland was subject to some qualification - “popular 
opinion was a little fickle“ and “One escaper who spent much time with the Greeks said Greece was 
the land of ‘you never know’”.203  Such were the subtle adjustments that, while acknowledging 
assistance, at the same time ensured Crete was uppermost. 
 
Retribution 
As noted in previous chapters, New Zealand expressions of indebtedness to the Greeks for 
assistance to its troops were widespread. It was intensified by the consequences of such assistance – 
reprisals in the form of executions, destruction of villages, torture and so on. When it came to post-
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war crime investigations and trials, New Zealand had servicemen attached to a British War Office 
agency in the Middle East. It also carried out police and army actions at home to gather testimony, 
and it also maintained its own representatives on Allied war crimes bodies in Europe.
204
  
 
The Dominion was in a situation where it was enmeshed in British and allied diplomatic-legal 
structures. Limits of British commitment and interest impacted on the Dominion. For example,  on 
12 July 1948, London told Wellington that, in terms of the British zone of occupation in Germany, 
“In our view, punishment of war criminals is more a matter of discouraging future generations than 
of meting out retribution to every guilty individual. Moreover, in view of future political 
developments in Germany envisaged by recent tripartite talks, we are convinced that it is now 
necessary to dispose of the past as soon as possible.”205 New Zealand disagreed with this stance, 
“having doubts on the arrangements outlined in your telegram.”206 London responded, saying 
crimes against personnel from the United Kingdom or the Dominion or those “in service of [the] 
Crown”207 were not included in this category, but it still set boundaries regarding other countries’ 
claims for extraditing individuals from the British-controlled zone.  These high policy decisions and 
British/major power apparatus also came with operational matters. They impacted on both New 
Zealand’s own national imagining and its relationship to Greece.  
 
Jack Stuart  
In contrast to the accepted view of New Zealanders helping Greek victims lies the case of Jack 
Stuart who was executed by Italians in Greece.
208
 His incarceration and treatment in the Averoff 
prison in Athens is an example of where machinery for war crimes investigation did not provide a 
committed avenue for dealing with war crimes - both those committed against its own nationals and 
also against Greeks - reported by New Zealand.  
 
Before his death Stuart had been beaten and kept in a cell deliberately maintained to physically 
damage him. The charge was the “shooting of an Italian soldier in Athens.”209 In response to the 
New Zealand submission about his case, the British response was that they had “a great deal of 
information is available in this office with regard to Averoff prison. No further assistance will be 
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required.”210  Nine months later, the British War Office told a London-based New Zealand 
representative that the cases about Averoff were “completed as far” as it was concerned.211 But they 
went on to say that New Zealand cases would be sent to the Greek representatives on the United 
War Crimes Commission. It was a decision that would not give one confidence. Wellington 
received numerous reports produced by the Allied nations’ war crimes trials being conducted on the 
other side of the world. In terms of Greece, there was an entry in an 11 August 1947 table about the 
progress of the war crimes of individual nations.
212
 Greece had the second-lowest number, with two 
cases, involving 4 defendants tried.  By 11 February, having had no recent news from the British 
authorities except that the Greeks had advised that the Italian trials had started, Wellington sought 
out a further update. There the archive trail ends and the case of Stuart is seemingly lost in the post 
war swirl of trials and civil unrest.  
Crimes Against Greeks 
Post-war New Zealand investigations also threw up testimony about war crimes against Greeks. 
Two were submitted to British authorities. The response to one reflected their position: “This is not 
the concern of this office.”213 The British were not pursuing crimes against other nationals (or 
members of their Commonwealth).  This was the norm in some post-war trials, the view being that 
crimes against nations should be pursued by their own government. 
 
In the general scheme of things, one New Zealander had been temporarily incarcerated at the 
Larissa concentration camp. The site is highlighted in one academic study on Italian brutality during 
the occupation.
214
 The New Zealand soldier concerned stated that there had been regular mass 
flogging in the camp and that “Many Greeks died of starvation in Larissa camp.”215 Such 
experiences may have been captured after the war, but during the conflict itself, Freyberg’s staff 
had generated its own summary report based upon interviews with escapees from Crete. It included 
descriptions of ill-treatment of Cretan villagers. For example, “In some cases, whole villages have 
been wiped out”216 and, “they rob the inhabitants of food…. murderous retaliations.”217 
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Such general statements did not feed into the war crimes process. However, two specific cases that 
the British would not take up had already been pursued. Both involved incidents on the mainland, 
not Crete, the pivot of New Zealand memory.  
 
The Dominion was so committed to pursue war crimes that it contacted army officer Sandy Thomas 
in Japan. Thomas never made a statement that supported his 1942 assertion after escaping from 
occupied Greece. A Greek mayor had told him about a reprisal and showed him where it happened. 
The whole episode revolved around “why he was unable to help me.”218 At the time of the later 
approach Thomas concluded, “I only stayed in the village overnight, and as it is now nearly five 
years since December 1941, I regret that I have even forgotten even the rather difficult name of the 
mayor.”219 
 
The second case involved the torture of a Greek youth in Averoff prison, the same place of 
incarceration that held Stuart. Unlike Thomas’ case, this information came from first-hand 
experience. A young Greek had been “tortured by Italian guards”,220 and the injuries had been 
shown to a New Zealand soldier. This was one of the cases against Greek nationals that Britain 
would not pursue. It would also seem that New Zealand did not have access to provide its 
information to a Greek party. 
 
One can state several observations about the New Zealand response to war crimes and Greeks. First, 
it was contained within machinery dominated by Britain. Second, this did not stop it from putting 
forward cases about Greeks. Thirdly, though, there was no specific drive in the New Zealand 
thinking about the need to give special place to retribution for the Greeks. Finally, Crimes 
committed against Cretans did not figure more highly than those carried out elsewhere. New 
Zealand would again make representations about crimes in Greece. This concerned a case of Greeks 
against Greeks. It will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
An analysis of New Zealand humanitarianism and retribution in the New Zealand-Greek connection 
shows both self-imposed limitations by New Zealand and/or constraints made by larger powers. In 
this, its funding policies were sometimes in conflict with the wider community and non- State 
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organisations (individuals seeking a special Greek fund and later, C.O.R.S.O.). From mid-1943, it 
genuinely pursued humanitarian aid for Greece but always with caveats and restrictions.  
 
Public expressions of appreciation by the leadership in speeches and the certificates never translated 
into practical State effort after the food ship. Similarly, the official war histories never promoted 
this whole area of humanitarian aid - in contrast to 1941, clandestine work and, to a lesser degree, 
Rimini. Perhaps reflecting this in the longer term is a lack of this humanitarian residue in the 
internal New Zealand diplomatic dialogue of the period 1960-1990s that informed the discussion in 
Chapter 3. It was focused on the 1941 battles. Those battles were also emphasised by the edited 
certificates of appreciation. Widening the definition of communities that had supposedly provided 
assistance to New Zealanders made the whole exercise somewhat dubious. 
 
But the archives show that, while the State had curtailed its activity, individual and veteran groups 
had increased and maintained their engagement. It was an indication of where the citizenry and 
veterans would, and could, make a difference. That was not the case with pursuing war criminals. 
Here, individuals were more motivated to raise the issue in public when it came to their own 
involvement. That is perhaps more understandable, as they as individuals had been already been 
involved in the Commonwealth legal mechanisms pursuing offences. Here, the Commonwealth-
London link provided avenues, whereas there appeared to be no similar one for the investigations 
into Greek nationals. The Pacific dominion had been willing to contribute toward seeing justice 
done for the Greeks. In the end, its efforts were nullified by the lack of verified testimony and the 
British policies (reflecting a wider diplomatic understanding) over war crimes committed against 
non-Commonwealth nationals. 
 
Politics seeped into the humanitarian efforts, as evidenced by letters from Greeks seeking assistance 
and some internal comments in Wellington. That the vast majority of the Greek comments were 
anti-left might be the result of the vetting process apparently instigated by the Foreign Office (and 
unknown to the New Zealanders). By late 1944, the political dynamic also engaged the wider New 
Zealand public, as the following chapter shows.
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CHAPTER SIX: TAKING SIDES 
 
Previous chapters have introduced the complexity and contradictions associated with New Zealand 
interacting with Greeks (and Britain) in an increasingly politically charged atmosphere i.e. blunting 
the notion of a singular, simple and palatable memory of the relationship with Greece. The 
Dominion had various touch-points in these currents. Soldiers serving with secret British 
organisations were out of consideration by New Zealand authorities - even though Wellington knew 
at least one had been killed in the first round of the civil war. The policy of non-intervention, as 
evidenced by a few paragraphs in cables, was never adhered to by the national leadership, for 
example, Freyberg sending Aked to Greece. Fraser was sympathetic to Greek mutineers but only 
after years of silence, during which at one point, in 1942-1943, his army was reported as being 
linked to the ever politically motivated leftist soldiers.  Fraser and Tom King were passionately 
fulfilling the food ship commitment, but the former had already discussed with Freyberg the high 
probability of fighting breaking out in Greece. He never did the same with King. The brigadier went 
on oblivious to what his New Zealand superiors thought would happen. Therefore, there was a 
disjuncture between the Dominion leadership and its own officers as well as an absence of strategic 
correlation between military and humanitarian policies: Freyberg and Fraser were allowing a ship of 
relief supplies to go into a probable civil war zone.  
 
The treatment of the above in the official war history was one of silence, fleeting references with no 
connective narrative, or the high policy of non-involvement, which implied neutrality. Freyberg’s 
use of the simple memory strut of civilian assistance to New Zealand troops had been applied from 
August 1944 to avoid accusations of New Zealand countenance of any military faction. The past 
would be used again, both by him at the first Crete commemoration and also by Fraser. The Prime 
Minister, however, used a different specific application to those same events of 1941. This occurred 
when different sectors of the wider New Zealand community would publicly condemn or support 
parties involved in the Greek scene. An eruption that started in Athens during the first week of 
December was the catalyst for the widespread outcry. Before that, there would be some public 
disclosures about the experiences of soldiers in occupied Greece that were not part of the mythos of 
Greek humanitarian aid to New Zealand soldiers that would form an essential strut of the New 
Zealand-Greek relationship. It was the S.O.E. experience of Greece. It fractured the image of the 
Greeks as allies against the invader and introduced a level of greyness.  
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Before discussing these post-liberation developments, the acuteness of the conflict between what 
clandestine operatives were doing in enemy-controlled Greece and their own government’s actions 
is briefly revisited. In doing so, the severity of contradiction is reinforced. 
 
GAP BETWEEN THE NEW ZEALAND LEADERSHIP AND CLANDESTINE 
OPERATIVES 
Peter Fraser took a step into the Greek political arena with his telegram of 22 July 1944 to London 
supporting clemency for the ringleaders of the Greek armed forces mutiny. This humanity did not 
stretch to encompass the directions given to New Zealand S.O.E. operative Tom Barnes over the 
same matter. Just nine days after Fraser sent his message to London, the British politico-military 
establishment sent Barnes a directive related to a speech by Anthony Eden in the House of 
Commons: “He ended by hinting broadly if unity can be thereby be achieved, concessions could be 
made to EAM in [the] matter of execution of mutineers.”1 Barnes’ orders were to report back on 
any change in attitude by E.A.M. toward them accepting the British-sponsored Papandreou-led 
government.  Fraser’s humanitarianism (possibly coupled with sympathy toward the mutineers’ 
aims) collides with the brutality of manipulation required of his officer. 
 
Another instance, this one involving Bill Jordan, shows the New Zealand determination to avoid 
sending troops to Greece upon liberation contrasting with his own recommendation for the British 
variety: “If Greece has any post-war importance for us, and I suspect it has, it is essential Allied 
troops be employed in sufficient numbers …It is better to bring in troops before the liberation than 
to bring them in afterwards.”2 
 
The divide between New Zealanders serving in occupied Greece and its government is perhaps no 
more obvious than in these two examples. For the New Zealand public, the activities of its soldiers 
working in secret operations would only start to appear in October 1944, the month of liberation. It 
came out as a darker story than what had been depicted in the New Zealand press during the years 
of occupation.  
 
                                               
1 HS 5/224 Policy: Subversion of ELAS units etc. The National Archives, Kew (NA). To Enoch July 31, 1944. Copy sent to 
Hammond and Barnes. 
2 HS9/812/3 (TNA). Special Operations Executive: Personnel Files (PF Series). William Sydney JORDAN.  NZ Officer Major 
Jordan Report on Tour of Duty in Greece, April 22, 1944.  
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NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC AND REPORTING OF ANTI-AXIS GREEK ARMED 
RESISTANCE  
A finer etching of the resistance groups and their politics gradually emerged in New Zealand 
newspapers during the occupation. None of the coverage appears to have come from any official 
New Zealand correspondents or indeed from any Dominion reporters. However, in the early years, 
it comprised general and sometimes fantastical reports about the armed resistance on the mainland 
and the island of Crete. The fighting against the occupying Axis was often presented as being a joint 
effort. In the beginning, this was not S.O.E. operatives and the Greek/Cretans but with 
Commonwealth solders left behind following the evacuations. For example, a “Doomed Battalion” 
of approximately 1,000 “British” soldiers and “the islanders are making sorties and ambushes” 
against the Germans in the mountains of Crete.
3
 The following year, in another story, the number 
had increased to 1,500, with another 2,000 on the mainland.
4
 The coverage veered more toward the 
realistic by early 1943, when it was reported that the resistance was growing and that there were 
various bands of Greeks operating.
5
  
 
By September 1943, just before the outbreak of civil war between the competing Greek factions, the 
politicisation and power of the mainland armed resistance was introduced- “The Greeks in some 
places have even elected town councils and mayors and are living without Axis interference.”6 The 
small towns and villages that New Zealand troops first experienced in early 1941 were undergoing a 
social change. The size of the resistance was also increasing. There were now 5,000 Greeks fighting 
(Crete is not mentioned, and the area of operations is the mainland), while another 100,000 were 
ready to join when the allies provided them with arms.
7
  In the New Zealand press, then, the Greeks 
were presented less as victims and more as capable fighters.  Their impact reached both the enemy 
and also the Greek government-in-exile and King George II, the monarch whom the New 
Zealanders had helped rescue from capture on Crete over two years before. In September 1943, it 
was now being argued in some quarters that a plebiscite must be held before the king returned to 
Greece. His responsibility for establishing the Metaxist dictatorship was referred to, as well as the 
possibility of future civil war.
8
  
 
The strained relations were not just within the Greek quarters. Also involved were now “Allied 
leaders”.  This was in a piece concerning the resistance leaders’ failed August 1943 visit to Cairo.  
                                               
3 ”Guerrillas in Crete,” Evening Post, August 3, 1941. 
4 “British fight on in Greece,” Evening Post, July 27, 1942.  
5 “Greek Gue[r]rillas,” Auckland Star, January 20, 1943. 
6 “Greek Guerrillas,” Evening Post, September 2, 1943. 
7 Ibid 
8 “King of Greece-Opposition to Continuance of Monarchy,’’ Auckland Star, September 24, 1943. 
 175 
 
Their efforts to obtain a more representative Greek government by including representatives from 
the resistance had been “rebuffed”.9 Though not reported, the visit had also included Brigadier 
Eddie Myers, who had led the S.O.E. sabotage attack on the Gorgopotamos viaduct the previous 
year and worked with New Zealanders such as Barnes, Edmonds and Stott (amongst others).  Myers 
was fired from his command because of his outspokenness and questioning of British policy in 
Greece.
10
  
 
When fighting broke out in October 1943, both immediate and long-term issues were touched upon 
in the press. The two main protagonists were actually named: E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. The former 
had “political objectives”, while the latter simply complied with British higher command directives 
– “non-political” [sic]. The respective territories of operations were outlined as well as names of 
leaders. In this case, it was Zervas (E.D.E.S.) and Sarafis (E.L.A.S.). The fighting was presented as 
a “clash”, with a potential for escalation to civil war.11 The New Zealanders were receiving 
something of a basic introduction to the politics of Greek resistance. 
 
Against the background of the breakout of political and armed conflict within the resistance forces, 
stories of their struggles against the Germans were still being relayed to the Pacific Dominion. In 
December 1943, a story was run describing how the partisans (faction was not given) had “captured 
27 villages from the Germans” and also controlled the Kalamae region of the Peloponessus.12 By 
April 1944, the month of the Greek mutiny that would generate Fraser’s telegram, the dominance of 
E.A.M./E.L.A.S. was made quite evident, as well as a Provisional Government established by the 
resistance in the mountains of occupied Greece.
13
 By late August, when the Greek Brigade joined 
the 2NZDIV in Italy, a new government structure had been formed. This was the British-sponsored 
Papandreou administration. E.A.M./E.L.A.S. abandoned its mountain administration and, after 
much internal conflict,
14
 but probably under Russian influence, had joined it.
15
 Papandreou’s 
government, including E.A.M. representatives, became the British-endorsed administration in 
newly liberated Greece. Absent was the Greek monarch. The man whose rescue by New Zealand 
                                               
9 “Greek Guerrillas” Auckland Star, September 29, 1943. 
10 For his own account see E.C.W. Myers, Greek Entanglement (Gloucester: Sutton, 1985). Also Richard Clogg, Anglo- Greek 
Attitudes: Studies in History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 76-77. 
11 “Civil War Possibility,” Evening Post, October 28, 1943. 
12 “Savagery in Greece,” Evening Post, December 4, 1943. 
13 “Greek Unity,” Auckland Star, April 6, 1944. 
14 “Greek Disunity,” Evening Post, July 28, 1944. For an academic study see John Louis Hondros, Occupation and Resistance- Greek 
Agony 1941-44 (New York, NY: Pella, 1983), 222-233. 
15 “Greek Unity apparently Complete,” Evening Post, August 21, 1944. A scholarly work is Peter J. Stavrakis, Moscow and Greek 
Communism, 1944-1949 (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 33. 
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soldiers in early 1941 did, and would continue to, feature in the memory of the Battle of Crete, was 
now not coming back to Greece until the people had decided whether or not they wanted him.
16
   
  
The unfolding violent and politically driven situation with the resistance groups in occupied Greece 
drew no comment from the New Zealand government. This was right across the possible venues of 
discussion - internally, with the London administration, the Greeks, in parliament or in the New 
Zealand press.  
 
LIBERATION  
Some of the New Zealanders who were in Greece at the time of liberation and the period 
immediately after had been there for years, either with secret British services or in hiding. Others, 
such as Tom King, arrived as part of the relief effort, while in November Ted Aked came with the 
returning Greek forces in the form of the Greek Brigade. Arthur Edmonds and Tom Barnes of 
S.O.E. were active, and at least one member of the elusive escape organization A Force, Don 
Macnab, was as well. Still others were concerned with collection and transmission to New Zealand 
of recent and current happenings. In liberated Greece, New Zealanders would have significant roles, 
but they never worked in the form of a New Zealand unit. This was in stark contrast to the 2NZDIV 
– the mainstay of the Dominion’s military presence during the war and also the unit uppermost in 
subsequent official remembering. 
 
S.O.E. Officers 
While there were no German forces left on the mainland, the dynamics of the Greek political scene 
were still being experienced by New Zealanders. Greeks were still confronting each other, with 
Britain maintaining its support for one side. Long-term policy was to disarm all resistance groups so 
as to enable the state and its British sponsor to once more monopolise military force, E.D.E.S. 
partisans were permitted to retain theirs during the immediate future.
17
 The real target was E.L.A.S. 
 
However, the situation was still a tangle, as evidenced by the activities of the New Zealand officers 
serving with S.O.E. Arthur Edmonds was attached to E.L.A.S. HQ. According to General Sarafis, 
Edmonds was on the receiving end of complaints about territorial disputes between E.L.A.S. and 
E.D.E.S. with accompanying collaborationist Security Battalions.
18
 During the same period, the 
                                               
16 “Vote on Return of King,” Evening Post, October 19, 1944; “Greek Future,” New Zealand Herald, October 20, 1944. 
17 . Thanasis D. Sfikas; British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War, 1945-1949: Imperialism of 'Non-intervention, (Keele: 
Ryburn, 1994), 33. The author uses Zervas’s own diary to justify the claim.  
18 Stefanos Sarafis, ELAS: Greek Resistance Army (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981), 393, 483.  
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senior E.LA.S. commander was told by Edmonds of his promotion [sic] to Major General by the 
Papandreou government when it first arrived.
19
 
 
New Zealanders who came after liberation were also responsible for reporting what they saw there. 
In the immediacy of the October liberation, it was a journalist who first saw the difference that had 
occurred in Greece.  
 
Journalists 
With the arriving British and Greek government émigré government was official NZEF war 
correspondent Cedric Mentiplay.
20
  He was seemingly the only New Zealand journalist.  The New 
Zealand Press Association is sometimes listed as the corporate source but the specific (individual or 
organisation) source is not discernible. Mentiplay took a number of photographs (some apparently 
unpublished) and also had news stories run in the New Zealand press. In an article sent on 30 
November, he related his journey along “100 miles of the route of the Allied withdrawal three years 
and a half ago”.21 There was little physical evidence of the campaign, but along the way were 
“Greeks in these areas, who remember the campaign only too well, and many of whom still 
preserve the names and addresses of New Zealanders they helped”.22 One of the underlying struts of 
the relationship that would be celebrated was again appearing.   
 
Mentiplay’s surviving images show a very different Greece from that encountered by the forces in 
early 1941. Armed E.L.A.S. partisans (including women) were now marching through villages, not 
the Greek army that had been fighting first the Italians and then the Germans. Unsurprisingly, he 
visited places of particular relevance to the 1941 expedition. At the waterfront evacuation port of 
Porto Rafti, he found more evidence of the new power balance. His notation described the boats 
there that were part of the E.A.M./E.L.A.S. forces and stated that they “had just returned from 
capturing 800 Germans who were cut off near Volos.”23 Alongside the change in internal socio-
political profile came the jubilation of liberation. 
 
                                               
19 Ibid., 414. 
20 IA1 3388 181/32/12 Pt 1 Archives New Zealand (ANZ). War History-Authors- Italian Campaign, N.C. Philips.  He was also an 
unsuccessful nominee for the narrator of future official war volume of the Italian campaign that had involved the Greek Brigade and 
2NZDIV. Mentiplay offered his services in early 1952.   
21 “Few Traces Left,” Auckland Star, December 6,1944. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Notation on Photograph 11842 National Army Museum, New Zealand. Kippenberger Archive, Waiouru. 
 178 
 
Liberation - October 1944 
During October, New Zealand newspapers carried stories about the joyous welcome given to 
arriving British troops and the Greek government.
24
 This was, again, a different Greece from that of 
1941. Armed partisans were reported as liberating centres such as Athens and Piraeus.
25
  
Figure 6.1 ELAS Female Partisans on their way to Athens. Photographed by Cedric Mentiplay November 29 1944 (Source: 
National Army Museum New Zealand) 
 
London’s communication to Wellington about the arrival of the Greek government-in-exile in 
Athens was one in the usual tone of diplomatic reporting. On 18 October, Papandreou and his 
government arrived on the Averoff (one of the ships involved in the April mutiny). They first went 
to the Acropolis to raise the Greek flag, then to a religious service, and finally to a rally in 
Constitution Square.
26
  Besides descriptions such as these came semi-official ones from New 
Zealanders.  
 
Aked, writing from Athens, told Freyberg of the return of the Greek Brigade in positive terms: 
“[Colonel] Tsacolotos [sic] and personnel of the Brigade were obviously nervous, all wondering in 
what manner the people of the city would receive them. Immediately the march commenced, all 
doubts vanished. It was obvious that the arrival home was welcomed by the greater percentage of 
the people. Streets, pavements and buildings were crowded, and it was almost impossible even to 
hear the band.”27 Unsurprisingly, Tom King wrote at length, and with some emotion, of his 
experiences. On November 21 he wrote to both Freyberg and Fraser (he sent a copy of the Freyberg 
                                               
24 “Tommies feted by delirious Greeks,” Auckland Star, October 6,1944; “Joy of Greeks,” New Zealand Herald, October 7, 1944. 
25 “Athens & Piraeus,” Evening Post, October 14, 1944. 
26 AAEG 950 W3240 140/G 345/4/1 Pt. 2 Countries –Greece-Political Affairs-General. (ANZ). Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs to Minister for External Affairs, October 21,1944.  
27 WAII 8 Freyberg Papers File 76 (ANZ). Greek Mountain Brigade. Aked to Freyberg, November 16, 1944. 
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letter to the latter as well). Of the local population, he said, “I just cannot say how much they love 
and almost worship New Zealanders.”28 He suggested to both the General and the Prime Minister 
that they should visit Greece. To Freyberg, he commented: “I can assure you that you will get a 
great reception; one that will astound you. Probably they may be a bit scared of anyone of your 
level otherwise you are liable to be kissed by all and sundry, male and female. You have been 
warned!”29 He told the Prime Minister that “I do hope that some day you can pay a visit here. The 
warning I gave to General Freyberg about that will equally apply to you!!”30 Naturally the New 
Zealanders were focussed on their own relations with the newly liberated Greeks but there was a 
general euphoria and exciting welcome for the returning British forces as a whole. 
 
That Freyberg and Fraser were expecting armed conflict in newly liberated Greece lies in dark 
contrast to King’s buoyant enthusiasm. Apparently, the senior New Zealander personalities never 
thought to tell him about their fears. They did the same with Charles Boswell, Head of the first 
Dominion legation to the Soviet Union. After watching a newsreel in Moscow, Boswell noted in his 
diary “The pictures showed tragically what New Zealand had missed.”31 He had, however, 
celebrated the liberation with the Greek Ambassador to the Soviets.
32
 He did this the day he 
farewelled the visiting British delegation that included Churchill and Anthony Eden – the two 
architects of the 1941 expedition. During this visit, another initiative had been discussed. It was the 
controversial agreement over spheres of influence in post-war Europe. That it attracted no criticism 
by the New Zealanders could be taken as another instance of silence (avoiding any obtuse statement 
on particularly sensitive Greek matters like the question of collaboration) or as consent to Britain 
saving Greece from Soviet expansion. 
 
PERCENTAGES AGREEMENT 
The controversial understanding reached between Churchill and Stalin at the Moscow meeting over 
post-war Eastern Europe came as no surprise to New Zealand. The lead-up to it was reported by 
London. 
33
 This occurred about the time the Greek Brigade was going into battle, a decision, like 
the agreement, that smacked of major power manipulation.  On 18 October Boswell told Wellington 
the basics of the percentages agreement between Britain and the U.S.S.R: “Just met Eden - General 
                                               
28 King to Freyberg, November 21, 1944. 
29 Ibid. 
30 EA2 238 103 3 6 Pt 2 (ANZ). Relief and Rehabilitation-Disasters and Relief-Greece and Crete. King to Fraser , November 21, 
1944.  
31 MSX-8764 Boswell, Charles Wallace Diaries etc. Alexander Turnbull Library (ATL). Diary Entry, December 7, 1944  
32 October 19, 1944 entry. 
33 AAEG 950 127a 345/4/8 Pt 1 (ANZ). Countries-Greece-Political Affairs-General. Secretary for Dominion Affairs to Minister for 
External Affairs, September 25, 1944. London told Wellington that the Soviets had “no objection” to British forces being sent to 
Greece and that they would not be sending any of their own. Furthermore “They also confirm their recognition of our special interest 
in Greece.” 
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agreement with Russia. Britain [has] free hand in Greece, Russia in Rumania; Bulgaria 50-50.”34 
This was followed within a few days by the official announcement from the British.
35
 
Further communication from London reinforced the reality of Soviet non-interest. Although they 
had a military mission in Greece, “there is no evidence that the Soviet Mission to ELAS are seeking 
to play any political role.”36 Such confidential diplomatic cables were matched by a December 
newspaper article in the New Zealand Herald about “Zones of Influence” being determined by the 
major powers.
37
 
 
The Fraser administration raised no issue with the percentages agreement. It was also silent when 
other information arrived via a third party from one of its officers who had been in Greece for years. 
 
NEW ZEALAND PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT HEARS FROM AN S.O.E. OPERATIVE 
At home, New Zealanders who were with S.O.E. in Greece were now discussed in the press: “The 
veil has been lifted to reveal the extraordinary nature of the lives they have led in occupied 
territory.”38 These were “remarkable stories”.39 Names and military feats that would be taken up by 
the official war history were now being read about. Barnes and Edmonds at the Gorgopotamos 
mission, Stott and Morton with the Aesopos, Bill Jordan and his life with the Greek resistance and 
then fighting alongside the French Marquis. 
 
Beside these tales of heroism came a darkening of the Greek resistance. Bill Jordan was prominent 
in the reporting. His stories included exposing the death of fellow New Zealander Arthur Hubbard 
at the hands of Greek partisans.
40
 Jordan also related how he was facing a Greek firing squad during 
the same incident.  Besides the press coverage, direct communication, albeit restricted, between the 
New Zealand S.O.E. operatives and Wellington finally happened. 
 
                                               
34 EA1 352/63/6/2 Part 1(ANZ). Exchange of Information and Publications with Overseas Posts-Moscow-General Reports from 
Minister. Extract from Bi Weekly Summary 162, October 20.1944.  
35 EA1 201/2/82 Pt 2 B (ANZ). United Kingdom-External Relations-Greece. Secretary for Dominion Affairs to Minister for External 
Affairs, October 22, 1944. On 22 October London gave Wellington a brief summary of events at the Churchill-Stalin meeting in 
Moscow. The percentages agreement that would cause much discussion and controversy amongst historians was subtly referred to: 
“Marshall Stalin agreed with the Prime Minister at their first meeting that Greece was important to Great Britain in the same way as 
Roumania was for the Soviet Union.” 
36 AAEG 950/345/4/1 Pt 2 (ANZ). Secretary for Dominion Affairs to Minister for External Affairs, Wellington, November 23, 1944.  
37 “Rifts in Unity,” New Zealand Herald, December 20,1944. 
38 “One Man’s War,” Evening Post, October 5, 1944. 
39 “N.Z. Guerrillas Activities in Greece,” Evening Post, November 4, 1944. 
40 “Amazing Exploits: Daring NZ Officer,” Auckland Star, October 5, 1944. Hubbard was named in “Shot by Greeks: an Officer’s 
Death,” New Zealand Herald, October 6, 1944. 
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Wellington Administration 
A London-based New Zealand government official sent Wellington a press clipping and S.O.E. 
operative Bill Jordan’s endorsement of its content. The Daily Telegraph had written a piece on the 
post-occupation: “The problem is unbelievably intricate; it is every shade of dirty grey as far as the 
warring parties go. There is no absolute good and no absolute bad on one side or other.”41 Jordan 
exempted former collaborators from condemnation: “He says that many Greeks have joined the so-
called quisling party purely for self-protection.”42 The threat was from the left, namely 
E.A.M./E.L.A.S.  Against this was a less than benign assessment of the security battalions that 
reached Wellington. In the previous month, just prior to liberation, London passed on to Wellington 
an assessment that the situation in Athens had deteriorated. It was “partly [precipitated] by ELAS 
atrocities, responsibility for this situation must largely be placed at the door of security battalions 
who are now quite out of hand and are fully co-operating with German SS.”43 Conflicting stories 
were reaching the Wellington administration. It would worsen during December. Liberation would 
soon be overshadowed by a level of violence and worldwide public and diplomatic protests about 
Greek-related events. 
 
As shown below, communications from New Zealand soldiers who had been serving in occupied 
Greece and/or were in newly liberated areas did not enter into any New Zealand government 
deliberations during a critical phase of the Greek drama. It would later in the new year. This lack of 
consideration prevailed despite the feelings of alarm and confusion that permeated the Wellington 
administration in the weeks ahead.  
DEKEMVRIANA 
According to the memoirs of S.O.E. operative Arthur Edmonds, in early December, he and senior 
relief officer Tom King were discussing the possible use of New Zealand S.O.E. officers in post-
liberation roles to help reconstruct the country. Their conversation was interrupted when “shots rang 
out from the police building opposite the Grande Bretagne, which was next-door to the office we 
were using.”44 What the two had heard was Greek police opening fire on an E.A.M. demonstration 
in Syntagma (Constitution) Square. It was an act that brought much public criticism at the time 
(Edmonds notes as much). The shooting resulted in casualties – both fatal and “wounding many 
more.” 45 The firing continued for more than fifteen minutes. Undeterred, the crowd had eventually 
                                               
41 EA1 201/2/82 Pt 2 B (ANZ). United Kingdom-External Relations-Greece. “In Greece, ‘Quislings’ are pro-British” Daily Express 
(n.d.) attached to Miller to McIntosh, October 11, 1944. 
42 Miller to McIntosh, October 11, 1944.  
43 AAEG 950 345/4/1 Pt 2 (ANZ). Countries-Greece-Political Affairs-General. Secretary for Dominion Affairs to Minister for 
External Affairs, September 6, 1944.  
44 Arthur Edmonds, With Greek Guerrillas (Putaruru: Author, 1998), 245. 
45 Ibid., 245. 
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re-formed and “continued on their route.”46 The Syntagma Square episode is essentially a key 
incident in the quickly escalating violence.
47
  
 
In New Zealand the press reported on Syntagma Square. The New Zealand Herald, for example, 
reported rioting after police poured “withering fire” into “unarmed demonstrators of the EAM”.48 In 
response, E.L.A.S. began attacking police barracks in the capital, and when they were getting the 
upper hand, British forces joined in on the side of the Papandreou government. The city then 
essentially became a battlefield. The rest of the country was relatively quiet, except for the North 
West where E.L.A.S. had a final reckoning with E.D.E.S. partisans, the British-preferred armed 
resistance group. The E.D.E.S. political headquarters in Athens had, as the Auckland Star reported, 
already been the scene of “a pitched battle” between the two.49 Interestingly, London did not make a 
blanket condemnation of E.A.M./E.L.A.S. in their official communication to Fraser. On 12 
December they told him that the “majority of so-called E.L.A.S. forces operating in Athens do not 
belong to E.L.A.S. andarte forces organized to fight Germans”50. Furthermore, they “may be 
following the lead of an extremist element in E.A.M. rather than E.A.M. as a whole.”51 Within a 
few weeks the departure from E.A.M. of the “Socialist party at Salonica” had taken place.52  This 
was in protest against actions in Athens by E.L.A.S. All this goes to show that E.A.M./E.LA.S. was 
not a homogenous entity and could arguably dent some of the vitriolic condemnation (e.g. Jordan 
and Barnes) directed at them.  . 
New Zealanders in Greece during the Dekemvriana 
Several of the New Zealanders based in Athens sent communications directly, or via third parties, to 
the New Zealand leadership during the fighting. The former were Aked and King. The latter was 
Mentiplay, the army journalist. None were supportive of the left.  The Wellington government and 
Freyberg never solicited these views nor did they respond to the highly charged letters. Neither did 
they communicate with each other over the events. Indeed, while the General was considered as a 
possible source of further information by the Wellington based diplomat, J.V. Wilson in late 
December, he was never approached. The reasons, and who made the decision, are not apparent. 
Either it was a reflection of Freyberg’s political capabilities or, as Wilson pointed out, “might not be 
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right” as the General was on the staff of the Briton Alexander who had overall direction of the 
battle.
53
 
Ted Aked  
It was during Dekemvriana, that Ted Aked assumed a unique position in New Zealand’s direct 
experience of the political turmoil and violence of Greek politics and British intervention.  In Italy, 
he countered the extreme Right. In Athens, he would fight the Left.  This was despite a recorded 
note
54
 that Freyberg wanted him recalled from Athens when the fighting commenced. He returned 
to the 2NZDIV Italy in January and, as discussed later, he made his experiences and opinions public 
when he returned home a few months later.  
 
While, in his November letter to Freyberg, Aked spoke enthusiastically of the reception the 
returning Greek Brigade received, he also mentioned the political tensions: “Several times the Local 
Red party attempted to create diversions, but civilians in the vicinity simply ‘howled them 
down.’”55 He thought “The Communist party seem to be making their last throw on 18 November, 
the 26
th
 anniversary of their party.”56 That prediction was overshadowed by later events. 
 
The Athens fighting was initially only between Greeks. The British were not targeted by E.L.A.S.
57
 
However, the British eventually entered the battle with their small numbers but technological 
advantage when E.L.A.S. began to get the upper hand. Aked pointed out as much to Freyberg in a 
letter written on 12 December.
58
 The New Zealand colonel told the General that the Greek Brigade 
was kept as a “last resource”. They were committed “as the situation was completely out of 
control.”59 Aked thought the fighting was “worse in many ways” than “normal warfare”, even 
though the latter “at times is most confused”.60 His examples reinforced his views –E.L.A.S. 
occupied hospitals (complete with bogus patients) and fired upon their adversaries. For his part, 
“We are forced to engage houses from which we are fired on, even if they contain women and 
children.”61 It is no wonder he considered “This is to me an extremely hateful type of war.”62 As 
shown later, Aked would eventually have the chance to voice his views in public when he returned 
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to Auckland. His participation in the fighting, however, was publicly known in New Zealand at 
least two days after he wrote Freyberg.  
 
On 14 December, both the Dominion and the New Zealand Herald ran essentially the same story on 
Aked- “One New Zealander was actively concerned in the first pitched battles of the Greek civil 
war now being fought in the Athens area”. Aked was a liaison officer with the Greek Brigade which 
“yesterday staved off a threat to the city by eliminating large bodies of ELAS troops”. Any overt 
politicking by Brigade members is dismissed: “charges of political activity are quite baseless”.63 
The last point is debatable, as the Brigade was a key element in partisan disarmament negotiations 
between British/Papandreou and E.L.A.S. This was communicated to Wellington by London later 
the same month.
64
 There were also press reports on the issue.
65
 When King wrote to Fraser after the 
fighting had broken out he included - “the great split came over the disarmament of the Andartes, 
followed by the resignation of the four EAM and two KKE members [from the government].”66 
 
By January, the battle had shifted in the British and the Greek government’s favour. Tsakalotos 
wrote to Freyberg on 11 January; included with the letter were notification of the military awards 
first recommended for the New Zealand officers after Rimini. He told the General that Aked had 
been “a great asset” and that “We have nearly cleared the country. Here, again, Lt Col Aked has 
helped us, and I offer you my thanks for this.”67 Freyberg thanked the Greek Colonel for the 
decorations. He commented on Aked and the situation in Greece, “I was glad to hear that Aked has 
done so well. He, I know, will always remember with pride his association with the 3
rd
 Greek 
Mountain Brigade… We have heard with great pleasure the better news from Greece and trust that a 
peaceful settlement is now assured.”68 On the same day that Tsakalotos wrote to Freyberg, Prime 
Minister Peter Fraser received a summary of points from British authorities.  The Greek Brigade 
and the Sacred Squadron were considered “politically undesirable to maintain” and that they should 
be “disbanded… and later used as cadres for expanding the Greek national army.”69 Aked and King 
were both operating in a world that was subject to acute political intrusion. 
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Aked was based in Athens. Tom King was also there. S.O.E. operatives Edmonds and Barnes were 
in the countryside. In contrast to Aked, the last point was never reported in the press nor 
communicated to Wellington.  
 
Tom King 
The fighting brought about a dramatic change in Tom King’s attitude. On 12 December, two days 
before Aked wrote to Freyberg, he sent Fraser a five-page typed letter.
70
  It provided a history of the 
armed resistance that included high-level characteristics such as key conferences and portfolio 
distribution in the Papandreou government. He supported Britain and its military representative on 
the scene, General Scobie. Closer to his own relief responsibilities, he accused E.A.M./E.L.A.S. of 
distributing food only to its supporters. Those civilians who had “befriended and sheltered British 
soldiers during the occupation are being treated as enemies by the communists.”71 
 
The shootings in Syntagma Square attracted his attention. Like the Edmonds memoirs, he said he 
had heard the shots being fired but could not say who had started it. He could not see the Square 
directly. He was obviously in conflict with press reports about the situation but admitted that British 
troops had become involved when early E.L.A.S. attacks on police barracks had resulted in “heavy 
casualties [of police]”. In this, he was in concert with Aked’s letter. Five days later, he sent another 
letter. While he forcefully argued “I am firmly convinced that this is a straight out “copy-book” 
Communist attempt at a Coup d’Etat”,72 he did not make a blanket condemnation of all Greeks 
fighting in the ranks of ELAS: “It is quite evident from the statements of ELAS p.w. [prisoners of 
war] that large numbers of ELAS troops have been completely misled by KKE propaganda and that 
the decent elements among them are horrified by what happened.”73  
 
King gathered part of his information from Tom Barnes. In his 12 December letter, he indicated as 
much when he passed on the latter’s positive assessment of Napoleon Zervas, head of the British-
preferred resistance group. King and Barnes had been socializing at least in Alexandria, Egypt and 
before the return to Greece: “drinking beer and swimming”.74 Barnes’ brief respite from the politics 
of Greece ended when he returned to join Zervas and E.D.E.S. when they were attacked by E.L.A.S. 
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Barnes and Edmonds 
In Western Greece, E.L.A.S. attacked E.D.E.S. According to the official S.O.E. report by 
Christopher Woodhouse, whose later published account would partially inform the official New 
Zealand volume on S.O.E. in Greece, “Barnes and all his officers and myself accompanied his 
[Zervas]troops as they evacuated one line after another. We helped to delay the advance of E.L.A.S. 
by every means except active participation in the fighting: demolishing bridges, driving vehicles, 
attending to wounded and encouraging Zervas’s officers.”75 The end came when E.D.E.S. was 
evacuated to Corfu by British ships in “a miniature Dunkirk” as described by Christopher 
Woodhouse, again in his official report.
76 
Escape was planned not just for Zervas. S.O.E. operatives 
still in Greece were to be evacuated from E.L.A.S.-controlled areas, as one of the maps used shows. 
Figure 6.2: Escape routes of S.O.E. Personnel after fighting broke out in early December 1944. Barnes and Edmonds were 
still there. Source: HS 5/288 (TNA) 
 
The Wellington government was kept informed about E.D.E.S. via the standard diplomatic updates 
from London.
77
 No New Zealanders were mentioned.  In the E.L.A.S.-controlled area, Edmonds 
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was told by E.L.A.S .General Headquarters that the following directive had been given by them to 
its partisans and that he had to pass it on to British commanders in Athens: “British troops in 
Greece in ELAS areas are forbidden [to] move south and especially toward Athens, where British 
troops attacked our units without any provocation. Any attempts to move will be stopped by 
arms.”78  So while fighting was going on in Athens involving British and New Zealanders, the 
scene outside was tense, but not with the same level of violence for the New Zealanders. But the 
possibility was there. For example, following Edmonds’ return to Lamia from Athens, he and his 
remaining S.O.E. colleagues acted on the possibility of being attacked by E.L.A.S: “At our HQ we 
were fully alive to the delicacy of our situation and had a fire-plan for the defence of our building, 
as we were determined not to surrender without a fight.”79 The assault never came, even though 
E.L.A.S. was dominant in the town and communications with Athens were sporadic.  
 
Mentiplay 
The dispatches from the Official War Correspondent found their way into the New Zealand press as 
well as to Peter Fraser’s office.  Like Aked, Mentiplay thought the fighting was vicious, with little 
differentiation between combatants and civilians. In the Evening Post, he wrote, “the entire 
population” was “under the constant threat of warfare in its cruellest form”.80 He placed this in 
contrast to Crete, which he had also visited in the previous week- “all was peaceful”81 and “what 
demonstrations there were friendly affairs into which an Allied soldier was apt to be swept in sheer 
exuberance of enthusiasm.”82 Another strut of the relationship was thus presented affirmatively.  
 
Mentiplay took an anti-E.L.A.S. attitude. The British-preferred E.D.E.S. partisans under Zervas 
were “gallant”.83 When the fighting died down, E.L.A.S. adversely affected the relief programme 
(he mentioned the food ship from New Zealand) and had used the supplies as a “political 
weapon”.84 Tsakalotos, commander of the Greek Mountain Brigade now fighting in Athens, 
attracted an entire article from Mentiplay about his questioning of an E.L.A.S. prisoner. The piece 
noted the recent association of the Greek commander with the New Zealanders in Italy. He is “well 
known to us for his work at Rimini and wearing alongside a Greek medallion on his right breast a 
New Zealand badge given him by General Freyberg.”85 The E.L.A.S. officer, a professional pre-war 
soldier, received a tirade of anger from Tsakalotos. His challenges to EAM/ELAS accusations of 
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collaborators reaching into all areas of the returning army/government: “Do you think me a pro-
German?”86 After that, Mentiplay did his own questioning. When the prisoner said the Greek 
Brigade and another regular Greek army unit, the Sacred Squadron, were working with the 
collaborationist Security Battalions, “We abandoned this line of questioning as unprofitable.”87 
What the journalist thought as preposterous was closer to the actual view being taken by Barnes and 
Jordan, the two New Zealand S.O.E. operatives. They were sympathetic to the Security Battalions 
as shown earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 4. 
 
Peter Fraser was presented with several official communications from Mentiplay by J.T. Paul.
88
 
Paul was a politician and also part of the Prime Minister’s Office. During the war, he was “director 
of publicity and, in effect, chief censor.”89 The shootings during the demonstration in Syntagma 
Square were marginalized in a dispatch of 9 December. Inverted commas enclosed the adjective 
“unarmed” to describe the crowd, while the subsequent eruption of hostilities were “the inevitable 
outbreak of violence” that would have happened anyway. The situation in Greece was not just a 
civil war with British intervention but “a test case… By what happens here the solidarity of the 
United Nations may stand or fall, and democracy itself may be supported or betrayed.”90 Describing 
the situation as one threatening the new international structure was highly inflammatory – 
especially as the United Nations apparatus was still to be fully implemented and the New Zealand 
government would place a great importance on the new international organization. The anti-
E.L.A.S. tone was again evident in a later communique. Families of the Mountain Brigade were 
mentioned as being taken hostage as part of a broader sweep.
91
 The partisans had a “bloodlust” that 
had led to many atrocities. In commenting on their wartime resistance to the invader, he stated, “Far 
from being the voice of Greece and democracy, they were nothing but armed bands of thugs and 
terrorists, whose only virtue was fierce guerrilla courage.”92  
 
The fighting continued.
93
 Although British and Greek government forces gained the upper hand it 
was still a precarious place for the British leadership. External and internal sources were 
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bombarding Fraser about Greece. But the pressure was also applied by his constituency as the 
following shows.  
 
New Zealand Protests at Home 
Besides reporting on the continued fighting in Athens, New Zealand newspapers began carrying 
stories about overseas popular protests. Stories about the protests in the Dominion also appeared. 
On 11 December, the New Zealand Herald reported: “A well-attended meeting organised by the 
Communist Party and representatives of the Trades Council, held in Latimer Square [Christchurch] 
today, carried a resolution urging the Government to use its influence with the British government 
to cease the use of arms against the Greek people”. The resolution went on to seek an “all Greek 
parties” conference to establish a representative government.94 The same meeting received exposure 
in the Evening Post, which also included the resolution’s allusion to the Greek-New Zealand nexus: 
“the thousands of New Zealanders who have given their liberty or their lives in Greece did so in the 
belief that they were fighting for freedom”.95 The Press also noted that the Canterbury Builders’ 
and General Labourer’s Union “deplores the shooting down of unarmed demonstrators and reported 
presence of British tanks and troops in support of the police”.96 To gain maximum effect, a press 
release about one Christchurch meeting was cabled by protesters for distribution to the overseas 
press.
97
 
 
After the eruption of fighting in Athens, letters and cables of protest started arriving at government 
offices in Wellington. Those that are in archives
98
 show they nearly all originated from the left - 
from trade unions, Labour Party branches and the New Zealand Communist Party. They condemned 
Britain, seeing its role as one of interference against an ally. War was being waged against the 
Greek people.  
 
Soldiers 
Besides the Left, one protest came from within an institution, but not through it. Ironically, protests 
were made by members of the army –a body based on strict subservience to higher authority.  A 
petition from soldiers at the Burnham Camp on the outskirts of Christchurch was reported in the 
press. The document was forwarded to Prime Minister Peter Fraser with a covering note from “H.J. 
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Greatorex” (a communist following Soviet pacifist dictates in the early stages of the war). 
Greatorex’s covering note was not entirely correct: “the men of this camp” included at least one 
W.A.A.C. (Women's Army Auxiliary Corps).
99
 
 
The petition included reference to British intervention and civilian aid.  John Denvir, a New 
Zealand soldier who had been in Greece but had fought with Yugoslav partisans, was quoted in the 
petition thus: “The situation in Greece is a Greek affair, not a British affair.” The nexus of bonding 
is then mentioned: “It is a crime that British soldiers who have gone back to Greece should be 
ordered to shoot down people who have assisted New Zealanders to escape, even to starving 
themselves. I feel sure that every New Zealander who fought in Greece would be behind me in this 
statement.”100 Denvir was part of a small group who had received Russian and Greek decorations at 
the same camp in which the petition was organised on 15 December. Photographs were included in 
the local press. The sight of Denvir being congratulated by a senior officer during the same time 
that soldier protest was brewing seems almost surreal.
101
 A similar ceremony was occurring in the 
North Island’s Papakura camp.102 New Zealand soldiers were receiving medals from a Government 
that was facing a physical threat from a force from within. 
 
Dissent within the Dissent  
Unsurprisingly, the Communist Party of New Zealand (C.P.N.Z.) was heavily involved in the 
protests.  Prominent members of the party included Selwyn Devereaux, who sent the soldiers’ 
petition to Fraser, and Sid Scott, who was editor of the People’s Voice. The New Zealand Police 
Special Branch noted that the Hands off Greece open air protest meeting in Christchurch was 
chaired by Aubrey Skilton, from the Canterbury Branch of the Communist Party. Other prominent 
communists attending included Sydney Fournier, Harry Switella and John Locke. Copies of public 
announcements concerning the meeting, also included in the report, clearly showed the involvement 
of the Party
103
  
 
There was at least one episode that shows the C.P.N.Z.’s role did not go unchallenged.  This 
occurred at the general meeting of the Canterbury District Trades Council (affiliated with the New 
Zealand Federation of Labour) held in Christchurch on 19 December. An accusation that the Party 
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was hijacking the protest was made. The resulting motion was defeated.  
104
 Thus again, the Party’s 
dominant position was maintained.  
 
As can be seen by the above, there were various actors (individuals and institutions) with differing 
views on Greece. The simple bonding through sacrifices against the invader in 1941, again, does not 
hold true for the multiple connections and complexity between the two countries. Already by 
1944/45, the Greek-New Zealand relationship represented a resource that could be mobilized by 
different political groups. Not surprisingly, the government sought ultimately to neutralize this 
situation. 
 
Response of National Elite 
To New Zealanders, the Fraser administration used strategies of public silence and political 
courtesy in reaction to written communications - apart from several notable exceptions. Typically, 
protest communications coming to the government were met with politely worded, brief responses 
acknowledging receipt. Closing lines were usually non-committal in nature and were signed by a 
civil servant.
105
 This differed in the responses to the C.P.N.Z. and the New Zealand Federation of 
Labour. Both attracted personal signatures from senior Labour government figures. Fraser told the 
Secretary of the “Auckland District Communist Party” that, “With much fuller knowledge of facts 
of situation in Greece than is revealed in the press I cannot agree that responsibility for [the] crisis 
rests on shoulders of [the] British government. That statement is simply not correct”. He ended by 
stating that the obvious imbroglio in Athens was not going to be resolved soon and that Britain had 
a role: “There are, however, matters for serious consideration in connection with [the crisis] in 
Greece, including questions of future action of British forces there”.106  The reply to the Federation 
of Labour was signed by Acting Prime Minister, Walter Nash. (Fraser was away at the time). It 
ignored British involvement but stressed that “There is no question of New Zealand troops being 
engaged, and I can assure you that the Government does not fail to make known its views in such 
ways as may seem appropriate in the present critical stage of the war”.107  
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No Troops? 
The statement that there were no troops in Greece spread into the popular press.
108
  As earlier 
sections show, the press release about New Zealand troops was incorrect. The leadership knew this 
to varying degrees. Although the predicaments of McNab, Barnes and Edmonds were invisible to 
New Zealand, those of King and Aked were not. Both wrote letters about their predicament to 
Freyberg or Fraser. As the following shows, the general public knew about Aked as well. 
 
On the same day that Aked’s situation was reported in the press, the “No New Zealand troops” 
statement was also published.”109  Although Aked was only one soldier, he was in a senior and 
critical position in the fighting.  He together with the S.O.E. operatives meant there was a military 
presence. There would be other major disjoints between State expressions and realities over Greece 
in the near future. Although it was not stated at the time, it was a disclosure that partly reflected the 
previous discussion amongst the leadership not to send the British-requested contingent for Greece. 
Those telegrams were subsequently published as part of the official war history project. The public 
exposure, however, was the result of domestic pressures and public embarrassment relating to 
Commonwealth diplomatic pressure. 
 
Parliament 
While the domestic response was in contrast to that coming from New Zealanders in Greece 
(namely, anti-E.L.A.S. statements from King and Aked), there were finer divisions at home as well. 
It all went to show that the idea of one singular people linked to another collapsed during the crisis.  
In Parliament, there was silence. It was facilitated by Fraser: He told London: “In deference to my 
request, proposed questions on the Greek situation in the House of Representatives were withheld”. 
Furthermore, as he now informed London, he had stated in the House that Greece was “a side issue” 
which would detract from the war effort.
110
  Both the New Zealand Government and the Opposition 
displayed an unwillingness to engage with each other over Greece. This is in contrast to the 
reported situation with Westminster.
111
  But the Wellington administration was also engaged with 
the Greek situation. It did this in the realm of confidential diplomacy. It was another example where 
what was being presented to the New Zealand citizenry was different from the nation state’s 
confidential endeavours. 
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Path to 20 December  
On 20 December, Fraser sent a telegram of protest to London about Greece. There is an indication 
that he had at least prepared an earlier one but it is unclear as to whether or not it was sent.
112
 The 
psychological effect of the protests on the Fraser administration was telling, as shown by a semi-
private letter written by Alister McIntosh, the Head of the Department of External Affairs. 
McIntosh, one of the most prominent figures in the history of New Zealand international relations, 
told Charles Boswell in Moscow that: “There is considerable excitement here on the question of 
Greece. The situation is a most unfortunate one, and we appear to be well offside in the view of all 
radicals in all countries. Trade Union circles here have not been behind with their criticism, and we 
receive a number of telegrams every day or so. God knows what the outcome will be!”113 It was a 
far cry from the words and emotions used in celebrating the New Zealand-Greek relationship. 
 
Motivation for a Confidential Protest  
What motivated Fraser to make a clear break with his previously drafted language and send a more 
pointed communication on 20 December was Churchill’s statement in the House of Commons that 
the Commonwealth Dominions had been consulted over actions in Greece.  It was neither a sense of 
unity in purpose with his constituency nor the tug of the special relationship. The New Zealand 
press picked up Churchill’s statement.114 Churchill’s very public utterance led to Fraser drafting a 
telegram to the Secretary of State for Dominions which he wanted External Affairs Secretary 
McIntosh to ‘over-haul’. The handwritten version by Fraser, penned at the Station Hotel, was 
probably made as he was exiting the country during his trip to the Pacific islands.
115
 Two days later, 
the telegram was sent to London. Fraser did state there was a special New Zealand-Greek 
relationship but did not leave Britain on the outer; he broadened it to include the latter as well. He 
wrote: “The special circumstance that New Zealanders fought in Greece and formed a particularly 
close attachment to the Greek people renders especially repugnant the adoption of forcible measures 
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against the population. I know that similar feelings are also entertained by the British Government 
and people”. 116 
 
Besides commenting about fighting in Greece, Fraser specifically highlighted the two Allies who 
had been invaded in the 1941 campaigns, Greece and Yugoslavia, as taking “a courageous stand for 
the United Nations in the face of the German and Italian armies and have suffered loss and exile 
accordingly”.117 He appeared to skew the current situation toward the memory of 1941. In this, he 
was echoing Freyberg’s speech made in the Italian fields just four months before, when he spoke of 
the aid Greeks had given Dominion troops in the aftermath of those battles.  
 
But Fraser differed from the thrust of the protest messages he had been receiving. Up until the time 
of the telegram, there had only been four organisations that had mentioned those battles, assistance 
to soldiers or a special friendship.
118
 In the months ahead, there would only be one other that 
followed suit. That was in early January 1945 and came from the Buller Trades Council. The 
content of the vast majority of the telegrams shows a preoccupation with the present. It included 
British intervention against allies and often cited international agreements such as the Atlantic 
Charter. E.L.A.S. was sometimes specifically mentioned. On the other hand, Fraser never named 
E.L.A.S. in his protest. He referred to “the disarming of those who seek to impose their will by 
force of arms”.119 The Labour leader wanted a solution via the ballot box, but he also seemingly 
dismissed the notion of a plebiscite, and even made an assumption that contradicted his own words 
about the Greek people selecting their own “kind of Government and Social System”.120 This was 
the return of King George and the continuation of the monarchy: “but the fact is plain that the 
majority of the people of their countries do not want them back to reign over them.”121 Fraser’s 
dislike of the King had come through again, to the point where he dismissed the democratic process 
to decide the greater issue of the monarchy. It was another instance where certain Greeks were 
acceptable to certain New Zealanders. However, it was not New Zealand exceptionalism about 
Greece – the Labour leader was condemning other European monarchies as well. 
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Greek New Zealanders 
There is an ample reservoir of New Zealand documentary records and newspaper articles showing 
the involvement of large sections of New Zealand society in protests against British actions in 
newly liberated Greece. To date, investigations show one brief mention of New Zealand Greek 
engagement in the same event. A letter to Prime Minister Peter Fraser by a non-Greek obliquely 
refers to the local Greeks: “Now I see the Greek section of the community here in New Zealand is 
out to support the people of Greece in their demand for a really representative government."
122
 
Without diasporic protest, the situation was simpler to control for the Fraser administration. 
 
State Dissection of Protests  
A police exercise just after the uproar throws up evidence of further complexity in the New Zealand 
reaction. If the archival material concerning New Zealand protests over Greece in late 1944 made 
available by the present day New Zealand Security Intelligence Service is representative of the 
efforts of the country’s services, then it belies the extent of the protest movement and the 
complexity of the issues. The Security Intelligence Bureau only reported on trade unions and the 
C.P.N.Z., not on any of the Labour Party involvement. As Peter Fraser had Ministerial 
responsibility for Police from 1944 until 1949, it is highly likely he had a hand in the scope of the 
surveillance. Furthermore, illustrating that the establishment, just like the protest movement, does 
not always enjoy total unity, nowhere in its 18-page analysis is Peter Fraser’s government nor its 
public announcement about no troops for Greece dealt with, except for prominent C.P.N.Z. figure 
Gordon Watson’s reaction to that announcement. Government leadership is limited to Churchill and 
national stance to Britain – not New Zealand.123  Communist infiltration of the unions was a large 
concern for Fraser. As he was Police Minister, it might be argued he maintained fidelity with his 
immediate power base, but the farther the protest extended, the less concerned he was.  The fact that 
the secretive covert service did not seem to be aligned with the New Zealand national sentiment is 
an indication of the multiplicity of sub-elites in the national apparatus. 
 
As discussed later, there were elements in the December episode that could have been shaped in a 
positive national imagining. The actual protests were mentioned in an unpublished official war 
history civilian narrative on the Communist Party
124
. It is yet another indication of the ubiquitous 
research activity of the official war history project. Similar to the Police perspective, the 7 pages 
devoted to the protests never mentioned the Fraser government nor specifically any Labour Party 
                                               
122 Boocock to Fraser, December 12,1944  
123 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS). Communist Propaganda Regarding Greek Crisis in New Zealand Security 
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124 WAII 21/63/c Civilian Narratives (ANZ), New Zealand Communist Party and the War  
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branches. The latter may have been considered to have been subsumed in the phrase “labour and 
trade movement.”125 The focus was the C.P.N.Z., and trade unions, with the Burnham soldiers also 
making an appearance. Dismissing the uproar as simply the result of C.P.N.Z. agitation was not, 
however, a given.  “While many of the resolutions passed by the unions registered protests in 
language similar to that found in Communist propaganda, it is problematical whether they were the 
result of Communist influence.”126 Indeed, one observation might be seen to lend itself to a bonding 
between New Zealand and Greece that was not ideologically driven: “To few other incidents in the 
war did the Party react so violently.”127  This unpublished account shows again how the New 
Zealand government’s role in Greek affairs was expunged from the record of two State actors – 
Police and historians. There would be other examples in the New Year. 
 
New Zealand Diplomats Analyse Dekemvriana 
Fraser’s December 20 telegram included something that was apparent in the Dominion’s internal 
consideration of the Athens fighting. In the cable to London, Fraser had spoken over “confusion” 
about “the intentions of the United Kingdom Government in Greece, and the issues 
involved”.128Less than 10 days later, J.V. Wilson of External Affairs in Wellington penned a 
memorandum, the opening paragraph of which included: “it does not seem as if Greek situation as a 
whole is much less obscure”.129 His two-page analysis tried to determine the motivation for obtuse 
British intervention (e.g. including the spheres of influence and “supress communism”).  British 
ruthlessness to achieve certain outcomes was also a possible development – “She will use force not 
against those whom she dislikes on ideological grounds but against those who interfere with the 
objectives.”130  Wilson’s pondering came to no real conclusion.  Hence the previously mentioned 
possible overture to Freyberg and the avenue that was eventually taken -John Mulgan, the New 
Zealander serving with S.O.E. (see below).  
AFTER DEKEMVRIANA  
New Zealand society’s engagement with Greek political affairs never reached the public level of 
discontent it did during December 1944. But against the deliberations of recognition of Greeks for 
hiding and assisting New Zealand soldiers, aid and rehabilitation, first post-war commemoration 
and recognition of Greek/Cretan civilian aid, the discourse about Greek politics in the Dominion 
continued in public and in confidential government circles. 
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Government Continues to Apply Certain Memories  
To the reading public in mid-January, the Fraser government projected acceptance of valid British 
involvement in Greek affairs and completely avoided its own and the wider New Zealand 
community’s protests as well. During an official occasion for the visiting Greek dignitaries, 
Archbishop Evangelinidis from Sydney, and the Greek Consul General for Australia, Vrisakis, the 
Greek situation received considerable attention from Fraser. It was “the crisis their motherland had 
been going through”.131 The conflict was a Greek and British affair.  The public were told Churchill 
and Eden had made “pledges” that elections would be carried out. Also, “they must accept the 
assurances that they had had repeatedly from Mr Churchill and Mr Eden as to the intention of that 
policy.”132 The Percentages Agreement was never mentioned, even as a diluted and benign form of 
international agreement that saw major powers avoiding immediate conflict.  
 
What was stressed was 1941, Greek aid to New Zealand soldiers, and the New Zealand relief 
efforts. According to Fraser’s speech, there had been no New Zealand involvement in recent Greek 
affairs except for relief supplies (Brigadier King was mentioned in this regard) and that “her men 
would never forget the kindness and hospitality they had received in Greece.”133  The main 
underlying struts of what is remembered, and celebrated, about the New Zealand-Greek relationship 
had once more appeared. It was, just like Freyberg’s speech to the Greek soldiers in Italy five 
months before, in blatant contrast to the present situation. If one looked for specificities and 
generalities in Fraser’s address, there are glaring omissions of recent events and an emphasis on 
those that could not draw discussion of New Zealand involvement in contentious Greek affairs. 
 
The affiliated New Zealand and Greek armies - one of the immediate pre-Dekemvriana links to 
Greece – were never raised. This was despite the media treatment Rimini had received and that it 
was the only shared wartime victory. If Fraser had done so, he would be reminding the public of a 
unit that was still a point of contention in discussions about ending the fighting.  Just two weeks 
before the Wellington event, the Evening Post had carried a story that the British commander in 
Athens, Scobie, had agreed to return the Brigade to barracks if E.A.M./E.L.A.S. agreed to terms set 
by him.
134
  There was also the particular involvement of a senior New Zealand officer (Aked) as 
one of its key officers. New Zealand clearly had an involvement in the fighting.   
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Besides the Brigade, there were the stories from Bill Jordan about the death of Hubbard with S.O.E. 
The long exposure of New Zealanders to the Greek politics of armed resistance was also avoided. 
Similarly avoided were the New Zealand protests.  Indeed, protest telegrams about British 
involvement in Greek affairs were still arriving when Fraser made his speech.
135
 
 
Having said the above, New Zealand government was not holding onto blind faith in British 
intentions. Their confidential actions showed a different attitude. It was one they did not share with 
their own citizens then, or after in their official memory. In the immediacy of early 1945, the Fraser 
administration was already taking actions that showed a genuine interest in contentious Greek 
matters of the present as well as comfortable memory shaping.  This took place against a backdrop 
of wider society’s ongoing concern with Greek matters. 
 
Mulgan and Hubbard 
The day after Fraser spoke at the function just discussed, the Wellington diplomatic machinery sent 
a semi-private letter to John Mulgan
136
, a New Zealander serving with S.O.E. in Greece, but shortly 
expected to join New Zealand forces.  The goal was to gain political intelligence from a source they 
knew and trusted. It was a distinct change showing the government shifted from passive receptor of 
official British communications and newspaper reports for information to a more proactive 
behaviour. The Mulgan approach set in train a series of incidents that led to Mulgan’s father 
pressing Wellington to consider the possibility that assassination had occurred when his son was 
found dead shortly after sending the requested report to the Fraser government. Closure for the 
government came in September (when Freyberg was pursuing his commemorations in Greece and 
Crete) with a final coronial report of suicide. I have already dealt with that episode elsewhere.
137
 
 
The Dominion State’s interest in the British-led investigation into Mulgan’s death shows another 
aspect of the elite and Greece –in one way, the farther a death was from its membership, the less 
interest it showed. Mulgan was personally known to senior members of the establishment, and his 
father, Alan, held a high profile position in national broadcasting.  Wellington pressed the 
investigating British for information. 
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In contrast, the shooting of Arthur Hubbard still did not bring forth any New Zealand interest. He 
was a clerk from Hamilton and did not mix in higher circles. Two months after the final decision on 
Mulgan was communicated, the Hubbard situation received brief discussion inside senior New 
Zealand army command. On 6 December 1945, over two years after Hubbard was killed, Brigadier 
Conway, Adjutant General, wrote: “The necessity for any secrecy concerning the circumstances of 
Lieut. Hubbard’s death does not now exist.”138 In contrast to the Mulgan situation, which showed 
much official New Zealand activity, Hubbard’s situation was marginalized. Conway argued the 
circumstances of the death had been described in “an account of it in detail, purported to have been 
given by Major W.S. Jordan, who was with Lieut. Hubbard at the time and, according to the Press 
notice, evidently gave full details to Lieut. Hubbard’s mother.”139The New Zealand Herald story 
made official communication superfluous. Hubbard’s family placed notices of remembrance in the 
same paper.
140
 
 
The treatments of Mulgan and Hubbard may have been different in 1945 but, as illustrated in the 
chapter dealing with New Zealanders serving with secret organisations in Greece, they were both 
relegated to footnotes in the published history. Hubbard’s mother never appears to have received an 
official account of his death. In January 1956, she wrote to Kippenberger asking for a “short history 
of my late son’s services” for “purposes of a war Memorial in book form”.141 In response, the Army 
Secretary sent a one-page summary that covered Hubbard’s service – both in Greece and before. 
His role in occupied Greece was slanted very much toward that of a peace facilitator. In late 1943, 
he was “seconded to a special mission to negotiate peace between different factions in Greece and 
to organise resistance there.”142  The death of Hubbard was recorded as 3 October 1943, but his 
entry was left to a general description: “Towards the end of 1943.”143 The intricacies of the 
resistance, understandably, had not been mentioned, but the effect of having a New Zealander as an 
honest broker bringing peace and fighting the invader was projected in this letter. There was 
nothing damaging to this representative of the nation. New Zealand non-involvement (rather than 
disinterest) was also implicit: “The death of your son, and the work he was carrying on, were 
referred to in the British House of Commons early in 1944 by Sir Winston Churchill.”144 
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Such are the variances and commonalities the State exhibited toward some of its individual soldiers 
caught up in the most acute episodes of wartime Greece. Another variant of the lack of consistency 
was demonstrated when some of the soldiers returned and spoke publicly about their experiences. 
 
King and Aked – Lack of Consistency in State Control 
When King and Aked returned home, their public statements showed various degrees of State 
censure as well as a mixture of emotions toward Greece. There appears to be no consistent policy 
on what the soldiers could say.  It was further evidence of the State’s inability or unwillingness to 
adequately deal with individual soldiers who were in the quagmire of Greek-related politics. Senior 
British representatives asked Freyberg if King’s views could be made public by them.  Freyberg 
passed on the request to Fraser who told him King could only speak privately to representatives of 
New Zealand, Britain and the USA.  His orders from Fraser to keep those views confidential were 
followed.
145
 In public King maintained his positive emotional stance. He “was amazed at the deep 
affection which Greeks have for New Zealanders. Several times, to his embarrassment, he was told: 
“We love you New Zealanders. To us you are almost like Gods.”146  Civilian assistance given to his 
fellow countrymen, and the price they paid was also mentioned.
147
   
 
In contrast, the Dominion press reported Ted Aked was “admitting freely that he is biased in his 
opinion – he could see no good in the ELAS movement”.148 The viciousness of the fighting was 
recalled: “I would prefer anything I have experienced in this war to that type of civil war.”149  
Besides the earlier press comments in late 1944 by Bill Jordan, there was now Aked. Horror and 
condemnation of one group of Greeks came with exaltation of another. 
 
Jordan versus the C.P.N.Z. - Truth about Greece 
In early 1945, the C.P.N.Z. distributed a booklet called the Truth about Greece.”150 The following 
year, another appeared with the same title.  It was written by Bill Jordan.
151
 Unsurprisingly, the two 
publications took contradictory viewpoints. The C.P.N.Z. supported E.A.M./E.L.A.S.  Jordan 
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argued that E.L.A.S. had done little fighting against the invader.
152
 Zervas had his support – “one of 
the greatest of the heroes”.153   It was not Greeks as a people or their politicking trait that were the 
problem. They had been “deceived by the red swindle” to join E.A.M./E.L.A.S.154   He also did not 
support King George II, thereby siding with the Republicans.
155
 He had introduced a degree of 
complexity with this last point. Jordan dedicated the book to the state-marginalised Hubbard.
156
   
 
The C.P.N.Z. also differed from Jordan in that they took a wider view. Included was the Greek 
Brigade. The Mountain Brigade, which was trained by and fought alongside New Zealanders at 
Rimini, is presented as being of the extreme right. Its commander, Tsakalotos, was willing to fight 
E.L.A.S. to the death and found it difficult to prevent his own troops shooting E.L.AS. prisoners. 
Some New Zealand Police tried unsuccessfully to pursue prosecuting the New Zealand communists 
over the booklet using a technicality.
157
  
Figure 6.3 Two publications with the same title but vastly different views. On the left is S.O.E. operative Bill Jordan's 
booklet. On the right is one brought out by the New Zealand Communist Party. They appeared in consecutive years. 
 
 
Jordan continued his polemic in the years to come.
158
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From his first publication and press interviews, Jordan was obviously engaged with the politics of 
Greece, whilst in public, the New Zealand national leadership was silent. The forthcoming official 
war history project about S.O.E. stripped them out. So did another arm of the nation state. It even 
went so far as to blatantly erase the fact that New Zealand and Greece had fought together in 1941. 
 
Army Education  
The New Zealand Army Education Welfare Service (A.E.W.S.) had by early March 1945 included 
Greece in the content of its regular, but restricted, Bulletin.
159
 The aim of the A.E.W.S, as one 
scholarly article has noted, was to explore, amongst other things, ”questions of social conflict and 
social change.”160 It did so, but with a limited vista when it came to Greece. 
 
In its concluding section on the Mediterranean land, “Points for your introductory Talk and 
Discussion”, it argues “Not many New Zealanders know much of ancient Greece and the debt we 
owe to that remarkable civilization, fewer still know anything about the Greek nation of today. 
[sic]”161 It was a remarkable statement given at least the publicized food shipment, expressions of 
gratitude and at least in the New Zealand press, stories about domestic protests over British actions 
during the Dekemvriana. What is more, nowhere is there mention of the well-known and direct 
New Zealand involvement with Greece i.e. the 1941 expedition and Crete.  
 
The above was against a detailed treatment of the immediate political situation, and its historical 
antecedents.
162
 In contrast to the silence over New Zealand's role, discussion starters were 
provocative.  They included the role of Britain (including quotes from leading British politicians 
from the left, as well as others supporting British actions and an allusion to the percentages 
agreement), and the left coup d'état versus imposition of a right- wing dictatorship arguments.
163
 In 
its discussion of the last point, it argues:  “Obviously, both cannot be right. Is it equally unlikely 
that one is right and the other wrong? Would the truth lie midway between the two?”164 In contrast 
to the public and semi-public statements by Fraser and Freyberg, this educational exercise was not 
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aimed at producing a singular and palatable view/memory about Greece. Its final emphasis on 
discussion and debate showed it was more supportive of the notion of history with its complexity. 
But it was an exercise with New Zealand omitted from the contentious area. 
 
Stephen Weir - One Stage of Separation  
While the above concerns public exposure of divisions over Greece, during 1945, there was also a 
continued direct New Zealand involvement.  Although absent from the public eye, Stephen Weir, 
who had temporarily commanded the New Zealand Division and Greek Brigade at Rimini, like 
Aked, ended up in Greece. Unlike the latter, this was not by design
165
 but through fast demands 
caused by the post-Dekemvriana situation.  In November 1944, he went to command 46 British 
Army Division 
166
 which ended up in Greece in early January.  He wrote to a family member that he 
“arrived to take part in the latter stages of the civil war here. Didn’t do much fighting… but had one 
or two small battles of a particularly vicious and dirty nature.”167  The New Zealander had a 
considerable responsibility: “I was given a sizable portion of Greece to clean up of bandits and 
rebels and to assist in installing the civil administration and internal security troops as well as the 
disarming and surrender of a few rebel divisions.”168 Weir’s command encountered both new and 
familiar government forces. The National Guard was the new one. It, as one of Weir’s unit’s reports 
said, had been “carrying out searches, arresting anyone with left-wing tendencies, and generally 
purging the area of communist activities.”169 The Greek force had a “strong pro-Royalist” bent170 
and had been carrying out indiscriminate arrests. The report also included the Greek Brigade, which 
had complained to Weir’s command that E.L.A.S. was “giving Communist salute, making rude 
signs, passing comments and singing songs unpopular with 3 Greek Mountain Brigade.”171 Unlike 
Aked and the S.O.E. officers, Weir’s situation was never brought up during the war history 
research. If it had, the response would probably have been the same as for Aked – exclusion from 
the scope of published official narrative.  
 
There is no archival evidence that Weir communicated any of his own feelings and direct 
involvement in the fighting to New Zealand officials or Freyberg. A search of archives in the 
United Kingdom did not throw up any comment from him to British authorities. It is of interest to 
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note that Harold MacMillan, one of the key British diplomatic figures involved with Greece, met a 
“[Norman] Weir” whom he describes as a “bluff and efficient-looking New Zealander”172 He 
probably meant Stephen (there was a Norman in the 2NZEF but he does not appear to have been in 
Greece during this period).
173
 
 
 
REMAINDER OF THE DECADE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE – ENGAGEMENT AND 
NEUTRALITY    
For the remainder of the 1940s, long after the 2NZEF returned home to New Zealand, there 
appeared memoirs and novels of veterans that dealt with fractious Greece. In this period civil war 
erupted again in 1946 and ended in 1949, the same year the Dominion’s Labour government lost 
power after 13 years in office. 
 
Both Dan Davin and C.W. Wheeler shared varying degrees of official endorsement for their work. 
The former was the credited historian of Crete; the latter’s memoirs had an introduction by 
Government Minister for Rehabilitation, C.F. Skinner. He considered the work a worthy addition to 
the growing corpus of veterans’ memoirs and predicted it would be received positively by those: 
“proud of the Second Division's achievements and appreciative of a story well told.”174  
 
But both Davin and Wheeler wrote critically of the wartime Greek government. The former did this 
via his 1947 novel For the Rest of their Lives
175
. His characters allude to the affinity of King 
George II of Greece with Metaxists and ongoing predation on Greeks outside of Axis-occupied 
territories - "Don't you know? The Ministry of the Interior brought its Secret Police along when it 
left Greece. Now they get anyone they don't like or who doesn't like them sent off to India on one 
pretext or another."
176
 According to the private papers of Emmanuel Tsouderos, Greek Prime 
Minister at the time of Crete and one of the Royal escape party, that is exactly what happened.
177
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Wheeler focused on E.A.M./E.L.A.S: “The great majority of Greeks supported the movement, 
which provided one of our finest and most self-sacrificing allies."
178
 The Syntagma Square shooting 
was when a “great crowd of Greek men, women and children were slaughtered by rifles, machine-
guns and mortars, pouring out death amongst them for more than an hour."
179
 The circumstances 
behind Skinner’s endorsement of this book are not known, but it again shows the open divisiveness 
of attitudes towards Greece in New Zealand at the time. Davin shows that an individual actor in the 
state apparatus (like McClymont and his dismissal of the moral cause of the Greek expedition), can 
have a view differing from a work carrying their name. 
 
Mulgan’s Posthumous Work 
In the same year as Davin’s novel appeared, John Mulgan’s posthumous Report on Experience180 
was published. Mulgan’s work also mixes philosophy with war experience yet has been cited by 
academic historians.
181
 His respect for the suffering and fidelity of the Greek people supports the 
dominant memory of the Greek New Zealand connection: “The real heroes of the Greek war of 
resistance were the common people of the hills. It was on them, with their bitter, uncomplaining 
endurance, that the German terror broke. They produced no traitors.”182 The partisans were a 
different matter. Their fighting capability had seemingly evaporated. We “were puzzled and a little 
ashamed to find ourselves working with a resistance movement that never did any fighting. Some 
said angrily that all Greeks were cowards.  Others, that only Greeks of one political persuasion had 
any military value, that the rest took arms for political power and not to fight Germans. Myself, I 
doubt the truth of either thesis.”183 While civilian suffering was assertively stated, the value of the 
armed resistance was painted in tones of grey to dark dismissiveness.
184
 The former naturally 
supported the memory constructs of the relationship. More thoughtful than previous New Zealand 
critics quoted earlier, he saw not only terror but also a fundamental absence of socio-economic 
planning for post-war Greece.  The Party [Communist] controlled through fear: “Two men in every 
village who are prepared to kill can hold the village. One political adviser beside every officer 
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keeps the army in order.”185 Its continually changing slogans reflected an opportunist bent: “the 
Communism we knew in Greece never had any real programme.”186  Although in Report on 
Experience Mulgan wrote at some length about the question of communists and socialist revolution 
– possible, planned or hypothetical – he did not deal with the issue of collaborators. 
 
His own return to Athens in January 1945 also led him to witness some of the government excesses, 
as archives now show. In late January 1945 he told his commander that the Greek 
Anagnostopoulos, a member of the S.O.E. Headsman mission had escaped E.L.A.S. imprisonment 
only to be “picked up by a roving band of E.P. [Greek Government’s Civil Guard] and shot.”187   
Just as Weir’s command had found, the government forces were not immune from terror-like 
activities. 
 
Uren and Neutrality 
What one study called New Zealand’s “earliest published war novel”188 appeared in 1945.  This was 
They will arise: an epic of Greece under the Axis, by Martyn Uren. Uren’s book is concerned with 
partisan warfare in occupied Greece. Its content has been deliberately cleansed of the intricate 
internal Greek politics: “Nowhere in the story have I taken cognizance of the complicated political 
situation that has simmered in that country for many decades. That this strong feeling should have 
been set aside in the darker hours of Axis tyranny so as to present a strong united front to the forces 
of oppression, is in itself a tribute to the national spirit of Greece.”189 It is both recognition of the 
extreme politics evident and also a denial of history. A “strong united front” did not exist – only 
civil war and undercurrents that would continue for years to come.
190
 Britain is treated as an umpire 
with no ulterior motive. In these aspects, the novel closely resembled the line of the New Zealand 
Army Education Service – avoidance. But it was so obvious as to be comical. While the above 
shows divisions in New Zealand society, its government was united in its pursuit of certain 
outcomes for Greece.  
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NATION STATE – REALITY AND MEMORY BUILDING PROJECT DURING THE 1940s 
GREEK CRISIS 
Earlier chapters have looked at post-war commemorative efforts covering several decades. The 
following is concerned with the attitudes and actions of the New Zealand elite during the remainder 
of the 1940s. This period is when the New Zealand nation state was still led by the wartime 
government and the sizable project it was funding was gaining momentum. It was also the years 
when there were more turbulent times of civil unrest and the third round of the Civil War. That the 
Axis had been defeated meant that exigencies of world-wide total war had disappeared. On another 
level, it was compounded by Dominion membership of the United Nations while still being a 
member of the Commonwealth, one soon to be led by the Labour Party in Britain. 
 
General Backdrop 
Press coverage and reports from London depicted the ongoing Greek trauma. On 6 December 1945, 
a year following the shootings in Syntagma Square, the Evening Post wrote of an E.A.M. delegation 
visiting London to make representations to “meet with officials and inform British public opinion” 
about the continued presence in the government forces and army of “reactionary elements” and their 
involvement with “monarchist terrorism”.191 That regime was, on about the first anniversary of 
Fraser’s mutiny clemency (July 1945), still holding “3,000 to 4,000 Greek army and navy personnel 
in camps in the Middle East, of only which only a small proportion are mutineers.”192  
 
While the delegation depicted E.A.M./E.L.A.S. and their associated supporters as victims, other 
stories tagged them as predators. The British Trade Union Congress that visited Greece had seen 
bodies and “heard ‘horrible stories’” about E.L.A.S. atrocities and hostage taking.193 It was a 
mixture that was seemingly grey with no black or white division. The New Zealand government 
was also receiving communications from London on the Greek situation. It was part of the ongoing 
British presence there. 
 
For the remainder of the decade Britain, and to a far lesser extent New Zealand, were interacting 
with successive domestic Greek administrations that academic historians have described as 
exhibiting “demoralisation of the state administration”194 and “divided and paralysed”195. It is no 
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surprise that Greece was moving along a path to open civil war. The interim period between 
Dekemvriana and the elections of early 1946 showed “The failure of the succession of governments 
in the aftermath of the December Uprising to effect even a modicum of reconciliation and their 
ability to control the lawlessness of the right-wing gangs roaming the countryside practically paved 
the way for another confrontation.”196 This was the Third Round of the Civil War. It began in 1946 
following the March elections. 
 
External intervention and aid in the form of military assistance and financial/economic provisioning 
continued under Britain. Eventually the U.S.A. ascended to a senior dominant role. The New 
Zealand public learnt through the press of “plotting” by monarchists197 and a “Prolonged Greek 
Crisis”.198 A reconstituted E.A.M. was still able to have its delegates circulate and make public 
protests in London.
199
Studies on the period at the time place the planned elections and plebiscite as 
key mechanisms by which there might be some reconciliation. The outcome of the elections (which 
the Left boycotted) meant “the resulting [rightist] government could therefore maintain, with full 
authority, that they were Greece’s legitimate rulers.”200 
 
The New Zealand public read of the intended elections and the ostensible aim of resolving 
outstanding issues e.g. a “chance to reach stability”201 However the surrender of weapons by 
E.L.A.S. following the Varkiza Agreement of February that year meant that there had been “a 
subsequent right wing revolution”.202 Threaded through this was the involvement of the “Big 
Three” (Britain, Soviet Union and the U.S.A).203 They were going to ”draft a new provisional map 
of Europe”204 Greece was a country still in convulsions. 
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Question of Intervention 
On 14 August 1945, the Blackball District Coal Miners’ Union sent a letter to Peter Fraser. It read: 
“The late British government intervention in the political and domestic life of the Greek people was, 
to my Union very distasteful, and a complete refutation of all the promises made to a gallant 
people.”205 Fraser sent an extensive reply on 7 September. He informed the union that “I have 
already made clear to the United Kingdom my views on any intervention in the domestic affairs of 
the Greek people”.206 He placed faith in the electoral process that was in train and stated that his 
views were “in accord with those of the new British Government, and so I do not think it necessary 
to register any protest to the British government.”207 He did, however, say that New Zealand 
personnel would possibly participate in the planned Greek elections. It was, again, the month of 
planning for the Freyberg commemorative events, where he would speak of the political divisions 
of the Greek Left and Right.  But during the same month, Wellington was promoting the political 
cause of one Greek. It was hardly the stuff of neutrality. 
 
John Sofianopoulos and Disillusionment 
John Sofianopoulos, according to the Greek historian, Sfikas, was "An eminent liberal with leftist 
tendencies.”208 He carried none of the legacy of being associated with the pre-war Metaxas regime. 
The Greek gained the approval of the New Zealand delegation, including Fraser, when they met 
him at the San Francisco U.N.O. conference in early 1945.
209
  On September 11, the Greek wrote to 
Fraser. His introduction included both reference to the inter-nation relationship and a personal one: 
“close ties existing between our countries and personal friendship".210  Besides seeking support for 
post-war Greek territorial issues, the Greek argued that the "most critical political situation in 
Greece demands urgent formation of representative government comprising moderate elements of 
Left and Resistance Movements, which alone are capable of preventing serious developments in 
Greece and generally in the Balkans.”211 The Greek and his views had been reported in the New 
Zealand press earlier in July.
212
 Fraser responded to him in the affirmative. The reply also held a 
degree of warmth that this project has not seen in his diplomatic communications: “I was very glad 
to hear from you and can assure you that I would be very pleased to give whatever support I can for 
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the recognition to the just claims of Greece and to any measures that will promote the early 
establishment of a freely elected representative government in your country.”213 He said the same to 
his High Commission in London, who passed on the communication to the British authorities.
214
  
The war experience was apparent again: “I feel that New Zealand has a special obligation arising 
out of the ties of the present war [the Japanese surrender had not yet been signed]” to ensure 
democratic elections.
215
 
  
On 11 October Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, responded: “I do not place great confidence in 
Sofianopoulos”.216 Bevin included the issue of elections with his general lack of faith in Greek 
politicians. Fraser politely took the Briton to task. He was suspicious of the information being sent 
to him: “I still have some doubts as to the information received concerning Greece. This still 
appears to me to me to be weighted in favour of the right elements and against those of the left.”217 
The Greek still had his approval: “The message concerning Sofianopoulos does not reassure me in 
this regard.”218 He pointed out the contradiction in the reasoning given by Bevin in his dismissal of 
Sofianopoulos on the grounds of his voting pattern in international forums.
219
 The British 
elimination of John Sofianopoulos from Commonwealth support over the next few months was 
something Fraser never forgot.
220
 Years later, he believed the result was a polarised Greece: 
“Today, there is a reactionary despotic government in office in Athens operating often through 
gangs of cut-throats, while the alternative is a Communistic cut-throat horde ready to pounce on  
Greece and establish another and even more cruel and drastic dictatorship with the final crushing of 
any semblance of democracy.”221 The same assessment was made as a result of British behaviour at 
the 1946 International Labour Organisation (I.L.O.) conference.  Fraser told London, “It but 
increases the strong disappointment I feel over a number of decisions on Greek matters.”222 
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1946 Elections and the Plebiscite- A return to Democracy? 
New Zealand’s pursuit of democratic elections for Greece had included a tentative agreement to 
provide electoral observers. But on 10 January 1946, Fraser sent London the news that, as a result 
of the army’s “accelerated repatriation programme” and “prolonged delay” in setting the election 
dates, no New Zealand soldiers would take part in supervising the forthcoming Greek elections.
223
 
The decision had been made in December, seemingly emanating from Freyberg’s command but had 
not been transmitted to British authorities. Two months before, there had been a New Zealand 
commitment to the Greek Ambassador in London to provide personnel for the election process.
224
 
That communication had also included the caveat that suitable personnel would have to be 
available. 
 
But there were still New Zealand officers and soldiers in Greece and Crete when New Zealand 
declared it could not provide any personnel. Communications concerning the certificates (Chapter 
5), mentioned there being New Zealand members of the Allied Screening Commission who came 
via London months after the elections of March. There were also Searcher parties at work - groups 
of New Zealand army personnel trying to locate remains of missing comrades. It is a strong 
possibility that the elections would see violence in the streets. On the ground in Crete, New Zealand 
searcher parties avoided the election points: "As any kind of trouble was likely to occur, we all 
remained within bounds during the day."
225
  
 
Fraser expressed misgivings and another publicized protest from the still-active Sofianopoulos.
226
 In 
the lead-up to the voting day, London informed the Dominions of its intention to continue with a 
date in March 1946, “even though this might mean that EAM abstain”.227 Despite the Dekemvriana, 
a form of E.A.M. had survived and was still operating. Fraser had already been questioning the 
wisdom of pushing voting through when there was opposition to do so from the “left”, “large 
elements of the Right” and “Centre”.228 Rightist terror campaigns would prevent any genuine 
expression through the ballot box. He pressed again a few days later when he did not receive an 
answer.
229
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Sofianopoulos was also still evident in Greek affairs, telling Fraser of the “farcical Greek 
elections”.230 The acute political situation was punctuated by emotive expressions of the wartime 
connection: “[I] assure you, Greece, myself, will never forget our debt to you.”231 They could be 
seen as reflections of the stencilled words on the 1944 New Zealand food shipment and public 
expressions by the New Zealand leadership. Again, New Zealand showed an interest by forwarding 
to London Sofianopoulos’ request with a supporting note. The elections showed Dominion interest 
in establishing a democratically elected Greece, but perhaps at no direct risk to its troops. It all 
happened under the domination of Britain over the Dominions in directing policy and action. A 
choice had been made in terms of the former. The latter, it thought, was inescapable. While there is 
no overt evidence as such, it is highly likely that without Sofianopoulos and a British labour 
government pursuing a particular line, Fraser was forced to discard his long championing of free 
elections and, elimination of the monarchy (perhaps even without the Greeks themselves having the 
final say via the plebiscite). 
 
The elections took place in March 1946 without E.A.M. and the K.K.E. participating. The New 
Zealand press had reported on E.A.M.’s argument about “rightist terrorist organizations” during the 
previous month.
232
 It was one of several demands that included purging of collaborators from armed 
forces and police, amnesty of “resistance fighters” and a “formation of a democratic government 
with large EAM representation.”233 A demand that the electoral registers also be purged would 
resonate in Wellington in the future. The atmosphere that Fraser and Sofianopoulos were discussing 
was also evident in official communications. In the month prior to the elections Wellington was told 
by London that the port of Kalamata, where most of the New Zealand prisoners of war were taken 
in April 1941, had experienced some of the extreme rightist activity. Several Communists who had 
been in a cafe were attacked, “presumably by Right Wing elements.”234 The situation worsened. 
The following day, 1,000 supporters of the ultra-right wing ‘X’ organisation appeared. Some armed 
men gained control of gendarme buildings, released their comrades, took 150 of “their political 
opponents”, and left.235 Later, 14 of the hostages were found dead, but the rest were released.  
 
Indeed, the right was victorious at the polls.  Prior to the elections and for years afterwards, the New 
Zealand government was suspicious about their validity - undoubtedly fuelled in part by the plea by 
Sofianopoulos. Future misgivings will be discussed later. They are in the context of possibly having 
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to defend what they thought was an unsavoury regime with New Zealand troops. In public 
expressions, despite what was going on in Europe, members of the national leadership were still 
speaking of a bond forged in war. At an August 1946 reception provided by the Wellington Greek 
community, Freyberg stated: “In our long war association with the Greek army and the Greek 
people, there has also been a bond of affection and understanding.”236 A lack of common language 
and great distance led him to add: “It is a touching bond - one hard to explain”.237 The Dominion 
reported another reception few months later. At this one, Fraser was presented with a gift “from a 
group in Athens who sheltered New Zealand soldiers and helped them escape from the enemy.”238 It 
was a hand woven carpet made by “young girls” and “worked into the design was a portrait of 
Mister Fraser.”239 It had been brought from Greece by returning members of the Allied Screening 
Commission. The case of Jack Stuart (mentioned in a previous chapter), who was the Averoff 
prisoner who was executed by Italians, also appears. The group who had originally hidden him had 
sent the gift. They had also refused any compensation. Fraser’s appreciation was, naturally, placed 
in the context of a form of memory of the past and future. He had been told of the showering of 
gifts when troops arrived in 1941. This, and the risks taken protecting New Zealand soldiers, “was 
an imperishable story that would live in the Dominion’s history.”240 
 
Just four days before the Freyberg-inspired commemorative episode on Crete, the Dominion had 
carried another story. It concerned the figure that had been catapulted into official memory – King 
George II of the Hellene - and the plebiscite.  There were doubts the plebiscite would be conducted 
under “fairly satisfactory conditions”.241 Implicitly, the new right-wing government led to its end of 
the political spectrum being promoted: “incidental excesses from widely tolerated Right Wing 
organisations”.242 But this was in the densely populated areas. In the more remote parts, it was both 
the Left and Right “roving the mountains and using persuasion and terror.”243  
 
Plebiscite 
The plebiscite concerning the monarchy also took place without New Zealand involvement. On 24 
May 1946, five years after the Battle for Crete had telescoped the monarchy into New Zealand 
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consciousness and official memory, Wellington told London that there was “doubt we can supply 
suitable personnel and would therefore prefer that New Zealand observers should not take part.”244 
 
London had in fact been sceptical about whether the two Pacific Dominions would be contributing 
anything. New Zealand and Australia were invited to contribute observers as a “tactical move”.245 
This was in response to Fraser’s “interest in Greek affairs, and his complaint that New Zealand was 
not sufficiently consulted.”246 As for the Australians, it was “Dr. Evatt’s intrigue with the Greeks“ 
(exact details not included).
247
 It is clear that the revision of the electoral roles was just as important 
as the actual process of recording votes.
248
 This had also been the case with the general election.  
 
The question of electoral validity would be a major factor in a critical phase of New Zealand’s 
response to the Greek Civil War. Before then, there were several publicly known incidents that 
stemmed from the experience of the war, threaded into the third round of the civil war that broke 
out late in the same year of the elections and plebiscite. 
 
ECHOES FROM THE PAST 
In 1947, the New Zealand public read about two cases that did not involve memoirs or novels but 
would highlight the meshing of the new Greek political circumstances with the Second World War. 
One was marginalized by the nation state, the other had their involvement. 
 
Missing Soldiers 
While the searcher parties were seeking out remains of dead soldiers, New Zealand heard of two 
living ones who had been found in circumstances reflective of the current internal Greek situation. 
They learnt it from Colonel Alex Sheppard, an Australian member of the British Economic Mission 
in post-war Greece.  Sheppard eventually became an outspoken critic of British policy and the 
Greek governments Britain supported.
249
 In December 1947, on his way home, he announced in 
Auckland that there were two New Zealand soldiers fighting with the Greek Communist forces. 
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They had been left behind after the exit of 1941, married Greek women, and were now platoon 
leaders. Sheppard said “I have spoken to one of them”250 but would not reveal their names. If the 
reports were true, then New Zealanders were actively engaged in fighting the government. The 
official response was that the men were either “missing” or eventually classified as “presumed 
dead”.251 The State, in one regard, was still disengaging itself from Greek politics in public areas. 
There was no condemnation and apparently no investigation into the allegation. New Zealanders 
engaged in direct involvement were persona non grata. However, it was a different matter when it 
came to supporting New Zealand soldiers who were attempting to assist Greeks condemned by the 
Greek State as rebels or “bandits” as the communists were now referred to. What is more, it 
happened on Crete. 
 
Case of Tsamandakis and Ledaki 
It is probably inevitable that there would be some Cretan/Greek civilians who had helped New 
Zealand soldiers evade capture and/or survive and who would be subjected to the impositions of the 
right wing Greek governments, this being due at least to statistical probability just as much as to 
any ideological leaning. In 1948, news of a lethal situation reached returned veterans, who then 
approached the Wellington via their local Returned Services Association branch.  
 
The October issue of the RSA Review reported the fate of two Cretans (although it called them 
Greeks) who had assisted New Zealand soldiers during the war. The two - Mitso Ledaki and 
Panayioty Tsamandakis - had separately been caught up in an “anti-Communist net”.252 The one-
armed Ledaki was executed. Tsamandakis had his sentence reduced to imprisonment. 
253
 The two 
had been the subject of an appeal made by several returned veterans. Wellington responded to their 
request and contacted the British Foreign Office, who in turn approached the Greek authorities. The 
R.S.A. was very cautious when it told its readers about the plea: “Lest there should be any 
misunderstanding, let it be said that the Kiwis who moved the RSA to intercede on behalf of Ledaki 
had no desire to support communism – any more than had the association branches and 
headquarters which took part in the representations to the Greek Government.”254  Surviving family 
members of both appeared in the 1991 New Zealand documentary In Rich Regard. None of the 
political aspects were mentioned. 
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251 “No Live NZ Men in Greece” Dominion, December 30, 1947. 
252 “Mitso Ledaki Executed, Kiwi's Evidence Reaches Greece Too Late,” NZRSA Review October (1948). 
253 EA1 688/90/9/2 Pt 2 (ANZ) Allied Nations Cooperation Polish Children Greece Recognition by Greeks New Zealanders.  
254 “Mitso Ledaki Executed,” NZRSA Review, October (1948). 
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Greek Expedition Redux?  
The possibility that New Zealand might be asked to once again provide military assistance to ward 
off an argued “threat” to Greece appeared again in 1947/1948, nearly seven years after the ill-fated 
expedition in early 1941. The situation was more complex. It involved the United Nations, 
Commonwealth, a Greek government beleaguered by a communist Provisional Democratic 
Government of Greece, formed in the mountains, the major powers and neighbouring Balkan 
countries. This time, the Dominion reacted in similar and dissimilar ways to their reaction in 1941. 
 
AFTER THE ELECTIONS OF 1946  
By the time of the 1946 elections, the New Zealand public had read how some member political 
parties of E.A.M. had left the organisation
255
 but also how the remaining body was a participant in 
the Greek political whirlpool.
256
 E.L.A.S had handed in its weapons.
257
  The K.K.E. eventually 
pursued a military avenue (for self-preservation and/or revolutionary purposes). The mountains 
were again were a haven for guerrillas.   The K.K.E. formed the Democratic Army of Greece 
(D.S.E.), basically now an openly communist army, but now ever increasingly referred to by 
London as “bandits”.258 This terminology seems lacking in the internal Wellington deliberations but 
was used by their long-standing diplomatic officer attached to the British Cabinet, Cecil Day.
259
 
Crete, although not the scene of the intense fighting on the mainland, was still involved. In March 
1948, he told Wellington that “to the great indignation of most Cretans”, the visiting son of the 
Republican hero Venizelos had his car “fired upon by bandits.”260 The comment about the majority 
of the Cretans being critical of such an occurrence naturally slants toward de-politicising the 
island’s population and thereby makes it more palatable for remembering and connectivity. 
 
New Zealand examines the Greek Players 
On Christmas Eve 1947, the D.S.E. had established its own mountain-based government. It was a 
second occurrence since the invasion of 1941. The first was the wartime E.A.M./E.L.A.S. “Free 
Greece” in the mountains. The possibility of formal recognition by foreign countries was raised, but 
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New Zealand had decided it would not be one of them.
261
 Neither was it supportive of the Athens 
administration. An internal report describes it thus: “in its internal policy exhibited features which 
are entirely repugnant to our conception of democracy.”262 The wartime link came into play: “New 
Zealand is regarded as having ties of sympathy with the Greek people in view of the common role 
played by both countries in the resistance to Fascism, but it is not so certain whether those ties can 
continue firm in the face of the more undesirable tendencies exhibited in the internal policy of the 
recent Greek Government.”263 Those characteristics from the global struggle also included “a 
number of officials who collaborated with the Germans”.264 Another echo from the occupation was 
Napoleon Zervas. According to London, he was showing a less than patriotic tendency in furthering 
his own private army: “Gendarmerie is being organized by General Zervas as a military force, 
which operates rather in competition than in co-operation with [the] Army.”265   
 
For the New Zealanders, the 1946 elections had been dubious.
266
 The Greek government’s claim of 
popular support was “not a very substantial one”.267 The massive absence from the election by the 
Left was also a contributing factor. That there was some external involvement from neighbouring 
countries was also not necessarily an indication of fairness as far as the Dominion was concerned. 
Fraser thought turmoil “was caused as much by the internal situation as by foreign intervention.”268 
That external involvement was not necessarily confined to the communist variety but also their 
opponents: “unfortunately both parties have their outside supporters.”269 
 
The above assessment illustrated at least that New Zealand was analyzing the Greek situation. It 
was a far cry from 1941 when the nations had first encountered each other. Now, the Dominion was 
consciously including the nature of the Greek regime in its deliberations.  It was also far more 
sophisticated and critical (of all the parties – Greeks, major powers and Balkan neighbours) than it 
had been during the Dekemvriana and the subsequent immediate period. 
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Amongst the Powerful and International Organisations 
The previously discussed grudging acceptance of British-led Commonwealth leadership in Greek 
affairs was still evident in internal deliberations. It was a continuation of a long-established 
predominant relationship, but now the U.N.O. also had a presence.  An internal New Zealand 
analysis dated 5 February 1948 examined the possibility that the Greek government might invoke 
United Nations Article 51 and request assistance. “It is this possibility which perhaps constitutes the 
crucial issue in the Greek situation for the United Kingdom, and indirectly, for New Zealand.”270  If 
a request were received it would be a valid one under international law. But the implication was that 
New Zealand would be supporting an Athens government it deplored.  
 
In the end, New Zealand never joined the Greek government and its supporters - Britain and the 
U.S.A. - in its war against the communist insurgents. It would appear that U.S. escalation of its 
involvement precluded Dominion participation. But the New Zealand and Greek armies would be 
together again in another war; this time in Korea. But they were never affiliated as they had been at 
their victory at Rimini. In fact, that episode was forgotten by the official history. Ian McGibbon like 
many before and after, took the 1941 battles as a reference point: "For this operation, it had on its 
left flank the Greek battalion - recalling another joint effort almost exactly ten years before when 
Greeks, British, New Zealanders, and Australians had stood together in Greece against invading 
Germans."
271
 There was no real military affinity in the present; it was one specific memory that 
counted. 
 
Past Associations 
Similarly while the general war situation had been referred to in internal government deliberations, 
New Zealand’s previous involvement in the politics of Anglo-Greek relations and internal Greek 
politics was absent. Fraser’s support for the mutineers, his protest telegram and the Wellington-
initiated approach to John Mulgan in January 1945 are absent. On an internal basis, at least, there 
had been an absence of the long-term history of Dominion involvement. The struggle against the 
invader had been touched upon briefly.  A stance more in tune with the major underpinnings that 
the State wanted to project was evident in the semi-public external diplomatic arena. At the 1946 
Peace Conference in Paris, the New Zealand representative spoke implicitly of the 1941 struggles – 
“our men fought at the side of the Greeks in Greece” when “Germany was at the height of her 
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271 Ian McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War Vol. 2 (Auckland Wellington, Oxford University Press in association with the 
Historical Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs: 1992), 96. 
 219 
 
power and our Allies not as numerous as they later became.”272 The humanitarian theme appeared 
again: “When the New Zealand soldier was cut off from his comrades, he was secure among the 
Greek people, who tended his wounds and concealed him from the Germans, and they fed him 
when they themselves were in direct need. The people of New Zealand cannot forget things like 
this.”273 Blended with such a speech were instructions given to the delegate by Wellington 
supporting the return of the Dodecanese to Greece, “providing that the consultation of the wishes of 
the population is in conformity with the result.”274    
 
There was, again, a clear pattern where in public arenas there was an appearance of non-
involvement in the factious Greek politics and a recall of the past desperate struggle and the 
humanity that was also part of it. But, as also illustrated, there was much New Zealand discussion 
about Greek politics. This went hand-in-hand with taking of positions. Through these years, the 
official war history project was gradually proceeding with its research and developing publications 
that were concerned with Greece. On-site research activities included the wearing of firearms. 
 
Greek New Zealanders 
Nothing from the Greek New Zealanders during the post-war years seriously challenged the New 
Zealand state drive to forget the involvement of the country in the controversies over Greek politics. 
There was a disturbance in the their Wellington centre in October 1952 that was in part caused by a 
public display of Stain’s photograph alongside that of Churchill and Roosevelt.  But the state’s 
police thought this was minor when put in overall context of different varieties of diasporic Greeks 
clashing through their particular cultural and social differences.
275
 The incident also highlights 
another state limitation on the relationship. There was no great influx of Greek immigrants from 
Greece or Crete i.e. those Greeks who were celebrated in memory. Previously mentioned limits on 
orphans flowed into the wider immigration policies. 
  
WRITING ABOUT THE PAST – OFFICIAL MEMORY 
In one way, the nation state’s history project was very conscious of conditions in Greece in 1945. 
New Zealand researchers met leading Greek personalities and, in one data-gathering exercise at 
least, they included measures to ensure their own personal safety in their activities. 
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Official War History Project -On Site in Greece  
That by April 1945 archivist Eric Halstead was quoted in the Auckland Star
276
 as having met the 
Secretary General of the Greek Communist Party George Siantos and General Sarafis, military 
leader of E.L.A.S., shows how radically things had changed since 1941. Although best endeavours 
have been unable to determine exactly when Halstead met these personalities, that it was reported 
amongst the press stories of ongoing Greek turmoil reinforces the drive of the New Zealand 
officialdom to forge a memory, even if it meant physically navigating through a violent world. 
Indeed, the reporting of these encounters was in the same piece where Aked had relayed his 
experiences of brutality and condemnation of E.L.A.S. The dual New Zealand involvement in 
politics went hand in hand with State efforts to gather data for what was to be a de-politicised 
history of their involvement. 
 
By September of that same year, the plans of an archives party, and also the official war artist, to 
travel through Greece and Crete included the following precautionary planning: “I have discussed 
the matter of political and road conditions with GS1 [British military], who report that a well-armed 
party of (say) five should be quite safe in the areas mentioned.”277 That this was written by Lang of 
the Allied Screening Commission mentioned in the previous chapter on, amongst other things, 
compensation and certificates. As well as the situation with the archives party, it also shows some 
of what his own unit’s work had to contend with. 
 
Just like Mentiplay in late 1944, the 1945 party visited 1941 evacuation sites. On 3 November, they 
visited Kalamata, which had been the scene of the greatest capture of New Zealand personnel. The 
expedition’s diary noted it was “a most successful day”.278 As shown earlier, the town was 
temporarily besieged in the New Year by extreme right wing forces. The expedition apparently did 
not encounter any problems except for tyre punctures on bad roads (of which there were plenty in 
Greece). While this was an attempt to gather one type of grist, in New Zealand the focus was on 
another. That enterprise was another type of struggle. 
Publications 
This section deals with the gestation of the official volume that was concerned with areas where the 
State had been pursuing some idealistic endeavours over Greece. This is Political and External 
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Affairs
279
 by Professor Fred Wood. It was published in 1958 and had a prolonged gestation. His 
work appeared 5 years after Crete and On Special Service, and one year before To Greece.  
 
Disregarding Elements Conducive to Positive Imagining 
In his introduction, Wood scoped the closing point of the study as “the end of the shooting”, that is, 
the signing of the documents of Japanese surrender
280
 in September 1945. Having said that, in the 
case of post-war Poland at least, New Zealand attitudes are examined up until 1947.
281
 This is in 
contrast to his treatment of Greece. It is clear from the previous sections that in the public arena and 
in government documents there was much material. The drive to foster Greek democracy after 
liberation would have also fit comfortably into Wood’s image of the national leader: “An appeal to 
moral principle never failed to move Peter Fraser.”282  The main concern relating to Greece was the 
catastrophes of early 1941. In addition to this there are several brief comments about Fraser’s 
dismissal of the Balkans as a theatre of operations in 1944 and no troops for the return to Greece.  
New Zealand was depicted as not being involved in Greek turmoil. 
 
Furthermore, Wood’s volume did include internal and age-old divisions that were affecting 
European former allies. Freyberg’s 2NZDIV was in the streets of Trieste in 1945 confronting Tito’s 
partisans as a result of “complex causes and character, and with highly explosive possibilities.”283 
Some of this argument could lend itself to the Greek situation, except for several key elements. One 
was that Greece had actually erupted into violence. Trieste saw New Zealanders as peace-keepers, 
whereas in civil-torn Greece they were participants in the fighting. The treatment shows 
exceptionalism toward Greece in historical treatment – but again it was of the censored variety. The 
restrictions and frustrations of the Wood project show that it was probably the politics that were at 
the heart of the restricted treatment. Official history was always subject to indirect control. In the 
writing of the volume on external affairs there were not so much soldiers who could be criticized 
for moulding their own history of individual battles they had participated in but politicians and 
functionaries whose world was more secretive by necessity and ongoing activities.  It was 
something Professor Wood made note of. He also interacted with the nation state’s champion, 
Howard Kippenberger. The relationship was stormy, as the following shows, but settled into 
amiability – formal titles were eventually replaced with “Fred” and “Kip”. 
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Frustration 
Both Kippenberger and Wood were frustrated with each other over the writing of the volume. What 
is apparent, though, in the dialogue is that the former general did not hold the same authority he had 
with the other narrators/authors. By December 1951, Kippenberger told Wood that he had to be 
“blunt” and demanded a synopsis and an estimated date for its completion.284 It was two years since 
the General Editor and champion of the nation-building exercise had asked for the same.  Wood 
replied he did not recall the earlier demand, provided some quantitative data (4,000 completed cards 
from his own research) and objected to what he saw as a demand for a premature synopsis or 
“window dressing”, which was “a departure from the proper course of historical research”.285  
 
The relationship was tested again when the professor hit a raw nerve in late 1953. Wood envisaged 
a complex treatment that went deeper than the concept of the nation's views being solely 
represented by the government that had led the country, namely, Fraser’s Labour Party. He wanted 
access to sources to discuss the National Party’s wartime record.286 Kippenberger declined and 
commented in a way that reflects upon the nature of history and historians vis-à-vis the national 
project: “This may not satisfy you as an historian, but it is an example of the Limitations of an 
Official Historian.”287  Kippenberger had, as discussed in previous chapters, envisaged a grand 
treatment of the S.O.E., including access to Barnes’ reports that contained highly explosive content 
and was aware of the testimony concerning the Greek 8 Battalion, but he would not condone 
anything that questioned the “nation” other than in terms of a degree of simplification that Wood 
would not entertain as a historian. In this, he veers towards the requirements of “memory” as 
against “history”.  
 
Wood’s extensive personal record keeping lacked Greek resources, as clearly shown by an 
exchange over the decision to go to Greece. Kippenberger relied on British sources, not the Greek 
variety. The evidence sought was about the final decision to send troops to Greece and whether the 
Greeks had been coerced into accepting a smaller number of Commonwealth troops than at first 
promised.
288
 This might lead one to the conclusion that the German invasion and catastrophe for the 
Greeks and New Zealanders had been unavoidable. Such a view detracted from the “moral cause” 
justification made by Fraser and dealt with earlier.  
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Kippenberger circulated Wood’s draft chapter to Freyberg and McClymont, who was working on 
the Greek campaign, and to the British Cabinet Office historical section. The British response 
included their view that the piece “over-emphasises the element of ‘pressure’ put on the Greeks.”289 
This point is explicitly made both in the introduction and within several pages of comments from 
the British official historian, Playfair. As such, it clearly shows the sensitivity of the issue. But also, 
the exclusion of the Greeks from the deliberations over the history is characteristic of the New 
Zealand attitude. 
 
Initially Wood openly vented his frustration at Kippenberger about the lack of access to primary 
material and about methodological issues (such as seeing what approaches other national history 
projects were undertaking) for his study.  Such access might have expanded his perspective on 
Greek affairs. It is perhaps not surprising that, when the volumes of wartime documents and 
communications were published, he told Kippenberger: “'As you know, I feel it is a goldmine of 
information, for which we all must be grateful to you and to the Government's decision [to publish 
them]”.290 This is given recognition in the Bibliography section of his finished 1958 volume. The 
same section brings into play the limitations placed on his work. It was “based on the confidential 
records of the New Zealand Government”291 and, that “these records are unpublished – save for the 
useful but necessarily limited selection included in the war History programme – and in the 
foreseeable future unpublishable.”292 This, together with a range of issues – “current business”, 
“affairs of other governments”, changing locations of documents, and overriding confidentiality - 
led to a decision that flew in the face of empirically based historiographical research and publishing. 
“In all these circumstances, it seemed inappropriate to burden the text with the complex symbols 
used in departmental filing systems, or in general to give detailed references to documents which 
remain inaccessible.”293  
 
The secrecy of government meant that there was a much tighter control on Wood’s project than on 
the more operational-related ones. The official attitude toward the political archives is in contrast to 
its attitude towards the army ones.
294
 . But there had been a decision to release the communications 
related to going to Greece in 1941. 
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Unlike Wood, my project has the benefit of currently available archives that show that the State had 
been genuinely supporting an attempt at democracy based upon the election process in post-
liberation Greece. Fraser’s protest telegram of 20 December 1944 and the support for 
Sofianopoulos’ attempts could be struts for such a view. Much of the New Zealand interest in a 
establishing democratic Greece could have been filtered and some indication, no matter how 
diluted, could have been published.  It never was.  So averse was the state in discussing any 
connectivity with the Greek turmoil that it sacrificed this in building its national imagining. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
New Zealand clearly had a more complex wartime interconnection with Greece that what is 
celebrated in official memory. The threads of regular post-Crete military interaction and diplomatic 
interest in a democratic Greece are at one end of a spectrum of obscurity. At the other end of the 
scale is the battle for Crete, its antecedent mainland expedition, and the assistance given to New 
Zealand soldiers and the recognition of their efforts by New Zealand.  Lying between is the story of 
special operatives in occupied Greece albeit having a short lifespan in the State official history 
efforts during the 1950s and reappearance on the periphery of public celebration decades later lies in 
contrast to the longevity of the memory of Crete.  
 
These general observations come with caveats, contradictions and inconsistencies. The elevation of 
Crete by the state was not immediate during the world war itself. When the Army Board brought out 
the Greek campaign interim history, it was before the Crete one. This was the reverse order of the 
later War History project – clearly reflecting Kippenberger’s drive. His editorial decisions assisted 
with the elevation of New Zealand using a number of mechanisms from application of methodology 
to censorship.  Fraser’s 1943 speech mentioned both the island and the mainland in equal measure, 
but humanitarian aid to the former did not attract any special elevation in the food ship distribution 
plan as per Brigadier King’s plan.  The initial discussions between the R.S.A. and the Government 
over a permanent utilitarian form of recognition initially included both Greece and Crete. Freyberg’s 
1945 visit to island was originally part of a mainland/island commemoration.  For the National 
Patriotic Fund, there was only “Greece”, and no distinctly separate Cretan entity. 
 
As the years following the war progressed, attitudes became more pronounced. Freyberg preferred 
Crete for any village adoption, and there were accusations that the island had missed out on relief 
supplies. In the minds of New Zealand’s diplomatic corps, the island and 1941 permeated their 
language. However, the emphasis on the island in commemoration was not always the result of New 
Zealand, it also came from the political leadership of Greece i.e. Mitsotakis.  The New Zealand state 
attended but its material investment in remembering was always historically directed toward its own 
citizens.   Even entreaties from Galatas Cretan officials during the 1940s for assistance with a 
monument had fallen on deaf ears. Dominion reticence led to embarrassment and internal disquiet 
when the Greeks who had suffered real hardship sought some tangible recognition corresponding to 
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the deeply emotional rhetoric provided by Freyberg and Fraser. J.V. Wilson’s suggestions for some 
calibration went nowhere. The symbolic food ship was the key pivot of material recognition and 
commemoration.  The reality was limits on aid (amount and existing contracted supply) as well as 
even concealing from the New Zealand public the source of the Allied Screening Commission’s 
funds for compensating Greeks. Similarly, lack of the National Patriotic Fund funding for the 
C.O.R.S.O. team was never an issue for resolution at the Government level – it was not a priority. 
The Fund’s preference for sending surplus P.O.W. parcels to Britain instead of Greece again shows 
state limitations.  
 
Dominion involvement in pursuing retribution for Greeks in post-war war crimes investigations was 
genuine but impacted on by international legal and Commonwealth frameworks. But the number of 
cases is inconsistent with the far greater number of atrocities related in interrogation reports and 
published memoirs.  Thus, while there was pursuit of war crimes against Greeks, the New Zealand 
effort was not a concerted one.  
 
New Zealand never followed up on what exactly was happening with its soldiers on secret service 
with British forces. Showing another contradiction, it then sought to capture their martial 
achievements for its official narrative. It is an example of the adaptability of the State in acquiring 
or reconfiguring certain episodes for the elevation of the nation – just like the disaster of Crete. 
 
There is clearly a lack of correlation between the State elite with the wider community when it 
comes to some areas. In terms of humanitarian relief, individuals and groups were seeking 
exceptional treatment for Greece before Fraser’s public announcement about the special food ship in 
mid-1943. The results of the 1944 United Nations Week appeal illustrated that ordinary New 
Zealanders had placed Greece in a special category. This was in contrast to the policies of the 
National Patriotic Fund, which still pursued the homogeneous concept of the “nation”. By early 
1945, the R.S.A. was seeking some form of utilitarian commemorative action.  But it never gained 
any support. Most public and eruptive were the protests during the Dekemvriana. The government 
stayed quiet publicly and only made its official stance known when Churchill openly and 
erroneously stated that the Dominions were uncritical of British actions in Athens.  New Zealand 
citizens had not shifted the government, just has its entreaties over aid had not been heard.  Most 
pointedly, the New Zealand Greeks did not have any influence. The State gave no exceptionalism to 
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them over relief. Bill Jordan’s individual crusade over Hubbard’s death implicitly points to the lack 
of concern by Wellington and its army command. 
 
One senior State actor’s influence lies in contrast to this gap between the state and its citizens. . It 
took the figure of Freyberg rather than the general or diasporic population to shift government 
priorities at home over aid. Without him, there would arguably have been neither any ongoing 
military wartime connection nor exceptional aid effort in the form of the food ship. However, he 
never championed the Greek army in the official war history project. It is a clear disjoint.  
 
Just how specific this abstinence and contradiction is to New Zealand, as against other nation’s 
memory making, is a suitable candidate for a future project – for example, a comparative study with 
the Australian-Greek relationship. From the scholarly work cited in the Introduction, the accepted 
norms for a war memory-making of the State are applicable. A straightforward moral cause was 
used to justify the calamity of 1941. Positive national imagining had been achieved. Complexities 
such as commercial agreements and aid supplies, Commonwealth diplomacy and divisiveness 
amongst Greeks and also New Zealanders, had been ignored. But the extreme silence over support 
for establishing a genuine democracy and willingness to assertively face possible punitive British 
directions over recalcitrant soldiers in Italy sits outside what one would consider the established 
pattern of what one would expect from any state behaviour. These positive episodes were kept 
hidden rather than celebrated.  Arguably, publicly raising New Zealand interest in the internal 
makeup of Greek matters would be a catalyst for a dialogue of the previous convulsive years of civil 
war and dissent. That was something the State would want to avoid. It would open divisions within 
its citizenry as well as between it and them. The strength of the New Zealand-Greek bond in the 
strata of ordinary people is thus recognised obliquely by the national leadership, but outside of 
endorsed official memory. 
 
Taking a wider overview outside of this New Zealand case study, official memory-making of war 
requires moral simplicity and tales of martial prowess. Other national allies are relegated to an 
auxiliary role and complications of politics are omitted. This thesis shows what is left out as a result. 
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AAA1 Immediate Family Member of Housekeeping Supervisor at Beau Rivage Hotel, Alexandria. 
AAA2 Immediate Family member of Major Arthur Edmonds, Special Operations Executive. 
Dr Ian Frazer, co-author of On the Run. 
Mr John Irwin, Documentary Maker. Producer of In Rich Regard. 
Mr Keith Locke, Son of New Zealand left-wing activist and author Elsie Locke (Participant in 
Dekemvriana protests). 
Mr. Themis Marinos, Greek member of S.O.E. and participant in Gorgopotamos Operation, 1942. 
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